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DIASPORAS WITHIN A DIASPORA

Jews, Crypto-Jews and the World Maritime Empires (1540-1740)

BY

JONATHAN I. ISRAEL

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PREFACE

I have intended this volume to constitute a hopefully coherent thesis about the nature of Sephardi and *converso* social, religious and commercial networks over the course of two centuries (1540–1740). During that period, it seems to me, there existed certain highly specialized Jewish diasporas within the wider Jewish diaspora of a kind which had not really existed before and which ceased to exist—at least with anything like the important scope they attained in those two centuries—after around 1740. I have attempted to analyze the rise, functioning and decline of a unique system of global trade networks cemented by religious and family ties of an unusual kind which evolved in distinctly peculiar circumstances.

In terms of their genesis, the volume contains three different categories of essays. First and largest, are a set of ten completely new essays (the Introduction and nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 18). Secondly, there are a group of five heavily revised versions of pieces previously published or which are based on more than one essay which I have published previously (nos. 5, 6, 10, 16 and 17). Finally, there are a category of four pieces (nos. 11, 12, 14 and 15) which are lightly revised versions of essays previously published under slightly different titles.

For lively discussion over many years of the issues herein dealt with, and for many a helpful research tip or suggestion, I would like to thank Yosef Kaplan, Daniel Swetschinski, Edgar Samuel, David Katz, Eva Uchmany, Richard Popkin, Gérard Nahon, Nathan Wachtel, Charles Amiel, Franz Binder, Marcel Curiel, Anita Novinsky, and Odette Vlessing. For providing financial and institutional backing enabling me to organize my research over the years, I am, and will always remain, greatly indebted to University College London and to the Institute for Advanced Study, here at Princeton. Finally, for her support and help in every possible respect I would like to record my profound gratitude to, and appreciation of, my partner, Annette.

Princeton, New Jersey, 7 December 2001

INTRODUCTION

Western Sephardic Jewry fulfilled a highly distinctive, and perhaps unique, set of functions throughout the maritime, commercial and colonial expansion of Europe from 1492 down to the late eighteenth century. This was especially true in the case of the mid and southern Atlantic, the Caribbean and in western Europe's relations with Islamic North Africa and the Near East. Over large expanses of the globe, Sephardic Jews, and the crypto-Jews of Iberian background associated with them, contributed conspicuously, and in fundamental ways, to the growing dominance over international trade, shipping and finance of the leading commercial centres of the West and hence also of the six great seaborne empires of the age—the Venetian, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English and French. At the same time they suffered sporadic and sometimes severe persecution, expulsion, harassment and other kinds of pressure not only from the Inquisition in the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic empires, and parts of Italy, but also resulting from shifts and vacillations in state policy in the empires of Venice, France and, to an extent—as in Tangiers under English rule (1661–84) or Gibraltar, in 1713—even England. Indeed, throughout the early modern period this particular segment of the Jewish people can be said to have been simultaneously agents and victims of empire.

Its specific tendencies and forms, furthermore, show that the Sephardic role in European maritime expansion during the early modern age had little to do with any imagined age-old characteristics of Jews *qua* Jews, or possessing certain supposedly ingrained economic skills or attributes. It resulted rather from very specific, novel and complex sets of international circumstances forging a new, world-political context interacting on characteristic Jewish forms of community and social organisation. It is doubtless true that without the resilient ties of religion and family which invariably underpinned Jewish involvement in long-distance maritime trade in this period, it would almost certainly have been impossible to form the diasporas within a diaspora—the highly specialized trading networks, cutting across empires, oceans and cultural divides which form the subject of this book. But, equally, without the changed and more flexible

European and intercontinental context quite different from that prevailing before 1492, created by the rise of the Ottoman imperium and then the western world maritime empires, the Jews would arguably have been no more successful than anyone else in traversing the continents, oceans and cultural spheres.

The rise of the early modern maritime empires then produced a different set of effects among one part of the Jewish people—the western Sephardic and (associated) Portuguese *converso* diasporas—than it did among most of the Jews (Ashkenazic and Arabic-speaking) or among the other trade diasporas of Europe and the Near East. Admittedly, all the early modern trade diasporas, including all strands of the Jewish people, shared certain key features which explain how it was that these groups succeeded, where others did not, in establishing enduring commercial networks over vast sections of the globe. The heightened confidence, trust in trading partners of the same community, and the systematic reduction (and in some instances complete elimination) of transaction costs fully incurred by others, generated by a geographically widely scattered but religiously and culturally close-knit, international community possessing a distinctive language and communal institutions particular to itself was, of course, by no means peculiar to the Sephardim. It was equally a feature of the Armenian diaspora, of the Greeks outside Greece, and post-1685 Huguenots, as well as all sections of the Jewish people.[1] The Greeks as Ottoman subjects and still more the Armenians who though Christian, had over the centuries, developed an almost unique confidence and skill in travelling through, and conducting business in, Muslim lands, were no less adept than the Sephardim in bridging the gap between the Christian and Islamic worlds.[2] Huguenots, Greeks outside Greece and Armenians no less than Jews of all categories could boast forms of legal autonomy existing independently of any particular state as well as highly developed methods enforcing social discipline, and maintaining strict standards of business practice within their own community wherever members travelled and traded.

If, as is argued in this book, western Sephardim and crypto-Jews—in contrast to the rest of the Jewish people, the Armenians, Greeks outside Greece, and Huguenots—played an altogether unique role in the early modern age and if this unique role began with the decisions of the Ottoman Porte with regard to the Jewish exiles of 1492, it is not to be denied that precisely the same opportunity which led to the creation of this uniquely extended maritime trading diaspora within the wider Jewish diaspora was, initially at least, in its early formative stages, in the Ottoman context, afforded equally to the Armenians and Greeks. For, as Philip Curtin has observed, the restrictions placed in the sixteenth century by the Ottoman Porte on foreign traders, and especially west Europeans such as the Venetians, Genoese, French and later the English and Dutch, forced all the westerners to rely in their dealings in Ottoman lands on what he called 'cross-cultural brokers', that is on intermediaries with the language, business, diplomatic and legal skills necessary to handle transactions for them, in other words on the Greeks, Armenians and Jews.[3] It was not then Ottoman policy which placed the Sephardim in a unique position. Rather, it was, as we shall see, the particular impact of this general elevation of cross-cultural brokers in the Ottoman empire on commercial relations between Italy and the Near East which during the mid-sixteenth century, placed one section of Jewry in a specially privileged position which none of the other diasporas, including the rest of the Jewish people, could aspire to- at any rate not until the mid-eighteenth century.

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[1] Aghassian and Kevonian, 'Armenian Merchant network', 82–3; Kardasis, *Diaspora Merchants*, 81, 93.

[2] Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade*, 182, 197–8.

During the Middle Ages, circumstances had encouraged large sections of the Jewish people to concentrate on trade and finance, and enabled them to spread their trading networks over considerable areas such as England, the Low Countries, Germany, and eastern Europe where they were newcomers. But the Middle Ages also divided the Mediterranean world between Christendom and Islam, and the Jews into corresponding Ashkenazic and Arabic-speaking categories which (despite what once used to be thought) showed relatively little capacity to interact. It was only after the Christian reconquest of most of southern Spain in the thirteenth century when a large, formerly Arabic-speaking Jewish population began to develop the specific skills needed to operate on both sides of the religious frontier between Christendom and Islam, that one section of the Jewish people began to acquire the expertise needed by any major 'cross-cultural' trade diaspora in early modern times. After 1500, stimulated by Ottoman policy, this section of Jewry developed its capacity to bridge religions and cultures still further until it was equipped to handle a much wider field of operations than other Jews, or the Armenians, Greeks and Huguenots and, in particular, comprehensively penetrate the new world of trans-Atlantic and colonial trade. For none of the other early modern trade diasporas, however extensive, remarkable and important, ever managed to bridge the gulf between the all four of the main early modern religious spheres of Europe and the Near East—that is Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam, all six of the western maritime empires, and America North and South as well as the Old World. Ashkenazic Jewry traversed all religions but by no means all the maritime empires playing little or no part in those of Spain, Portugal, Venice, France England or the Dutch. The Armenians traversed all religions but not the Atlantic. The Huguenots traversed the Atlantic but not all religions or empires. Meanwhile, the Greeks outside Greece remained largely confined until the late eighteenth century to the Levant, the Balkans, Italy, Russia and the Black Sea. Only one particular sub-section of the Jewish people, the western Sephardi diaspora in combination with their forcibly converted (i.e. *converso*) relatives and associates in the hispanic world contrived for some two centuries to span in structurally crucial ways all the great religious blocs with exclusive claims (i.e. Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodoxy and Islam), all the continents, and all the western maritime empires.

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[3] Emmanuel, *Histoire des Israelites de Salonique*, 254–61; Paci, *'Scala' di Spalato*, pp. 33–5; Cooperman, 'Venetian Policy', 66–7; Veinstein, 'Communauté ottomane', pp. 785–7; Israel, *European Jewry*, pp. 27–8.

Although the impressive Sephardic contribution to European maritime expansion and colonization effectively began with the discovery of the Americas and with Portugal's initial exploratory efforts in coastal Africa and India in the late fifteenth century, it only assumed its mature form, extending also to the northern European maritime empires, from the end of the sixteenth century, and did not attain its fullest maturity until the second half of the seventeenth. At most, the Sephardi-crypto-Jewish world trade network remained at, or somewhere near, its fullest stage of development for a century and a half. In fact, after around 1750, western Sephardic Jewry's contribution to the functioning of the West's by now overwhelming preponderance over world trade-routes, resources and markets began, fairly rapidly, to disintegrate.

The western Sephardic diaspora orginated in medieval Spain and Portugal. By a century and a half after the Expulsion from Spain in

1492, Sephardic Jewish communities scattered across western Europe and recently if tentatively established in the New World, together with the residual crypto-Jewish networks in the Iberian Peninsula and Ibero-America, as well as elements of hispanicized Levantine and North African Jewry, had forged close and vigorous connections with the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Gulf, trans-Saharan Africa, the Atlantic Islands under Portugal and Spain, the Caribbean, Brazil, Spanish America and North America as well as, more tentatively, with India, China and Indonesia. In doing so they had created a startlingly new phenomenon in Jewish history. For theirs was a new type of Jewish commercial system which while showing some affinities with medieval Jewish patterns of trade and finance, differed in that it chiefly used maritime rather than overland routes and was principally based not on local markets and dealings in agricultural produce but rather on importing non-European products over long distances. Also in marked contrast to the Middle Ages, the Christian-Islamic divide now became a central axis of activity rather than, as in the past, a line of internal Jewish segregation while operating across the Protestant-Catholic divide also became a typical feature, at any rate after 1590.

The colonial commodities shipped to the commercial emporia of western Europe by Jews belonging to this culturally specific and economically highly specialized sub-diaspora included sugar, spices, silver and gold bullion, diamonds, pearls, hides, tobacco, cacao, silks and American dye-woods (especially Brazil wood and Campeche wood) besides numerous other luxury and exotic commodities ranging from Saharan ostridge feathers to indigo, cochineal, ginger and coffee. In addition, western Sephardi Jewry from the late sixteenth century onwards, played a major part in re-exporting Asian spices to the New World, as well as North African red coral to India—the latter in competition with the Armenians with the latter, typically, using the overland routes and the former, usually, the maritime routes—and exporting such European manufactures as linens, high-quality woollens and metal goods to all the other continents. These Sephardim, and those *conversos* with whom they formed trading partnerships, also played a not inconsiderable part, albeit eventually much less substantial than the big (Protestant and Catholic) slaving companies established by Dutch, English and French, in the transportation of African slaves to the Americas, and their sale to plantation, mine and *hacienda*-owners.

The new global context which evolved from the end of the fifteenth century onwards, and which enabled the western Sephardim to play their unique role in early modern times, came about essentially as the result of two dramatic new developments. First, there was the destruction of existing trade routes and systems across the Near East owing to the Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine empire and the establishment of Turkish hegemony in the Balkans and around the coasts of the Aegaean. Secondly, there was the discovery of the trans-oceanic routes by the Spaniards and Portuguese and the ensuing rapid conquest and colonization of the Spanish Caribbean, Mexico, Peru and Brazil. The rise of Ottoman power in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East combined with the rise of the American market soon overwhelmingly powered by New World sources of sugar and bullion gradually eliminated or drastically modified the trade routes of the past and generated new commercial patterns, placing a large premium on expertise and especially reliable channels of communication and trade which spectacularly traversed not just continents and oceans but also religious frontiers. To bridge the much greater distances which were now involved—political, cultural and religious as well as geographical—a range of new techniques were required which the old-established European Christian merchant elites, and also the majority of European and Near Eastern Jewry, largely lacked. Those who were in a position to develop the necessarily skills quickly and effectively had been schooled and conditioned by a particular set of harsh and unusual circumstances.

By 1400, the Jews of Germany, Italy and Provence had been squeezed by the hostility of the 'host' societies among which they lived into an extremely narrow range of economic functions, chiefly money-lending and petty trading. It is true that the largest European Jewish community, that of Spain, remained despite the onset of systematic Christian oppression also there from the 1390s, still generally more prosperous and favourably situated than the rest of European Jewry. But prior to 1492 Spain was neither a great maritime nation nor yet a major military power. Furthermore, most of Spain's international trade lay in the hands of the Genoese, Flemish and other Christian nations. The commerce of Spanish Jewry though diverse and wide-ranging was largely confined to the internal market in local products such as textiles, leather goods and grain. It was orientated inwards rather than outwards.

At the time of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, a considerable proportion of Spanish Jewry converted at least nominally to Christianity, thereby not only retaining their immovable property and valuables which those who remained faithful to their old religion largely lost, and gaining the right to remain in Spain but were also emancipated from the oppressive restrictions and pressures to which they had been subjected whilst living as Jews. Hence, as nominal Christians, they had much more freedom than before. Meanwhile, the bulk of those Jews who left Spain in 1492 migrated either to the Ottoman seaports or else to Portugal (where they were forcibly baptized in 1497) precisely the two other most decisively situated locations from which to respond to the new commercial opportunities and take part in the reshaping of the world's trade routes. Thus nearly all the Jews and crypto-Jews in the three key maritime and commercial cross-roads of the early sixteenth-century world who were in a position to participate in long-distance trade could do so in a new context of freedom, having been liberated from all the usual restraints besetting medieval European Jewry either by the Turks or else by more or less forced conversion in the Iberian Peninsula. Furthermore, despite the distances and contrasting conditions they had to negotiate, the Jews and crypto-Jews in all three of these key zones were of Iberian background, speech, and culture, and frequently linked by close social and family ties.

In the early sixteenth century while Portuguese crypto-Jews gained an important share in the burgeoning overseas commerce of Portugal, Spanish-speaking Jews, fanning out from Salonika, rapidly acquired a prominent and in certain respects dominant position in the internal trade of Greece and the Balkans. Where until around 1500, Venetians, Genoese and also Florentines continued to dominate the Balkan market, supplying high-quality woollens and other western products and buying up the raw silks, wool and hides, between 1500 and 1540 they rapidly lost their former hegemony over the internal distribution of western products within the Ottoman empire and the buying up of Morean silks and wool and other Greek, Balkan and Anatolian wools and raw materials. During those decades, the Venetians, Florentines and other Italians were progressively squeezed out of such regional trade emporia as Salonika, Belgrade, Sofia, Sarajevo, Edirne, Ankara, Bursa, and Patras as well as the Black Sea and Dalmatian ports. This happened despite the fact that the Italian commercial republics continued to provide most of the European manufactures consumed in the Ottoman empire, as well as ship out the spices transported overland via India from south-east Asia to Aleppo and Alexandria, together with the Persian raw silks, Anatolian mohair yarn, and Cypriot cotton and sugar exported to the west.

Moreover, this had relatively little to do with commercial skills, or competitiveness in an economic sense. General circumstances and Ottoman policy simply worked in favour of a particular group. The sultan forced the shipping of the Italian trading republics out of the Black Sea region and compelled westerners to pay higher tolls and customs than his own subjects in the inland Balkan and Anatolian commercial centres.[4] Hence, the sultan's administration, wishing to curtail the wide-ranging freedoms and privileges enjoyed for centuries by the Venetians, Genoese and other westerners, forged a trading context in which Turks, Balkan Christians, Armenians, Greeks and Romaniote Jews no less than the Sephardim theoretically found themselves in a favoured position. But the Sephardic Jews alone were in a position fully to take advantage of the new circumstances. Like the Romaniote Jews, Ashkenazim, and Turks they had the advantage of not being Christians; but in addition, as a result of their recent expulsion from Iberian and southern Italy, the Sephardim, unlike the Romaniotes and (Italian, Hungarian-Roumanian and Balkan) Ashkenazim possessed knowledge of western languages and writing, and continued to have connections with the maritime centres of the west. This clearly placed them in a unique position in the Jewish as well as in the Christian and Muslim worlds. While in some cases the Ottomans may have deliberately favoured the Jews in preference to anyone else as when Rhodes fell to the Turks, in 1523, and Cyprus, in 1571, and the Ottoman authorities almost immediately issued orders for the settlement of Jews on those islands as a way of diminishing Italian and western Christian commercial influence,[5] in general Sephardic pre-eminence in Balkan trade was simply a by-product of a broader context and set of circumstances.

Hence it proved to be the new arrivals from Spain, Portugal and southern Italy who were best placed to exploit the new circumstances. While the bulk of the Sephardic population in the Ottoman empire settled in the Greek lands and the littoral of Asia Minor, a few lesser Judeo-Spanish communities which took root to the north of the Greek lands attained considerable size and prosperity during the early sixteenth century. This rise of a new Sephardic trading trade network revolving not so much around around the Ottoman capital, Istanbul—which was by no means the largest Sephardic centre in the empire—but rather Salonika and the latter's numerous satellite communities in Greece and the Aegaean, and to a lesser extent in the Balkans proper, in turn attracted further Sephardic immigration from both the new Spanish-speaking congregations in Italy and directly from Portugal. The largely Sephardic and Italian Jewish population of Valona, on the Dalmatian coast, for example, increased by over five times during the first two decades of the sixteenth century, reaching around 2,000 by 1520,[6] a considerable proportion of these, consisting of ostensibly Christianized Jews escaping from the mass forced baptism in Portugal in 1497.

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[4] Ibid., 198.

[5] Levy, *Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, 11, 28; Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 123.

The gaining of ascendancy over the Balkan inland trade routes and emporia against the background of the rising power of the Ottomans at sea, as well as on land, placed the Jews in an entirely new position with respect to international—and especially international maritime—trade. Having been progressively marginalized throughout the later medieval centuries in western, central and southern Europe, they now for the first time for generations again became a vital link between east and west and, in particular, an indispensable link in trade relations between Italy and the Near East. By the 1540s, despite their unwillingness to admit to having suffered such a serious setback, not to mention aversion to the prospect of having to adapt to it, the Venetians as well as the Ferrarese, Florentines and the papal states had come to realize that if they wanted to preserve a major role in the Levant trade they had no choice but to learn to deal with and through the Sephardim of the Balkans, Greece and Aegaean.

Ragusa was apparently the first Christian state, albeit a client republic subject to the Ottomans, to accept this new economic reality and permit Sephardim to settle on its territory and trade from there on guaranteed and relatively advantageous terms.[7] Before long, republics and principalities on the Italian mainland flocked to emulate the Ragusan example. In 1538, the duke of Ferrara, perceiving that this might be a useful method of diverting some of the lucrative Levant traffic away from Venice, issued a charter permitting 'Levantine' and other Spanish and Portuguese-speaking Jews special rights of residence within his territory. In a sensational move, made only after much heart-searching and a long debate, the Venetian senate, prodded by the senatorial council for trade, the *Cinque Savii alla mercanzia*, reluctantly abandoned its traditional policy of excluding Jewish long-distance commerce from the city and permitted Sephardic merchants to settle there. Because, as the *Cinque savii* expressed it, 'the commerce of Upper and Lower Romania [i.e. of the whole Balkans] is being diverted from this city, being now principally in the hands of the Levantine Jews', the latter would now be permitted to establish themselves and practise their religion in the city.[8] Hard on the heels of the Venetians, Pope Paul III granted similar rights of domicile to 'Levantine' Jews in Ancona in 1547, expressly for the purpose of promoting the Levant trade, while, in 1551, the Grand Duke of Tuscany issued charters inviting Ottoman and other Jews equipped for commerce with the eastern Mediterranean to settle on his territory.[9] As early as 1552, there were over 100 Portuguese Jewish families residing in the papal port of Ancona besides 'Italian' and Spanish-speaking 'Levantine' Jews.[10]

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[6] Veinstein, 'Communauté ottomane', pp. 785–6.

[7] Krekic, 'Ebrei a Ragusa', pp. 839–40.

The early growth of the new Italian Sephardic communities was soon heavily disrupted, however, by the dramatic change in papal policy, followed in part by the other states, from the mid 1550s. Pope Paul IV, one of the chief architects of the Counter-Reformation, reasserting the theological priorities of the Holy See, shifted to an unrelentingly anti-Jewish and anti-*converso* stance.[11] For the moment, ideological concerns and the perceived need to enhance the power and jurisdiction of the Church outweighed all economic considerations however substantial. Supported by the king of Spain who also ruled Milan, Naples, Sicily and Sardinia, the Pope intervened, over a wide front, generally to diminish the influence of the Jews within Italian society both within and outside the Papal States and, not least, check the defection of Portuguese *conversos* from Christianity to

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[8] ASV CSM 1st ser. Vol. 137, fos. 135v–136 and vol. 143, fos. 20v–21; Israel, *European Jewry*, 37.

[9] Cassuto, *Gli ebrei a Firenze*, 89–90, 179; Cooperman, 'Venetian Policy', 73.

[10] Toaff, 'Nuova luce', 263–4.

[11] Ioly Zorattini, *Procesi*, 11–14; Israel, *European Jewry*, 14–18.


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SICILY (under Spain)
O T T O M A N E M P I R E
Sarajevo
Split (Spalato)
Dubrovnik
Valona
Corfu
Venetian Territorium
Sephardi Communities
F.D. 2002

Map 1. The Sephardi Communities in the Italian States

Judaism. During what for Italian Jewry was a difficult and extremely tense period, Sephardic settlement and economic activity was extensively affected not only in Rome and Ancona but also in Tuscany, Venice and other places. In Ancona, a considerable number of *Marrani*—baptized Portuguese and Spanish Jews who had defected from Christianity and reverted to Judaism in Italy—were arrested and tried by the Pope's Inquisitors in 1555–6, twenty-five being burned alive. Also in 1556, Pope Paul IV decreed that all Jews who had been born in Portugal were to be viewed by the ecclesiastical and secular authorities as *ipso facto* having been baptized (even when they denied it) and therefore as judaizing heretics.[12] Papal pressure on the duchy of Urbino secured the expulsion of the *Marrani* from there in 1558. Grand Duke Cosimo I of Tuscany, in return for papal concessions on other matters, took action against the Marrani as well as instituted a number of wider anti-Jewish measures in the 1560s. However, in Ferrara, the Este court remained for a long time impervious to this the new papal policy and Ferrara which then had one of the largest Jewish communities in Christian Europe, exceeding 1,000 souls, accommodated a particularly large number of *Marrani* living there under a safe-conduct for the 'nazione hebraica lusitana et spagnola', issued by Duke Ercole II in 1550, ironically enough on the model of the relevant clauses in the papal charter of 1547.[13] When the Pope angrily demanded that Duke Ercole expel the 'perfidious and abominable race of *Marrani*' from his territory, the duke refused citing the earlier papal formula. However, he had to make some concession to papal pressure for measures to repress Judaism and, in 1555, did put a stop to the printing of Jewish prayer books in Spanish or Portuguese.

Under this new pressure, the Ottoman Empire was more than ever the prime refuge and support of the exiles from Iberia. The economic and cultural development of the Spanish Jewish exiles in Ottoman lands, meanwhile, was both rapid and impressive. Theirs was a social and commercial system which combined new elements, especially as regards maritime and long-distance trade, and the bridging function of Ottoman Jewry between east and west, albeit accommodating more traditional tendencies, such as the extensive artisanal and textile skills of medieval Spanish Jewry. Especially in Salonika but also in Safed, in Galilee, a Jewish community which sucked in raw wool and silk materials from as far away as the Peloponnese, cloth-making, leather, silk-weaving and dyeing industries took root in the wake of the mass migration from Spain, reaching a peak of vigour and prosperity during the third quarter of the century. After that, the Jewish textile industries in the Ottoman empire—undermined in particular by textile imports from Italy and western Europe where techniques were increasingly more sophisticated and transport costs less—and, after 1600, the whole Ottoman Sephardic trading system as such, began a long, slow but inexorable decline.

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[12] Pullan, *Jews of Europe*, 68.

[13] Balletti, *Gli Ebrei e gli Estensi*, 220–1; Ioly Zorattini, *Procesi*, 32–3.

The success of the Spanish exiles in the Ottoman empire then was rapid but one followed by an early decadence which was increasingly obvious by the early seventeenth century. Meanwhile, in Portugal the success of the forcibly converted New Christians was slower but ultimately even greater and more enduring. Initially, the prospects of the *conversos* remaining in Portugal and the Portuguese enclaves in North Africa were far from promising. The bulk of the exiles who trekked from Spain into Portugal in 1492, had not only been forced to sell their houses and other immovable property at knock-down prices, but were frequently stripped of their money and jewellery by Spanish officials at the border.[14] If Portugal was already then embarking on her long career as a maritime and colonial power, for several decades very few of the recent immigrants from Spain had the wherewithal to participate in her burgeoning overseas trade. Moreover, during the early phases of the new Portuguese long-distance commerce, with Portugal emerging as the dominant European trading power in India, Indonesia, the Persian Gulf and West Africa and extending her grip over the coasts of Brazil, her overseas trade was nevertheless small in scale and highly centralised in character. For it was then largely confined to spices, jewels and Guinea gold, luxury goods of high value but little bulk which required few ships and fewer merchants. Consequently, those who participated in the traffic consisted of just a handful of front-rank merchants with very large capital resources, often Italian, Flemish or German.

Hence, at first, relatively few New Christian businessmen participated in any capacity, though these few prospered and found opportunities for others, especially since they needed reliable agents and factors to help them exploit the business opportunities their new Asian, African and Brazilian trade opened up for them in the wider European market. Preferring to employ their own relatives, and in the case of those who remained loyal to the old faith, fellow crypto-Jews, as their correspondents abroad, the originally small group of crypto-Jewish Lisbon New Christian businessmen engaged in colonial commerce amassed not only wealth and far-flung connections but created a whole new network of crypto-Jewish business agents to handle (in particular) their spice and jewel consignments to Italy, France, Germany and the Low Countries. Needing trusted, experienced agents adept at dealing internationally, in Antwerp, which was by far the pre-eminent entrepôt for Portuguese colonial goods in northern Europe, the central reservoir from which Portuguese pepper, spices and jewels perculated to France, England, Germany and the Baltic. From a tiny group of less than twenty persons in 1511, the Portuguese *converso* community of Anwerp grew by 1570 to represent a sizeable body of around 300 adults divided ideologically, the evidence indicates, into two (inwardly) sharply differentiated factions, some emphatically aligning with Christianity others consistently rumoured to be of crypto-Jewish orientation.

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[14] Marx, 'Expulsion', 93; Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos Cristãos Novos*, 22–3.

The most notable of these incipient high-level *Marrano* trade networks of the sixteenth century dealing in Portuguese colonial commodities which is definitely known to have been crypto-Jewish in allegiance was that headed by the Lisbon merchant Francisco Mendes who traded in both spices and Indian diamonds and whose brother, Diogo Mendes, founded a flourishing branch of the firmly firm in Antwerp.[15] In 1532, the latter, a leading retailer of Portuguese pepper in northern Europe, was tried by the legal authorities in Brabant in part for helping *conversos* who fled from Antwerp to revert openly to Judaism in Turkey by transferring their assets to Salonika. In 1537, Mendes' widow, Gracia Mendes, who later became known in the Near Eastern Jewish world under the name doña Gracia Nasi (c. 1510–1569), left Lisbon taking various family members and a considerable part of the family capital with her, and joined her brother-in-law in Antwerp. In 1545, she quit the Low Countries for Venice again taking much capital and an extensive entourage with her. She then exchanged Venice for Ferrara before finally abandoning Italy and Christendom altogether for the freedom and protection of Istanbul where she and her following threw off all pretence of Christian allegiance in 1553. Her nephew João Miques, followed not long after and similarly reverted to Judaism in Istanbul where he assumed the name Don Joseph Nasi. The latter whose business interests radiated out from Turkey to Italy, Antwerp, Poland and the Holy Land was to be a major figure in the political as well as commercial history of the Ottoman empire during the 1560s and 1570s when he enjoyed the favour of the Sultan Selim II (1566–1574) and was proclaimed 'duke of Naxos'.[16]

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[15] Kellenbenz, 'I Mendes', 144–45; Swetschinski, 'Tussen Middeleeuwen en Gouden Eeuw', 62–3.

Various other Antwerp agents and factors employed by the early Portuguese crypto-Jewish merchant princes, if less famous than Joseph Nasi, also in their way had remarkable and exotic careers. Felipe de Nis, for example, born around 1530 in Oporto, reportedly spent some twenty years on the tropical island of São Thomé and neighbouring places in West Africa before migrating to Antwerp around 1570 where he continued to attend Mass but was swayed by other crypto-Jews in Antwerp to lean inwardly towards Judaism. After some years there and in Cologne, he moved, in 1583 to Venice where he had himself circumcised and reverted, under the name Solomon Marcos, to normative Judaism; but on being found out, he was arrested and tried by the Venetian tribunal of the Holy Office, though in the end he was let off lightly being placed under perpetual surveillance and forbidden to leave Venice.[17]

From the 1550s and 1560s, however, the participation of the New Christians in Portugal's overseas trade entered a fresh phase. New circumstances encouraged a marked acceleration and intensification of involvement with many more opportunities for those with relatively little capital to invest. First and foremost among these changed conditions were the rise of the rapidly burgeoning Portuguese Atlantic sugar trade. Sugar was a semi-bulk commodity which required far more resources in terms of invested capital, organization, shipping, labour, brokerage, storage and processing facilities than did the trade in spices, jewels or gold. In the past most of Europe's sugar had been imported by the Venetians from Egypt and Cyprus. But Italian entrepreneurs had early on introduced its cultivation to Madeira and by the mid sixteenth century sugar cane began to be grown successfully on São Thomé which soon emerged as a major source of supply for the European market. Before long sugar production began also in Brazil where, from the 1560s, its cultivation began to spread rapidly. As a result there was a vigorous increase in the numbers of Portuguese emigrating to Brazil among them large numbers of *conversos* as well as, a connected rise in the numbers of Portuguese New Christians migrating to Antwerp.

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[16] Inalcik, *Economic and Social History*, i, 212–14.

[17] Pullan, *Jews of Europe*, 215–17, 223–4.

Sugar vastly enhanced the value of Brazil to Portugal and simultaneously increased the importance of the Portuguese seaborne empire to Antwerp, Livorno, Venice and European commerce as a whole. While a few Portuguese New Christians had already traded with Brazil, in particular importing Brazil wood, a dye-stuff highly prized by Europe's textile industries, in the early sixteenth century, it was unquestionably the rise of the Brazilian sugar, after 1560, which forged the crucial and enduring relationship between the Portuguese *conversos* and Brazil, generating a relatively large class of Portuguese New Christian merchants engaged in, and orientated towards, trans-Atlantic trade. At the same time, it was also the rise of the Brazilian sugar plantations which first gave rise to a large-scale trans-Atlantic traffic in black slaves. The growth in the Portuguese New Christian community at Antwerp, however, was halted by the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt in 1572 and ensuing decades of severe disruption in the Low Countries. Until then, Antwerp had overwhelmingly dominated the storage, processing and distribution of Portuguese colonial products in northern Europe and to an extent Antwerp continued to function as a major world entrepot at any rate down to the Spanish recapture of the city, after a long and bitter siege, in 1585. But from 1572 the constant insecurity and sporadic fighting around the great commercial metropolis inevitably affected its shipping, landward communications and trade.[18]

The escalating conflict in the Low Countries also had other consequences for the emerging Portuguese crypto-Jewish diaspora and the latter's relationship to the wider Jewish world. For it temporarily checked the previously rising stream of emigration to northern Europe, confirming Venice and Livorno as the main focus of crypto-Jewish resettlement in western Europe in the 1580s and 1590s. Eventually, though, it also encouraged a search for northern European alternatives to Antwerp with tiny numbers of Portuguese *conversos* migrating to London and, especially in the 1590s, to Hamburg and (from 1595) Amsterdam. Not only does the founding of the Portuguese Jewish community in Hamburg precede that of Amsterdam but it is clear that briefly, particularly in the early 1590s, Hamburg appeared to be better placed than either London or Amsterdam to retrieve what Antwerp had lost and secure the northern commerce in Portuguese sugar and spices.[19] Although, from the late 1590s, the great Elbe port was outstripped by Amsterdam both as a depot for colonial goods and as a Jewish centre, the Portuguese Jewish community which took root in Hamburg in the 1590s was to remain the most northerly of the main western Sephardic congregations throughout the period discussed in this book.

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[18] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 29–30.

The Dutch Revolt and the paralysis of Antwerp from 1585 thus acted as an agent of diffusion, spreading the incipient Portuguese Jewish business diaspora to various new locations in northern Europe. But other factors were even more important in driving this process of extension and enlargement. In particular, a factor typical of the late sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth, was the growing volume and diversity of the spice traffic handled by Atlantic trading powers, first only the Portuguese but then, from the 1590s, also the Dutch followed soon after by the English. Pepper from Indonesia and the Malabar coast, nutmeg, cloves and mace, began to be shipped in larger quantities than before, while cinnamon from Ceylon, a new item in the inventory, began to be shipped from Lisbon to other European destinations in significant amounts from around 1570. Also from around 1570, the revival of the Venetian spice trade began to lose momentum, followed at the end of the 1590s by the arrival of the Dutch in the Indonesian Spice Islands, an event which was rightly recognized as a catastrophe for them by the Italian trading powers, as well as by the Portuguese, leading before long to the undisputed the dominance of the European Atlantic seaboard in the marketing of spices (and other south Asian products) throughout Europe and the Mediterranean.[20] However, perhaps the single most important cause of the expansion and consolidation of the linked Portuguese crypto-Jewish and Jewish diasporas after 1580 was the political union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in that year and the resulting dramatic increase in Portuguese *converso* immigration into Spain and via Spain (and sometimes also via Brazil or Portuguese West Africa) into Spanish America.

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[19] Ibid., pp. 33–4,41–2; Kellenbenz, 'Pfeffermarkt um 1600', 33–6; Feilchenfeld, 'Anfang und Blüthezeit', pp. 200–1.

[20] Lane, *Venice and History*, 33–4; Veinstein, 'Commercial Relations', 101–2.

It was, indeed, in the 1580s that crypto-Judaism first deeply penetrated the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru and first became a considerable factor at the great Andean silver metropolis of Potosí as well as in the contraband traffic which began in the 1580s, linking Peru, via Tucumán and the River Plate with Buenos Aires and the Portuguese outposts in southern Brazil.[21] The Portuguese *conversos* in the Spanish New World specialised above all in long distance trade and retailing European textiles, and especially in circumventing the closely regulated and rigid framework of the official trans-Atlantic convoy system which was designed to restrict trade to officially approved routes, harbours, times and methods of shipping, so as to minimize the difficulty of exerting bureaucratic and fiscal control over vast distances with limited resources. Thus, the route to and from Potosí, via Tucumán and Buenos Aires, was in theory closed to commercial traffic, and was supposed to be used only by officials, soldiers, and clergy, and likewise, wholly or partly, were numerous other maritime and overland routes, as for example, between Peru and Central America, Peru and New Spain, Venezuela and New Spain and from Buenos Aires to Peru via Paraguay. In 1604, New Spain's maritime trade with Peru was restricted to two vessels per year, with a ban on carrying oriental fabrics on the outward run or bullion on their return; and in 1634 this traffic was prohibited altogether.[22] New Spain's trans-Pacific China trade, via Acapulco, on the Manila galleons to the Philippines was, from 1593 onwards, limited to only two vessels per year so as to prevent Chinese silk imports from Manila undercutting Spain's textile exports to Spanish America; later it was still more heavily restricted.[23] At the same time, the Spanish crown strictly prohibited commerce or contact of any sort with Portuguese, English, Dutch or other foreign ships cruising along the coasts of the Spanish Caribbean or Spanish American mainland. All this provided ample scope for contrabandists not a few of whom, from the 1580s onwards, were Portuguese New Christians.

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[21] Canabrava, *O Comercio português*, pp. 61–4, 87.

[22] Vitoria Baraona, *Relacion de los fundamentos*, fos. 1–2; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 100–2, 196–7.

[23] Ferriol, *En nombre del prior y consules*, fos. 3–7; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 75, 101.

By reason of the contraband systems they developed, and their willingness to engage in unauthorized trade, it would seem that the Portuguese *conversos*, some of whom were undoubtedly crypto-Jews, forged the earliest contacts between Spanish America and European countries other than Spain. The Dutch, for example, first began to trade with the Spanish colonies through Portuguese New Christian merchants in Puerto Rico, Cuba, Española and in such Venezuelan centres as Caracas, a town where, in 1606, out of forty-six resident foreigners, making up a sizeable proportion of the adult male white population, no less than forty-one were Portuguese, many doubtless *Cristianos nuevos* (New Christians), as the *conversos* were officially called.[24] However tenuously, the contraband route between Potosí and Buenos Aires, a port where many Portuguese New Christians settled in the years around 1600 linked up with the Portuguese in southern Brazil and ultimately with Lisbon. Not only did untaxed silver and other American products reach Brazil and eventually Portugal by this route but so, in reverse, did unregistered imports of textiles from Europe and slaves shipped by the Portuguese from West Africa via Brazil to Potosí and Peru.

From the 1590s onwards, Dutch ships began appearing regularly in the Caribbean, partly to fetch salt at the salt-pans of Punta de Araya off the coast of Venezuela but also to trade for hides, tobacco and bullion along the coasts of Venezuela, Española, Cuba and Puerto Rico.[25] According to a Dutch report of 1608, the 'hide trade' to the three large Spanish Caribbean islands employed by that date as many as twenty Dutch vessels yearly.[26] They carried prohibited linen, woollens, paper, metal goods and wines for the Spanish settlers and anchored for weeks in small groups in remote bays well away from the Spanish garrisons at Havana, Santo Domingo and San Juan. Despite a drastic attempt by the royal authorities in 1603 to eliminate contraband from north-west Española which involved sending soldiers to clear the cattle ranches from the area, the Bay of Gonaïves located in that part of the island nevertheless remained a favoured haunt of the Dutch and their agents also subsequently. In January 1605, no less than seven Dutch ships lay at anchor there.[27] Because of their religious and family ties with *conversos* who had returned to Judaism in Amsterdam, it may well be the case that it was especially those New Christians with crypto-Jewish tendencies who were eager to establish commercial ties with the Dutch, though this, admittedly, is pure speculation.

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[24] Sluiter, 'Dutch-Spanish Rivalry', 173; Vila Vilar, 'Extranjeros en Cartagena', 155–6; Israel, *Dutch primacy*, 62.

[25] Ibid., 62–6.

[26] Ibid., 184.

In any case, the chief successor of Antwerp as the northern entrepot for Ibero-American colonial products as well as the silks, mohairs, and other luxury goods of the Levant and North Africa was not Hamburg, London or Rouen but, overwhelmingly, Amsterdam. This was true in general terms and also with respect to the further evolution of the trans-Atlantic and trans-Mediterranean Jewish-*converso* trading diaspora. After a short interruption in the late 1580s during which the northern Netherlands provinces were closely besieged by Spanish troops and disrupted by fighting, from 1590, the Seven Provinces of the United Netherlands, thanks to the diversion of the main Spanish war effort into France, were rapidly cleared of Spanish garrisons and fortified by a formidable defensive ring of powerfully constructed town walls and strongholds. As the revolt consolidated, during the 1590s, there began an unprecedented expansion in Dutch shipping and commerce and, at the same time, Amsterdam emerged as a center for specialised industries and services—sugar-refining, diamond-cutting, tobacco-spinning and blending, maritime insurance, commodity brokerage, and much else—geared to the shipping, processing and distribution of colonial products. Without the acquisition of these specialised industries, it would have been impossible for Amsterdam permanently to supplant Antwerp as the primary northern European depot for colonial products.

When it became obvious, as it did by the late 1590s, that Amsterdam was becoming the principal northern entrepot for Iberian, Ibero-American and Levant commodities, the Spanish crown endeavoured to abort this—in Spanish eyes—highly pernicious development by imposing a general ban on Dutch ships, goods and merchants in the ports of Spain and Portugal as well (as was already prohibited) in those of Ibero-America. The objective was to strip the Amsterdam staple of the silver, spices, sugar, Portuguese salt, Indian diamonds, West African gold, high-quality wools, dye-stuffs, southern fruits and wines, tobacco, silks and other Levant goods with which the Dutch now supplied much of northern Europe. But this ambitious strategy failed catastrophically, since it prompted the Dutch to retaliate by sending out whole fleets of armed merchant vessels to obtain everything the Spanish king sought to deprive them of at source. From 1598–9, Dutch ships began appearing in greatly increased numbers in the Caribbean, West Africa, the Moluccas, and along both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South America.[28] By 1602, when the diverse Dutch private companies trading with the East Indies united under the auspices of the States General to establish what was then, and long remained, the world's largest joint-stock company, the VOC (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie—or United East India Company), Hollanders and Zeelanders had already succeeded in ousting the Portuguese from several of the Spice Islands, and much of the East India spice traffic, as well as from their previous hegemony in the Guinea gold trade.

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[27] Ibid., pp. 188–90; Gomes Solis, *Discursos*, 88.

Portuguese *converso* settlement in the northern Dutch provinces had been conspicuously sparse to begin with. During the 1570s and 1580s, it was far from clear that the Revolt could succeed or that the 'rebel' state would survive. From neither a political, social, religious or business point of view did it make much sense to establish their families and commercial activities in a tightly besieged, heavily disrupted and partly Protestantized region under the ban of Pope, Inquisition and that very monarch who ruled practically all of the Indies east and west which were then under Christian supremacy. The picture was dramatically transformed, though, with the receding of the Spanish pressure after 1590 and the extremely impressive growth achieved by Dutch commerce and shipping during the 1590s. From 1590, in contrast to the 1580s, Amsterdam became a secure and advantageous position from which to base viable and enduring trade connections with Portugal, Spain, the Mediterranean, and Ibero-America as well as the Mediterranean. Portuguese crypto-Jewish merchants, some with substantial means, mostly coming from Lisbon, Oporto or Antwerp, began to settle in Amsterdam from 1595 at the very moment—the shipping figures show—that Amsterdam took over from Hamburg the leading role in distributing pepper, spices and sugar across northern Europe.[29] By 1620, there were around 1,000 Portuguese-speaking Jews, many former New Christians including some who had not definitively reverted to normative Judaism, living in Amsterdam.

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[28] Pontanus, *Historische beschryvinghe*, 181, 267; Velius, *Chronyk van Hoorn*, 495, 505–6; Van Dam, *Beschryvinghe van de Oostindische Compagnie* I, 8; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 61–9.

In the first quarter century of the existence of the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community, down to 1620, an impressively wide-ranging maritime commercial web—which at the same time was a social, cultural and religious network—was created. In this period the most important links were with Portugal and (usually indirectly but sometimes directly) Brazil. Brazilian and São Thomé sugar provided the mainstay of their commercial activity. But Brazil wood, Indian diamonds and pepper, Ceylon cinnamon, Portuguese salt and fruit, Caribbean hides and bullion, 'Cracostoeback' (Caracas tobacco), Moluccan spices, and Guinea gold all regularly figured likewise in their dealings. The expansion in the economic activities of the Amsterdam Sephardim were particularly rapid during the so-called Twelve Years' Truce (1609–21) when a precarious interim peace between Spain and the Dutch was in force and—except in the Indies—Dutch ships, merchants and commodities were freely admitted to the ports of Spain, Portugal and the Mediterranean more generally.[30] In that period the Sephardic community in Holland handled the larger part of Dutch commerce with Portugal, Brazil, Madeira, and the Azores, established a leading role in the Dutch trade with Morocco,[31] and gained a significant foothold in the Dutch trade with the Caribbean, Spain and Italy.

This period of rapid expansion and prosperity came to an abrupt halt in 1621 however with the decision of the Spanish crown to re-impose its general ban on Dutch ships, merchants and goods. The new global prohibition took effect with the expiry of the Truce in April of that year.[32] From then until the Spanish royal ban on Dutch trade were finally lifted in June 1647, as one of the preliminaries to the final Spanish-Dutch peace signed at Münster, in 1648, all the ports of the Spanish empire—including those of southern Italy, Flanders and (until 1641) Portugal—were closed to Dutch vessels, including ships built in Holland and purchased by others. Equally, all Dutch or Dutch-purchased products whether shipped direct from Holland or indirectly via interim destinations such as England or France were prohibited. This meant that until the Portuguese Secession from the Spanish crown in 1640, Portuguese ports and the sugar trade with Brazil, the mainstay of the commerce of the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam, were officially closed to them as to all merchants resident in the United Provinces. Historians used to believe that this grand economic strategy was all resonance and no substance having very little practical effect. But research in Spanish, Dutch and Belgian archives has amply shown that this (still widely held view) is a mistaken one and that in fact the prohibition had an enduring and fundamental effect on maritime relations between the Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World throughout the period 1621–47, though it was indubitably less effectively enforced in Portugal (especially the small ports of northern Portugal such as Viana and Aveiro) than in Spain or the Flemish ports.[33] The embargo decrees were additionally reinforced, from 1624 by a new kind of Inquisition of commerce set up in the Spanish ports called the *Almirantazgo* as well as by the effective maritime raiding campaign waged against Dutch shipping by the Dunkirk and Basque privateers. Also effective for a time was the river blockade mounted during the years 1625–9 in the Low Countries around the Dutch defensive ring and in northwest Germany.[34]

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[29] Koen, 'Earliest Sources', 39–41; Fuks-Mansfeld, *Sefardim in Amsterdam*, 41–3.

[30] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 110–12.

[31] De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 17–18.

[32] Swetschisnki, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 112; Israel, 'A Conflict of Empires', pp. 11–16.

Many aspects of the Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese economies, and those of their colonial empires, were impinged upon by the Spanish ban on Dutch trade and shipping. At the same time, it is certain that no-one was more severely hampered by the measures than the Portuguese Jewish community in Holland and their network of *converso* correspondents in Lisbon, Oporto, Seville, Malaga,

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[33] Ibid., 16–29; Domínguez Ortiz, 'Guerra económica', pp. 71–110; Ródenas Vilar, ''Un gran proyecto anti-holandés', pp. 542–58; Rau, *Estudos*, 209; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 144–8, 204–10, 371–83; Schaub, *Portugal au temps du comte-duc*, 285–327; and P.T. Rooney, 'The Habsburg Government of Portugal in the Reign of Philip IV (1621–1640) (unpublished University of Keele Ph.d. thesis, 1988), pp. 140–1, 173.

[34] Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, pp. 217–223; Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, pp. 45–62.

Hamburg and Antwerp. Being more dependent on Iberian markets and the Iberian empires than other sections of the Dutch merchant community, the Sephardic Jews together with the ostensibly Christian *conversos* who had settled in Antwerp were indeed almost bound to be the most drastically affected.[35] Yet by no means all the effects were damaging or negative. For the embargoes, by severely impeding Dutch Sephardic Iberian contacts and trade, stimulated commerce with Morocco, a country which served in some measure as a substitute and with which Dutch Christian merchants plied only a rather restricted trade. A still more notable compensatory gain was the rise of Dutch Brazil. For after the Dutch West India Company captured Recife and adjoining areas from the Portuguese in 1630, the continuing depression in the indirect traffic via Portugal undoubtedly lent much added impetus and zeal—which would otherwise have been lacking—to the Dutch Jews' efforts to help colonize and develop that bitterly contested sugar plantation colony.

Nevertheless, the overall impact of the embargoes on the Atlantic system of western Sephardic Jewry should by no means be underestimated, especially as regards the 1620s and 1630s when the Spanish crown succeeded in shutting down a large part of Dutch Sephardic trade with Portugal and Brazil as well as Spain. The sustained contraction and diminution of the business dealings and status of the Dutch Sephardim during the twenty years between 1621 and 1641 is plainly reflected in the dramatic decline of their financial profile. The number of Sephardic—there were not yet then any Ashkenazic—bank accounts held in the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, then the premier banking institution of the western world fell from 114 in 1620, to 76 by 1625, and still hovered at only 89 accounts as late as 1641 over twenty years later![36] As a proportion of the total, Jewish accounts with the Exchange Bank fell from almost nine per cent in 1620 to under six per cent by the early 1640s, reflecting the appreciable decline in their importance which had taken place during these two decades. Conversely, the number of Sephardic Jewish deposits in the Hamburg Bank, the only other major banking institution in northern Europe at the time, swung vigorously in the opposite direction, climbing from twenty-eight, in 1619, to forty-three in 1623, mainly as the result of migration from Amsterdam.[37]

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[35] Ibid. pp. 116–32; Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', pp. 16–28; see also Fuks-Mansfeld, *Sefardim in Amsterdam*, pp. 68–9; Swetschinski, 'Tussen Middeleeuwen en Gouden Eeuw, pp. 88–94; Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 131–2.

[36] Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam', p. 14.

Substituting for Amsterdam, Hamburg in this period served as the chief supplier of Baltic naval stores, Swedish copper, and other essential supplies to the Iberian Peninsula.[38] Other Sephardic emigrants from Amsterdam settled, particularly in the early 1620s, in the Danish port of Gückstadt, in Holstein. Meanwhile, the major New Christian sugar exporters of Lisbon were forced to switch to using non-Dutch ships and crews, despite the added expense, and to exporting to Hamburg in order to comply with the strict regulations imposed by the Spanish crown and safeguard their cargoes from seizure by the Dunkirkers. As there were insufficient Hanseatic ships available to fill the gap left by the departing Dutch, there was a sudden demand also for supplementary Scottish, English and Danish shipping. Even some Norwegian vessels had to be used as, for instance, early in 1624, when Gaspar Rodrigues Pasarinho (or Pasariño), later to be a prominent *converso* financier in Seville and then a merchant in Lisbon, loaded a sizeable consignment of 337 cases of sugar onto a Norwegian ship consigned to 'Diogo Cardoso' (alias Diogo Nunes Vega) in Hamburg.[39] In this way the Lower Elbe again became a principal depot for sugar, spices, Indian diamonds and other Portuguese and Spanish colonial products as well as the chief supplier of naval munitions for the Spanish and Portuguese fleets sailing to the Americas. At first, in the early 1620s, Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam often countered by likewise chartering Hanseatic, English and Scottish ships and crews as a way of evading the embargoes.[40] However, besides adding appreciable extra cost, this practice still involved considerable risk. Thus, in 1626, three Hamburg ships sailing under genuine Hamburg flags and with German crews, carrying among other things valuable consignments of textiles for the (secret) account of Francisco Lopes d'Azevedo and other Sephardic Jews, in Amsterdam, were confiscated by Spanish officials in Lisbon harbour together with their cargoes, causing heavy loss to both Amsterdam and Hamburg.[41]

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[37] Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, p. 258.

[38] Ibid, 225; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 135–6, 207–9.

[39] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds' no. 3317. Amsterdam, 9 March 1624.

[40] See, for instance, 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds' nos. 3005, 3126, 3130, 3160, 3274, 3279, 3307, 3555, 3557, 3600, 3607, 3612.

[41] Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 32.

After a time Spanish officials took additional steps to prevent Dutch goods being re-exported from Hamburg, or carried to the Peninsula on Hamburg vessels manned by German crews, such, for example, as insisting on all cargoes from North German ports being accompanied by sworn testimonials issued by magistrates in the Hanseatic cities testifying that consignments were not of Dutch origin.

A major effect of the Spanish ban on Dutch trade and shipping on the western Sephardic maritime trading network as a whole was that it forced leading practioners to devise new ways, often risky and precarious, of sustaining the heavily disrupted links between the Dutch entrepot and the Iberian maritime empires. A regular ploy used to circumvent the embargoes down to 1635 when France entered the Thirty Years' War against Spain and Austria, was the system presided over by the Portuguese Jewish brothers Alvaro and Jacome Luiz in the French port of Bayonne. They and their associates, acting as factors for Amsterdam Sephardim, imported large quantities of Dutch and German linens, East India spices, fine cloth, metal goods and other merchandise destined for Madrid and the Castilian market, to Bayonne, a port conveniently situated close to the Spanish frontier, then transported the goods, albeit laboriously and at added cost, overland by mule train to the passes into the viceroyalty of Navarre where officialdom was less stringent than in the Castilian sea ports, and from where the consignments were conveyed into Castile through the so-called *puertos secos* (dry ports) and then on to Madrid.

This system pivoted on the fact that Jacome Luiz and his correspondents in Madrid could arrange matters with the administrators (*arrendadores*) of the *puertos secos* of Logroño, Agreda and Cervera, between Navarre and Castile, namely Juan Nuñez de Vega and his brother-in-law Manuel Nuñez de Olivera, businessmen who were also Portuguese New Christians. The former had lived for many years in Vitoria and knew the area thoroughly. He won the contract to farm the *puertos secos* in 1620, for the decade 1620–30 despite considerable reluctance in the royal council of finance, in Madrid, precisely on account of his being a Portuguese New Christian and therefore apt to operate together with other Portuguese *conversos*.[42] Despite the efforts of the Viceroy of Navarre, and commissioners sent from Madrid, the Pyrennean loophole stubbornly resisted eradication. In February 1630, a senior financial official reminded the royal council of finance (*Consejo de Hacienda*) in Madrid, that he had repeatedly pointed out the need to 'close that passage to the Dutch because they trade on a large scale through the Portuguese [*conversos*] who reside in Holland and who have established a community in France of those of their nation in order to go passing from hand to hand in Spain merchandise from the rebel provinces'.[43] In September 1630, it was reported to the board of the *Almirantazgo*, in Madrid, that no less than two to three million ducats worth of Dutch and Dutch East India commodities were entering Castile each year via Navarre and Vizcaya, generating a large stream of silver and merino wool flowing overland northwards to Bayonne and then, by sea, in Dutch vessels to Amsterdam.

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[42] AGS Consejo de Hacienda MS 592. *Consulta*, 31 October 1622.

This lucrative contraband traffic clearly attracted new business to Bayonne and did much to stimulate the web of crypto-Jewish communities which became fully established during the early seventeenth century in the south-west corner of France. Ever since the first decade of the seventeenth century Saint Jean de Luz, a town just over the border from Spain had become a regular way station for Portuguese crypto-Jews fleeing the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal and, together with Bayonne, a maritime bridge linking the crypto-Jewish social world of the Iberian Peninsula with the Sephardic congregations in the Netherlands. Now the crypto-Jews of south-west France, a group half way between the secret Judaism of the Peninsula and the normative Judaism of Amsterdam, served also as an economic bridge connecting Dutch Jewry with the *conversos* in Castile. In 1625, the Cortes of Navarre, resentful at Madrid's counter-measures to block the contraband trade, and especially a new regulation that Navarrese officials were to refuse entry to all East India spices into Navarre unless packaged and sealed in Lisbon, complained to the king about the constant flow of contraband spices passing from south-west France via the Pyrenees further east, by-passing Navarre and entering directly into Aragon.[44]

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[43] AGS Estado MS 2044. *Consulta*, 28 February 1630: Hortuño de Urizar avisa [. . .] que algunas vezes had representado a Vuestra Magd. quan importante seria cerrar aquel passo a olandeses porque negocian por el muy en grueso por medio de los portugueses que residen en Olanda los quales tienen hecha poblacion en Francia de los de su nacion para yr metiendo de mano en mano en España las mercadurias de las islas rebeldes.'

[44] AGS Estado MS 2847. *Consulta* of the *Junta de Comercio*, Madrid, 17 April 1625; AGS Estado MS 2645, *Consulta* of the *Junta de Comercio*, Madrid, 6 July 1625.

To the Dutch Sephardim, the West India Company's capture of Recife (Pernambuco) in north-east Brazil, one of the key zones of sugar production, in 1630, must indeed have seemed like a heaven-sent answer to their difficulties. It took some time to revive the sugar economy of Recife which suffered considerable devastation during the fighting of the early 1630s, but from the mid 1630s Dutch Brazil exported large and increasing quantities of sugar direct to Holland each year in the Company's ships and the colony entered on a vigorous and prosperous if relatively short (1635–45) period of successful settlement and expansion. During this time, Netherlands Brazil replaced Portuguese Brazil as the main supplier of sugar and Brazil wood to the northern European market. Furthermore, after various adjustments in policy, the Company, while reserving to itself the trade in Brazil wood, and the slave traffic, and the supplying of most staple provisions, in 1638 threw open the production, refining and export of sugar as well as the general import trade and financing of sugar production, to private enterprise. The Jews were offered more liberal terms of settlement in the new colony than they had been granted in the Netherlands itself and consequently there was soon, attracted by the fast rising prosperity of the sugar trade, a substantial immigration of Sephardim from, or sometimes via, Holland as well as a smaller trickle of local Portuguese New Christians reverting to normative Judaism there.

Amsterdam Portuguese Jews fairly quickly gained control over a large share of the private trade with northern Brazil carried by the Company's ships—at least a third and possibly as much as half, or more—not only in the case of those fitted out by the Amsterdam and Rotterdam chambers but also those of the North Quarter and Groningen.[45] During these years, moreover, not only did the Brazil trade serve as the corner-stone of the entire Dutch Jewish commercial system, but Netherlands Brazil was unquestionably the pivot of the interaction between New World and Old World Judaism both spiritually and socially. The Sephardic population of Dutch Brazil rose to a peak in 1644 of 1,450 souls, or between a third and one half of the white civilian population of the colony.[46] Since most of the other white civilians were Portuguese Catholics with only a small number of Dutch and German Protestants present in the territory, the Jews were in fact the largest group of settlers actively loyal to the new regime. Speaking Portuguese as they did, and knowing both the local culture and the sugar trade, Jews in Dutch Brazil were also the chief intermediaries between the Portuguese Catholic planters and the West India Company which not only took care of the colony's slave imports, and Brazil wood exports, but also accounted for roughly a third of the sugar exports. Many of the Catholic planters became heavily indebted to Jews in Recife or Amsterdam who had sold them goods on credit or helped finance purchases of land, sugar-mills and other equipment.

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[45] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 164–5; Van den Boogaart, *Expansión holandesa*, 126; Van Winter, *Westindische Compagnie ter kamer Stad en Lande*, 154.

[46] Wiznitzer, *Jews in Colonial Brazil*, 120–38; Wiznitzer, 'Number of Jews in Dutch Brazil', 107–14; Emmanuel, 'Seventeenth-century Brazilian Jewry', 32–68; Böhm, *Los Sefardíes*, 67–9.

By the early and mid 1630s, it was possible to imagine that Judaism—supplemented in lands of the Inquisition by crypto-Judaism—was destined to flourish to an extraordinary degree in the New World. For by then, not only was there a large concentration of Jews in Recife but a spreading web of Portuguese *converso* mercantile activity reaching across much of Spanish America and the Caribbean. Indeed, the crypto-Jewish trade network in Spanish America developed to such a point, that the presiding figures of the judaizing groups centered in Mexico City, Cartagena and Lima, men such as Simón Váez Sevilla in Mexcico City and Manuel Bautista Pérez, in Lima, by the early 1630s ranked among the foremost merchants and financiers of the Spanish Indies. Váez Sevilla, originally from Castelo-branco in Portugal, imported into New Spain from Peru, Central America and the Philippines, as well as Spain and had shops and agents retailing imported textiles, and other goods which he supplied them with, in Zacatecas, Querëtaro, Pachuca and other towns scattered across north-central New Spain as well as in Mexico City.[47] In Cartagena where in 1630, no less than 154 of 184 registered foreigners were Portuguese, representing about 10% of the white male citizens of the city, Portuguese New Christian merchants who were suspected by many of being crypto-Jews dominated much of the trade of the surrounding region (Nueva Granada).[48]

However, the main group in Peru was seized or dispersed by the Inquisition in 1635, the group in Cartagena de Indias was descended upon soon after, and finally some fifty leading members of the

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[47] Uchmany, 'Simon Váez Sevilla', 129–30; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 126–7.

[48] Vila Vilar, 'Extranjeros en Cartagena', 155, 175–6.

Mexican community, including Simón Váez Sevilla, were seized by the Mexican Inquisition during the closing months of the viceregal term of Bishop Palafox, in July 1642. The investigation and trials of the Mexican prisoners continued for seven years thereafter, culminating in the so-called *Auto General de la Fé* (general Auto-da-fe) held in Mexico City, in April 1649, at which no less than thirteen of the imprisoned judaisers, eight women and five men, were burned at the stake, twelve after being 'reconciled' to the Church and strangled first. One man, Tomas Treviño de Sobremente, remained defiant to the last and, after being gagged to stop his invoking aloud the God of Israel, was burnt alive.[49] He was later celebrated as a martyr to his faith by both the rabbi Menasseh ben Israel and the poet Daniel Levi de Barrios. All told, in the four *autos-da-fe* mounted by the Mexican Inquisition in the years 1646–9, no less than 188 judaizers were publicly paraded, humiliated and penanced, including an appreciable number of deceased burnt in effigy.[50] With that the Inquisition had successfully completed its eradication of the main crypto-Jewish network in Spanish America, though there were still isolated cells which persisted for some decades.

Meanwhile, the era of prosperity of the Portuguese Jewish community in Dutch Brazil ended abruptly, in 1645, with the great revolt of the Portuguese planters and their slaves against Dutch rule which broke out in that year. Receiving supplies and encouragement from the Portuguese authorities in Bahia, the rebels swept across the hinterland of Recife and Olinda, burning the plantations and sugar-mills as they went. The Dutch colonial regime and military garrison, being caught completely unprepared did little more than retreat behind the walls of the main towns and forts. Within a matter of months, the colony's economy was largely destroyed.[51] Sugar output and exports ceased almost entirely and never recovered during the remaining nine years of the Dutch presence in the area. Many of the Jews who had settled in Recife and neighbouring localities left Brazil during the late 1640s and early 1650s, dispersing in various directions though the majority returned at least initially to Amsterdam or Middelburg. During the bitter war which followed, the Dutch held on to Recife while, at sea, they heavily disrupted Portuguese Atlantic shipping; but they failed in every attempt to defeat the rebels in the field and clear them from the sugar producing zone. With the final collapse and surrender of Dutch Brazil during the First Anglo-Dutch War, in 1654, the remaining 600 Jews in the country, were all expelled, some leaving for other parts of the Americas, chiefly in the Caribbean and the Guyanas, most for the Netherlands.

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[49] Guijo, *Diario*, i, 39–47.

[50] Uchmany, 'Participation', 198.

[51] Wätjen, *Holländische Kolonialreich in Brasilien*, 322–3; Cabral de Mello, *Olinda restaurada*, 43–4, 273–5; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 168–70; Van den Boogaart, *Expansión holandesa*, 127.

Thus, the most remarkable Jewish social, economic and religious experiment in the New World was extinguished in 1654. Nevertheless, something of what had been built up by the Jewish colonists in Brazil survived elsewhere, contributing in various ways to the development of other New World Jewish communities, notably in New Amsterdam (New York) as well as in tropical America. The earliest and long the most important sugar-producing island of the Caribbean, English Barbados, was the most immediate beneficiary of the destruction of the Dutch sugar economy in Brazil. The transfer of sugar cultivation and production there, from Brazil, was facilitated by the fact that during, and for some years after, the Civil War in England (1642–5), Barbados remained under Royalist control and was thus temporarily cut off from its normal maritime trade links with London. During this period, as an English contemporary expressed it, 'the Dutch managed the whole trade of our western colonies and furnished the islands with negroes, copper, stills, and all other things appertaining to the Ingenious [i.e. 'engenhos (sugar mills)] for making of sugar'.[52] In the early eighteenth century, despite the decline of the island's sugar production and trade from around 1720, Barbados Sephardic Jewry, fed by fresh immigration from Europe, continued to increase slowly to around 474 by the middle of the century.[53] From the late 1650s, Sephardic Jews also began settling in newly conquered Jamaica and then in other English islands.

The exodus from Brazil likewise led to the founding of Sephardic communities in the French Caribbean colonies which were allowed to take root, albeit precariously, during the period of relatively liberal social and economic policies pursued under Mazarin and the opening years of the personal rule of Louis XIV, before policy toward the Jews was sharply reversed by the new intolerance which emanated from the French court under the older Louis, from around 1680. Early in 1654, the governor of Martinique had been on the verge of allowing a ship-load of refugees from Brazil, mostly Jews, to settle on the island but been finally dissuaded the Jesuits.[54] However, the governor of Guadaloupe did welcome both the Jewish refugees and some Protestant Dutch. When the Jesuit superior of Martinique protested, the governor of Guadaloupe seems to have told him to mind his own business. Soon after another shipload of refugees arrived and this time, the governor of Martinique did give permission to settle. Moreover, Jews from Brazil were soon joined by other Sephardim coming from Bayonne and Bordeaux so that, it is estimated, by 1658, there were in all some 300 Jews in the French islands, amounting to between six and seven per cent of the white population.[55] It was also, and by no means co-incidentally, in the 1650s that sugar production was established first in Guadaloupe and then in Martinique. During the 1660s and 1670s, Martinique rapidly outstripped Guadaloupe both in sugar production and general importance. The leading figure in the Sephardic community socially, economically and culturally, was Benjamin d'Acosta de Andrade who arrived there in 1654. He had been brought up as a *converso* in Portugal but, significantly, had subsequently lived as a professing Jew in Dutch Brazil.

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[52] BL Sloane MS 3662, fo. 59.

[53] Ibid., pp. 48, 56.

The growth of the Jewish presence in French America ended rather abruptly, however, after three decades with the edict issued by Louis XIV in 1685 (the same year in which he revoked the Edict of Nantes), in response to repeated efforts by the Jesuits and their allies to secure the expulsion of the Jews. Louis, referring back to the edict of his father, Louis XIII, of 23 April 1615, denying Jews all right to live in France, proclaimed them 'declared enemies of Christianity' who therefore were a pernicious and undesirable presence in the French colonies. They were commanded to depart within three months of publication of the decree, on pain of imprisonment and confiscation of their goods. Most of the Jews in the French islands, perhaps nearly one hundred from Martinique, left for the now flourishing Sephardic community of Curaçao taking with them the Torah scroll which had been presented to the Martinique community by the Portuguese synagogue in Amsterdam in 1676.[56] However, the Sephardic presence was by no means totally eradicated from Martinique, Guadaloupe or from Cayenne or Saint-Domingue at that time, or later.

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[54] Arbell, 'Jewish Settlements in the French Colonies', 289.

[55] Ibid., 290.

The exodus from Brazil accelerated the process of Jewish settlement in other parts of the New World. But it also stimulated the impulse to found new Sephardic communities within a mercantilist framework in Europe. There is in fact a close connection between the spread of new Jewish communities in the Caribbean, Guyanas and North America during the 1650s and 1660s and the simultaneous efforts to re-settle Jewish communities in England, Zeeland, and several Italian states.[57] Discreetly, and behind the scenes, the Amsterdam Sephardic leadership, anxious to reduce the excess of poor and needy on their hands, and help rehabilitate those who had lost their homes and businesses, guided and presided over this remarkable trans-Atlantic colonization programme ranging from Italy to the Caribbean. England was then the fiercest rival of the Dutch for domination of world trade and shipping; and given the bitter and hard-fought background of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–4), a struggle fought mainly by the rival fleets in the North Sea and English Channel but with important clashes also in the Mediterranean, it was impossible for the Elders of the Portuguese Jewish congregation in Amsterdam, now the largest, wealthiest and most influential in western Europe, openly to support projects for Jewish resettlement in London and the English empire. To have done so would have been to appear ungrateful to the city of Amsterdam, and States General, inviting the hostility and suspicion of the Dutch authorities and public. Consequently, the Amsterdam Sephardic leadership encouraged part of the trans-Atlantic colonization programme, that within the English empire, while publicly trying not to appear to be doing so.

Despite Menasseh ben Israel's failure to secure a charter with formal rights of settlement, guaranteeing freedom of exercise of the Jewish religion, and the disappointment and disillusionment which followed the Whitehall Conference of 1655, the crypto-Jews in London, mostly belonging to Portuguese *converso* families which had been living in the Canaries, Malaga and other parts of Andalusia, did obtain more security of residence from Cromwell's regime and small numbers of Jews continued to arrive, usually again *conversos* from Spain or Portugal who then reverted to normative Judaism in London. This and the growing size of the congregation over the next few years suggests that the Whitehall Conference of 1655 had, after all, in a way, marked the beginning of the resettlement in England. Even so, neither the Cromwellian regime, nor the restored English monarchy which followed, after 1660, ever granted the Jews either formal rights of settlement or religious freedom, or, for that matter equivalent economic opportunities to those the Jews enjoyed in the Netherlands. The difference in status between the two communities, was and remained for some time more considerable than is commonly assumed and this is undoubtedly the most important reason why Sephardic Jews—even after the undoubted enhancement of their position in Britain and Ireland following the Glorious Revolution of 1688—were never able to play a role in the commercial and colonial expansion of England of comparable significance to that which they played in the Ottoman, Venetian, and Dutch maritime empires, or (as crypto-Jews) in the Portuguese and Spanish world empires.

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[56] Ibid., 294.

[57] See *infra* pp. 385–420.

During the second half of the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century, the period which marks the high-point of Jewish involvement with Europe's global maritime empires, that is a world economy dominated by the commercial, financial, organizational and shipping resources of western Europe, Amsterdam and Livorno—but not London were increasingly the leading Sephardic commercial, maritime and cultural centres, all other Sephardic communities tending in various degrees to stagnate, decline or fail to grow to a comparable extent. The London Sephardic community admittedly did grow to reach around 1,050 by 1720 and possibly as much as 1,700 by 1740 but even at its height, in the mid and late eighteenth century, it remained firmly in a secondary category compared to Venice, Livorno, Amsterdam or Salonika.[58] In a few restricted sectors of commerce especially trade with Portugal, the Sephardic communities of Barbados and Jamaica, and the buying of rough diamonds at Madras, this community was of real importance to the wider English economy. By the 1680s, the English East India Company fully acknowledged that the London Sephardic community and its factors in southern India were crucial to England's success in capturing and dominating the world market in Indian diamonds.[59] Also, London did fully vie with Amsterdam and Livorno in its capacity to draw a constant stream of crypto-Jewish immigration from Spain and Portugal down to the 1740s when London Sephardic Jewry reached its peak and the last wave of Portuguese New Christian emigration spent itself. But given the increasing dominance of Britain in trade with Portugal, Brazil the Atlantic Islands and eventually also Spain, Spanish America, and the Caribbean, it is striking how limited and restricted both the expansion of British and British imperial Sephardic Jewry and the scope of their economic activities remained. This limited context was reflected in the lack of provincial Sephardic communities in Britain outside London and the inability of London Sephardic Jewry to grow beyond a relatively low ceiling. By and large, even when the Dutch lost their world trade primacy in the 1720s and 1730s and England emerged as unquestionably the world's dominant maritime, commercial and colonial power, the London Jewish community always stayed very much in the shadow of those of Amsterdam, Salonika, or Livorno and even Venice and Curaçao.

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[58] Diamond, 'Problems', 40–1.

Meanwhile the Sephardic community of Hamburg lost much of its former prosperity and importance, and shrank drastically in numbers, in the late 1690s, owing to the difficulties of the congregation there with the Lutheran preachers and public whose intolerance and hostility proved unrelenting. After years of controversy over the issue, in 1697 the Hamburg Senate found itself obliged to give in to the growing popular and ecclesiastical pressure for special taxes to be imposed on both the Sephardim and Ashkenazim and, as a consequence, most of the affluent Portuguese left Hamburg during 1698, mostly for Amsterdam or London.[60] Meanwhile, Venetian Jewry stagnated from the mid-seventeenth century onwards, owing to the rapid decline of Venice's commerce and shipping following the outbreak of the War of Crete with the Turks (1645–69) while the community of Bordeaux grew only relatively slowly. Although the latter continued to expand, and did have a string of satellite Sephardic communities in south-west France in a way that London did not; and did attain international prominence by the early eighteenth century, its contribution to the development of French trans-Atlantic commerce continued to be greatly hindered by the absence of organised Jewish communities in the French empire in America.

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[59] Yogev, *Diamonds and Coral*, 92–6.
[60] Whaley, *Religious Toleration*, 79–80.

The Portuguese Jewish communities of Amsterdam and Livorno both numbered well over 3,000 in the late seventeenth century. Indeed, according to the most expert recent estimates Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry at its peak, around 1685, attained much higher levels than has previously been supposed, amounting to around 4,500.[61] Both communities not only attracted and but also retained considerably larger numbers of Sephardic and crypto-Jewish immigrants than the other main centres in the west, and at the same time also directly employed substantial numbers of non-Sephardic Jews. This again puts them in a unique category to which neither Hamburg nor London, despite the rise of the British empire and British economic dominance in the eighteenth century, ever managed to attain. The special success, and pre-eminence of Amsterdam and Livorno in the western Sephardic world, has to be ascribed to the fact that conditions in those cities particularly favoured the development of specialised processing and auxiliary industries geared to servicing long-distance maritime trade. Thus, whereas in Hamburg and Venice, tight guild restrictions—and in London a mixture of restrictions, guild regulations and circumstances—prevented Jewish entrepreneurs establishing themselves in brokerage, sugar-refining, diamond-cutting and polishing, tobacco-spinning and blending, red coral-polishing, and other such functions, in Amsterdam and Livorno it proved possible to develop refining and processing workshops based on the importing of colonial products as largely Sephardic or mixed Sephardic-Ashkenazic industries.[62] There was more freedom in Bayonne and Bordeaux than in Hamburg or Venice but for various reasons, and with the notable exception of chocolate-making,[63] there was comparatively little success in establishing processing industries in those cities either.

The relative failure of other centres is especially remarkable in the case of London, a city which, after 1660, dominated the trade in Indian rough diamonds as it did, in the early eighteenth century, in

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[61] According to Nusteling's calculations, the Amsterdam Sephardic community reached its demographic peak around 1680 or 1685 at which date it numbered around 4,500, see Nusteling, 'Jews in the Republic', pp. 58–60.

[62] Kellenbez, *Sephardim*, 61–3, 101.

[63] Leon, *Juifs de Bayonne*, 69–76.

Brazilian diamonds, and at the same time controlled a major source of tobacco supply—the produce of the Virginia plantations. Yet tobacco imports from America to England were as a rule simply re-exported unprocessed to Amsterdam where they were spun and blended in Sephardi-owned workshops, as were the rough diamonds for cutting and polishing.[64] In the case of diamonds London's failure to divert the cutting and polishing (and therefore also much of the retailing of finished jewellery) away from Amsterdam seems to have been largely due to the technical intricacy of the training and skills required and difficulty of replicating them on any scale elsewhere. Among other notable gaps in the armoury of London Sephardic Jewry, was the near absence of brokerage, a phenomenon due to a policy of exclusion on the Royal Exchange which was reorganized in 1697, the number of licensed Jewish brokers permitted to function in London being then limited to twelve. For all these reasons then, in Amsterdam there were many more Jewish brokers, a much larger Jewish diamond-cutting and polishing industry, and a far more important Jewish tobacco industry than in London. In Amsterdam by 1700 there were no less than twenty-three tobacco-spinning and blending establishments around a dozen of which were Jewish-owned.[65] By 1720, the total number of tobacco-processing workshops there had risen to about thirty and the Jewish total to around fifteen, establishments which employed both Sephardic and Ashkenazic workers albeit usually with the former acting as supervisors and the latter in the more menial functions.[66]

The brokers both in Amsterdam and Livorno deserve special attention. In the latter city, the big English and Dutch Levant houses tended to stockpile large quantities of textiles, colonial products and ship's stores which they then left to Jewish brokers to find ways and means to ship to North Africa, Egypt and the Levant or distribute within Italy. In Amsterdam there was a wide variety of brokers, some specialising in matching shipping and storage space to merchants' requirements, some specialising in particular commodities such as wool, coffee, or sugar which they tested, classified and evaluated, other buying and selling ships, stocks or shares. Of special importance by the second half of the seventeenth century was the informal stock exchange which developed in coffee-houses and other meeting points near the main Amsterdam Exchange and which, as we shall see, was heavily dominated by Sephardic Jews. An Amsterdam Sephardi merchant whose family of Portuguese *converso* background had come to Holland as part of the mid-century wave of emigration from Spain and who later moved to Livorno, Joseph Penso de la Vega, in 1688 completed and published, in Spanish, the first ever detailed description of the workings of a stock exchange under the title *Confusión de confusiones* (Confusion of confusions).[67]

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[64] Yogev, *Diamonds and Coral*, 141–2; Samuel, 'Manuel Levy Duarte', 11, 25–6; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 266.

[65] Luzac, *Hollands rijkdom* iv, bijlage A; Herks, *Geschiedenis*, 175, 195.

[66] Westermann, 'Memorie van 1751', 73; Herks, *Geschiedenis*, 164–6.

One of the chief reasons for the prominence of the Sephardic Jews of Amsterdam and Livorno in international brokerage dealings was the vital necessity for early and accurate news from distant parts. In this respect, Sephardic merchants with their far-flung networks of relatives and associates on both sides of the Atlantic, both sides of the Protestant-Catholic divide and both sides of the frontiers between Christendom and Islam had a clear advantage over every other merchant diaspora of the time operating in Europe and the Mediterranean whether Huguenots, Armenians or Greeks. This was demonstrated in a manner important for the allied governments fighting the Bourbons during the War of the Spanish Succession when the Dutch and English ministries on several occasions received the earliest reports of battles in the interior of Spain from Amsterdam Sephardic merchants and brokers.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Venetian and Dutch maritime empires rapidly declined in importance while the stream of crypto-Jewish emigration from Portugal and Spain dried up, Portuguese *conversos* as a recognizable group ceased to play a significant or distinctive role in Spanish and Ibero-American society while the Sephardic community in England first stagnated and later declined. By around 1750, the Sephardic merchants of northern Europe and Italy could no longer count on a category of related Portuguese *converso* merchants to be found in commercial centres dotted all over the Iberian Peninsula and Ibero-America and this, in turn, little by little steadily reduced the general importance of the Sephardic trans-Atlantic and international trade network as a whole. As the system faltered, losing its momentum and creative drive, and its capacity to adapt, it lost its general significance for the great maritime empires, a decline which, in turn, generated a host of new social problems with which the leading Sephardic congregations in Europe had to wrestle: a marked increase in poverty and unemployment, a tendency for sons of wealthy families to become inactive gentlemen *rentiers*, and finally, a tendency for wealthier Sephardim to move away from Amsterdam, Venice and Livorno with their rising social burdens.[68] The ultimate result of this process of weakening, impoverishment and abandonment of communal responsibilities was a trend towards dispersal especially towards the New World and towards cultural assimilation, not infrequently culminating in reconversion to Christianity both Protestant and Catholic, a phenomenon especially marked in England, Holland and Germany but also to be seen in the eighteenth-century Caribbean.

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[67] See *infra* pp. 452, 460.

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[68] Levie Bernfeld, 'Financing Poor-Relief', 67, 71, 85–91, 96–102.

CHAPTER ONE

THE *MARRANI* IN ITALY, THE GREEK LANDS AND THE OTTOMAN NEAR EAST (1540–1580)

The Papal bull establishing the Holy Office in the kingdom of Portugal was published in Évora where the Portuguese king, João III (1521–57), was residing at the time, in October 1536. It was an event which ushered in a new era in the history of both Portugal and the Jews but also, in a remarkable way, of the religious and maritime history of the entire Mediterranean. Denunciations and the collection of evidence began soon afterwards. Then came the initial batch of arrests.[1] Meanwhile, already in the early 1530s, the Portuguese crown, with a series of edicts, tried clamp down harder on New Christian emigration and, in particular to prevent it from seeping to North Africa via the Portuguese enclaves in the Maghreb.[2] This presumably contributed—once large-scale emigration resumed after 1540—to steering the bulk of this new and in many ways remarkable exodus towards the Ottoman Levant and Italy.

The first *Auto-da-fé* in Portugal took place in Lisbon on 20 September 1540. Several more followed in the early 1540s. A detailed description survives of that organised in Lisbon in October 1544 by Dr João de Melo in which over seventy heretics were presented to the people. Lines of crosses were held high in the procession which, reportedly, made the deepest impression on everyone. Many nobles and prominent citizens participated in the event. After solemn hymns and preaching, the crimes and sentences of the guilty were read out. Twenty were condemned to die at the stake for judaizing—the largest number in one Portuguese *auto-da-fé* ever—although one of these, a woman, was sent back to the Inquisition dungeons on relenting at the last moment and loudly professing the truth of Christianity. Melo explained that he gave 'this good example to the people so that at least they should see clearly that only those are burnt who do not want to be Christians'.[3] After 1544, the operations of the Holy Office in Portugal were, however, impeded for a few years by a combination of New Christian protests to Rome and papal unease at the powers the Portuguese crown and Inquisition were claiming. A papal general pardon for offences against the faith was published in Lisbon, in July 1548, after which some 1,800 prisoners were released from the cells of the Holy Office. But before long first the arrests and trials, and then the *autos-da-fe* resumed. In the *autos-da-fe* held in Portugal between 1552 and 1563, 1,338 persons were penanced and fifty-eight judaizers burnt at the stake.[4]

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[1] Lúcio de Azevedo, *História dos Cristãos novos*, 89, 93.

[2] Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, *Os judeus na expansão*, 88, 513–14.

While it is true that in the period 1540–67 the Portuguese Inquisition was somewhat sporadic, even mild, compared with the efficient machine of systematic surveillance and repression which it became after 1580, the psychological and cultural impact of the early *autos-da-fe* was, arguably, not just great but of fundamental significance in the shaping of Jewish, Portuguese and Mediterranean history. In the first place, it generated a major new wave of emigration from the country where since the general prohibition on the emigration of New Christians decreed in 1532, the outflow had slowed to a trickle.[5] In the second place, for the first time it created a lasting and oppressive climate of fear. In some localities of Portugal, the appearance of an Inquisition commissioner for the first time, as at Trancoso, in 1543, sufficed to reduce the New Christian population to mass hysteria and precipitate flight.[6] No less crucial the shock evidently caused a kind of internal spiritual flight: it became suddenly impossible, or at least recklessly unsafe, to teach even the most basic rudiments of Judaism to children while adults had to retreat from communal participation in the preservation of Jewish practices to furtive and often exclusively individual experience, deep introversion displacing the external. At the same time, and no less fundamental, the New Christians as a group not only became much warier of Old Christians than before but tended to segregate themselves, internally and externally, no less than the Old Christians discriminated against them.[7]

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[3] João de Melo to King João III, Lisbon, 13 Oct. 1544 printed as appendix 4 to Lúcio de Azevedo *História dos Cristãos Novos*, 450–2.

[4] Ibid., 115.

[5] Ibid.; David, 'Spanish Exiles in the Holy Land', 106–7.

[6] Yerushalmi, *Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto*, 57.

[7] Cunha de Azevedo Mea, 'Oraçãoes judaicas', 153.

Mixed marriages, reportedly, became appreciably rarer than they had been earlier.

The ban on emigration was renewed, for three years only, in 1547 but then apparently allowed to lapse (except for North Africa) for a considerable time before being re-imposed once more in 1567. If most of those who emigrated continued to go to lands controlled by the Ottoman sultan, or other Islamic lands, as they had been doing in considerable numbers since the 1490s, very soon, Portuguese ecclesiastics in Italy began to protest at the relative ease with which Portuguese crypto-Jews, fleeing the Inquisition in Portugal, were reverting to normative Judaism among the Jewish communities also in Italy. In November 1547, the Bishop of Oporto, and an Inquisitor himself, exhorted Pope Paul III to reform the Inquisition in Italy which seemed incapable of dealing with even a fraction of the influx. Reform, and in particular more rigour, was needed, he urged, because so many New Christians whom their parents had had baptised in Portugal, and had lived there as Christians, were 'coming to Italy and becoming Jews again and being circumcized' and what was worse such intolerable proceedings were going on freely even in Rome and other papal towns, notably Ancona.[8] 'Nao ha lugar de Italia', reported a cleric from Évora to King João III, in November 1547, 'que não tenha judeus portugueses de sinal [there is no place in Italy where there are no Portuguese Jews with the sign], that is appearing outwardly as such.[9]

But from the outset there was something profoundly new and distinctive socially, psychologically, and culturally about the new wave of Portuguese Jewish emigration which marked it off from the great exodus from Spain in 1492 and the subsequent waves of pre-1540 Jewish and *converso* emigration from Portugal. This was partly because the new exodus, after 1540, raised on a large scale much more complex questions of identity, status and Jewish religious law than had its predecessor. For a considerable number of the fleeing *conversos* were in fact the children of mixed marriages, while, in the new context, *converso* males were usually uncircumcised and generally lacked familiarity with Hebrew and Jewish ritual.[10] By 1540, anyone who had left Spain for Portugal as an adult of twenty, or over, in 1492 might still have a good knowledge of Judaism and Hebrew but would now be nearing seventy, or older, and therefore increasingly unlikely to contemplate emigration to distant lands. But the widening gulf between post-1540 *converso* newcomers and other Jews in Italy, the Greek Lands and the Near East went well beyond such issues, important though these were. For earlier emigrants who had been in no personal danger, and at little risk of having their possessions confiscated whilst living as 'New Christians' in Portugal, emigrated in the main for one reason only—so as to live freely as Jews elsewhere. But after 1540 this was by no means always the case and with the new exodus a far more variegated and convoluted psychological and cultural situation arose.

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[8] Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos Cristãos Novos*, p. 119.

[9] Quoted in ibid., p. 119.

[10] Veinstein, 'L'Empire Ottoman', 368.

Post-1540 emigration from Portugal consisted predominantly of people with no personal experience of life in a normative Jewish context who were driven by new motives to emigrate which had been largely non-existant before: in particular fear of arrest, torture and confiscation of goods by the Holy Office, the horror of witnessing close relatives, perhaps a mother or father, burnt at the stake, the prospect of being placed under suspicion, and in danger, by others less willing to conform than oneself, the distress and inconvenience of seeing one's extended family publicly dishonoured and humiliated due to dissident beliefs of some close or even more distant relative. At the same time open reversion to Judaism abroad, as opposed to continuing to live outwardly as a Christian, meant burning all one's bridges with Portugal, abandoning contacts and assets there, and very likely also endangering relatives. The new Portuguese Jewish identity in Italy the Maghreb, the Balkans and the Near East, thus included a hefty dose of ambivalence, confusion, and hesitation pervaded with underlying contradictions reflected not least in the *Consolação as tribulações de Israel* (1553) of the famous exile Samuel Usque, writing and publishing in Portuguese at Ferrara. Above all it was often an unstable identity which was neither altogether Jewish nor necessarily fixed in its Jewish allegiance.[11] Furthermore, the forming of a distinctive and separate Portuguese Jewish identity in Ottoman lands, in particular, was additionally stimulated by the tendency of the Portuguese Jews who congregated under the sultan's protection to establish congregations apart from those of the Spanish Jews as well as separate from the Romaniote and Italian communities. Separate Portuguese synagogues arose not only in Salonika, Safed, and Istanbul but also Valona, Adrianople, Ankara, Izmir, Tripoli and other places.[12]

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[11] Salomon, *Deux Études*, 30–2; Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, *Os judeus na expansão*, 106–8.

On leaving for Italy, Turkey or North Africa emigrants were almost bound to gravitate towards compatriots, and settle among the proliferating number of Portuguese communities in exile. Thus, for example, at Fez, the largest Jewish centre in Morroco, where several thousand,—some accounts suggest as many as 10,000—Jews dwelt in the *judería* one could distinguish as early as the 1530s not two but three distinct elements—*toshavim*, or indigenous Arabic-speaking Jews, the main body of Spanish Jews or 'newcomers' (*megorashim* who had left in the 1390s or in 1492, and the immigration of *conversos* who, after around 1530, were mainly 'Portuguese' and who rapidly formed a quite distinct and highly complex cultural entity.[13] Among the latter in Fez during the late 1530s were Miguel Nunes, Catarina Nunes, Rodrigo Dias, Jorge Fernandes nicknamed 'o Laboredas', Francisco Martins, Bartholmeu Pais, Diogo Lopes of Coimbra, Luis Garcia, Francisco and Luis Lopes and Duarte Lopes of Lisbon who were all denounced to the Portuguese Inquisition for having lived as Jews in Fez, despite having been baptized in Portugal, and several of whom later returned, to live as Christians, in Portugal.[14] Another *converso* living in Fez at that time, Jorge Fernandes, claimed to have stayed in the *judería* but not observed Jewish rites, or prayed in the synagogue, precisely because he intended to return to Portugal.

In Italy, meanwhile, besides a scattering of Portuguese New Christians who lived also there outwardly as Christians, newcomers from Portugal settled among fully-fledged Jewish communities where they experienced the inevitable double culture shock inherent in such a situation, simultanously struggling to adjust to both a new life in Italy with all the economic problems this frequently entailed, and to Judaism. In addition to which they had to cope with the growing disdain which those brought up within Judaism in Italy, the Maghreb and the Levant tended to regard newly arrived *Marrani* who avowedly rejected Christianity for Judaism but were largely or wholly ignorant of Hebrew, Jewish tradition, rabbinic scholarship and the *Torah*. This created a degree of disorientation and alienation which nurtured a host of baffling new psychological and cultural phenomena: a tendency to feel caught between two religions, doubts about aspects of both religions, uncertainty about how to reorientate, and, after a time, nostalgia for Portugal leading in some to a hankering after their former life and even idyllic illusions and wishful thinking about the character of Portuguese society.[15]

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[12] Galanté, *Hommes et choses juifs portugais*, 5, 33.

[13] Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, *Os judeus na expansão*, 99–130.

[14] Ibid., 103, 107–8, 513–14.

Hence not only were there now a growing number of Portuguese New Christians who had opted to assimilate into Portuguese society as far as that was possible, and in consequence had decided to embrace Christianity sincerely, as well as a few such persons in Rome and elsewhere in Italy and France, but there were now also doubters, men adrift and crypto-Christians among the Portuguese Jews in Italy and the Levant who wished to escape from the restricted world of the ghetto and in some way renew their ties with Portugal. Portuguese ecclesiastics in Italy, and the itinerant odd Portuguese friar travelling in the Holy Land, or other lands under Islamic rule, were quick to spot and respond to this new phenomenon. The Portuguese Jesuit, Simão Rodrigues de Azevedo, reporting to King Joao III, in July 1554, estimated that there were then between 2,500 and 3,000 Portuguese New Christians who had reverted to Judaism living in the papal Adriatic port of Ancona, probably the largest such concentration then to be found in the Christian world, but also noted that some of these, finding themselves uprooted and without resources, now repented of their flight and were tormented by being disdained as *Marrani* by Christians; thus they lived as half-hearted, unwilling or false Jews among the Jews and aspired to return to Portugal if only the king and Inquisition would grant them pardon.[16]

Such individuals often reacted quite strongly against crypto-Judaism and the pressure to judaize introducing for the first time into the main body of Mediterranean Jewry an element of self-hatred, inner estrangement from relatives and ideological civil war.[17] Dom João Soares, bishop of Coimbra, when visiting Cyprus and the Holy Land, took skilful advantage of this, gathering extensive information from alienated Portuguese New Christians and crypto-Christians which subsequently led, in 1576 and 1577 to numerous arrests of crypto-Jews in Portugal and Extremadura.[18]

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[15] Pullan, *Jews of Europe*, 211–28, 240–1.
[16] Lúcio de Azevedo, *História dos Cristãos Novos*, 119.
[17] Pullan, *Jews of Europe*, 229–42.

The bulk of the new exodus from Portugal settled in Italy and particularly in the Ottoman Empire. By the 1560s, among the largest concentrations of Portuguese Jews in exile were those to be found in the Holy Land and Syria-Lebanon. In Safed, the largest Jewish community in sixteenth century Syria/Palestine, the number of Jews by that decade was beginning to approach the number of Muslims. Moreover, most of this community now consisted of recent immigrants from Europe, especially Spanish and Portuguese who rapidly took over the leadership of the community from the *musta'riba*, or Arabic-speaking Jews.[19] A separate Jewish quarter called 'Purtukal' (Portugal) had already existed in Safed, in the 1520s when the Arabic-speaking Jews were still the majority and as yet there was no separate 'Castilian' or 'Aragonese' quarter.[20] At that stage between a quarter and a fifth of the Jews in Safed were Portuguese; but there were few more arriving at that time. So substantial, however, was the post-1540 influx from Portugal that by the 1550s, the Portuguese again constituted between a fifth and a quarter of the total number of Jews in the town, having caught up with the rapid pace of increase in the Jewish quarter where in absolute terms there were now no less than seven times as many Jews as before.[21] The 'Portuguese' now numbered slightly less than the 'Castilian' nation but were nearly twice as numerous as the various Italian 'nations' put together and three times as numerous as the 'Aragonese'. Between 1555 and 1567, according to Ottoman census records, the Portuguese Jewish community in Safed increased from 143 to 200 households, their proportion of the total Jewish population remaining steady.[22]

In Jerusalem where the Jews increased, surpassing the Christians in numbers, during the first half of the sixteenth century, rising to 324 households by 1553, there was subsequently a marked fall in the Jewish population during the 1550s and 1560s, doubtless owing part to the greater attraction at that time of Safed, Damascus, Tripoli

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[18] Vicente da Costa Matos, *Discurso contra a heretica perfidia do judaismo*, 90v.
[19] Cohen and Lewis, *Population and Revenue*, 31.
[20] Ibid., p. 161, see Table vi.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid., 161; Hacker, 'Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire', 112.

Table 1: Jewish Communities in the Ottoman Near East in the 16th Century

	c. 1525 (households)	*1550/60*	*c. 1590*	*c. 1610*
Ankara	28			
Bursa	117	–	650	–
Damascus	–	503	–	
Gaza	95	115	73	–
Hebron	8	11	11	–
Istanbul	1,647	–	–	2,195
Jerusalem	199	324	237	–
Safed	235	719	945	–
Tripoli	–	250 ?	139	–

Sources: Veinstein, 'L'Empire Ottoman', 366; Cohen and Lewis, *Population and Revenue*, 94, 111, 128, 161; Inalcik, *An Economic and Social History* i,257; Epstein, *Ottoman Jewish Communities* (Freiburg, 1980); Levy, *Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, 12.

and other centres further north.[23] The Portuguese friar Pantaleão de Aveiro who visited the Holy Land in the years 1563–6, and left a detailed account of his travels, observes that there were then only about 600 Jews in the holy city 'pello mayor parte pobres porque na terra não alguns trattos' [for the most part poor because in that land there is no trade].[24] Moreover, the Portuguese seem to have represented a much smaller proportion of the Jewish population of Jerusalem than of Safed, Damascus, Aleppo or Tripoli, Aveiro estimating that there were only around thirty there at the time of his visit. Finally, there was the newly established Portuguese community on the banks of the Sea of Galilee, at Tiberias, where the friar heard much talk of the 'purchase' of the town from the Ottoman sultan by a group of rich Jewish exiles from Portugal, led by a renowned woman, whose surname was de Luna [i.e. Beatrice de Luna, alias Gracia Nasi (d. 1569)] who had fled Portugal with vast riches with which she had won great renown and high status throughout the Ottoman empire, being so venerated by other Jews that they called her not by her name but simply as 'La Señora'.[25] Gracia Nasi first obtained a concession for settlement, and for special rights, at Tiberias in, or around, 1558 so that the Portuguese ex-Marrano community to be seen there in Aveiro's day presumably came into existence in the late 1550s or, at the latest around 1561 when Joseph Nasi received a share in the concessions assigned to his aunt and at a time when Portuguese settlement at neighbouring Safed was at its height.[26]

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[23] Cohen and Lewis, *Population and Revenue*, p. 94, see Table 1; Cohen, *Jewish Life under Islam*, 14–15.

[24] Aveiro, *Itinerario*, fo. 124.

[25] Ibid., fos. 223v–4.

In Damascus, as at Safed and Tiberias, the Portuguese formed a separate presence, having their own *barrio* apart from that of the Castilians, Aragonese, and Arabic-speaking Jews.[27] Damascus was one of the largest cities of the Ottoman empire and in the mid sixteenth century had nearly four times the population of Jerusalem.[28] Its Jewish population, in 1548, was registered at 503 households,[29] some 2,500 individuals, and therefore considerably larger than that of Jerusalem but smaller than that of Safed, and as usual, in the Ottoman Near East was divided into numerous congregations. The Portuguese community was apparently closely linked to that in Safed whose trade and woollen cloth manufacture, as the evidence of road tolls shows, was orientated much more north-eastwards towards Damascus than it was either southwards, towards Jerusalem or westwards towards the coast.[30] Another important Portuguese community in the vicinity was that of Tripoli [Tarabulus] in northern Lebanon, a port with important links with Cyprus and the Aegaean as well as one of the chief points of access to Damascus from the sea. According to Aveiro, in the early 1560s 'avera na cidade como dous mil judeus, polla mayor parte Portugueses' [there are in the city some 2,000 Jews, for the most part Portuguese], the latter a gross exaggeration no doubt but also a good indication of the growing prominence of older and more recent immigrants from Portugal.[31] The Portuguese merchants of Tripoli, like those of Aleppo, not only looked towards Cyprus, Salonika and the Aegean but also towards Italy.

What is most remarkable about Aveiro's account of his encounter with Portuguese Jews in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, however, was their extraordinary eagerness to engage him, as a learned man and a learned Christian, in uninhibited and unrestricted dialogue on theological and related issues, flocking to his lodgings at dawn and resuming at every opportunity, as if embroiled in a perpetual psychological tug of war between Judaism and Christianity, something he remarks, which the 'Castilians' (being descended mostly from Jews who left the Peninsula in 1492), took little or no interest in.[32] This continued throughout the eight or nine days Aveiro sojourned in Damascus and, at times, the friar felt quite tormented 'com suas iudaicas e ignorantes perguntas' [with their Jewish and ignorant questions] whilst his mendicant companion frequently had tears in his eyes 'por causa das blasfemias que contro nosso Redemptor dezião' [owing to the many blasphemies they uttered against our Redeemer].[33] Yet what these friars were subjected to was not, or not only, polemic but also genuine questioning and fervent dialogue. Many of the recent arrivals evidently found it difficult to adjust to the ways of traditional Judaism even in a predominantly Portuguese *barrio* and had been reduced by their experiences to a state of disorientation, and spiritual numbness which evolved into a powerful, if unstable, cultural impetus in its own right and, as we shall see, was to combine with economic trends in a most remarkable way.

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[26] Roth, *House of Nasi*, 108–15; Veinstein, 'L'Empire Ottoman', 376; Weiker, *Ottomans, Turks and the Jewish Polity*, 76.

[27] Aveiro, *Itinerario*, 234.

[28] Cohen and Lewis, *Population and Revenue*, 20, 94.

[29] Epstein, *Ottoman Jewish Communities*; Levy, *Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, 12

[30] Cohen and Lewis, *Population and Revenue*, pp. 57–8.

[31] Aveiro, *Itinerario*, 251.

Asking one youth whom he talked to in Damascus, and who came from Braga, how he came to be there, he answered that he had fled because the Inquisition had burnt his father and incarcerated his mother; another, from Lagos, in the Algarve, told him that he was a perfectly good Christian until he saw his father arrested and burnt as a Jew after which 'se fizera Iudeu, e fugira para Turquia, por viver livremente na ley de Moyses' [he made himself a Jew and fled to Turkey, to live freely within the law of Moses].[34] Whereupon the good friar asked how it was that his father had not taught him to be a Jew before he was arrested, at which the youth answered that Jewish fathers living among Christians never dare to trust their sons with the secret of their Jewishness until they see them grown up and reaching the age of twenty five or so, an interesting indication of the far-reaching impact the advent of the Holy Office exerted on the education of *converso* children, and the propagation of Jewish knowledge in Portugal. A Jew from Setúbal with whom he conversed at length had only recently arrived from Portugal and still suffered from head and eye ache caused by his being unused to the weight of the large turban one needed to wear in those parts to demonstrate being a Jew of affluence and standing.

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[32] Ibid., 235v, 240.
[33] Ibid., 235v.
[34] Ibid., fo. 234.

The story was the same in Tripoli where, he reports, there was an enormous albeit 'very ugly' synagogue. There he spoke with a Jewish physician born in Santarem who while outwardly posing as an observant Jew, lived in fact (it was reported to him by other Jews) as someone who no longer believed in the coming of the Messiah and, like the Saduccees of ancient times, 'tinha opinão, que não avia resereiçam dos mortos' [has the opinion that there will be no Resurrection of the dead].[35] Another with whom he conversed whose name was Isaac Beizudo (or Becudo), a spice merchant and expert in the spice trade, much connected with Aleppo, Basra and the East India traffic and who also had ties with Istanbul and Venice, combined commerce with being a professional spy in Ottoman lands, an eager clandestine servant of the Portuguese king who since 1559, or soon after, had been in regular contact with the latter's ambassador in Rome, via Venice, much of the time from Aleppo, 'mandandolhe avisos, de que passava na India, com toda fidelidade [sending him reports of what was happening in India, with all fidelity].[36] His brother, Matheo Becudo, had been doing the same from Cairo. Isaac Becudo several times came to talk with Aveiro, at his lodgings, carefully concealing the fact from the other Jews who, he explained, regarded him with suspicion and considered him a spy, assuring the friar of his zeal for Portugal and willingness, if it would give satisfaction, to send accounts every three months to Lisbon reporting what was happening in India.[37]

A third Jew with whom he discoursed in Tripoli, a prosperous merchant who at that very moment had a cargo of white soap loaded aboard a ship in the harbour about to depart for Istanbul, recounted his whole lineage and earlier life in Portugal in great detail and told how, misled about religion, he had left Portugal, a become a Jew, a decision which he now deeply repented. The fervour with which he professed having erred in abandoning Portugal, and the Christian religion, moved the good friar to intense feelings of pity at this man's 'perdition'. He assured Aveiro that if only the authorities would pardon him his past, and his having abandoned the 'true faith of Jesus Christ' for Judaism, he would gladly return to his native land and undergo every imaginable penance, public and private, that would be asked of him.[38] He begged the friar to take a letter for him, for his relatives in Portugal, to which Aveiro consented.

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[35] Ibid., fo. 251.

[36] Ibid.; see also Lane, *Venice and History*, 29; Gentil da Silva, 'Juifs portugais', 119; Rodrigues da Silva Tavim, *Os judeus na expansão*, 290.

[37] Aveiro, *Itinerario* fo. 251v.

Sending letters back from the Sephardic communities of Italy and the Near East to New Christian relatives in Portugal may indeed not have been as difficult or unusual as one might suppose. Much correspondence flowed from the ports of the Levant to Venice, Ferrara and Ancona which could then, from Venice and Rome, easily be sent on by Christians or New Christians to Portugal. An Inquisition note relating to Duarte Nunes of Coimbra, the New Christian grandfather of the Duarte Nunes da Costa (Jacob Curiel) who, though a Jew, became agent of the Portuguese crown in Hamburg, in 1641, refers to a letter which a Portuguese friar sent from Turkey, in 1560, recounting that as a youth, around 1530, Duarte Nunes had stayed for a period in Rome together with his brother, Fernão Nunes and that the latter had subsequently migrated to Istanbul where he, his wife and two children had converted to Judaism while Duarte had returned to live as a Christian, in Portugal, but that, nevertheless, over the decades, Fernão had remained in contact, by letter, with his brother in Coimbra, from the Sultan's capital.[39]

Stories of hesitation, doubt and disillusionment, were regularly reported from Istanbul and Aleppo where visiting western Christians, Italian and French mostly but also the odd Portuguese or Spanish Old or New Christian, were relatively numerous. Even Gracia Nasi's famous nephew, João Miguez (c. 1520–79), who won international fame, under his Jewish name, Don Joseph Nasi, who became lord of Tiberias and (from 1566), in the reign of Selim II, 'duke' of Naxos, may have had some doubts on first arriving in the Ottoman capital, in 1554. Having widespread business interests in the west, and having previously always lived outwardly as a Christian, first in Portugal and then, since the age of sixteen in Antwerp, Venice and Lyons, conversion to open Judaism is likely, for him too, to have been in some degree problematic. It is certain, in any case, that during the first few weeks he resided in Istanbul, he continued to live outwardly as a Christian, keeping secret the fact that he was preparing to convert publicly to Judaism, and that during this period several Christians actively sought to dissuade him from taking such a step, at least one of whom, the Spaniard Andrés Laguna, author of a *Viaje de Turquía*, states that Miguez fervently assured him that he was a sincere Christian, and that after apostatizing—which allegedly he only did because in Turkey it would be more advantageous to be a Jew—was tormented by feelings of guilt at the immense crime against Christ which he had supposedly committed.[40]

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[38] Ibid., fo. 252.

[39] ANTT Santo officio, papeis avulsos M7–2608. I am grateful to Dr Antonio Vasconcelos de Saldanha, of Lisbon, for this reference.

In contrast to other Jews, the western Sephardim emigrating to Ottoman lands, and especially the *Marrani* reverting from Christianity to Judaism, were not only regarded as religious apostates but also in a secular sense traitors and betrayers. For Christian travellers and diplomats, frequently accused the Sephardim, and the Portuguese *Marrani*, in particular, of helping introduce new techniques, technology and weapons which had rendered the Turks more formidable in the struggle with Christian Europe than they would otherwise have been. Of course, one can question, as several historians recently have, whether the western Jewish immigrants who arrived after 1492 in fact introduced any significant technological (or financial) innovations to the Ottoman Empire.[41] But even if as a matter of fact they did not, the accusation was frequently made and the French, Italians and Spaniards, seem also to have placed part of the blame on the Portuguese king who had allegedly not done enough to stop the seepage from Portugal to the Ottoman empire. The crypto-Christians among the *Marrani* in the Levant entirely agreed that sincere apostates from Christianity should be condemned as dreadful traitors but were anxious, as part of justifying their own stance, to exonerate the Portuguese crown.

This was the fervent view, for example, of Duarte de Paz, the notoriously corrupt Portuguese New Christian, who in the 1530s first gained prominence as an agent for the New Christians in Rome, supposedly trying to halt the moves to obtain papal authorisation for the proposed new branch of the Holy Office in Portugal, and then when this failed becoming a spy, against the *Marrani* and Jews, in league with the Portuguese court, and finally having irretrievably antagonised both his fellow New Christians and the king, had no choice but to emigrate in the early 1540s, to Istanbul.[42] In Turkey, despite having been virulently hostile to Judaism as part of his strategy in Portugal and Italy, Duarte de Paz found himself obliged to live outwardly a Jew, assuming the name of David Bueno, while privately remaining a crypto-Catholic and vehement enemy of the Jews—at least in the company of Christians. In December 1545, he wrote to the Portuguese ambassador in Rome, giving an account of a dinner at which he had been present, attended by the French ambassador and other French notables in which the Emperor Charles V and Portuguese crown had been severely taken to task for driving the Portuguese New Christians to emigrate to Turkey. The reason given was the Turks had previously been thoroughly backward compared to the Europeans but now, thanks to the Portuguese Jews, were provided with all the industries, 'officios mecanicos', and up to date weapons they needed. De Paz claimed to have refuted this slur on the Portuguese crown, by insisting that no king followed a more truly Christian policy than that of Portugal and that if those Portuguese who refused to live as Christians left this scarcely helped the Turks. This was because any technical innovations which they might have acquired from the Jews, they obtained at the outset, with the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, in 1492, and not as a consequence of the setting up of the Holy Office in Portugal, and secondly because the Jews and *Marrani* had brought so much moral, theological and financial corruption and confusion to Turkey that far from strengthening the Ottomans they had all but undermined traditional Turkish virtue and integrity.[43]

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[40] Roth, *House of Nasi*, 8.

[41] Braude, 'Rise and Fall of Salonica Woollens', 223, 227–8; Cohen and Lewis, *Population and Revenue*, 60–1.

The Portuguese Jews who settled in the Near East and Greek Lands did not introduce any significant new industrial or other techniques or technology. What they did do was create a remarkable intercontinental trading, cultural and social network which undoubtedly evinced some of the features of the later Portuguese Jewish and crypto-Jewish maritime networks which matured in the seventeenth century. If they participated in the flourishing textile, silk, soap, jewellery and dyeing industries in Safed, Damascus, and elsewhere, this was not in the capacity of innovators. Where they did innovate is in forming crucial new trade links with the west, exporting large amounts of woollen cloth, silks, cotton and soap from the Arabic-speaking Near East to Istanbul and importing raw (Balkan and Spanish) wool and dyestuffs through Sidon and Tripoli to Damascus and Safed. Via Venice, Ferrara, Ancona, Rome, and later also Pisa, they remained in regular contact with Italy and Portugal and via Basra, and the Persian Gulf with India. A Jew from Tavira who wished to be particularly hospitable to Father Pantaleão de Aveiro and his companions, and showed the visitors the sights of Damascus, happened to be a prominent merchant who imported luxury goods and spices from India by way of Basra.[44] He informed his guests that there were five to six thousand workshops in Damascus, processing every imaginable kind of silk, from the richest gold and silver brocades downwards. Aveiro was also impressed by Damascus' famed metal workshops and the great jewellery emporium where he saw more wealth than he had ever before witnessed and there met another group of Portuguese Jews, former Christians, who had learnt diamond cutting and polishing, and the setting of jewels in gold and silver, in Lisbon.[45]

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[42] Lúcio de Azevedo, *História dos Cristãos Novos*, 73, 75, 79–80.

[43] Ibid., pp. 446–7. Letter of Duarte de Paz to the Portuguese ambassador in Rome, Constantinople, 12 Dec. 1545.

Yet the impressive impetus which this Near Eastern trade network gained during the middle decades of the sixteenth very quickly slackened and turned to decay. Difficulties, trade diversion, and industrial setbacks followed thick and fast. Joseph Nasi took a keen interest in the economic development of Tiberias and the Galilee area and invested in planting mulberry trees and establishing fine cloth manufacture using Spanish wool on the model of Venetian cloth; but all these ventures failed.[46] The silk industry was damaged by a combination of Portuguese incursions in the Persian Gulf and rising Venetian and French purchases of raw silk at Aleppo. Meanwhile, the failure of the Jewish woollen cloth industries of Safed and Tiberias, like that of Salonika, were all attributable to the superior technological and capital base, as well as better links to the key raw materials enjoyed by the Venetian fine cloth industry. During the second half of the sixteenth century Venetian fine cloth manufactured from Spanish wool penetrated the Ottoman market more and more successfully at the expense of Safed and Salonika.[47] At the same time, cotton which made up a large part of Syria's exports to Venice in the early sixteenth century, lost much of its importance after 1550 as the Venetians increasingly succeeded in growing large quantities on their island of Cyprus.[48] Meanwhile the revived spice trade via the Levant, at its peak precisely in the decades 1540–70, began to decline in the 1570s.

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[44] Aveiro, *Itinerario*, fo. 237.
[45] Ibid., fos 237–7v.
[46] Roth, *House of Nasi*, 117, 133; David, 'Spanish Exiles in the Holy Land', 107.

The reasons for the rapid decline of the Sephardic manufacturing and trading network in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, therefore, have little to do with patterns of emigration from Portugal but are certainly closely bound up with the more general phenomenon of the decline of the Ottoman Near East in the later sixteenth century. Aleppo declined virtually throughout the sixteenth century although in this respect it was undoubtedly an exception, its population falling from around 67,00, in the early sixteenth century to about 46,000, by 1586.[49] But nowhere except Safed where it persisted for several decades longer, did the surge of growth characteristic of most major Arabic-speaking towns of the Ottoman Near East in the 1530s, 1540s and 1550s continue into the late sixteenth century. Possibly as early as the 1560s, and certainly by the 1580s, all the towns of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon had ceased to be an attractive venue for prospective immigrants from Portugal owing to a rapid deterioration of the local urban context and of local trade and industry.

The city of Damascus, showing impressive growth in the 1530s and 1540s, fell from a total of 9,330 households in 1548 to 8,621 households by 1569.[50] By the 1590s, every town in Palestine without exception had undergone significant demographic deterioration, Ramleh and Gaza, the main staging posts for trade with Egypt, losing as much as half their population between 1560 and the 1590s, while Jerusalem and Hebron shrank by some 30%.[51] Most critical of all, for the Spanish and Portuguese Jews in the Arabic-speaking part of the empire, was the failure of the textile industry of Safed, owing to structural weaknesses—that is its relative remoteness from its sources of Balkan and Spanish wool, and the impact of growing

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[47] Braude, 'Rise and Fall of Salonica Woollens', 230.

[48] Lane, *Venice and History*, 17.

[49] Cohen and Lewis, *Population and Revenue*, 20.

[50] Ibid., 20.

[51] Ibid., 21, 92–4, 127, 140.

Venetian competition for those wool supplies, together with the fact that Safed's fulling-mills could operate only in the winter rainy season. After around 1580, with the decay of the woollen industry, the population of Safed fell precipitately, with hundreds moving away, a steep decline which continued down to the middle of the next century.[52]

Of more lasting significance for the evolution of the Portuguese Jewish (and New Christian) maritime networks of early modern times—and a point little emphasized or understoood in the existing historiography—was the partly separate web of Sephardic Jewish communities and trade routes which evolved specifically in the Greek Lands and adjacent areas in the aftermath of the Expulsion from Spain. The origin of this development lay in the huge concentration of Spanish and Portuguese exiles settling at Salonika, a Greek city close to the main trans-Balkan trade routes and the only substantial European city in Early Modern times which had a Jewish majority—some 64% of the population in 1613 by which date there were officially 2,933 Jewish households there, as against only 2,195 Jewish households in the much larger city of Istanbul.[53] Whereas in 1478 there had been a large Greek Orthodox population and a few Muslims living in the town but no Jews, by 1519 there were over 3,143 Jewish households, constituting a clear majority of the population. The very high figure for 1519 probably reflects the fact that Salonika served as the initial entry point for the Spanish and Portuguese exiles fleeing to Ottoman territory. Many of the Jews who originally settled there subsequently fanned out to other parts of Greece and the Balkans so that, by 1535, the Jewish population had fallen back somewhat to the still very impressive figure of 2,645 mostly Sephardic households.[54]

But the point which has been insufficiently stressed is that the cultural composition and balance of Salonikan Jewry was quite different from than at Istanbul being far more predominantly hispanic in character. At Istanbul, in 1608, around half or more of the total Jewish population (1,152 households) consisted of Greek-speaking Romaniote

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[52] David, 'Spanish Exiles in the Holy Land', 104–5.

[53] Lowry, 'When did the Sephardim arrive in Salonica?', 203, 209–10; Levy, *Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, 7–8.

[54] Hacker, 'Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire', 110; Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 118–19.


BLACK SEA
Istanbul
SEA OF MARMARA
Bursa
Edirne
Izmir (Smyrna)
Rhodes
Kavála
Serres (Serrhai)
Salonika
AEGEAN SEA
Naxos
Chalkis
Thebes
Pella
Larisa
Tríkala
Naupaktos (Lepanto)
Corinth
Nauplia
Patras
Mistras
Koron (Koroni)
Ioanina
Arta
Valona (Vlere)
Corfu
CORFU (under Venice)
Nikopolis
ZANTE (under Venice)
IONIAN SEA
▲ Sephardi Communities
F.D. 2002

Map 2. The Sephardi Communities in the Greek lands under Ottoman Rule

Table Two: The Sephardic Network in the Greek Lands and southern Balkans in the 16th and 17th century

	c. 1519	*c. 1530*	*c. 1550*	*c. 1590*	*c. 1620*	*c. 1650*
Individuals						
Canaea (Crete)				300	–	–
Candia (Iraklion)				800		
Corfu			400	–	700	500
Leucade					50	
Rhodes		750		500	500	
Mistras		360	480			
Patras		–	1,160			
Zante				–	–	385
Households						
Arta		25	24			
Chalkis		30				
Corinth		–	55			
Ioannina		–	26			
Kavála						500
Koron (Koroni)		36	55			10
Larissa	8	42	–	212	–	
Lepanto (Navpaktos)		84	–	120		
Mardin	92	131	118		–	
Mistra	72	99	92		–	
Nauplia		25				
Nikopol	–	99	–		–	206
Patras	168	252	500	–	–	–
Pella	–	24	–			
Salonika	3,143	2,269	2,883 (in 1567)	–	2,933	–
Skopje	12	–	32		–	
Serres	54	66	–		–	
Sofia	–	–	52		126	800
Thebes	–	126	–		60	
Tríkala	19	181	–		111	387
Valona (Vlöre)	97	527	–		212	
Vidin	–	7	–		31	50

Sources: Veinstein, 'L'empire Ottoman', 366; Bernstein-Makovetsky, 'Social and Communal Organisation', 208–10; Paci, *"Scala" di Spalato*, 136;Angel, *Jews of Rhodes*, 21, 113; Bowman, 'Jews of Mistra', 29–30; Seymour, 'Séfarades de Corfou', 335, 339; Panova, 'Social Differentiation', 135–6; Roth, *History*, 313; Inalcik, *An Economic and Social History* I, 257; Levy, *Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, 6, 11.

Jews, as against 539 Sephardic households—divided into several congregations, including 'Cordova' and 'Portukal'—and 209 Italian Jewish families.[55] At the same time numerous subsidiary but thriving Spanish-speaking communities proliferated all over Greece, neighbouring fringes of the Balkans, and the Aegean, such as at Chalkis, Pella, Arta, Ioannina, Valona, Thebes, Lepanto (Navpaktos), Nauplia, Koron, Doron, Modon (Methoni), Patras, Corinth, Mistra, Kavála, Demotica, Serres, Xantha, Castoria, Trikkala, Larissa and Rhodes, as well as the Venetian possessions of Cyprus, Crete, and Corfu, and the Jews became notably active in Venice's trade with Corfu, Morea and neighbouring parts of Greece.[56] As the Venetian Levant trade as a whole contracted markedly in the decades 1590–1620, Venetian trade with Corfu, Morea and the rest of Greece, now to a large extent in Jewish hands, tended to expand with the rising influx of silk, currents, cheese, grain and olive oil being paid for with cash as well as Venetian cloth.[57] Consequently, the Greek hispanic Jewish communities with Salonika at the forefront, rather than those in the Arabic-speaking Near East, were the real hub of the new international Sephardic trading network as it originally evolved on Ottoman territory and it was specifically the Jews in the Greek lands rather than the predominantly Muslim parts of the empire who shaped and developed that network in a form which soon enabled it to bridge the worlds of Islam and western Christendom.

Forging the new Jewish trade network in Greece and the Balkans which was to have such a fundamental importance for Sephardic history in early modern times was the achievement of a mixture of Spanish, Portuguese and southern Italian Jews arriving in the wake of the Expulsion from Spain (1492). But the Ladino-speaking culture and trade system which the exiles from Spain had created subsequently absorbed most of the other layers of the Jewish presence in the area, integrating the Portuguese New Christians after 1540 as it had earlier Portuguese immigrants, besides Italian and Sicilian Jews, a smattering of Ashkenazim and at least some of the native Greek-speaking Romaniote Jews. During the later sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the Italian and Greek-speaking Jewish communities underwent a fairly rapid process of hispanization not only in Salonika and Istanbul but in many (though not all) of the smaller inland centres and on islands such as Rhodes.[58] It is true that in some places, such as Arta and Ioannina, where relatively few Sephardim settled, the Romaniote communities successfully resisted the process of hispanicization.[59] But by and large the 'Greeks' were gradually largely absorbed. In this way an entirely new Spanish-speaking international trade diaspora was created, centering on Greece and the Aegean, which was essentially an amalgamation of Jews from Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece.

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[55] Levy, *Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, 7–9.

[56] Ciriacono, *Olio e ebrei*, 62, 67.

[57] ASV CSM vol. 145 fos. 18–18v.res. 12 April 1619.

Meanwhile, during the first four decades of the sixteenth century, as Spanish and Portuguese Jews became more prominent in buying up the raw wool, Morean silk and other products of Greece and the Balkans, and in distributing spices, western cloth and other imports, Florentine, Genoese and even the mighty Venetians tended to withdraw more and more from the internal overland routes linking Salonika and Constantinople with the Balkan interior and the Adriatic. The process was accelerated by the Ottoman-Venetian war of the late 1530s which temporarily suspended all Venetian trade with the Turkish empire. This broad shift of course worked in favour of Greek and Armenian as well as Jewish merchants. But the Jews proved to be best placed to take advantage of the change, gaining a general ascendancy over the overland trade routes of Greece and the Balkans and eventually compelling even the great Italian commercial cities trading with the Ottoman Empire to adjust their attitude towards them. From the 1540s, the latter began offering facilities, privileges and trading concessions to attract the so-called 'Levantine Jews' that is Spanish and Portuguese Jews settled in the Ottoman Empire to settle and trade on their territory.[60]

In the 1550s and 1560s, successive representatives of the Venetian Republic in Istanbul concluded that 'Levantine' Jews now dominated the buying up of wool and other products of the Balkans. As one of them, Bernardo Navagero put it, in 1553, 'they have completely ruined' that trade for the Venetians; equally, they had wrested control of the distribution of Venetian cloth and camlets from Venetian Christians.[61] In 1560, the new Venetian *bailo*, Marino Cavalli, reported that there were now only ten or twelve Venetian merchant houses still in business in Istanbul and that their leverage was so reduced compared to what it had formerly been that they 'fanno il tutto per mezzo degli ebrei' [do everything through the Jews] both buying Balkan wools and distributing Venetian manufactures including fine cloth.[62] According to the Venetian ambassador to the Porte, Leonardo Donà, in 1595, two-thirds of the trade between Venice and Istanbul was now in the hands of the Jews,[63] while Alvise Sanudo affirmed, in 1604, that the Jews were further increasing their ascendancy over the Levant trade and that whereas in the early days of Ottoman Istanbul three-quarters of the traffic had been in Venetian hands and only one quarter in those of Jews and other Ottoman subjects, now the proportions were exactly reversed and three-quarters of the trade was in the hands of Ottoman subjects, and in particular the Jews.[64]

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[58] Rodrigue, 'Sephardim', 166.

[59] Bernstein-Makovetsky, 'Social and Communal Organisation', 210; Dalven, *Jews of Ioannina*, 18–21.

[60] 'Rodrigue, 'Sephardim', 167–8; Israel, *European Jewry*, 37; Cooperman, 'Venetian Policy', 66–7, 71; Arbell, *Trading Nations*, 5.

It was in order to attract these *Levantini*—his charter refers to Greeks and Turks as well but places 'Spaniards and Portuguese' at the top of the list of those being invited—that the duke of Ferrara initiated the process of offering charters for Jewish settlement which so resoundingly heralded the age of European mercantilism.[65] It was doubtless, in turn, this Ferrara charter of 1538, which evidently persuaded the Venetian board of trade, of *Cinque Savii alla Mercanzia*, to change its age-old policy of excluding all Jews from participating in Venice's seaborne commerce. In 1541 the *Cinque Savii* declared that because the 'commerce of Upper and Lower Romania [i.e. the whole Balkans] is being diverted from this city, being now principally in the hands of Levantine Jews', that Jews who were Ottoman subjects were henceforth to be allowed to visit and stay in Venice for purposes of trade on a temporary basis, alongside the small resident 'German' Jewish community already inhabiting the ghetto.[66] Then in 1544, 1547 and again in 1553, just a short time before the Papacy switched to the harshly anti-Jewish policies which were to be so pronounced a feature of the Counter-Reformation in Italy, liberal terms were offered to Jews trading with the Levant who were willing to settle in the papal port of Ancona.[67] Not to be left behind, in 1551, the Grand Duke of Tuscany intervened with his unprecedented charter offering Greeks, Turks, Moors, and Jews trading with the Levant, as well as 'Armeni e Persiani' and others, attractive terms to settle at Pisa from where they could trade with the Balkans, Salonika and Istanbul via the Adriatic ports of Ancona and Pesaro.[68]

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[61] Ibid., 18–19; *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti* i, 102.

[62] Ibid., i 274–5 and ii, p. 53.

[63] Ravid, *Economics and Toleration*, 45.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Balletti, *Ebrei e gli Estensi*, 220–1; Ioly Zorattini, *Processi*, 32–3.

[66] ASV CSM Ist ser. cxxxvii, fos. 135v–6 and cliii, fos. 20v–1; see also Ravid, 'First Charter', 190, 197; Arbell, *Trading Nations*, 6–7.

But in sixteenth-century Italy, Jews were one thing, Portuguese *Marrani* quite another. Among the spate of Italian charters issued between the late 1530s and early 1550s, only one, that of 1555 published by Ercole II of Ferrara, explicitly promises immunity to Portuguese *Marrani* converting from Christianity to Judaism.[69] The rest conspicuously refrained from doing so. The papal charter of 1544 did invite 'Portuguese' to settle and that of 1547 actually specified that 'Novi Christiani' were welcome but conspicuously did not say that New Christians who reverted to Judaism would be tolerated. In 1548, Cosimo I of Tuscany also issued a special edict inviting Portuguese New Christians to settle at Pisa but at the same time laid down that they would only be protected from the Inquisition provided they continued to live outwardly as Catholics.[70] Portuguese Jews who had been living in the Levant, having formerly been baptized, were definitely not supposed to be included in the protection afforded to Levantine Jews; but in practice some were. One of the founders of the Levantine community at Pisa, a silk merchant named Leon Sabibi, is known to have been a Portuguese and, before coming to Pisa, to have been living in Lebanon. Married to Felipa Fernandes a Portuguese Jewess (and doubtless former New Christian, with Antwerp connections) whilst residing in Pisa in the 1560s, he was alternately designated in local records 'Lusitanus' and as 'Leon Sabibi, di Tripoli di Soria'.[71]

In the 1540s and early 1550s, Portuguese New Christians living in Italy were not only numerous but treated with studied leniency.

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[67] Cooperman, 'Venetian Policy', 73; Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 29.
[68] Cassuto, *Ebrei a Firenze*, 89–90, 179.
[69] Ioly Zorattini, *Processi*, 32–3; Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 28.
[70] Ibid., 35.
[71] Luzzati, *Casa dell' Ebreo*, 132–3; Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 57.

But the position changed dramatically during the papacy of the Counter-Reformation pope, Paul IV, who initiated his campaign against the Talmud and other Hebrew books, and to ghettoize Jewish life in Italy, in 1553. As part of this wider set of policy changes regarding Judaism, Paul IV expressly declared that the mass forced baptism of 1497 in Portugal was to be considered valid and that no lapse from Christian status could be condoned or permitted. A papal legate was dispatched to Ancona to root out the *Marrani* who had reverted to Judaism there. Many escaped in time Ferrara or Urbino. But fifty-one were caught interrogated and tortured. Some were sent to the galleys. Twenty-five victims were burnt alive on the Pope's orders, in April and June 1555. Incensed, Gracia and Joseph Nasi, at Instanbul, tried to organize a boycott of Ancona among Ottoman Jewish merchants trading with Italy from Ottoman territory.

The burning of the Ancona Portuguese made a considerable impression throughout Italy, Greece and the Levant. It was followed by a campaign of pressure by the Papacy (backed by Spain and Portugal) on other Italian states to tighten up their policy on the Portuguese forced converts which led to several local expulsions of *Marrani*, culminating in 1579–81 when Ercole II's more amenable successor bowed to papal pressure and expelled the largest concentration of Portuguese New Christians who had returned to Judaism in Italy, that of Ferrara. This abrupt change of course, in the mid 1550s, owing to papal policy, prevented Italy from yet becoming the chief focus of fresh New Christian emigration from Portugal. It meant that for two decades or so after 1555, the Ottoman Empire continued to be the prime destination for Portuguese New Christians fleeing the Inquisition and intent on returning to Judaism as well as many who were in a state of hesitation or doubt. It was a tendency powerfully reinforced by the confrontation between Venice and the Turks in the late 1560s and early 1570s when the notion became pervasive at Venice that the Jews throughout the Levant, directed by the Sultan's favourite, Joseph Nasi, were plotting the destruction of Venice and her commerce in league with the Turks.[72]

Early in 1568, the Venetian senate expelled from Cyprus all Jews who were not natives of the island. In June 1568, the Venetian Council of Ten decided to deport all the Jews from its strongholds in the Levant, citing their links with Joseph Nasi as grounds for doing so though the measure was only sporadically enforced.[73] Those that left inevitably migrated to Ottoman territory. Consideration was also given to expelling the Jews from Venice itself. But the upsurge of anti-Jewish sentiment in Venice, and in Italy more generally, subsided again after the great naval victory at Lepanto (Navpaktos) and in the wake of the Turkish-Venetian peace of 1571. As early as December 1573, Venice was again seeking to repair her bridges with the Ottoman empire and that meant reverting to the policy of the 1540s with regard to the Jews, granting safe-conducts to the Spanish-speaking Jews emanating from Ottoman territory (whether or not they may have originally been *conversos* in Iberia).[74] It was in this changed context of the later 1570s and 1580s that Ottoman Empire first began to lose its position as the main focus of emigration for Portuguese New Christians escaping from the rigours of religious repression in the Iberian Peninsula with Italy, and Venice in particular, beginning to take its place.

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[72] Pullan, *Jews of Europe*, 19, 179–80.

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[73] Arbell, *Trading Nations*, 62–3.

[74] Ravid, 'Tale of Three Cities', 146–7; Segre, 'Sephardic Settlements', 123.

CHAPTER TWO

VENICE, SALONIKA AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SEPHARDI DIASPORA IN THE NORTH (1574–1621)

The height of the confrontation between Venice, the Papacy, and other Italian states, as well as Spain, on the one side, and the Ottoman Jewish merchants they knew as the 'Levantini', that is the Sephardic international trade diaspora of the Ottoman Empire, on the other, occurred in the years immediately preceding, and during, the War of Cyprus (1570–73). In the years between the great Turkish siege of Malta (1565) and the mid 1570s, the Italian states (and Spain) viewed the Ottoman Empire with a mixture of heightened fear and religious aversion which directly influenced their view of the now heavily hispanicized Jewish communities engaging in long-distance overland and seaborne trade to be found strung out across the sultan's dominions.[1] This new eastern Mediterranean commercial diaspora, scattered across the Levant from Venice to Basra (taken by the Turks in 1546), superimposed upon earlier strata of Jewish life, was geographically highly dispersed and fairly disparate in origin being an amalgamation of Jewish exiles from Castile, Catalonia, Portugal, and southern Italy together with some native Greek and Arabic-speaking Jews as well as a smattering of Ashkenazim. But culturally and economically it nevertheless displayed an impressive cohesion, in language it was (at least north and west of Syria) overwhelmingly and increasingly Ladino- or Spanish-speaking, and its geographical and strategic heart was in the Greek lands, above all in Salonika.

The War of Cyprus temporarily suspended virtually all commerce and correspondence between Italy and the Ottoman empire, and, for a time, heavily disrupted the nascent network of religious and commercial ties linking the Sephardic communities in Islamic lands with those in Italy and the Venetian maritime empire, ties which had begun to acquire a far-reaching significance, as we have seen, as far back as the 1530s and 1540s. By the end of the 1560s the atmosphere was confrontational in the extreme—politically, religiously and economically. On the eve of war, several Spanish and Portuguese-speaking Levantine Jewish merchants were arrested in the Ghetto Vecchio of Venice and their merchandise confiscated. The small community of *Levantini* settled Pisa, several of whom had traded for years in Syria and Turkey, were expelled from Tuscany, in 1570, while the Spanish Levantine synagogue in Pisa was closed.[2] The next year, the drive against Jews with Ottoman connections reached it climax, with the Venetian Senate's decision, of 18 December 1571, to expel all the Jews from Venice though, in the end, the measure was never fully implemented.[3] At the same time, the Papacy stepped up its campaign against the Portuguese *Marrani* in Italy—in Ferrara, Florence, Venice and Tuscany, no less than in the Papal States—the *Marrani*, that is Jews in Italy who had formerly lived as Christians in Portugal, being viewed as inveterate enemies of Christ and natural allies of the Turk. This new repression tended, once again, to channel the main stream of Portuguese New Christian refugees from the Inquisition away from Italy—thus far the main western alternative to Turkey—and firmly back towards Islamic lands.

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[1] Pullan, *Jews of Europe*, 19–20, 179–80.

After the War of Cyprus, by contrast, there was a rapid transformation of relationships in the Mediterranean. A combination of pressures forced the Venetian government to restructure the Republic's seaborne empire and trade in a way which, for the first time, ensured a central role both for Jews trading with the Levant, and for the Portuguese *Marrani*, in the economic and cultural life of Venice and its colonies. The consequences of this momentous shift not just for Italy and the Levant but for the history of the European maritime empires in general, and for Jewish history outside the Mediterranean—though by no means immediately obvious—were to be prove fundamental. In particular, the religious and economic interaction between the Jews of Salonika and Venice, once interaction became fully established, during the 1580s, created a new kind of Sephardic society, cutting across the barriers between the Christian and Islamic worlds, and bracketing the institutions and culture of traditional Judaism together with the cultural world of the Portuguese *Marrani*. This proved a combination of experience, techniques, intellectual apparatus, and organizational structure which made it possible for the mercantile elements among the post-1590 Portuguese New Christians emigrating to northern Europe, and settling in places where there was no previous Jewish social or religious structure, to be rapidly and effectively reintegrated not just within Judaism and the Jewish social world but also within the new, highly distinctive and tightly-knit inter-continental complex of Sephardi trade networks.

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[2] Luzzati, *Casa dell' Ebreo*, 131, 135; Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 54.

[3] Ravid, 'Socioeconomic Background', 41–2, 47; Arbell, *Trading Nations*, 23, 63–74.

Of western Sephardi Jewry's four principal communities in the seventeenth century—Amsterdam, Hamburg, Livorno and Venice—the first three all originated in the 1590s and were in an important sense all rooted in the experience, psychology and institutions of the so-called 'Ponentine' or western Sephardic community in Venice which, in origin, went back, as we have seen, to 1541 but which only became firmly established and organized in the late 1570s and 1580s.[4] It was following the crucial policy reversal in Venice, in the years 1573–4, and especially after the dispersal of the Portuguese *Marrani* from Ferrara in the years 1579–81, that Venice became indisputably the main focus of Portuguese New Christian emigration in Italy a well as the chief link between Portuguese Jews and New Christians in western Europe and the Spanish and Portuguese synagogues of the Ottoman empire.[5] It is true that until 1589, there was no explicit official toleration of Portuguese *Marrani* reverting to Judaism in Venice. But the same *raison d'état* which led the *Serenissima* to encourage Ottoman subjects, including Levantine Jews, to restore their ties with Venice and her empire, settle agents in Venice, and ply their Levant trade through the Venetian emporium, from the end of 1573, a policy resulting from the Venetian leadership's realization that there was no other way to revive Venetian commerce with the Balkans, mainland Greece and Constantinople, before long induced them also to adopt a new policy toward the *Marrani*.[6] For in Venice, as in Salonika and the Levant generally, the Portuguese New Christians who reverted to Judaism settling among the *Levantini*, invested heavily in the Levant trade (including the spice traffic with India via Basra and the Red Sea), then still the only strand of maritime trade in which Jews played a major role. The *Marrani* inevitably sought the protection of the Levantine congregations and elders.

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[4] Israel. 'Jews of Venice', 95–116; Bodian, *Hebrews of the Portuguese Nation*, 33–4.

[5] Roth, 'Marranes à Venise', 205–8; Ravid, 'Socioeconomic Background', 46–50.

[6] Pullan, *Jews of Europe*, 22, 180–1, 186, Segre, 'Sephardic Settlements', 123; Ravid, 'Tale of Three Cities', 146–7, 159.

Much to their displeasure, the papal authorities were well aware of this new trend by the early 1580s, and were deeply disturbed by it; but could see no way of preventing it. As the papal nuncio Bolognetti explained, in 1581, as long as they made no attempt to proselytize among Christians, or show any disrespect for Christian worship, the Venetian authorities now insisted as a matter of policy on condoning the economic activities and reversion to Judaism of the *Marrani*.[7] Nor, in fact, had the Venetians much choice if they were serious about reviving their Levant trade and organizing it on a new basis, in place of the old galley fleets, through encouraging merchants who were Ottoman subjects, whether Greeks, Armenians and or Jewish *Levantini*, to bring the goods of Turkey and the Balkans to the Venetian Greek islands and the Venetian outlets in the Adriatic. This was because, as indeed Bolognetti assured Rome, the former Portuguese New Christians in Venice also participate in the Levant trade, and do so in collaboration with and 'with the goodwill' of the *Levantini*; and because 'they are all closely interconnected', in practice the *Marrani* were covered by the capitulations with the Ottoman sultan and, in effect, legally classified, or at any rate protected, as 'Levantini'.[8] This from the papal point of view was a theological disaster but an economic fact.

This legal-commercial conjunction and symbiosis of *Ponentini* with *Levantini* at Venice in the 1570s and 1580s was indeed, in the Christian context, a new and remarkable phenomenon. Culturally and religiously, the newcomers may have been quite distinct, indeed very different, from the main body of Salonikan Spanish Jewry. But in the prevailing situation of Italy in the 1570s and 1580s, no other survival strategy was available if they were to escape from Christian ecclesiastical jurisdiction without settling in Islamic lands. Furthermore, as far as investment of capital and involvement in trade, were concerned, no other economic strategy made sense. Of course, they could also survive by remaining genuine, or nominal Christians, and there is no doubt that numerous Portuguese New Christians in Italy, particularly those with medical or academic qualifications which enabled them to enter the professions, did so. But in that case they would have no access to the only maritime commercial network of the sixteenth century, the Levant trade, where Portuguese merchants who uprooted themselves from Peninsula could otherwise readily gain entry. Maritime trade between Italy and Spain, for example, was dominated by large Genoese and Florentine firms who needed no Portuguese to assist with long-established, and highly lucrative operations in the Peninsula.

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[7] Cooperman, 'Venetian Policy', 77.

[8] Ibid.

The absence of any viable commercial niche for those who remained Christians is clearly proven by the fact that no significant Portuguese New Christian trade networks avoiding Jewish connections were established anywhere in Italy. However many Portuguese New Christians were, and had been, active in Florence, Rome, Venice, Naples and many parts of Italy since the early sixteenth century, and however vehement the Christian allegiance of some of these, no workable or substantial networks were or could be formed. Indeed, neither in Italy, nor anywhere else in Europe with the sole exception of Antwerp, was there ever an organized Portuguese 'nation', consisting principally of Portuguese New Christians—officially Christian and with an enduring and acknowledged legal status—which endured for any length of time. The uniqueness of the Antwerp Portuguese New Christian community, as a commercial as well as institutional and cultural entity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is convincing proof of the extent of the advantages, and the strategic superiority, of the Portuguese crypto-Jews over their brethren who remained Catholics outside the Iberian Peninsula and Ibero-America, politically, culturally and, perhaps above all, economically. But it was a strategic superiority that, originally at least, was due exclusively to the Ottoman factor.

What became a *de facto* reality in Venice in the late 1570s and 1580s was regularized in legal form by the Venetian charter of 1589. While it is no doubt true that the 1589 charter grew directly out of larger project to reorganize Venetian Balkan commerce repeatedly proposed, in particular by an enterprising Balkan Spanish Jew, Daniel Rodriguez (or Rodriga), the strengthening of the basis for Jewish immigration to Venice which was its direct result was a logical outcome of Venice's post-1573 general situation and policy. Commencing in 1573, Rodriguez, who had ties with the Turkish governor of Bosnia, submitted a series of petitions to the Venetian Senate, arguing that Venice could best restore and consolidate her grip on Balkan trade, and defend it against the growing incursions of pirates, other Italians and northern Europeans, by linking the internal trade-routes of the Balkans (dominated by Spanish-speaking Jews) directly with Venice by means of a Venetian protected and controlled 'scala', or maritime depot, on the Dalmatian coast, affording good routes across the Balkans to Salonika and Constantinople and, at the same time, a short, easily protected maritime route to Venice. For this purpose, Rodriguez proposed the hitherto little-utilized Venetian port of Split (Spalato).[9] Quite apart from the practicalities—such a plan required building a proper harbour there—such a concept implied nothing less than a fundamental revolution in the structure and organization of Venetian trade which, over the centuries had relied on Venetian-built state galley fleets, supplemented by 'round ships', sailing to Istanbul and the Levant and purchases at source effected by Venetian merchants. For Rodriguez's proposals would drastically lessen the importance of the sea-routes to the Aegean, Sea of Marmara, Black Sea and Near East, greatly reduce the role of Venetian merchants in the Levant, and render the Balkan overland routes, and the Jews, virtually the chief pillar of Venetian overseas commerce and prosperity.[10]

The final outcome of the proposal regarding Split which, in 1589, were combined with a petition of the Levantine Jewish merchants for better legal status, protection and privileges in Venice and its empire, was acceptance of both parts of the package by the Venetian Board of Trade, and the Senate, in the full realization of the vast implications of this decision. In their 1589 report on the proposals, the Venetian board of trade expressly stated that similar proposals had been turned down in the past despite the 'concorso di tanti, che usciti dalla Spagna, et andati in Levante per non haver trovato in queste parti recapito, hanno portato i loro grossissimi capitali in quelle bandi con aggrandimento di negotij d'altri et grave interesse di questa città' [mass of exiles from the Iberian Peninsula who had gone to the Levant because they found no admittance to these parts, and took their very great capital to those places, increasing the business of others very much at the expense of this city].[11] In addition, the authorities noted the great change they were making in the status of the *Marrani* who, for the first time, were to be officially protected under the new charter, admitting that their wording, referring to Spanish and other Jews would substantially widen the basis of Jewish settlement in Venice, and acknowledging that this would afford security to numerous Jews coming from the west. They even hinted that these would inevitably include numerous former Christians, justifying their legislation by adding that this would cause no greater harm than the present situation which leads to their settling in Ottoman lands and then afterwards coming, from there, to Venice and gaining the benefit of favourable privileges 'under the name of Levantine Turkish subjects'.[12]

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[9] ASV CSM 1st ser. cxxxvii, fos. 73v, 96v–7, 105–6, 188v–90; Ravid, 'First Charter', 192–7; Arbell, *Trading Nations*, 7, 11, 163.

[10] Luzzatto, *Discurso*, 31–41; Novak, *Židovi u Splitu*, 13–18; Ravid, *Economics and Toleration*, 30–2.

[11] Report of the *Cinque Savii*, Venice, 27 June, 1589 printed as appendix D in Ravid, 'First Charter', p. 217.

The charter that finally emerged not only provided firm encouragement for Jewish settlement in Venice and at Split—albeit in ghettos and with distinctive Jewish dress—but expressly extended freedom of religious practice with immunity for past religious offenses so that the *Marrani* were no longer potentially subject to prosecution by the papacy or the Inquisition in Venice. Of course, it was impossible to refer directly to *Marrani* in formal the legislation of a Catholic state, and less still to Portuguese New Christians who wished, or who might consider, returning to Judaism. For this reason the Venetian authorities deftly introduced the euphemism 'Ponentini' into the legal terminology in which the charter is embodied, an apparently innocuous counterpart to the already widely used term 'Levantini', implying a legal parity between 'Ebrei Levantini et Ponetini' which was, in fact, both from a theological and international legal point of view was completely bogus but which admirably served its purpose. In any case, no informed person, merchant or ecclesiastic, at the time could possibly be in any doubt that 'Ponentine' was nothing but a euphemism for *Marrani*, Portuguese New Christians openly returning to Judaism in Italy.[13]

The new system proved successful economically and constituted a considerable strengthening of Venice, and her trade with the Balkans and mainland Greece. Rodríguez who contributed much of his own capital to the project of constructing the harbour at Split, succeeded in attracting Sephardic mechants, and securing Ottoman approval for the new route despite its maritime terminal being a fortress under

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[12] Ravid, 'First Charter', 201; Israel, *European Jewry*, 39.

[13] Cooperman, 'Venetian Policy', 75.

Venetian control. The route and new 'scala' were officially opened in 1592.[14] The 'scala' of Spalato did link Venice directly to the Balkan overland routes to Salonika and Istanbul, and did draw many Sephardic merchants away from Valona and other places in the Adriatic,[15] though in the longer run it was somewhat less predominant in the new pattern of trans-Balkan commerce than Rodriguez had hoped—Ragusa, Valona and Corfu all likewise being key depots servicing the overland routes to Salonika and likewise importing fine cloth, camlets, and other manufactures from Venice and remitting as returns raw wool, silks, cotton, mohair, flax, hides, and alum, the latter an additional essential material for the Venetian textile industry. By the 1590s, most of Venice's exports to mainland Greece, the Balkans, and Black Sea area, passed via Corfu, Patras, Split, Valona, Ragusa, or other Dalmatian ports, and were then transported overland, and distributed, principally from inland regional centres as well as Salonika and Istanbul.[16] Rodriguez himself, as 'consul' of the new community at Split, was among the leading traders handling the traffic and was followed in this regard by his successor as consul, Joseph Penso, who besides trade with Venice regularly sent large quantities of hides to the tanneries at Ancona.[17] While Venice's trade with Egypt and Syria remained very largely, as in the past in Venetian Christian hands, much or most of her Adriatic, Balkan and Greek trade was henceforth handled by Sephardic Jews.

The legal and institutional fusing of *Levantini* and *Ponentini* at Venice, though presaged earlier in Ferrara, was something virtually new in the 1580s but not for long something unique. In July 1591, Grand Duke Ferdinand I of Tuscany (1587–1609) offered freedom of religion to the *Marrani* as well as Levantine Jews in his new free port of Livorno (Leghorn).[18] Previously, while there had been a significant number of *Marrani* in Pisa and at Florence, these had lived separately from the *Levantini*, living outwardly voluntarily or involuntarily as Christians.[19] In Tuscany, after 1591, there was no further interference with Portuguese *Marrani* who had reverted to Judaism (as long as they did not do so inside the grand duchy), although the Sephardic community of Pisa, for extra status and form's sake, continued for another half a century to style themselves 'di Nazione Ebrea Levantina'.[20] The only *Marrano* who did meet a tragic fate at the hands of the Inquisition in Tuscany, after 1591, Fernando Alvares (alias Abraham da Porto Nato) was known to have converted back to Judaism within the grand duchy and had the misfortune to be impenitent as well as unlucky. Having already spent six years in the Coimbra Inquisition dungeons before migrating to Spain and, later, to France, he subsequently gravitated to Livorno where he joined the synagogue; arrested by the Tuscan Inquisition as an blatant apostate from Christ, he spent the years 1634–8 in their dungeons, at Pisa, before being transferred to Rome where the Holy Father kept in prison for another two years before having him burnt alive on the Campo dei Fiori as an obstinate heretic.[21] But for the rest Tuscany after 1591 became a noted haven of *Marrani* fleeing the Iberian Peninsula. By 1613, the Spanish-speaking community at Pisa had virtually quintupled while the predominantly Portuguese-speaking community of Livorno, founded in 1591, by 1613 consisted of 711 individuals, a number equivalent to more than the whole of Tuscan Jewry in 1570.[22]

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[14] Loker, 'Spanish and Portuguese Jews', 290, 292.

[15] Inalcik, *An Economic and Social History* i, 266–8.

[16] Aymard, 'Commerce dans la Mer Adriatique', 704–5; Paci, *'Scala' di Spalato*, 103–10; Bumenkranz, 'Commerce maritime', 144–51.

[17] Loker, 'Spanish and Portugeuse Jews', 292–3.

[18] Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 44–5; Luzatti, *Casa dell' Ebreo*, 140–1; Ravid, 'Tale of Three Cities', 156.

[19] Luzatti, *Casa dell'Ebreo*, 141.

The result of the change in policy by the Italian commercial powers was a rapid and fundamental transformation not just in their economic role, and demographically, but also in the religious and cultural character particularly of the Jewish communities of Venice, Livorno, Ferrara, and Pisa. The demographic change in itself was quite dramatic. At its height, by 1613, the 'Levantine' congregation of Pisa consisted of ninety-three families, consisting of 441 individuals.[23] The congregation at Livorno grew steadily though not rapidly, to 711 (out of a total population of 10,500) by 1622 and 1,250 by 1645.[24] But from the late 1570s down to the early years of the seventeenth century, there was no question that Venice represented the presiding and dominant Sephardic community of the west and chief link between the Jews of the west and those of the Ottoman empire as well as prime instance of religious and cultural symbiosis of *Levantini* and *Ponentini*. The number of Jews living in Venice from approximately 900, in 1552, rose, after falling back somewhat in the early 1570s, to 1,694 by 1586 and over 2,500 by 1600. Correspondingly, and as an immediate consequence, by the 1590s, fresh Portuguese New Christian emigrants from Portugal (and the Spanish lands) settling in Islamic lands beyond the Adriatic dwindled to a small trickle,[25] though there were still some Portuguese arrivals, among them Diogo Peres da Costa, native of Coimbra and an uncle of Duarte Nunes da Costa, who after many years as an itinerant trader in the viceroyalty of Peru, fled South America when the Inquisition began searching for him in Cuzco and Potosí, in the late 1590s. By the time he was burnt in effigy in the Lima *Auto-da-fé* of March 1605, he had escaped, via Seville and Venice, to the Ottoman Levant where he reportedly reverted to normative Judaism, reviving the old family name of Curiel, and moving from Tripoli to the Holy Land, where he died at Safed.[26]

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[20] Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 59.
[21] Ibid., 59.
[22] Ibid, 60, 119; Luzzati, *Casa dell' Ebreo*, 272–3; Laras, 'Delatore', 66–7.
[23] Toaff, *Nazione ebrea.*, 60.
[24] Ibid., 149; Engels, *Merchants, Interlopers, Seamen*, 42.

Given the early cultural ascendancy of Venice over Livorno, Amsterdam and Hamburg, the vibrant fusion of Portuguese New Christian attitudes, dress and economic dynamism with an older Spanish rootedness in Jewish tradition transferred to the Greek lands and Istanbul, and combined with the new international maritime trade network, had the most far-reaching implications. In the first place, Venice was now the hub of an impressive network of maritime commerce and contacts linking the Ottoman empire with western Christendom. All transfer of correspondence, donations, legacies, and rabbinic judgments between north-western Europe and the Levant, including Jerusalem, passed through Venice which meant that Venice became the mediator and point of contact between east and west. Secondly, the effectiveness of a closely knit network of communities scattered over a vast distance connected by maritime routes was shown to depend on a hub which was simultaneously a major world commercial and financial exchange and great religious and cultural centre. Thirdly, Venice where the charter of 1589 had been obtained by merchant leaders speaking on behalf of the Levantine and Ponentine merchants together, brought the two categories together in what was to become a new European context, creating an entirely novel cultural and institutional milieu.

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[25] Nehama, *Histoire* iii, 57–8.

[26] Toribio de Medina, *Historia* . . . *Inquisicion de Lima*, 267–8, 497; Palma, *Anales*, 6.

In place of the older Greek-Ladino and Levantine pattern of establishing numerous small synagogues based on regional provenance, and dominated by rabbis, the new Venetian Sephardi construct amalgamated Jews of Castilian, Catalan, Italian, Sicilian, Portuguese and Greek background into two large and closely associated congregations, the Levantine and Ponentine, based not on traditions or place of origin but interconnecting trade networks sharing the same legal privileges which meant that for all practical purposes they were virtually one community.Where Salonika housed over twenty *kehalim* (congregations) 'each according to its tongue', each supporting its own poor and each supposedly, 'like a city unto itself', as one rabbi expressed it in the 1560s making it virtually impossible to co-ordinate a common policy,[27] Venice erased place of origin, and rabbinic control and created large-scale Sephardic institutions dominated by lay elders (*parnasim*). By contrast, the uniquely large Sephardic population of Salonika remained divided into numerous small congregations, having as early as 1524 no less than twenty-four synagogues based on place of origin.[28] In Safed, by 1555, there were twelve separate communities, including the Arabic speakers, Germans and the 'Franks', the rest being designated as Purtukal (Portugal), Maghariba (Maghreb), Kurtuba (Cordoba), Kastilia (Castile), Araghun (Aragon), Macar (Hungary), Pulya (Puglia), Kalawruya (Calabria), Sabilya (Seville), and Taliyan (Italy).[29] At the Graeco-Albanian port of Valona, in 1520, at that time the third largest Jewish community in the Balkans, with 528 households, there were no less than eight communities, including besides Castilians, Portuguese and Catalans, Sicilians, Greeks and that of Qalivrus (Calabria).[30]

As they took shape in the early seventeenth century, the new Sephardic communities established in northern Europe expressly modelled their communal organization and institutions on those of Venice and nowhere more so than in their efforts, eventually successful, to create a single centralized administration for the community as well as system of representation in dealings with external bodies. The general principle that 'os senhores do Mahamad', the annually co-opted board of elders, or *parnasim*, including the communal treasurer, or *gabay*, should preside over the whole life of the community and, outside issues of religious law, take precedence over the rabbis, was a typically Venetian social construction with important political and economic consequences which was subsequently replicated throughout the Sephardic diaspora in the west.[31] It meant that major decisions affecting the life and dealings of the community were made by men who were deeply involved in international trade and finance, acutely sensitive to the intricacies of great power politics, rather than based purely on religious law and rabbinic tradition. Thus, not only were rabbis, cantors and other synagogue staff appointed (and when necessary dismissed), and their salaries paid by the *Mahamad*, but their traditional functions as judges and arbiters in disputes and civil legislation, and as guardians of morality and communal discipline, were considerably cut back. Communal rules regarding dress, life-style, sexual conduct, social welfare and the suppression of unruly or violent behaviour, as well as intellectual censorship, were proclaimed, judged and enforced by the *parnasim* who also then administered warnings and, where relevant, imposed sanctions or punishment the latter usually in the form of financial penalties.

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[27] Rozen, 'Individual and Community', 222–3; Levy, *Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, 68.

[28] Nehama, *Histoire* ii, 28–9, 39; Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 123.

[29] Cohen and Lewis, *Population and Revenue*, 161.

[30] Veinstein, 'Juifs d'Avlonya', 785–6.

One of the fundamental rules imposed by the communal elders was that no member other than someone delegated by the *Mahamad*, might set himself up to speak to official bodies outside the community in its name, or in that of the Portuguese and Spanish Jews more generally, under penalty of the communal ban, or *herem*. This practice reinforced both the cohesion and the political standing of the community and enhanced its power to enforce social discipline on its members. Another key regulation was that no-one might dispute, or conduct arguments about questions of religion with professed Christians—other, it was understood than those who are of 'our nation, Portuguese and Spaniards'—nor urge anyone to convert from Christianity, nor use offensive words towards Christians, 'because to do otherwise is to disturb the liberty which we enjoy and make us disliked'.[32] Yet another was that in cases of major disputes within the community no one was permitted to invoke local or foreign courts against the authority of the elders.

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[31] Fuks-Mansfeld, *Sefardim*, 59.

[32] *Libro de los Acuerdos*, 11.

Sephardic self-rule, Venetian style, as replicated in the western Sephardic diaspora, was close-knit, oligarchic and authoritarian, even perhaps despotic, but it had the great advantage of sustaining a highly organized, communal entity well-attuned to the need to defend and promote its collective interests. Like those of the Ponentine synagogue of Venice, the *haskamoth* (laws) of the great daughter western Sephardic communities of Amsterdam, Hamburg and London, begin by stating that 'os senhores do Mahamad', the gentlemen of the Mahamad, shall 'have authority and supremacy over everything' and this was no idle boast.[33] Its justification was the collective need to respond effectively to legal, ecclesiastical, economic and political pressures, at home and abroad, to impose the right to decide who could, and who could not be a member of the community, and to supervise the complex process of migration and settlement of Portuguese New Christians reverting to Judaism, or thinking about doing so, all of which positively required a new and more centralized type of communal organization. In the west, tight, secular and oligarchic control exerted through the new central institutions proved to be necessary also, for controlling the flow of donations to the Holy Land and for ransoming captives in the Mediterranean, for organizing communal welfare, health care and education, and also to curb begging—or any form of pressure of Jewish poor (or excessive Ashkenazic immigration)—liable to antagonize the Christian clergy and authorities.

But if Venice was the declared model, the symbolic primacy it continued to exert through the seventeenth century was more and more overshadowed in practice by the growing real ascendancy of the largest and economically most powerful northern community, that of Amsterdam. By the second half of the seventeenth century, Amsterdam not only took clear precedence over Hamburg and London and presided over the five small satellite Portuguese Jewish congregations in the United Provinces—Rotterdam, Middelburg, The Hague, Maarsen and Amersfoort—but also exercised a protective and supervisory role over the Sephardic communities of the New World—Curaçao, Surinam, Martinique, Barbados, Jamaica, and New Amsterdam (after 1664, New York).

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[33] GAA PJG xix, pp. 106–11; SAH JG 993/I, pp. 1–10; *Libro de los Acuerdos*, p. 4; Israel, *European Jewry*, 162.

But in terms of communal organization and methods, Amsterdam and the other new communities in northern Europe and the New World consciously emulated the example of Venice. The three separate synagogues that emerged in Amsterdam in the early seventeenth century, having merged their welfare systems into one, in 1622, finally amalgamated into one large congregation, in 1639. On drawing up their written constitutions (*haskamoth*) for the future governance of the now united community, they named it *Talmud Torah*—the same as that used by the 'Ponentine' congregation at Venice—and expressly stated that they were following 'ho estilo de Veneza' [the style of Venice] in the form of their regulations.[34] The London *haskamoth* drawn up in 1663–4 assert that they are modeled on the procedures of Amsterdam which, in turn, 'have included the usage of that of Venice',[35] and there is little doubt that the same is true of the earlier Hamburg constitutions, drawn up in 1652 when the roughly 600 Sephardim there, having previously been divided again into three small congregations—*Talmud Torah, Keter Torah* and *Neve Shalom*—created a single, united community which they called *Beth Israel*.[36] All these congregations characteristically excluded Ashkenazim and other non-Sephardic Jews, stipulating that only Jews of the Spanish and Portuguese 'nation' were eligible to be members; but made no distinction between Portuguese, Castilians, Aragonese and hispanicized Italians, or between Levantines or Ponentines, or between returning New Christians and those who had never been baptized.[37] This represented a concept which had never existed in the Levant and was a product of the Venetian context.

Moreover, as with the organization of the community as a whole, so also with its various charitable and educational institutions. The famous *Dotar* society established at Amsterdam, in 1615, by *Haham* Joseph Pardo, partly on the initiative of Jacob Coronel, at Hamburg, was expressly based on the *Hevra do orfans do kahal de Talmud Torah* established at Venice two years earlier.[38] As in the Venetian case, the northern *Dotar* society was designed, through drawing lots among an approved list of candidates, to provide marriage portions for orphan girls and poor girls, in the latter case in France, Flanders, England and Germany as well as Holland 'da mesma naçam portugeza ou hespanhola, hebreas' [of the same Portuguese or Spanish nation, Hebrews]—meaning both those born into the Jewish community and Portuguese New Christian girls—provided the latter, in return for their dowries undertook to marry in synagogue and live as Jewesses under the authority of the community. Remarkably, the society had associate members in France and other places living as New Christians. Where the Venetian *hevra* created a western network of correspondents concerned with arranging marriages in Venice, Pisa, Lyons and other parts of Italy and France, the new network based on Amsterdam sought to cover the whole span on the Atlantic side, from 'Jean da Lus até Danzig', that is from Saint Jean de Luz in south-west France northwards as far as Danzig, and also to link up with the crypto-Jews in Brazil.[39]

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[34] Pieterse, *Daniel Levi de Barrios*, 156; Bodian, 'Amsterdam, Venice', 47–65; Kaplan, 'Sephardim in north-western Europe', 273.

[35] *Libro de los Acuerdos*, p. 3; Laski, *Laws and Charities*, 2–3; Bodian, 'Amsterdam, Venice', 65.

[36] Ornan Pinkus, 'Portugiesische gemeinde', 3–4; Kaplan, 'Place of the *Herem*', 64, 66.

[37] Kaplan, 'Sephardim in north-western Europe', 273.

[38] Kayserling, *Bibliotheca*, 84; Seeligmann, *Bibliographie en historie*, 29–30; Révah,

Among the lay founders who drew up the rules of Amsterdam *hevra* were such leading figures in the then existing two synagogues as Duarte Fernandes (alias Joshua Habilho), Francisco Mendes de Medeiros (Isaac Franco), Antonio Lopes Pereira (Joseph Pereira)—brother of the Manuel López Pereira who became a *contador* at the Spanish court and favourite of Olivares, Tomas Nunes Pina (Joshua Sarfati), Jeronimo Henriques (Joseph Cohen) and João Gonsalves Valverde (alias Eliahu Valverde). Jacob Coronel was appointed representative for Hamburg. Another founder-member, Paulo de Pina (Rohiel Jezurun), had, as the New Christian informer Mendes Bravo informed the Lisbon Inquisition,[40] lived many years in Brazil and knew much about that country where two Portuguese crypto-Jews still resident there, João Luis Henriques and Francisco Gomes Pina, both living in Pernambuco, the latter doubtless a relative of Paulo, were elected *companhieros auzentes*.[41] In the autumn of 1615, the Amsterdam *hevra* elected additional correspondents at Saint Jean de Luz (Valverde's father), Bordeaux, Nantes (Manuel Rodrigues de

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'Premier règlement imprimé', 652–3, 656, 668, Kaplan, 'Portuguese Community', 150–2.

[39] Révah, 'Premier règlement', 653.

[40] Roth, 'Strange Case', 237.

[41] Révah, 'Premier règlement', 659.

Espinoza, alias Abraham de Spinoza, grand-uncle of the philosopher), Rouen (Antonio de Cáceres), Paris, and Antwerp (João Rodrigues Peres).

The constitutions of the *hevra* expressly state that any men of Portuguese or Spanish background could be admitted as contributing members of the society provided there was adequate information 'que confessam a Unidade do Senhor do Mundo [that they confess the unity of the Lord of the universe and the truth of His most sacred Law]—that is reject the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and divinity of Christ, and 'acknowledge the truth of his holy law' irrespective of whether they are circumcised, or whether they live within Judaism 'ou fora delle' [or outside of it].[42] On being admitted, those who lived 'fora de Judesmo', that is outside organized Jewish communities, were to be inscribed in the book of the *hevra* under the names they employ where they live 'e, quando venham a Judesmo, se lhe mudaram nos que tomarem' [and when they enter Judaism, these will be changed to those which they shall take], meaning that their specifically Jewish names would be substituted later.

The first girl chosen by lot to receive a marriage portion was Ester Rodrigues, daughter of Lianor Rodrigues, living at Nantes, who was engaged to marry Saul Levi Morteira. A girl could be freely entered for the lottery wherever she lived, from Brazil to Poland, if she was the legitimate daughter of Iberian New Christians even if both parents had been professed Christians. Remarkably, she could also be entered if she were the bastard daughter of a Jew or 'man of the nation' and a woman of another ethnic background, or the bastard daughter of an Iberian Jewess and man of other background who has converted to Judaism, but not if she was the bastard daughter of a Jewess and a man of different ethnic background who does not 'acknowledge the Lord of the universe and his law'.[43]

Likewise Venetian practice inspired the college of *Talmud Torah* which the then two congregations in Amsterdam set up, in 1616, and which rapidly developed into the most important and most powerful educational and cultural institution of the community. Administered by an annually elected board of governors—like the elders of community called *parnasim*—who appointed the teachers, paid their salaries, provided books, and supervised the college's work, *Talmud Torah* provided basic instruction and literacy in Hebrew, religious knowledge, Spanish (and perhaps Portuguese) language and other subjects to boys while in the higher classes, or *midrash,* Talmud and rabbinic learning were studied. It meant that there was no formal teaching within the community not supervised by the lay elders.

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[42] Ibid., p. 674; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 179.
[43] Révah, 'Premier règlement', 677.

A prime function of the new kind of Sephardic communal organization developed at Venice was to pressure Portuguese New Christians to abandon Christianity and revert to Judaism. That in both Italy and north-west Europe there were, during the most decisively formative period—the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries—a large number of Portuguese New Christians who were either reluctant to return to Judaism, or hesitated to do so, is beyond question. Even in Amsterdam, where the pressure to reject Catholicism, and publicly adopt Judaism, was especially strong, it is certain that there were many Portuguese who permanently or temporarily resisted that pressure. Manoel Carvalho, having earlier lived as a New Christian in Brazil and who, after 1604, imported Brazilian sugar to Holland from Oporto, via a relative Paulo Mendes Carvalho, and also developed a lively trade with Genoa and Livorno, later stated in a notarial deed of 1643, that though he had arrived in Amsterdam forty years before, that is in 1604, he had made no profession of the Jewish religion for twelve years until the year 1616.[44]

One of the most interesting figures who resisted the pressure to convert, after a long period of hesitation, was that intriguing Portuguese New Christian, Hector Mendes Bravo. Born around 1591 and raised in Portugal, Mendes Bravo was taken to live in Florence by his mother, after his father's death, in 1606 where they lived as Catholics. However, they came in contact with a Portuguese New Christian merchant, Bento de Medeiros, who was a secret judaizer and had relatives living as Jews in the Venetian ghetto, and who kept urging his mother to go to Venice and convert to Judaism, it being safe to do so there. Consequently, she moved to Venice around 1607 where the sixteen year old youth was persuaded to become a Jew, and have himself circumcized, by a Portuguese Jewish merchant, Garcia Ribeiro, using a Bible printed in Spanish which they gave him to read and which he studied for some days.[45] A few weeks after arriving in Venice, despite some reluctance to abandon Christianity, and knowing no Hebrew, he was circumcized and given the Jewish name, David Levi Bravo, in the presence of Rabbi Moseh Altaras, a leader of the Venetian 'Ponentine' drive to reclaim Portuguese New Christians.[46] He then lived as an observant Jew in the ghetto for five years until, around 1612, he left Venice for Amsterdam, one of a substantial stream transferring northwards at that time, where he worked as a clerk to Manoel Pimentel (alias Isaac Abeniacar), then the leading Portuguese Jewish merchant of Venetian and Levantine background in the city.

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[44] Fuks-Mansfeld, *Sefardim*, 40; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 108, 175.

[45] Roth, 'Strange case', 222.

However, he continued to feel torn between Christianity and Judaism, and engaged in discussions with rabbis, in particular *Haham* Isaac Uziel, from Fez, who told him not to be a Karaite, not to doubt so much and to believe as others believed. But such admonitions failed to quell his doubts. Finally, in Haarlem, he came into contact with a disguised Franciscan friar who ministered to the Catholics there and who expounded Christian doctrine with such eloquence, that Mendes Bravo made up his mind that his salvation depended on submitting to Christ, returning to Portugal, and confessing everything to the Holy Office. He left Holland and returned to Lisbon where he appeared before the Inquisition, in December 1617, anxious to relieve his conscience and tell everything he knew of the Jews of Venice and Amsterdam. The Venetian 'Ponentine' community, he estimated to consist of 1500 souls 'mostly Portuguese and some Castilians'.[47] He gave the Inquisitors the names and some other details of a large number of Portuguese in both Venice and Amsterdam (including that of Manoel Carvalho) several of whom had fled the Inquisition, and others who were not necessarily professed Jews but who broadly revolved around the Sephardic congregation, among them, a brother of Diogo Gomez Duarte who was learning to become a printer and who was 'an Epicurean, or atheist, not believing in any religion'.[48]

Besides family and communal pressures, the chief method of seeking to convince prospective New Christian converts to abjure Christianity was through Bible-reading and adult re-education in religion conducted in Spanish and Portuguese. Since all traditional Jewish literature was available only in Hebrew, Aramaic or Arabic, such a programme required the preparation and publication of an extensive new body of Jewish literature in modern Iberian languages and here again Venice, from the 1580s, taking up from where Ferrara had left off, in the 1550s, led the way. From the 1580s to 1612, apart from a handful of publications at Amsterdam, virtually no Jewish publications appeared anywhere in Europe in modern languages, or in Latin script, or vocalized Hebrew script for beginners, except at Venice. Venetian Sephardic publications in Spanish and Portuguese thus played a pivotal role in the propagation of Judaism, and of knowledge of Jewish prayers, liturgy and hymns, among the entire western (and to a degree eastern) Portuguese New Christian and crypto-Jewish diaspora, ranging from Brazil and Spanish America to Syria and the Holy Land. Among the more notable such publications were Joseph Caro's *Sefer ha-shulkhan ha-panim* (1602), Moseh Altaras' *Libro de mantenimiento de la alma* (1609) and a dual Spanish-Hebrew version of the laws of ritual slaughter of animals.[49]

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[46] Ibid., p. 230.

[47] Ibid., 233.

[48] Ibid., 237; Kaplan, 'Intellectual Ferment', 288.

But if Venice provided the organizational, political and cultural model on which the later trans-Atlantic network of Sephardic communities was based, and the hispanic literary and polemical apparatus with which the Catholicism of the Portuguese New Christians was combated, while at the same time constituting the hub linking the Sephardi commercial networks of east and west together, the Ponentine-Levantine symbiosis at Venice itself went back no further than the late 1570s and therefore lacked authority in the sphere of religious law. At the level of spiritual authority, rabbinical judgment, and Jewish law, all the new Sephardic congregations in the west needed to look beyond Venice to an earlier source of religious experience and guidance and that, emphatically was Salonika. Even though the golden age of the Salonikan community, and the textile industry which formed its economic base, was over by the end of the sixteenth century, the spiritual status of the rabbis, synagogue culture, music and liturgy of Salonika remained paramount. Indeed, Salonika's religious and cultural influence in the west during the crucially formative four decades 1580–1620 may well have been enhanced precisely by the loss of economic impetus and consequent drift of sizeable numbers of Levantine Spanish Jews to Italy and the west.

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[49] Kayserling, *Bibliotheca*, 29, 32; Yerushalmi, *Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto*, 203–4.

While there is, as yet, no final consensus as to exactly why the Salonikan Sephardic textile industry waned, or precisely when, there is no doubt either that it was past its peak by the 1580s, or that the close ties with Venice which underpinned the activities of Salonikan Jewry, and the patchwork of small communities radiating out from Salonika across the Greek lands and the Balkans, was also one of the principal causes of its economic stagnation. For precisely the flow of Balkan, Greek and Anatolian raw wool, silk, cotton and mohair to Venice which constituted the chief export trade of the Sephardic Jews of the Greek lands, and the importing of Venetian fine cloth and camlets, their chief import trade, by stimulating Venice's export based fine cloth industry, and imports of Venetian textiles into the Ottoman empire, engineered Salonika's (and Safed's) economic decline.[50] Yet while Salonika's economic position weakened after 1580, the Sephardic cloth industry still remained sufficiently substantial, even after the great fire of 1620, reportedly destroying twenty-eight synagogues and a large number of textile workshops,[51] to sustain what remained the largest Jewish community in Europe and a rich religious and cultural life. According to a census of 1613 there were then still twenty-five congregations in Salonika consisting of 2,933 households and 2, 230 bachelors, in all probably nearly 20,000 Jews, representing two thirds (68%) of the total population.[52] Meanwhile, the Jewish import-export trade continued to flourish throughout the Greek lands: the buying up of raw silk in Morea, and its export via Patras, Lepanto and Zante to Venice flourished along with key Morean Sephardic communities such as that of Mistra where there were some 500 Sephardic Jews in the late seventeenth century,[53] while the northern Greek communities throve on the basis of the wool and hide trade.

The continuing link between Venice and the Greek lands served as a channel through which the learning, age-old traditional Spanish Jewish culture, and rabbinical expertise of Salonika could flow to the north-west. It is illustrative of this remarkable process of acculturation, religious conversion, and economic reorientation, that Joseph

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[50] Braude, 'Rise and Fall of Salonica woollens', 228–31; see also Nehama, 'Jews of Salonika', 205, 208–9; Goffman, *Izmir*, 82–3; Bashan, 'Rise and Fall', 360.

[51] Ibid., 370; Braude, 'Rise and Fall of Salonica Woollens', 234.

[52] Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 123.

[53] Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks*, 315, 338; Bowman, 'Jews of Mistra', 32–3.

Pardo (d.1619), possibly the most influential of all the Sephardic rabbis active in north-west Europe during the most formative phase, down to 1620, should have been born and raised in Salonika and then spent long periods in Venice before proceeding to Amsterdam, together with his son, David, where, in 1608, he became *haham* of the Beth Ya'acov synagogue.[54] When the young Amsterdam community was rocked by one of the most serious quarrels to affect the synagogue leadership there, leading in 1618–19 to the splitting off a group from the *Beth Ya'acov*, and the setting up of a rival, third synagogue (*Beth Israel*) it was natural that both Pardo and his rabbinical colleague, Isaac Uziel, *haham* of *Neveh Shalom*, should seek to resolve the unprecedented furore by submitting the case to the judgment of the Salonikan rabbinate.[55]

Venice was also the channel through which the Sephardim in northern Europe organized their commercial and financial contacts with the Levant. During the period of the Twelve Years' Truce (1609–1621), the Levant trade and especially the importing of Cyprus cotton, and via Aleppo of Persian silks, briefly became a major strand of Amsterdam's burgeoning high-value trade.[56] Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry did not initiate this development but undoubtedly was a considerable factor. Since Venice was importing growing quantities of Brazil sugar from Lisbon, as well as Spanish wool by the early seventeenth century, and since Dutch shipping with it low freight rates began to capture a large part of the transit traffic in the Mediterranean after the onset of the Truce, in 1609, it became quite attractive for Amsterdam Sephardi Jews to charter Dutch vessels to sail to Venice, reloading in Iberian ports *en route* as well as participate in the trade with Istanbul and Tunisia by sea, from Venice, in collaboration with Venetian Jewish merchants. Thus, in 1613 a Venetian vessel, *Il Paradiso*, was wrecked en route from Venice to Istanbul, part of the cargo, belonging to two Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish merchants, Duarte Fernandes and Fernando Alvares Melo, being insured in Amsterdam.[57] In 1615, Diogo Nunes (Jacob Israel) Belmonte had hides and alum insured for him on a Venetian vessel sailing from

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[54] Seeligmann, *Bibliografie en Historie*, 23–30; Révah, 'Premier règlement', 653.

[55] Vaz Dias, 'Scheiding', in *Vrijdag avond* vol. VII 386–8, 402–4 and vol. VIII, pp. 7–9, 22–3; Bodian, 'Amsterdam, Venice', 57.

[56] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 55–60.

[57] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', nos. 619, 626.

Istanbul to Venice.[58] Manoel Carvalho, at Amsterdam, in 1615, chartered a Rotterdam vessel to sail to Tunis (doubtless for red coral) and Venice, and then continue in the port to port trade in the eastern Mediterranean for a whole year.[59] The following year, Carvalho hired another ship to sail in his service for ten months, plying between Tunis, Venice and Alexandria.[60] In 1616, Duarte and Jorge Pereira in Amsterdam consigned a cargo of Spanish wool to Venice with the proceeds from which, their agent remitted goods on their behalf from Venice to Istanbul.[61] After 1621, however, this kind of traffic was drastically reduced by resumption of the Dutch-Spanish war, the concomitant rise of Dutch freight and insurance rates, and the impact of the Spanish ban on Dutch ships and cargoes, which together depressed the Dutch Jewish Levant trade for a quarter of a century.[62]

In any case, the embryonic Portuguese Jewish communities which arose in Hamburg and Amsterdam in the 1590s, and opening years of the seventeenth century, were the nodal points not in already established but rather in the major new trans-oceanic trade networks, in particular linking Brazil and Portugal with northern Europe. From the outset, the main basis of their commercial and financial success, was the shipping of colonial products from Portugal, especially Brazilian sugar, to Holland, Germany and the Baltic. Also the great majority of the merchants who joined these communities were fresh emigrants from Portugal, or Portuguese New Christians leaving Spain, or else—as Hector Mendes Bravo noted in the case of several of the 119 Portuguese living in Amsterdam whom he denounced to the Lisbon Inquisition, namely Manoel Carvalho, the latter's brother Manoel Fernandes, Jeronimo Enriquez, and Paolo de Pina[63]—merchants who had lived, often for many years, in Brazil and had direct experience of the Brazilian sugar plantations. But initially, for some years, neither community showed much outward sign that it was evolving into a Jewish community and left to themselves it seems quite possible that the New Christians may not have done so. For their return to normative Judaism, a powerful 'confessionalizing' force was needed and that was clearly supplied from elsewhere. The communal leadership, secular and religious, the architects of the new institutions and religious life and founders of the closely knit social and family network which was created to underpin the new trans-Atlantic commercial system, came not from Portugal, or Brazil or Spain, but predominantly from the already formed Ponentine-Levantine hispanic Jewish milieu generated by Venice and the other Italian cities with Spanish-speaking Jewish Levantine communities.

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[58] Ibid., 873.
[59] Ibid., no. 880.
[60] Ibid., 979.
[61] Ibid., no. 1018.
[62] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 149–56; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 144–8.
[63] Roth, 'Strange case', 236–8.

Besides Joseph Pardo who arrived in 1608, there was the Levant-trained cabbalist Abraham Cohen Herrera who lived for some years in Hamburg before moving to Amsterdam, and the famous rabbi, and strict disciplinarian, Saul Levi Morteira (1590–1669), a man of (probably) Portuguese New Christian origin who arrived in 1616, with a rabbinical training and polemical outlook chiefly acquired in Venice, bringing with him, from France, the bodily remains of Eliahu Montalto, one of the most determined of the former *Marrano* Judaisers in Italy with whom he had become closely associated.[64] At Hamburg, the first traditionally trained, professional rabbi, Isaac Athias, was brought from Venice, in 1627.[65] But it was arguably less the rabbis than the secular leaders who gave the most vital impulse to shaping, and lending cohesion and impetus, to the new congregations. Though little is known about the beginning of Sephardic Jewish religious observance in Hamburg, it is certain that during the embryonic stages Venetian influence was paramount.[66] The three original synagogues were located in private homes and apparently all already in use by around 1610.[67] One of these, that of *Neveh Shalom*, was located in the home of Rodrigo Pires Brandão, a second, named *Keter Torah* in that of Alvaro Diniz, and was presided over by André Falleiro (alias Abraham Aboab), and the third in that of Ruy Fernandes Cardoso (alias Eliahu Aboab) originally from Lisbon.[68] The three leaders who purchased the first Hamburg Sephardi cemetery, at Altona in 1611, were Alvaro Diniz, Ruy Fernandes Cardoso, and again André Falleiro who, though he had been in business living as a New Christian in Portugal, had subsequently lived for some years in Venice where, together with his wife, Beatriz Gomes, he had become familiar to Mendes Bravo during his Venetian period.[69] Falleiro's relative, Fernandes Cardoso, who also used the synagogue name Aboab, likewise had close Venetian connections. Mendes Bravo who spent some two months in Hamburg on a business trip, around 1615, later told the Lisbon Inquisition about the judaisers whom he knew there, explaining that the Portuguese in Hamburg 'assemble in these houses to perform all the ceremonies of the Jews', adding that he himself 'has seen these ceremonies performed by those whom he will mention and he himself has performed them together with the others.'[70] Clearly, by 1615, thanks to the Venetian influence, organized, normative Judaism was predominant, albeit assuredly not universally so, among the Portuguese in Hamburg.

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[64] Salomon, 'Haham Saul Levi Morteira', 129–34.

[65] Feilchenfeld, 'Anfang', 217.

[66] Löwenstein, 'Die Familie Aboab', p. 674; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 116–17.

[67] Rohde, 'Synagogen', 142.

[68] Ibid., 142; Feilchenfeld, 'Anfang', 216–17; Roth, 'Strange Case', 238–9; Salomon, *Portrait*, 143.

Exactly the same was true of Amsterdam. Garcia Pimentel (alias Mordechai Abeniacar), having lived many years in the Levant and Venice, where he had numerous relatives, settled in Amsterdam in 1596, being one of the first important Portuguese merchants to do so.[71] One of his first transactions in Holland was to freight an Enkhuizen vessel to sail (around the top of Britain) to Cape Ghir, in Morocco, to unload and load with goods which were then to be conveyed to Livorno, where the commissary would load marble, alum and other goods which were then to be shipped back to the southern Moroccan port of Safi, the outlet of Marakesh.[72] Subsequently, he conducted a lively trade with Morocco and Italy but especially Portugal. At the same time he concerned himself with communal religious matters. Whereas previously the Portuguese in Holland had not marked themselves out for separate burial, in accordance with Jewish rites, in a specifically Jewish cemetery, Garcia, being used to organized Judaism, helped purchase the first Dutch Sephardic burial-ground, at Groet and, when he died, in 1604, according to the late seventeenth-century chronicler of the Amsterdam Sephardi community, Daniel Levi de Barrios (1635–1701), was the first person to be buried there. Calling himself 'Abeniacar' for ritual purposes, he may also have been the first, to adopt the Levantine-Venetian practice of continuing, adopting or reviving medieval Spanish Jewish surnames to be used in the synagogue in place of Portuguese secular names which, however, were still employed in business, so that congregants were now known by two names. How far these adopted medieval Spanish surnames represent a genuine continuity and recollection of the old names within particular families, or were simply adopted more or less arbitrarily, is still a disputed question, but it seems probable that some at least were a genuine inheritance from pre-1492 Spain although this is hard to prove except in a very small number of instances. In any case, the Pimentel had decided already in the Levant, and probably authentically, that they were descendents of the thirteenth and fourteenth-century Ibn Waqar dynasty of Toledo rabbis and financiers.

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[69] Feilchenfeld, 'Anfang', 207; Roth, 'Strange Case', 232.

[70] Ibid., 238–9.

[71] Salomon, *Primeiros Portugueses de Amersterdão*, 14.

[72] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds' no. 7, 22 July 1596.

His remarkable brother Manuel, by contrast, surfaced as a professing Portuguese Catholic at the court of Henri IV, in 1607 where he caused a sensation with his phenomenal skill at cards, supposedly causing the king to remark, 'I am the king of France, but you are the king of gamblers'.[73] Leaving France, with considerable funds at his disposal, he reverted to Judaism, joining the Ponentine congregation in Venice where he remained until 1613 in which year he transferred to Amsterdam bringing more Venetian experience to the running of the new community. During the short time he lived in Amsterdam, Manuel was the richest member of the congregation and, following the example of his brother, made several noteworthy financial contributions to its genesis. Agreeing that the fledgling community needed a nearer and better burrial-place than Groet, Manoel, in the spring of 1614, helped pay for the acquisition of what became the community's main burial-ground at Oudekerk. When he in turn died, the following year, he was reportedly the first person to be buried there.[74] In gratitude for his support, the congregation voted to perpetuate his memory by instituting a special prayer to be recited every sabbath in perpetuity thereafter. This Pimentel bequeathed some 250,000 guilders to his offspring, causing, however, an inheritance dispute which dragged on for many years, his will being contested by another brother, Alvaro Pimentel, a rabbi at Istanbul.

Undoubtedly, there were strong religious-ideological tensions among and between the Portuguese who settled in the north during these years. Not a few leaned towards Christian doctrine and belief while others, alarmed by the prospect of burning their bridges, or making it impossible ever to return to Portugal or Spain, preferred an unobtrusive private Judaism without being drawn into the obligations and collective practices of an organized community. This resulted, among other things, in a continuing quarrel about the rite of circumcision and the status of formal prayer with a *minyan*, in the presence of at least ten adult men. Some among the fresh immigrants from Portugal stubbornly resisted participation in regular ceremonies, services and formal obligations and refused circumcision. In 1622, Francisco Lopes Capadosse was expelled from the Amsterdam community for refusing to be circumcised and so were his sons, after being repeatedly warned by the *parnasim*.[75] Manuel López Pereira who later returned to Spain and became a financial adviser to Olivares, at the court in Madrid, and who, before that, had resided as a Portuguese New Christian in Antwerp where he settled in 1609 and for some years was a leading business intermediary between Amsterdam and the Iberian Peninsula, had previously lived among the early Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam. Whilst there, it was later reported to the Lisbon Inquisition, he showed a preference for Judaism, as the great majority of the Portuguese who came there did, but, at the same time, like a number of others did not wish to practice Judaism 'publicamente', so that he could continue to live among Christians; consequently, while in Amsterdam, he sometimes prayed with the other Jews in synagogue but did not put on the prayer shawl (*talith*), or lay *tefillin*, or participate in other 'ceremonias dos judeus, porque só as poden fazer os circumcidados' [ceremonies of the Jews because these can be done only by the circumcized].[76] Evidently, the 'Venetians' and rabbis, in the face of resistance from new arrivals, insisted on reducing the uncircumcised to second-class congregants ineligible for synagogue honours and functions.

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[73] Israel, 'Jews of Venice', 100.

[74] Franco Mendes, *Memorias*, 13, 21.

Similarly, at a time when the Amsterdam city government was not yet willing to permit the building of a 'public' synagogue in their city, it was mainly the Sephardim from a Venetian-Levantine background, rather than the fresh immigrants from Portugal, who endeavoured to fight this prohibition. This would seem to be one reason why shortly after Garcia Pimentel's death, in 1604–5, a group of

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[75] Kaplan, 'Intellectual Ferment', 289.

[76] Salomon, *Primeiros Portugueses en Amesterdão*, 48; further on Manoel López Pereira, see Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 247–64.

Amsterdam Sephardic merchants applied to the (then more tolerant) Haarlem city government for a formal charter authorizing them to establish a 'public' synagogue and congregation in that city. Although nothing came of the negotiation, the episode remains a significant one because those who requested the charter emphasized their Levantine background and undertook to establish trade links not with Portugal, the Portuguese colonial empire, or Spain but with Venice and the Levant, describing themselves—doubtless somewhat confusingly for the Haarlem regents—as belonging to the 'Portuguese and Spanish nation descended from the eastern and western Hebrews, or Jews, living, and professing the Jewish religion in Italy and various places in Turkey'.[77] Two of the leaders of this group, Melchior Mendes and Francisco Mendes de Madeiros (alias Abraham and Isaac Franco) were both later, in 1612, among the four founders as was Duarte Fernandes—of the *Neveh Shalom* congregation in Amsterdam while the latter paid for the publication in Amsterdam that same year of a reprint of the standard Spanish-language prayer-book, or *Sidur* in use among the Venetian *Ponentini*.[78] Francisco Mendes de Madeiros (1568–1623) originally from Oporto, settled in Amsterdam where he was prominent as a silk merchant, in 1598, most probably after a period in Venice or the Levant.[79]

To conclude, it may be affirmed with some confidence that the Ponentine-Levantine milieu created at Venice in the 1570s and 1580s was pivotal in transforming the north-west European Portuguese New Christian diaspora into an organized Sephardic Jewish trans-Atlantic as well as trans-European and trans-Near Eastern network. It is perfectly true, as many historians have argued, that many of the Portuguese New Christians who fled the Inquisition in the Peninsula and settled in countries such as Italy, France, Flanders and Brazil in the late sixteenth century, and at the beginning of the seventeenth, had no particular wish to be absorbed into an organized Jewish religious and social framework and often actively resisted pressures to become integrated into Sephardic Jewish society whether out of sympathy for Christianity or simply out of a desire not to compromise their standing in Iberian lands. But the counter-pressure was considerable and fairly rapidly had the effect of transforming the main body of those who settled in France, Holland and at Hamburg, as well later at London, into an organized Jewish society, a result impossible to explain except in the context of the recent Sephardic experience in the Greek lands and Venice.

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[77] Seeligmann, 'Het Marranen-Probleem', 112; Wolff, *Geschenis der Joden in Haarlem* I, 57–63; Silva Rosa, *Geschiedenis*, 12–13; Israel, 'Jews of Venice', 99; Vlessing, 'New Light', 45.

[78] Fuks-Mansfeld, *Sefardim*, 51; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 172; Salomon, *Portrait*, 149.

[79] *Livro de Bet Haim*, 187–8; Vega, *Beth Haim van Oudekerk*, 30.

Furthermore, the social and religious network which in Amsterdam and Hamburg became openly Jewish before 1610, and had clearly shown strong judaizing tendencies since the 1590s, proved to be a more effective means of organizing and regulating long-distance correspondence, and commerce than the specifically Catholic Portuguese New Christian diaspora which was numerically strong in Italy, Flanders and France but strikingly lacked social cohesion and commercial weight. That there was, as early as 1600, more than a little correlation between those merchants who first became major distributors of Portuguese colonial products in northern Europe, and those who initiated and helped shape the earliest formal religious and social communal network based on Venetian models, is proved by the important evidence of the fleet of six Emden ships returning from Lisbon and Oporto to Amsterdam which was seized by the English and brought into London in 1601. At that early date Portuguese New Christians had only recently begun to settle in Amsterdam, and as a group they had as yet had no fixed religious or social profile. But it was already playing the leading role in distributing Portuguese colonial products in northern Europe and it is striking that many or most of the key merchants involved were, as we see clearly from the following appendix, the very same people who were soon to emerge as active leaders of the Amstedam house synagogues, *hevrot* and other Jewish institutions.

Appendix I: 'Portuguese' merchants of Amsterdam whose imports of Portuguese colonial goods, (consigned from Lisbon on a fleet of six Emden vessels in 1601 to avoid the Spanish embargoes against the use of Dutch vessels) were seized by the English and brought into London. Listed in approximate order of importance of cargo.

Amsterdam Merchants	Subsequent Synagogue names	Cargo	Amount
1) Manoel Rodrigues Vega		sugar (chests)	34
		cotton wool (bags)	14
		Indian diamonds (packets)	1
(for 50% to Jacome Rodrigues)		green ginger (bags)	3
2) Francisco Pinto de Britto[a] (alias 'Frans de Briette')		sugar (chests)	20
		Indian diamonds (packets)	4
		pearls (packets)	1
		unspecified jewels (packet)	1
3) Duarte Fernandes	Joshua Habilho (co-founder of *Neveh Shalom*)	sugar (chests)	27
		green ginger (barrels)	2
4) Thomas Nunes Pina	Joshua Sarfati (co-founder of Dotar and Beth Ya'acov)	sugar (chests)	27½
5 Melchior Mendes	Abraham Franco (co-founder of *Neveh Shalom*)	sugar (chests)	26
6 Fernando Mercado[b]		sugar (chests)	8
		Ceylon cinnamon (fardels)	18
		Indian diamonds (packets)	2
		pearls (Persian Gulf ?)	1
7) Michael Lopes Homem		sugar (chests)	20
		Portuguese olive oil (hogsheads)	9
8) Manoel Carvalho	Moseh de Casseres	sugar (chests)	16
9) James (Guimes) Lopes da Costa	Jacob Tirado	sugar (chests)	6
	(founder of Beth Ya'acov)	green ginger (barrels)	6
		cotton wool (bags)	1
10) Jorge Rodrigues and Manoel Pinto		green ginger (barrels)	11
		indigo (hogsheads)	1
11) Antonio Fernandes		sugar (chests)	9
12) Duarte Saraiva Coronel	David Senior	sugar (chests)	9
13) Fernando Rodrigues		sugar (chests)	8

Appendix I (*cont.*)

Amsterdam Merchants	*Subsequent* Synagogue names	Cargo	Amount
14) Jacome Rodrigues		sugar (chests)	6
15) Manoel Lopes Homem and Francisco Lopes Homem	David Israel Homem	sugar (chests)	5

[a] Subsequently, Francisco Pinto de Britto moved to London where he acted as agent for Duarte Fernandes, see 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', no. 285. Amsterdam, 27 Aug. 1608 and no. 300., Amsterdam, 21 Oct. 1608.

[b] Some time later, Fernando Mercado was the London agent of his brothers Simão de Mercado, in Amsterdam and Rodrigo de Mercado, in Hamburg. Simão's business later failed and, in 1609, he was imprisoned for a while in Amsterdam for insolvency and then, in 1610, in Antwerp, for judaizing, see 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', no. 200, Amsterdam, 6 March 1606.

Sources: the main source for this table is 'A brief note of the goods, pearls and precious stones claymed by James Lopes da Costa and Charles Hughebant for the accompte of the Portugale merchants dwelling at Amsterdam in the six shipps brought in by her Maty's ships (16 dec. 1601) in BL Ms Landsdowne 144, fos, 79–83; the goods consigned to Francisco Pinto de Britto described as a 'coopman woonende binnen deser stede' are also listed in the notarial deed drawn up by the Amsterdam notary Bruyningh, authorizing Pinto de Britto's commissary in London, Robert de la Barre to reclaim them, see GAA NA 92, fos. 64v-65 deed, Amsterdam, 4 March 1602 (J.F. Bruyningh); see also GAA NA 94, fos. 17304. deed, Amsterdam, 1 May 1603 (J.F. Bruyningh) and ARH SG 5884/i. Amsterdam burgomasters to SG, Amsterdam, 19 July 1602 referring to the claimants as 'coopluiden vande Portugeese natie residerende binnen Amsterdam'.

CHAPTER THREE

PORTUGUESE CRYPTO-JUDAISM IN NEW SPAIN, 1569–1649

'New Spain seethed with Jews', wrote the Mexican Inquisitor, Estrada y Escovedo, in 1646, referring to the situation before 1642, 'who concealing their perfidy with constant deception, used to imitate Catholic conduct outwardly; a cruel nation, whose hatred of all the nations of the world is so great that, if once the mask with which impatiently they conceal it is cast off, the volcano of its virulent hatred would erupt in the most appalling atrocities'.[1] Whether their feelings were really as virulent as this Inquisitor imagined, the agony and resentment of the Portuguese New Christians who had built a remarkable and flourishing network based on Mexico City, Veracruz, Guadalajara, Puebla and Zacatecas, in the early seventeenth century was certainly intense. This emerges abundantly and forcefully from the Mexican Inquisition records of the period preserved today in the national archives in Mexico City. Their web of contacts, spreading across New Spain and the Caribbean, linking up with Seville, Central America, Cuba, and the Philippines, constituted a kind of subterranean religious society or fraternity. Clearly it was in part a highly effective commercial network; partly, it was also a closely-knit patchwork of family relations, a socially cohesive if geographically scattered group which tended to marry and reproduce mainly from within their own ranks. But above all it was a network based on a common background, experience and emotion, a part of a vast trans-Atlantic clandestine diaspora based on a shared experience of concealment, subterfuge and persecution which remained a living force for some eighty years down to, and indeed even after, the Auto General de la Fé, in Mexico City, in 1649.

That most of secretly practising Jews in late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century New Spain were born in Portugal, or to parents from Portugal, readily emerges from even the most cursory check through the Inquisition files. In the three decades 1620–50, over two hundred alleged judaizers were tried by the Inquisition tribunal of Mexico City of whom nearly half were born in Portugal, mostly Lisbon or Castelobranco. Another thirty-five of those imprisoned as 'judaizers' were Mexican-born of Portuguese parents while a further fifteen or twenty had been born of Portuguese parents in south-western France, Italy or Peru. The remainder were mostly children of Portuguese New Christians living in Spain. There may have been a handful descended from Spanish New Christians but, if so, even those were incorporated into the Portuguese milieu acquiring Portuguese wives or otherwise becoming acculturated into the Portuguese circle.

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[1] *Documentos inéditos o muy raros* xxviii, p. 18; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 125.

Most of the Portuguese New Christians condemned as 'judaizers' by the Mexican Inquisition seem to have been shopkeepers, shop assistants, and craftsmen or else peddlers and vagabonds. The wealthy elite of the community—for that is undoubtedly what it was—the wealthy merchants, by contrast, were comparatively few. But these were the unquestioned leaders of this far-flung trade and religious network and several of them, such as Simon Váez Sevilla and Mathias Rodríguez de Oliveira, at Mexico City, or Francisco de Tejoso, at Veracruz, were for some years among the most prominent merchants of New Spain. Simon Váez, a native of Castelobranco, whose business contacts ranged from Manila, capital of the Philippines, to Pisa, in Tuscany where part of his family lived, had shops in Mexico City, Zacatecas and elsewhere and a fortune estimated at over 200,000 pesos,[2] placing him roughly on a level with Manuel Bautista Pérez, head of the crypto-Jewish fraternity in Peru until his arrest there in 1635. Among his assets and property seized in July 1642, was a mass of business correspondence, in Spanish and Portuguese, documenting the dealings between him and a large number of factors and correspondents on both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific.[3] Rodríguez de Oliveira was considered the second richest of the Portuguese New Christian 'judaizers' in New Spain and Tejoso whose fortune was estimated at 70,000 pesos, the third.[4] Simon Váez, a merchant with a strong religious sensibility who was accused by the Inquisition of using his house as 'la sinagoga',[5] presided over this expanding Mexican crypto-Jewish network until the Inquisition crack-down of 1642 which marked the onset of the tortured last stage of its existence. He did so together with his relative, Antonio Váez de Castelobranco, a commanding figure, in 1640 appointed captain of one of the Mexico City militia detachments.[6] Simon Váez had originally been converted to Judaism, like many in his circle in New Spain, by a certain Alvaro de Acuña who had travelled widely in the Mexican interior both as a trader and propogator of crypto-Judaism, and, around 1630, had visited the silver mines at San Luis Potosí where numerous Mexico City Portuguese had taken refuge after the great flood of 1629 and where, among others, it was later recorded, he had encouraged a certain Margarita de Rivera in her secret faith. Acuña was apparently never caught and reportedly later returned to Castile.[7]

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[2] AGN Inquisición 409, fo. 381.
[3] AGN Inquisición 340, fo. 136.
[4] ADIM Palafox Papers lxvi, fo. 114v.
[5] AGN Inquisición 426, fo. 534.

Most Portuguese New Christian merchants of standing in New Spain had built up from humble beginnings with remarkable speed and had often travelled and endured arduous circumstances in an impressive number of geographical locations. Mathías Rodríguez de Oliveira, for instance, had been born in Portugal and later moved to Madrid and Seville, then participated in a slaving expedition to Angola, from where he shipped his unfortunate black captives to New Spain where he sold them. Returning with the proceeds to Seville, and then Lisbon, he subsequently crossed back to New Spain, in 1630. Amassing a considerable fortune, he emerged as one of the principal figures of the crypto-Jewish community in Mexico City and remained such until seized by the Inquisition along with Simon Váez and most of his friends and associates, in 1642.[8] Similarly, Antonio González Jamaica had been born in Portugal, resided in Maracaibo, and as his nickname implied, wandered the Caribbean before settling in Veracruz as a prosperous factor trading in slaves imported from Angola; the Mexico City Inquisition's medical staff confirmed that he had been partly circumcised 'with a small transverse mark'.[9] Another merchant, Francisco López Fonseca, known in Peru (whence he had fled from the Inquisition, to Mexico) as Francisco Méndez, had lived in Coimbra and La Guardia in Portugal, Valladolid, Madrid and Seville, in Castile, Cartagena, Quito, Guayaquil, Ríobamba and Maracaibo in South America and then, finally Veracruz and Mexico

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[6] Alvárez de Toledo, 'Politics and Reform', 119.

[7] AGN Inquisición 398, fo. 344; AGN Inquisición 431, fo. 411.

[8] ADIM Palafox Papers lxvi, fo. 114v.

[9] AGN Inquisición 399, exp. 12.

City, in the Mexican viceroyalty.[10] Melchior Rodríguez López, a cacao dealer of Mexico City who owned a cacao estate in southern New Spain, had lived in various parts of the Mexican interior as well as on Tenerife, in the Canaries, and also spent a period at Luanda, in Angola.[11]

Pedro Fernández de Castro, a son-in-law of Simon Váez, born in Castile, at Valladolid, had resided in Naples, Rome, Ferrara, Marseilles, Genoa, and several other Spanish cities before crossing the Atlantic to New Spain.[12] Juan de Torres, had started in Portugal and then, like Rodríguez de Oliveira and quite a few others, gone an expedition to Angola to obtain slaves with which he then proceeded to the New World, setting himself up with the proceeds in Mexico City.[13] Among the prominent Portuguese New Christian 'judaizers' living in the flourishing silver-mining town of Zacatecas, was the interesting figure of Diego Pérez de Albuquerque, had been brought up in Bordeaux and lived in Rouen as well as Seville, Puebla, and Mexico City.[14] For his part, Pedro de Campos had lived in Portugal, Castile and Brazil and when arrested in 1642 was a 'residente en la ciudad de Caracas, tratante en cacao desde dicha ciudad de Caracas, a la de Nueva Veracruz, donde fue preso' [resident in the city of Caracas, trading in cacao between the said city of Caracas and Veracruz where he was arrested].[15] An itinerant trader of Mexico City with some interesting Messianic ideas, Luis Núñez Pérez, came from Portugal but had lived in Spain before moving on to the Canaries, Angola, Portuguese Brazil, Dutch Brazil, Tortuga, Maracaibo, Caracas, Cuba and then finally New Spain, where he dwelt first at Campeche and later Mexico City.[16]

On the one hand, this remarkable Mexican community played a unique role as a trans-Atlantic and trans-American commercial network. While the trading activities of this group extended over numerous routes and commodities, five particular strands of commerce attracted their initiative and energy. Firstly, there was the trade in textiles, both Spanish and other European shipped on the trans-

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[10] AGN Inquisición 410, fo. 494.

[11] AGN Inquisición 378, exp. 3.

[12] AGN Inquisición 489, fos. 579–83.

[13] AGN Inquisición 433, fo. 538 *et passim.*

[14] AGN Inquisición 348, fos. 511, 517, 531; Uchmany, 'Participation of New Christians', 194.

[15] AGN Inquisicion 430, fo. 532v.

[16] AGN Inquisición 412, fos. 416, 534–8v, 543.

Atlantic convoys from Seville and its outports. Retailing linens and woollen fabrics made up the largest part of Simon Váez' business in Mexico City and Zacatecas and that of other leading merchants of the group. Secondly, there was the illegal trafficking in the same merchandise by contraband routes, mostly via Brazil, Buenos Aires, and Peru, or from Brazil via Venezuela and the Caribbean, or else—and by no means marginally—via the Canaries. Thirdly, and again trans-Atlantic in character, there was the importing of black slaves on Portuguese ships sailing from Angola. Fourthly, there was the importing of Chinese silks purchased with Mexican silver, at Manila, and shipped across the Pacific to Acapulco on the renowned 'Manila galleons'. Finally, there was the commerce in cacao, some produced within the viceroyalty, the rest imported from Caracas and from Ecuador, a major item of consumption in seventeenth-century New Spain and Guatemala where it was extremely popular as a warm beverage sprinkled with cinnamon (imported from Portuguese Ceylon via Seville).

After the Inquisition uncovered the main crypto-Jewish network in New Spain, in 1642, several observers noted that even the richest, and most highly regarded, of those arrested had risen rapidly to the higher echelons of colonial society from conspicuously humble beginnings.[17] In their heyday, Simon and Antonio Váez rubbed shoulders socially with *oidores* and other high officials but solely by virtue of their great wealth and forceful personalities.[18] But this rapid commercial success was in part an integral feature of a wider structural phenomenon: the large-scale entry of Portuguese New Christian merchants in Castile, during the reign of Philip III (1598–1621), into the system of royal *asientos* and contracts for tax farming, supplying stores and munitions to fleets and fortresses, and for the supply of slaves to Spanish America. Quite apart from fear of the spread of crypto-Jewish heresy, and aversion to the Portuguese as foreigners, not a few Castilians both in Europe and the Indies were worried by the potential flight of capital from Spanish lands and other economic implications of this remarkable social phenomenon. A governor of Panama, Francisco Valverde Mercado, expressed the matter with an accurate and experienced eye when he reported to the Council of the Indies, in Madrid, in July 1606, that 'today the traders of the Indies are Portuguese because they have the *asientos* for supplying slaves, and the dispatch of the fleets and flotillas with proper provision, on which all commerce depends, and of this nation there have been many Jewish merchants around here who live according to their Law [of Moses] and they, upon becoming wealthy, go to other realms before they fall into the hands of the Inquisition'.[19]

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[17] Estrada y Escovedo, *Relación sumaria*, 42, 49–51; Guijo, *Diario* i, 47; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 128; Alberro, 'Être *converso*', 498.

[18] Guijo, *Diario* i, 47.

For the Portuguese New Christians who emigrated from the Peninsula to the Spanish Indies there were two main routes whereby both to emigrate and make money—firstly, to serve as trans-Atlantic factors to *asentistas* of Seville and Madrid who enjoyed special privileges in the Indies trade through tax-farming and servicing royal contracts for fitting out fleets with provisions and stores, or, secondly, as agents of Lisbon contractors handling the slave trade. Several began as travelling salesmen sent across with batches of textiles or other piece goods on the official convoys from Seville. Diego Mendez de Silva, arrested by the Mexican Inquisition in 1642, had arrived only two years before, sailing from Seville, 'with merchandise' as a merchant's commissary.[20] Meanwhile, the supply of black slaves to Mexican lands, an important part of the economy even as far north as Zacatecas,[21] was entirely controlled by Lisbon slave *asentistas* throughout the six decades (1580–1640) of the union of Castile and Portugal under the Spanish Habsburgs.[22] This particular strand of Atlantic commerce was also, throughout the decades down to the Portuguese Secession from Spain, in 1640, the most important loophole in Seville's trans-Atlantic monopoly convoy system. For it was notorious that the Portuguese slaving ships brought not only black slaves but quantities of unregistered European linens and other textiles which then easily undercut the more expensive textiles shipped by the licensed route. By the 1620s, there was a strong feeling in the west Andalusian ports, and the main trading emporia of Spanish America, that the official trans-Atlantic trade was beginning to contract markedly and that the chief reason for this deterioration was the commerce of the 'Portuguese', and especially their shipping unregistered cloth and spices, along with slaves, via Angola and Guinea.[23]

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[19] Quoted in Uchmany, 'New Christians', 197, 202.

[20] AGN Inquisición 409, fo. 463. Processo contra Diego Méndez de Silva.

[21] Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica*, 66.

[22] Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 67–8.

[23] Cianca, *Discurso breve*, 1–6.

Between 1615 and 1640, some three-quarters of all the Portuguese slaving ships destined for the Spanish Indies procured their human cargo in Angola, mostly the immediate hinterland of Luanda.[24]

During the period 1595–1640, the Spanish crown signed six major *asientos* with Portuguese New Christian slave dealers. The first, drawn up in 1595, by Pedro Gómez Reynel, specified delivery in the Spanish Indies of 4,250 slaves annually, for 2,000 of which the crown reserved the right to specify the destination, until a total of 38,350 had been reached. It was left to the *asentista*'s discretion whether he obtained the slaves in Angola, Guinea, Cape Verde, of São Thomé and what factors and agents, and how many, he employed both in Africa and the Spanish colonies, the only restriction being that these had to be Spaniards or Portuguese, as was the case also with the ships' crews.[25] The same ample freedom in placing factors in Africa and the Spanish American colonies applied also to the subsequent contracts.[26] The next *asiento*, assigned in 1601 to João Rodrigues Coutinho and completed after his death by his brother, Gonzal Váez Coutinho, stipulated the same number of deliveries as the previous contract, but was more specific about the destination of the slaves, assigning 10% that is 200, of the 2,000 whose destination lay with the crown, to Honduras, 30% to the main Spanish Caribbean islands (Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico), 35% to New Spain, and the reminder to Caracas, Santa Marta, Río de la Hacha, Maracaibo and Cumaná.[27] In September 1615, the king assigned the slaving *asiento* to Antonio Fernandes d'Elvas who transported some 30,000 slaves to Spanish America between May 1615 and October 1622.[28] The following year the *asiento* was awarded to Manuel Rodríguez Lamego, presumably a relative of the wealthy crypto-Jewish Rodrigues Lamego family at Rouen, who organized the slave trade to the Spanish colonies between 1623 and April 1630. From 1631 to 1639, the last major contract, the *asiento* was held by Melchor Gómez Angel and Cristobal Mendez de Sousa.[29]

The slaving *asientos*, consequently, provided a major loop-hole by which Portuguese New Christians, escorting consignments of black slaves, could set themselves up in commerce in the ports of Spanish America. Most of the slaving *asentistas*' factors seem to have plied this traffic comparatively briefly, until they had amassed enough capital to enter some other form of trade, though Fernando Rodríguez, a Portuguese *converso*, born in Portugal and arrested as a 'judaizer' in New Spain, in 1644, had reportedly lived in Veracruz for over forty years and been for much of that time 'factor de los negros por la corona de Portugal' [factor for blacks for the crown of Portugal].[30] Furthermore, most of the leading and middling Portuguese crypto-Jewish merchants of New Spain seem to have got started in trans-Atlantic commerce in this particular way. Alvaro de Acuña, the 'gran dogmatista' who had converted Simon Váez Sevilla and many others was, in Seville, reportedly on the point of leaving for a slaving expedition to Angola when he proposed to Doña Leonor Váez Castelobranco, niece of Simon Váez and Antonio Váez de Castelobranco, then thirteen or fourteen years of age, promising to marry her provided she agreed to live by the secret Law of Moses.[31] Others arrested by the Mexican Inquisition who had been to Angola included many of the greatest figures among the 'Portuguese' in the viceroyalty such as Sebastian Váez de Acevedo, who became *proveedor-general* (chief supplier) of the Spanish Caribbean guard fleet, the *Armada de Barlovento*, a wealthy contractor who reportedly 'entre los ricos de primera classe, llegó a la mayor opulencia con el trato de los negros que rescatava de Angola y otras partes de Africa así como Simon Váez Sevilla, Antonio Mendez Chilón, y otros [. . .] y despues la dexaron ocupandose en otros gruesos tratos' [among the wealthy of the first rank, reached the greatest opulence through the trade in blacks which he brought from Angola and other parts of Africa, as did Simon Váez Sevilla, Antonio Mendez Chilón, and others [. . .] and afterwards they dropped it, occupying themselves with other great trades].[32] Rodríguez de Oliveira had lived in Angola for four years, working as a factor before crossing to New Spain, in 1628, with a cargo of blacks, sailing via Recife to Veracruz; yet, apparently, he only made one such crossing and then left the slave trade; after returning to

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[24] Palmer, *Slaves*, 21.
[25] Ibid., 12.
[26] Garcia de Proodián, *Judíos en América*, 72.
[27] Palmer, *Slaves*, 13.
[28] Ibid.; García de Proodian, *Judíos en América*, 73.
[29] Ibid.

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[30] AGN Inquisición 399, doc. 12 'Relacion de las causas'.

[31] AGN Inquisición 399, exp. 1.

[32] See the 'Ynformacion fecha con occasion de la nuebas que binieron de Castilla de levantimiento de Portugal' in ADIM Palafox papers vol. lxv, ff. 310v–11; Israel, 'Portuguese', 325.

Spain, and then Portugal, he crossed back to New Spain in 1630, settling in Mexico City.[33] Others arrested as judaizers in the early 1640s who had been to Angola, included Francisco Home [alias Vicente Henriquez], merchant of Veracruz tried in 1641,[34] Fernando Moreno, originally from Lisbon and now merchant at Oaxaca, Juan Rodriguez Suarez, native of Lisbon and merchant of Mexico City, and Thomas Mendez, a Portuguese of Veracruz who had lived in Caracas and Maracaibo after crossing from Angola. Melchior Rodríguez López, owner of several *haciendas* and a cacao producer in the province of Cacatula, had wandered in Castile before migrating to the Canary Islands in 1634, living for a time on Tenerife; from there he had sailed to 'Loanda en el reyno de Angola' and then crossed with a slaving ship to the Caribbean, calling in at Jamaica on his way to New Spain.[35]

For those who participated in more than one slaving expedition, the meandering between continents that this method of commercial penetration entailed was quite spectacular. Garci Méndez de Dueñas, for example, a Portuguese *converso* who spent some time in Mexico and Central America had been born at Olivença but taken as a fifteen year-old by his parents to Lisbon; later, at some point around 1590, he left Portugal on a slaving ship sailing to West Africa, in the company of a certain Ruy Méndez who, he later stated, had induced him, in the sweltering heat of Guinea, to forsake Christianity and embrace Judaism. Together they had collected a batch of slaves at the estuary of the Río Santo Domingo whence they crossed to Santo Domingo, in the Spanish Caribbean. From there, Méndez de Dueñas proceeded to Cartagena de Indias where he spent half a year before moving on to Tunja and La Palma in the viceroyalty of Peru. Later, he returned to Santo Domingo from where he crossed back to Seville. After marrying, and spending a year in San Lúcar de Barrameda, and Seville, 'fue por toda Castilla y a Francia [. . .] buscano su vida' [he travelled through all Castile, and to France, seeking a living]. He visited France with a parcel of pearls, from the proceeds of which he bought a consignment of French linen which he then sold in Spain for more pearls. After leaving his wife and children among the Portuguese crypto-Jewish community in Saint

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[33] AGN Inquisición 409, fo. 206v.
[34] AGN Inquisición 391, fo. 106.
[35] AGN Inquisición 395, doc. 3.

Jean de Luz, near the Franco-Spanish border, he returned to Seville from where he joined another slaving expedition to Guinea. From West Africa, he sailed with the captives this time to Cartagena, sold them, and then bought wine and other merchandise with which he settled for a time in Nicaragua. But eventually, he set off once again for Peru, arriving in Lima in 1603. From there he made a voyage up the Pacific coast of the New World to Acapulco, and spent a period in New Spain, after which he returned to Lima where he lived for many years running a shop selling textiles, much of his merchandise being imported from Mexico. It was in Lima that he was arrested by the Inquisition, in November 1623; during his trial he was charged with following in his parent's footsteps, learning the rites of Judaism from them, and following 'la dicha ley muerta de Moyses' for thirty six years.

A striking feature of the Garci Méndez case was his being accused of being 'receptor y encubridor [receiver and concealer] of merchandise sent from Saint Jean de Luz by crypto-Jews there and continuing a correspondence with crypto-Jews in south-west France. It was revealed, for instance, that in 1613 he had remitted 2,000 pesos to Seville to a certain person 'que todos los años havia benido de Francia a Sevilla por el dicho socorro y carta del reo' [that used to come from France to Seville every year for the said remittance and letter of the defendant]. It seems that Garci Méndez while in Lima had even been able to arrange the marriage of one of his daughters in France, remitting the dowry from Peru to Saint Jean where his wife and daughters remained, having left Spain, as the Inquisitors expressed it 'a bivir en su ley con mas libertad, a las quales havia socorrido en todas las occasiones' [to live in their law with more freedom, and whom he had assisted on all occasions].[36]

The very close linkage between the trans-Atlantic network of crypto-Jews as a commercial system and that same web as a religious network is further neatly illustrated by the fact that Angola and Guinea, the two main slaving depots in this period were also places where many Portuguese New Christians were inducted, 'converted' or confirmed in crypto-Judaism.[37] The Angola slave trade then served as a stepping stone to the Indies in both a commercial and a religious sense, providing many with the opportunity to set up as a merchant and integrating them into a hidden religious fraternity. After graduating from the slave trade, crypto-Jews in New Spain generally entered what was always the chief strand of the commerce of the Portuguese merchants in Spanish America, importing linens, fine woollen cloth and other textiles from Seville and San Lúcar in exchange for silver, cacao, dyestuffs and other American products. Such merchandise, and the silver, was consigned in the first instance to Spain; but Garci Méndez was certainly not alone among the Portuguese *conversos* in the New World who organised the re-export of these returns from Seville or Madrid to France, the Netherlands and Italy.

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[36] García de Proodian, 'Appendice documental', 287.
[37] Uchmany, 'Participation of New Christians', 198.

Simon Váez Sevilla was the son of a financier who spent some years in Inquisition dungeons in Lisbon before being released under the general pardon of 1605. The family migrated to Seville where Simon Váez seemingly received his early training in both business and crypto-judaism. He was taught Judaism, he later confessed, at the age of eleven by the inveterate proselytiser Alvaro de Acuña, a *judaizante dogmatista* as the Inquisitors termed him, who had reportedly learnt his Judaism in the ghettoes of Italy.[38] Simon Váez first travelled to New Spain in 1614 bringing a consignment of textiles which he gradually sold off in Mexico City before returning to Seville, in 1618, making fresh purchases with which he returned to Mexico City, in 1620. At first travelling in person between Veracruz, Puebla, Mexico City, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas, he subsequently created a network of shops and agencies in his service, which he later extended as far as Manila, in the Philippines, retailing European and Chinese textiles, a business network which, at the same time functioned as a family organisation and religious underground.[39]

Acapulco's trade with Manila based on the exchange of silver for Chinese silks was fundamental to the commerce of New Spain in this period.[40] It was linked to the trans-Atlantic trade in a complex counterpoint which generated considerable tension between Mexico City merchants and those of Seville. For there were continual accusations that the bullion shipped to Manila greatly exceeded the permitted limits, and that the consequent excessive amounts of Chinese fabrics being imported to Mexico and Peru, were steadily undermining exports of textiles from Seville to the New World on the Atlantic convoys. Aware that much of the capital of Simon Váez Sevilla—only about half of whose wealth was successfully found and confiscated by the Inquisition at the time of his arrest—and other leading Portuguese *converso* merchants of Mexico City—was held by factors in Manila and at Acapulco, the Inquisition issued a special decree in Acapulco, addressed to all the clergy of the city who were required to read it out in the churches with appropriate admonitions, exhorting all persons holding, or knowing who held cash, gold, silver, jewels, slaves, or any other assets belong to Váez Sevilla, his son, Gaspar Váez, Francisco López de Fonseca, Capitan Simon López de Aguarda, citizen and merchant of Zacatecas 'con tienda que administraba de Simon Váez Sevilla' [with a shop which he administers belonging to Simon Váez Sevilla] and other business associates, to come forward and surrender everything immediately to the Holy Office.[41] At the time of the main spate of arrests in New Spain several associates and factors of Simon Váez as well as other crypto-Jewish elite merchants of Mexico City, were reportedly absent in the Philippines, among Jorge de Montoya, a Portuguese, said to be about to return from Manila to Acapulco.

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[38] Uchmany, 'Simon Váez Sevilla', 155.
[39] Ibid., 129–31.
[40] Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 99–102.

But however remarkable the trans-oceanic business network of the Portuguese crypto-Jewish community in New Spain, its trans-oceanic network of religious and family ties was assuredly even more astounding and historically important. The latter also has great relevance to the question of how 'Jewish' in observance and doctrine the Portuguese crypto-Jewish community in New Spain really was and the problem of ritual syncretism. A number of scholars, and most cogently Nathan Wachtel, have pointed out that the Portuguese New Christians in America would have received a Catholic education, and had been raised in an overwhelmingly Catholic environment, arguing that these influences must not only have left their mark but penetrated deep into their group consciousness.[42] This is undeniable and means that examples of religious syncretism in which Christian ideas predominated can be expected to have been both numerous and significant. Wachtel cites the bizarre case of a Passover celebration in the home of Simon Váez Sevilla in Mexico City during the 1630s when the faithful were gathered in the back room of the house and Blanca Enríquez, as a spiritual leader of the group, officiated. On beginning to distribute the pieces of unleavened bread which had been secretly prepared, she lined up her congregation in front of her and placed pieces of unleavened bread, one after the other, in each worshipper's mouth, in imitation of, but also as a conscious antidote to, the Catholic mass.[43]

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[41] AGN Inquisición 416, fo. 412 and 426, fo. 545v.

[42] Wachtel, 'Marrano Religiosity', 150–1,166; Alberro, *Inquisition et société,* 208–9; Alberro, 'Crypto-Jews and the Mexican Holy Office', 184.

On becoming pregnant, Simon Váez's wife, Juana Enríquez prayed secretly to 'Saint Moses' and publicly to San Antonio, in the church of San Francisco. 'This association of two "saints", remarks Wachtel, one from the Old Testament and the other from the New, 'represents another remarkable case of syncretic combination'.[44] Fasting was unquestionably one of the principal rituals of the 'judaizers', and one of the offences for which they were most often denounced to the Inquisition but this too, he argues 'was another of the many forms of syncretism developed by the Judaists of Mexico'.[45] Furthermore, contends Wachtel, even certain hidden practices prevalent among the 'judaizers' in New Spain which at first sight may not appear to be syncretist, such as violent and sacriligious behaviour directed at crucifixes and other images, when examined can 'be considered as one form—here superstitious or magical—among many syncretic combinations that are found in such wide variety among the New Christians'.[46]

But was the clandestine faith of the Mexican crypto-Jews essentially a product of syncretism, something thoroughly remote from real Judaism and profoundly influenced by the Catholic milieu? In fact, it would seems historians of crypto-Judaism in Spanish America have generally been too ready to emphasize the gulf which divided these people from the Jewish world of the time and insufficiently aware of the cultural and religious implications of the systematic trans-Atlantic networking with which this community was so intimately entwined. While there were doubtless many persons in New Spain of New Christian extraction who were sincerely Catholic, those Portuguese who did judaize unquestionably formed a very close-knit group who were, quite self-consciously, developing a shared religious culture and awareness powerfully influenced by ideas and practices emanating from outside the Spanish empire. One of the witnesses who testified against Luis Núñez Pérez remarked on their tendency to marry among themselves, even frequently within suspiciously close degrees of kinship, 'por tener precepto de no mesclarse con catholicos y que asimismo se dieron aviso, y noticia de los muchos judios que concocian en diferentes partes, assi las dichas judias como el dicho Luis Nunez Perez, porque los Hebreos hacen notables diligencias para saber de los de su Ley, que residan en cualesquier reynos, o provincias, congratulandose de verse multiplicados' [holding it as a precept not to mix their blood with Catholics and that also they—both the said Jewesses and the said Núñez Pérez—inform each other as to the many Jews they know in different places, for the Jews go to considerable effort to know about those of their Law who reside in whatever realms, or provinces, congratulating themselves to see themselves being multiplied].[47]

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[43] Wachtel, 'Marrano Religiosity', 152–3; 166–7.
[44] Ibid., 159.
[45] Ibid., 160–1.
[46] Ibid., 159.

Being part of a vast web of contacts which extended beyond the seaborne empires of Spain and Portugal their cultural characteristics can only be correctly understood if this uninterrupted stream of influences coming from outside, and the ties which served as the lines of transmission are properly taken account of. Of course these ties were by no means only and not necessarily primarily religious and cultural in character. In the first place they were commercial and it was through commercial contact that the system of resulting religious and family ties evolved. But the fact that the network was economic as well as religious only rendered it the more enduring and capable of propagating itself in the New World context. The network of maritime links, moreover, was in turn all the more durable and effective through being at the same time a transmitter of religious ideas and practices built on a tissue of wide-ranging family ties.

While there are occasional hints in the Inquisition files of connections with Holland and Netherlands Brazil, the vital connections for the crypto-Jewish community in New Spain and Central America, were those with Italy and south-west France. The ties with Ferrara and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany involved at least eight or nine of the leading figures of the crypto-Jewish community in Mexico City, several of whom had themselves lived in Italy and all of whom had relatives participating in organised Jewish community life there. In origin the family connections which lay at the root of this network probably reach at least as far as the 1540s, that crucial decade when the links between the Sephardi Levant trade in the Greek lands and Balkans, on the one side, and Italy, on the other were first formed. For Portuguese marranos returning to Judaism in the mid-sixteenth century, Ferrara the city Samuel Usque dubbed 'el puerto mas seguro', had been the chief haven and it is remarkable that this city continued to play a far-reaching role in the underground culture of the *converso* networks of the Iberian monarchies and empires until well into the seventeenth century. Among the founders of the network connecting Ferrara to the viceroyalty of Mexico, was Jorge de Almeyda who had lived as a Jew in Ferrara in the 1570s but then returned to Spain and, in 1580, with his mother and two brothers, embarked for New Spain where he acquired a mining enterprise and shop in Taxco.[48] In 1588, Almeyda had married Leonor de Carvajal, one of the daughters of Francisca Núñez de Carvajal who has long been known to have been the female head of the small group of Portuguese crypto-Jews established in New Spain in the 1570s.[49] One of the chief influences on the family circle in the early 1580s, it later transpired, was a certain Portuguese physician named Manuel de Morales who judaized in Mexico City in the early 1580s, returned to Madrid in 1584, and who, in 1587 was reported by a Greek Christian to have been seen dressed as a Jew and living in the Jewish quarter of Venice.[50] In 1589 Doña Francisca was arrested by the Mexico City Inquisition for judaizing along with her subsequently renowned son, Don Luis de Carvajal, and three eldest daughters, including Leonor. However, Jorge de Almeyda and his brother successfully went into hiding, in Mexico City, while Doña Francisca's eldest and youngest sons, Balthasar Rodríguez and Miguel de Carvajal also evaded arrest and escaped from New Spain. Rodriguez migrated to Italy and joined the Sephardic community of Pisa while the younger Carvajal moved on to Salonika where he studied and later became a rabbi.[51] In the *Auto-da-fé* celebrated in the cathedral of Mexico City on 24 February

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[47] AGN Inquisición 412, fo. 538 'Processo contra Luis Núñez Pérez'.

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[48] Liebman, *Jews in New Spain*, 172–3.

[49] Uchmany, *Vida*, 52.

[50] Ibid., 77.

[51] Ibid.

1590, Doña Francisca, Leonor de Carvajal, and the others arrested were 'reconciled' and penanced, three of the prisoners, including Doña Francisca and Luis de Carvajal being sentenced to perpetual penitence in seclusion, being sent to live in a house in the Indian quarter of Tlatelolco, opposite the famous Franciscan priory. Unable to trace Almeyda's whereabouts, the Mexican Inquisition eventually abandoned the search; later they burned him in effigy at an *auto-fa-fe* in 1609.[52]

In 1591, Almeyda and his brother succeeded in escaping from New Spain, and returning to Madrid, where his house became an important meeting-point for travelling Portuguese New Christians and a place where one could expect to make contacts with successful Portuguese who held *asientos* with the crown, including merchants connected with the slave trade and others who knew how to obtain licenses for passage to the Indies. Among those who lodged there in the early 1590s, were Jacob (alias Ruy) Dias (alias Ruy Gómez), and his son Diego Dias Nieto. The family of Ruy Dias had emigrated from Portugal to Flanders around 1535 and then moved to Ferrara where they had reverted to normative Judaism and Ruy assumed the Jewish name Jacob Dias. When the *Marrani* were temporarily expelled from Ferrara in 1551, Ruy and his brother Yosef Dias, who had been born a Jew at Ferrara, decided to return to Portugal to renew contacts with relatives some of whom were crypto-Jews but others of whom were sincere Christians. In around 1555, Ruy Dias had returned to Ferrara where he married Esther Nieto. However, after many years of residing among the Jews there as an active merchant participating in the Levant trade, he went bankrupt owing to losses suffered 'in Venice, in Ragusa, in Constantinople and at sea'.[53] Ruined, Ruy Dias now aged sixty, had set off with his sixteen year old son—both leaving their wives behind at Ferrara—on a life of wandering.

Still dressed as Jews in Venice, they switched identities, in 1592, on entering Rome where, rather imaginatively, they obtained a papal authorisation to collect alms for the ransoming of Christian captives from the Turks.[54] They then travelled via Genua, Barcelona, and Madrid to Portugal where they remained for some months, contacting relatives and looking for economic opportunities, living off charity mainly, before returning to Madrid. Here they gravitated to the circle of Antonio de Fonseca, a merchant and crypto-Jew with regular business links with Venice and Ferrara and through whom they renewed contact with Jorge de Almeyda whom Ruy Dias had known earlier in Ferrara.[55] Almeyda took them into his confidence, telling them about his life and relatives in New Spain and the property he had abandoned in Taxco. He also told them about Diego Dias Nieto's second cousin, Fernando Cardoso, of Lamego, who lived in the Mexican town of Querétaro, and in return for their agreeing to take letters and messages for his relatives and friends, helped arrange licenses for their passage to New Spain. Arriving in Seville, in late 1593, they stayed, while awaiting the departure of the Mexican *flota*, on Almeyda's instructions, in the house of Blanca Lorenza, a cousin of his who had also lived many years in the *judería* of Ferrara, and knew her Judaism from there, a house where many Portuguese New Christians stayed when visiting Seville. She was sufficiently taken with them to put them up free of charge.

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[52] Liebman, *Jews in New Spain*, 173.
[53] Uchmany, *Vida*, 45.
[54] Liebman, *Jews in New Spain*, 191–3.

In the spring of 1594 they arrived in New Spain, taking the usual route from Veracruz via Puebla to Mexico City where they promptly contacted members of the family Carvajal. Luis de Carvajal, grateful for the letters, one of which was from his brother Balthasar, in Italy, put them up in the house of his brother-in-law, Antonio Díaz de Cáceres, husband of Doña Francisca's second daughter, Catalina. He had just returned from a long business journey on the Manila galleons to the Far East on which he had embarked at the time of the Inquisition arrests, in 1589, taking with him besides his own goods and capital, a cargo chiefly of silver, wine, and olives, invested in by several others, 1,600 *pesos* of the merchandise belonging to Almeyda.[56] Diaz de Cáceres had in fact been one of the first Portuguese New Christians to establish himself as a merchant in Mexico City settling there in 1574 and was now an expert on Mexico's commerce. Diego Dias Nieto and his father began their new life by touring the Mexico City quarters, showing their papal bull and collecting money for ransoming Christian captives. But in secret they kept the Jewish sabbath and fast days in company with the perpetually penanced Luis de Carvajal, his mother and sisters, and others in their house in the suburb of Tlatelolco. The family Carvajal evidently took an intense interest in Hebrew knowledge, Biblical expertise and descriptions of Jewish observance, father and son had brought with them to Mexico from Ferrara. For much of the thorough grounding acquired in Ferrara long survived in Mexico. Indeed, the Inquisition discovered later that Diego knew virtually the entire Pentateuch and Prophets by heart in Hebrew.[57] Despite their poverty, it is plain that their knowledge of Hebrew and Judaism led to the two men of Ferrara being held in the highest respect in their new circle.

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[55] Ibid., 172, 193; Uchmany, 'Judío italiano', 55.

[56] Uchmany, *Vida*, p. 57.

Luis de Carvajal, after years of assiduously researching Judaism in the Franciscan library at Tlatelolco, was arrested for the second time, in February 1595. Relentlessly tortured, he eventually broke and compromised a considerable number of persons among them the Dias Nieto father and son, who were duly arrested in the spring of 1596. Under interrogation and during torture, they admitted their judaizing in Spain and New Spain but concealing their earlier life as Jews in Ferrara, the son seeking to protect his father (who was born a baptized Christian and therefore liable to be sentenced to death) by denouncing Antonio de Fonseca in Madrid as the one who had inducted him to the Law of Moses. Diego Dias Nieto appeared as one of the forty-six Portuguese 'judaizers' paraded and penanced (besides another twenty-three prisoners convicted of sorcery, blasphemy and miscellaneous heretical propositions) in the first big public Mexican *Auto-da-fé*—an occasion attended by the viceroy, held amid splendid solemnities in Mexico City's Plaza Mayor on the day of the Immaculate Conception, 8 December 1596.[58] With the crowd roaring its approval, and the Inquisitors resplendent in their authority, Luis de Carvajal, his mother and six others condemned in the name of Christ as obstinate 'judaizers' were put to the flames. Among the latter was Manuel de Lucena, merchant living at the silver mines at Pachuca, an associate of Luis de Carvajal, and Diego Enríquez, of Seville, a trader who had previously been a soldier in the *presidios* of Guatemala and northern Mexico. Among the 'judaizing' fugitives whose names were read out, and were burnt in effigy, were Luis' younger brother, Miguel de Carvajal, Dr Morales and his wife, Isabel López Pérez, and Francisco Váez Rodríguez, an associate of Jorge de Almeyda who had earlier that year left New Spain, via Acapulco, for Manila where his father was; it was later reported to the Inquisition that the Váez Rodríguez had then sailed from Manila to Macão and from there to Goa.[59]

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[57] Ibid., p. 62.
[58] Ibid., 79; Liebman, 'Secret Jewry', 480.

But many leads remained to be followed up and soon there were fresh arrests. Diego Dias Nieto, whose father had already been rearrested, was taken for the second time in December 1600, in Texcoco. Now facing a death sentence, he endeavoured to save his life by claiming never to have been baptized, that his real name was Isaac Nieto and that he had been born a Jew in Ferrara. In desperation, he sank to his knees, clutching a crucifix, insisting he was now convinced that Christianity is the truth, asking to be baptized. He testified at length, describing the *judería* of Ferrara in detail, and his teachers there, and reciting from memory numerous Hebrew prayers he had learnt there.[60] In addition, he compromised some thirty persons for 'judaizing'. In 1601, the Inquisitors decided to 'reconcile' him, sentencing him to perpetual confinement and penance.

At the grand *Auto-da-fé* of March 1601 in Mexico City, 124 prisoners where penanced in person and nineteen burnt in effigy.[61] Among this large batch of heretics and blasphemers were once again forty-five 'judaizantes'. These offenders included Antonio Díaz de Cáceres, Hector de Fonseca, an elder brother of Jorge de Almeyda who was a miner at Taxco, Alvaro de Carrión—a follower of Luis de Carvajal and inhabitant of Tilcuautla, near Pachuca, Isabel Machado who possessed books on the Law of Moses left by Dr Morales, an eighteen year old girl, Ana de León de Carvajal who had imbibed much from Diego Diaz Nieto and was sentenced to be taken to a convent and thoroughly re-instructed, and a travelling merchant, Francisco Rodríguez de Ledesma who travelled back and forth from Cartagena de Indias bringing pearls which he sold in Mexico City. Two obstinate judaizers were put to the flames—Thomas de Fonseca Castellanos, of Taxco, who was a cousin of Jorge de Almeyda, and another bearer of the Ferrara legacy, and another of the Carvajal women. Among the fugitives burnt in effigy was a friend of Luis de Carvajal, named Pelayo Alvárez, a brother of Almeyda's cousin in Seville, Blanca Lorenza Rodríguez, Miguel

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[59] Uchmany, *Vida*, p. 87.

[60] Ibid.; Uchmany, 'Judío italiano', 57–8.

[61] Toribio de Medina, *Historia . . . México*, 124–36.

Hernández, a brother of Almeyda himself, Isabel Clara widow of Dr Morales' brother, Francisco, and Blanca Morales, sister of Dr Morales. Also burnt in the *Auto-da-fé* were the disinterred bones of Simon Payba, father of the Diego Enríquez burnt in 1596, whom, it had been discovered had judaized at Pachuca where he had died.

Diaz Nieto's account of Ferrara and all the links connected with it was so remarkable and important that the Inquisition decided that it was essential to send to Ferrara to obtain confirmation of his testimony and further details relating to the case. In June 1602, the Ferrara Inquisition, on orders from Rome duly interviewed several local Jews belonging to the synagogue of the Levantines (*scuola di Levantini*), in effect that of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews, about the individuals concerned, and wrote confirming that Jacob and his son Isaac Nieto had indeed lived among the Jews of Ferrara until around 1590. Meanwhile, other former Portuguese *conversos* destined to migrate in New Spain were growing up within orthodox Judaism in Italy. Especially notable is the case of Juan Pacheco de León (alias Solomon Machorro) who was brought by his father, David Machorro, and mother, Luna Machorro (who had two brothers and two married sisters living as Jews in Amsterdam) to Pisa, in 1611, at the age of two. Moving soon after to Livorno, his family had had him taught Judaism and the Hebrew language from an early age;[62] he attended the synagogue regularly with the other boys 'y se vestia el *tale*' [and wore a talith].[63] Around 1621, he was sent to Smyrna, in Turkey, to study with his uncle there, Abraham Israel, and later, on his way back, been captured by North African corsairs who took him to Algiers. Altogether he spent four years in the synagogues of Chios, Smyrna and Algiers.[64] On returning to Livorno, he found that his father had left and that only his mother was still there. Setting out in 1629, at the age of twenty, he went to join his father who under the alias Antonio de Narváez Farfán, had migrated to Seville and written, summoning him to join him there. But on reaching Seville, he heard that his father had gone to Mexico City whither he dutifully followed only to discover later that he had died at sea.[65]

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[62] *Proceso y causa criminal contra Juan Pacheco de León*, 129; Wachtel, 'Marrano Religiosity', 158, 68; Uchmany, 'Participation of New Christians', 195; Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 411.

[63] AGN Inquisición 416, fo. 519.

[64] *Proceso y causa criminal contra Juan Pacheco de León*, 132.

[65] AGN Inquisición 416, fo. 520.

In Mexico City, Pacheco de León gravitated, as a matter of course, to the circle of Simon Váez Sevilla and his wife, Juana Enríquez in whose household the family, spiritual and commercial lines of contact connecting Pisa, Livorno, and Ferrara with Mexico converged. To them he told, and described everything he had seen and learnt in Italy, presumably including his account of his visit to the ghetto of Venice about which he later told the Inquisitors.[66] According to his confession to the Inquisitors, in May 1648, he claimed not to know the Catholic names of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews whom he met in the Italian ghettoes for there they used only Jewish names.[67] As it happened, Juana's mother, Blanca Enríquez, had known his father, David Machorro, in Seville, before he had emigrated to Italy and also known his remarkable uncles, Jerónimo Rodríguez (alias Isaac Israel) Méndez and his brother, Duarte, before these two emigrated to Amsterdam, in 1617, and became prominent merchants there.[68] Simon Váez and his circle clearly welcomed him, and supported him financially, and, moreover, eagerly adopted him as a supplementary teacher of their community, holding his knowledge of Hebrew, orthodox Judaism and the Italian synagogues in high esteem. He became a particular friend of Gaspar Váez, Simon's son. After two years in Mexico City, he was sent to Querétaro to tend a shop there for Simon Váez.[69]

Antonio Váez Castelobranco, Simon Váez' brother, teacher of Judaism to the young physician, Pedro Tinoco, a man accused of seeking to 'enseñar a muchos su muerta Ley assi en los reinos de Europa, como en este' [teach his dead law [of Moses] to many in the realms of Europe as well as here],[70] and one of the 'relapsos' burnt in the *Auto general de la Fee* of 1649, was another key figure whose life was inextricably bound up with the ghettoes of Italy. Before his execution, he confessed to the Inquisition that at the age of sixteen, around 1588, he had travelled to Pisa, having fallen in love with a certain Doña Elena [de Silva?], in Lisbon and followed her there when her parents had migrated to the *judería* of Pisa to be able to live freely as Jews. In fact, he got into trouble on being caught in bed with her. But if love had brought him there, it was also 'en Pisa de Toscania' that he had been inducted into orthodox Judaism and it was because of this that years later in New Spain he came to be regarded by the other Portuguese crypto-Jews as a veritable holy man accustomed—not least when faith-healing—to impress them by reciting prayers in Hebrew.[71] And even after he and Tomas Treviño de Sobremente had on one occasion, shortly before their arrest, in 1642, vehemently disagreed as to the precise date of Yom Kippur, causing some dismay among the rest, neither being willing cede ground on so crucial a matter, most of the community 'no dejaban de mirarle como a rabbino y como a oraculo, y consultarle en especial en materias de aiuno' [did not cease regarding him as a rabbi and as an oracle, and to consult him especially in matters relating to fasting]. Apparently, he prided himself on being of the tribe of Levi and on his prowess in dispute, boasting that once whilst in Venice, or Florence, that he had succeeded in convincing a Christian cleric of the truth of Judaism and of having circumcized him.[72]

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[66] AGN Inquisición 416, fo. 520v; Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 411; Uchmany, 'Simon Váez Sevilla', 148.

[67] AGN Inquisición 416, fo. 520.

[68] *Proceso y causa criminal contra Juan Pacheco de León*, 258; *Livro de Bet Haim*, 190.

[69] Liebman, *Jews in New Spain*, 268.

[70] AGN Inquisición 489, fo. 383; Liebman, 'Secret Jewry', 482.

Simon de Montero, likewise from Castelobranco, and another wealthy merchant, had also travelled in Italy and lived in the ghettos of Pisa and Livorno.[73] Julian de Alvarez, inhabitant of Chamacuero, in Michoacán, born in Amsterdam of 'Portuguese' parents, often talked to his friends in various parts of New Spain, about 'Amsterdam en Olanda donde los judíos viven con libertad y de aver visitado y frequentado las sinagogas de Pisa, Florencia y Liorna' [Amsterdam, in Holland where the Jews live in freedom and about having visited and frequented the synagogues of Pisa, Florence and Livorno].[74] Diego Correa was another with Dutch connections, his father having migrated to Amsterdam from Dutch Brazil; amazing though it may seem, despite his being in Mexico and his father in Holland they had been able to sustain a tenuous correspondence by letter.[75] Not surprisingly, since one heard so much about Italy among the crypto-Jews in Mexico, there were also several members who had long been planning to leave New Spain for Pisa or Livorno. These included Antonio Carvallo, who in around 1634 had had discussions with Alvaro de Acuña in Mexico City, he being the one who 'con palabras suaves' had swayed him 'keep the law of Moses'.[76] In conversation with fellow crypto-Jews in Mexico, Antonio and his wife, Isabel da Silva, often mentioned that 'tenían determinado a irse a tierra donde el dicho Cavallo tiene hermanos y hermanas, y biben con libertad los que guaran la Ley de Moyssen' [they had resolved to go to lands where the said Cavallo has brothers and sisters and where those that keep to the Law of Moses live in liberty], and that these relatives used to write to her, and her husband, sending them presents and urging them to flee to those parts.[77]

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[71] AGN Inquisición 426, fo. 545v; AGN Inquisición 489, fos. 382–2v, 384v; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 127.

[72] AGN Inquisición 426, fo. 382.

[73] Israel, 'Portuguese', 325.

[74] AGN Inquisición 431, fos. 92v–93.

[75] *Proceso y causa criminal contra Juan Pacheco de León*, 195, 398.

Nor does this by any means exhaust the list of Mexican crypto-Jewry's Italian links. Pedro Fernández de Castro, born in Valladolid in Castile to Portuguese parents, who when arrested for judaizing by the Mexican Inquisition in 1642 was trading at the mines of Chichicupa, had as a young man travelled in Italy and, in 1633 having seen Naples and Rome, proceeded to Ferrara. Here he had had sexual relations with a Jewess named Ester, who persuaded him to act on his secret preference for Judaism and profess Judaism publicly 'como todos los judíos que en la ciudad de Ferrara havia'.[78] Consequently, he had had himself circumcized, learnt Judaism and attended the synagogue in Ferrara. He also got to know the Jewish quarter of Pisa and others in Italy. Later, however, he tired of Ester and left Ferrara. After visiting 'las sinagogas de Genova y Liorna', he switched back from Judaism to Christianity and returned to Spain, disembarking at Barcelona in 1634. From there, he proceeded to Valladolid where he married Leonor Váez, native of Castelobranco and an illegimate daughter of Simon Váez.[79] Both being *judaizantes* and Fernandez de Castro being particularly enthusiastic about Pisa, they decided to go and live there 'libremente' as Jews.[80] This they did. But their economic circumstances there were rather difficult. For this was shortly after the 1630 plague epidemic, a time of marked decline for the Sephardic community of Pisa which by 1632, had fallen to 357 individuals (76 families) as against 441 individuals, in 1613.[81] Tiring of his poverty, after two to three years of life in the ghetto at Pisa, Fernández de Castro decided to return to Spain once more, this time to Seville from where he hoped to obtain from Simon Váez Sevilla, the dowry he had been promised but not received. He left Leonor in Pisa.[82] From Seville, he eventually crossed to New Spain, in 1640 and took up residence in his father-in-law's house, in Mexico City. Over the next months, he regaled the whole group in Mexico City with stories about his life in Ferrara and Pisa, during evenings in which they also recited psalms in Spanish.[83] But before he could act on his desire to return via Seville, to Pisa, and rejoin his wife with the money secured in Mexico, he was seized as a judaizer by the Inquisition.

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[76] AGN Inquisición 409, fo. 395v.
[77] Ibid., fo. 399.
[78] AGN Inquisición 409, fos. 579v–80; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 127.
[79] AGN Inquisición 409, fo. 579.
[80] Ibid. 409, fo. 380v.

Yet while the ties with Ferrara and Pisa were especially crucial, and amply demonstrate the extent to which the converso diaspora in Spain and the New World during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century—though this has rarely been recognized—in fact formed part of a constantly interacting dichotomy with the Sephardic *diaspora*, ties with Saint Jean de Luz, Bayonne, and Bordeaux were also extremely important in generating the judaic content of Mexican *converso* religiosity. Antonio Fernández Cardado, for instance, born of Portuguese parents at Almagro, in La Mancha, and later citizen of the mines of Pachuca, imprisoned by the Inquisition in 1634, is one of the Mexican 'judaizers' who exhibited, it has been claimed, strong signs of syncretism in his personal religious observance. When his cousins inducted him to crypto-Judaism, they spoke of the 'Holy Ghost' in the same breadth as in denying that Jesus Christ is the Messiah; when in his maturity he regularly recited a prayer which he had originally learnt from priests, and which he liked, he usually remembered to omit the 'Amen Jesus' at the end, but sometimes forgot allowing it to slip in, as by an unconscious reflex.[84] Even so, what is more significant culturally and religiously is that at the age of fifteen his father took him, on a commercial trip, to Bordeaux, and that afterwards, in 1611, at the age of twenty-one, he spent a year among the Portuguese crypto-Jewish refugee community (which at that time included Lopo Ramirez and other uncompromising 'judaizers') at Saint Jean de Luz where, he later admitted, 'abía apostado de la fee catholica y pasado de toda su corazon a la dicha Ley de Moyses' [he had apostasized from the Catholic faith and converted with all his heart to the said Law of Moses], learning a certain amount about normative Judaism and how to recite at least one prayer in Hebrew.[85]

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[81] Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 60, 62–3.
[82] *Proceso y causa criminal contra Juan Pacheco de León*, 195–6.
[83] AGN Inquisición 409, fo. 381.
[84] Wachtel, 'Marrano Religiosity', 151–2.

Having returned to Spain, in 1612, the following year he crossed the Atlantic to New Spain. There, he worked his way up, first earning his living as an itinerant trader on the road between Veracruz and Puebla, then trading in Mexico City and finally establishing himself at the silver mines of Pachuca, a focus of Portuguese settlement in recent decades and a place where they comprised some 7% of the white population as early as 1609.[86] Because he had lived in south-west France and knew more Judaism than other *conversos*, Cardado 'estava tenido y comunmente reputado el dicho reo por judio, padre y maestro, do todos sus parientes y de los observantes de la dicha Ley' [he was considered and commonly held to be a Jew, father and head of all his relatives and the adherents of the said law].[87] At Pachuca, it seems, people habitually called him and his associates 'Jews' 'sin que ubiesen hecho caso dello ni deligencia alguna en su defensa' [without their making any issue of it or doing anything in their defence].[88]

Meanwhile, others had still stronger French connections. Gaspar de Pereira, denounced to the Mexican Inqisition, in 1623, had been born in Bayonne.[89] Isabel Núñez, tried by the Inquisition in 1633, had been born in Bordeaux.[90] Jorge Jacinto Baçan, born to Portuguese parents at Malaga, husband of Blanca Xuarez, a Portuguese born in Mexico City, arrested by the Inquisition there with confiscation of all his property, on 13 July 1642, was accused not just of being a 'judaizer' but of having lived publicly as a Jew in France, at Marseilles and other places and of having been converted to Judaism in France by 'David Vacquero, natural de Florencia'.[91] Diego Pérez de Albuquerque, one of the principal Portuguese crypto-Jews of Zacatecas after his arrest at first claimed to have been born at Segovia; but he had in fact been born in Bordeaux, and lived many years there, and as a young man had also lived for a time among the Portuguese New Christians in Rouen.[92] Once again, it was economic pressure which drove him to migrate to Spanish America: 'y que por ser tanta su pobreza había determinado de pasarse a las Indias' [and on account of his great poverty he decided to got to the Indies].[93] In 1618, he made an arduous journey, without stopping, direct from Bordeaux to Seville, and then on to Cadiz, to board the fleet for New Spain. On arriving at Puebla he had met a fellow Portuguese New Christian whom he had known in Rouen and whom he knew to be a Jew, a man who had attended the synagogue at Pisa.[94] They became firm friends and allies since both kept the Law of Moses. Then, the next year, in 1619, another Portuguese arrived whom he had known, and known as a crypto-Jew, in Bordeaux, a man who also knew a good deal of Judaism having been in Amsterdam. Together the three celebrated 'el día del Ayuno Grande' [i.e. Yom Kippur], and 'ayunado juntos y resado algunos psalmos' [fasted together and recited some psalms].[95] During the fast day the three sat all day in a small deserted chapel praying and discussing 'la solemnidad con que aquella fiesta se celebraba en la ciudad de Amsterdam en Olanda, por vivir con toda libertad, los de la nacion hebrea' [the solemnity with which that festival was celebrated in Amsterdam where those of the Hebrew nation live in complete freedom].[96]

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[85] AGN Inquisición 378, fos. 287–7v. 'Processo contra Antonio Fernández Cardado'.
[86] Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 316.
[87] AGN Inquisición 378, fos. 292v–3.
[88] Ibid., fo. 293.
[89] AGN Inquisición 344, exp. 4.
[90] AGN 381 'Relacion de causas despachadas por el Santo Oficio en el ano 1633'.
[91] AGN Inquisición 426, fos. 536–6v.

It seems clear then that the Portuguese crypto-Jewish community in New Spain between the 1570s and 1642 was a closely-knit network which was simultaneously religious, social and commercial. Undoubtedly, it was theologically seditious, as well as meticulously clandestine, and so could be construed, particularly in the feverish atmosphere prevailing in Spanish America in the wake of the Portuguese Secession, in 1640, as also being politically seditious which in a certain passive sense it arguably was. In several of the trials of the judaizers arrested in Mexico in the early 1640s it emerged that there had been repeated discussions among some of the male members of the group in which 'hablaron contra el rey nuestro señor, llamandolo tirano' [they spoke against the king, our lord, calling him tyrant', and in support of the duke of Braganza.[97] Salomon Machorro had reportedly said of the Portuguese secession that everything would be fine now and that the first thing the new king of Portugal would do would be to suppress the Inquisition.

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[92] AGN Inquisición 348, fo. 517v. 'Proceso contra Diego Pérez de Albuquerque'; Uchmany, 'New Christians and crypto-Jews', 194.
[93] AGN Inquisición 348, fo. 531.
[94] Ibid., 348, fo. 531v.
[95] Ibid., fos. 533–3v.
[96] Ibid., fo. 532.

In the months after the news of the Lisbon *coup d'état* reached Mexico City, in January 1641, there were reports of fresh risings and revolutions against Castilian rule, and against the Castilians, in Madeira and Brazil and rumours of a dangerous conspiracy at Cartagena de Indias.[98] There were reports also that the several hundred Portuguese in Mexico City and Puebla were stockpiling arms and, according to Bishop Palafox, a real danger of a political conspiracy in support of the Braganza. What has aptly been called the 'apprehension and hysteria that arose in Mexico upon the news of the revolt of 1640'[99] may have been essentially groundless, or grossly exaggerated, but was real enough for all that. That Viceroy Escalona and others of relatively tolerant disposition, sympathetic to Olivares' comparatively liberal policy towards the Portuguese New Christians, may well have been protecting the group from the full rigour of the Inquisition down to 1642, despite several prior denunciations by hostile witnesses,[100] is suggested by the fact that the mass arrests which broke the back of the community in New Spain began precisely in July 1642, the very month after the removal of Viceroy Escalona (who had Portuguese connections), from his post as viceroy, as a precautionary measure, by Bishop Palafox, acting on secret orders from the king.[101]

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[97] AGN Inquisición 412, fos. 540–1v; *Proceso y causa criminal contra Juan Pacheco de León*, 320, 398; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 129.

[98] AGN Inquisición 489, fos. 85–8. Bishop Palafox to Viceroy Escalona, 20 Nov. 1641.

[99] Borah, 'The Portuguese of Tulancingo', 394.

[100] Alberro, 'Crypto-Jews and the Mexican Holy Office', 180–2.

[101] AGN Inquisición 416, fos. 445–9v; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 312–13.

CHAPTER FOUR

BUENOS AIRES, TUCUMÁN AND THE RIVER PLATE ROUTE: PORTUGUESE *CONVERSOS* AND THE 'COMMERCIAL SUBVERSION' OF THE SPANISH INDIES (1580–1640)

During high-level consultations at the Spanish court, in Madrid, in June 1623, two members of the royal Council of Portugal were asked to advise on a pressing question of policy relating to Spanish America recently discussed by both the Inquisition *Suprema* and the royal council of the Indies, namely whether or not to establish a new Inquisition tribunal at Buenos Aires, at the mouth of the Río de la Plata (River Plate) in South America.[1] There had been a certain amount of pressure for this for some years, emanating from both secular and ecclesiastical authorities in the viceroyalty of Peru and the River Plate governorships,[2] and in Madrid there was some support for the step, though, in the end, no such tribunal was actually ever erected, presumably because the proposal conflicted with the plans of Olivares and the new king, Philip IV (reigned: 1621–1664) to ameliorate the position of the New Christians and to contain rather than expand the powers of the Inquisition.

Nevertheless, the issue of the Portuguese *conversos* in the regions strung out along the Río de la Plata, from Buenos Aires to Peru, continued to be considered in both Madrid and Spanish America a thorny one with far-reaching implications. Over the years there had been a stream of complaints reaching Madrid, often from high officials, Inquisitors and others in Spanish South America, about the clandestine and illegal seepage of Portuguese New Christians from Brazil via Buenos Aires up the River Plate to the immense, wide-open province of Tucumán in what is today north-west Argentina and, from there, further northwards to Potosí, the great silver-mining centre in the Andes. For this surreptitious immigration, in progress

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[1] BL MS Egerton 344, fo. 98. 'Consulta original del Consejo de Inquisición, parecer de Garci Pérez de Araciel y Mendo de Motta, Madrid, 10 June 1623.

[2] Monteiro, 'Politica de Castela', 222–3.


F.D. 2002
BRAZIL
Rio de Janeiro
São Paulo
Río de la Plata
(River Plate)
Paraná
VICEROYALTY OF PERU
Potosí
Arica
San Miguel de Tucumán
Santiago del Estero
Códoba
Santiago de Chile
Buenos Aires
▲ Portuguese New Christian Communities

Map 3. The River Plate Route to Potosí in the Early 17th Century since the 1580s, the effects of which were increasingly noticeable, was held to pose a double or treble threat, religious, economic and strategic, to the entire edifice of Spain's American empire.

As early as 1602, the crown took action to tackle what was already then evidently perceived as a worrying and troublesome matter. In October 1602, orders were issued to the president and judges of the *audiencia* of Las Charcas which exercised judicial responsibility over the River Plate towns and settlements, requiring them to expel all Portuguese who had entered over the years clandestinely without royal license, from Brazil. The three reasons given for this expulsion eloquently reflected the alleged triangular character of the problem: these illegal immigrants were to be removed in the first place because many or most of them were 'christianos nuebos y gente poca segura en las cosas de nuestra santa fee catholica judaiçantes' [New Christians, people little reliable in matters of our holy Catholic faith, judaizers]; secondly, because they were subverting the rules and regulations governing commerce between Europe and the Spanish New World; and, finally, because they were a security risk, having given 'entrada a los enemigos y tienen tratos y contratos con ellos' [admittance to the enemy and having trade and dealings with them], presumably an allusion to the fact that in the Spanish Caribbean, notably Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and the coasts of Venezuela, Portuguese New Christians had, since the 1590s, established contact with Dutch interlopers and established a lucrative and illegal commerce with them, thereby encouraging Dutch penetration of the New World.[3] As a result of this directive, a number of illegal Portuguese immigrants were rounded up at Potosí, Tucumán and neighbouring places, and brought to Buenos Aires from where, in the summer of 1603, a batch of at least twenty-five were deported by the royal authorities by sea to Brazil.[4]

However, in the longer perspective such measures did little to change the situation. The two Portuguese ministers consulted in Madrid, in 1623, concurred with the *Suprema* of the Inquisition, and other advisers that it was urgently necessary for the Spanish crown to 'atacar (quanto fuera possible) la entrada y communicacion que los christianos nuevos de la nacion hebrea de los reinos de Portugal hazen por via de Buenos Aires' [combat (as much as possible) the entry and communciation which the New Christians of the Hebrew nation of the realm of Portugal effect by way of Buenos Aires]. They deemed this indispensable both in the interests of the Catholic faith and Church and 'para la conservacion temporal de las provincias del Peru' [for the temporal preservation of the provinces of (the viceroyalty of) Peru]. For there was now an extensive network of Portuguese New Christian communities distributed at intervals along the whole route from Buenos Aires to Potosí, Lima and the Peruvian Pacific ports. In some places, moreover, the proportion of Portuguese to Spanish settlers was uncomfortably high. From a list of all the foreigners then resident in the sprawling province of Tucumán drawn up in1607 it is clear that all three main towns—Santiago del Estero founded in 1563, San Miguel de Tucumán founded in 1565 and Córdoba de la Nueva Andalucía founded in 1573—as well as the smaller settlements had substantial minorities of Portuguese. Of 124 registered white adult male foreigners residing in the province in that year no less than 109 were Portuguese, many of them New Christians. Since there were only approximately 700 'Spanish' *vecinos* in the province, this means that some 14% of all the heads of family in Tucumán were Portuguese.[5] In Santiago del Estero there were twenty-one Portuguese, eighteen of whom had entered Spanish America illegally via Buenos Aires while in Córdoba all but one of the thirty-three resident foreigners had arrived by that route.[6] In Potosí, in 1610, seventy-four out of 144 registered foreigners were Portuguese;[7] and while many more of those residing there had come through Peru, having arrived on the *flotas* via Cartagena or else New Spain, or the Caribbean, it is striking that nevertheless a clear majority of forty-two were listed as having entered via Buenos Aires.[8] In Buenos Aires, at the mouth of the Río de la Plata, around 1620 there were estimated to be around 1,500 white inhabitants, no less than 370 of which, or practically a quarter, were Portuguese; furthermore most of the city's commerce was in Portuguese New Christian hands, the most prominent, after he settled there, in 1601, being Diego de la Vega, a native of Madeira who had permission to reside and trade, being for many years the River Plate factor of the slave *asentistas* in Portugal.[9]

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[3] Ibid., 225; Lewin, *Judío en la época colonial,* 52; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 63–6.

[4] Lafuente Machain, *Portugueses en Buenos Aires*, pp. 116–74.

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[5] Lavalle, 'Les étrangers', 128.

[6] Ibid., pp. 126–7.

[7] Ibid., 137–8; Vila Vilar, 'Extranjeros en Cartagena', 155; Böttcher, *Aufstieg und Fall*, 56.

[8] Lavalle, 'Les étrangers', 138.

The belief that the Portuguese New Christians entering Spanish America through Buenos Aires constituted a treble threat—religious, economic and strategic—which was having seriously damaging consequences was clearly reflected then in royal, judicial and Inquisition edicts at least as early as 1602 and was probably in the air well before that.[10] The perceived menace to religion was of course the spread of crypto-Judaism; but this was thought to consist of more than just an unwanted network of crypto-Jewish groups astride the main route from Buenos Aires to Lima. For just as some Portuguese New Christians had reportedly taught Jewish rites and notions to blacks in 'Guinea' so, the worry was, they might propagate judaizing heresy among the Indians and *mestizos* of Tucumán and the Andes. Similarly, the perceived economic threat entailed more than just undermining the official monopoly operated through the trans-Atlantic convoy system based on Seville and its outports by smuggling large quantities of unregistered and untaxed merchandise to the viceroyalty of Peru without having registered anything in Spain, serious as that in itself was in the eyes of the king's ministers, since this economic subversion was accompanied by ominous strategic ramifications. For besides subverting the established system for controlling trade between Spain and Spanish America, the Portuguese New Christians entering Peru by way of Buenos Aires, Santiago del Estero and Tucumán were deemed by some 'mui sospechosos por la communicacion que por medio de otros, sus deudos, tienen con olandeses' [very suspicious by reason of the communication they have, through other (New Christians), their relatives, with the Dutch].[11] This, as we shall see, referred to links which actually existed connecting the Portuguese in Spanish South America via Brazil and Portugal with the Sephardim of Amsterdam and through the latter with the Dutch more broadly.

Potosí was clearly central in all contexts, religious, economic and strategic. A letter sent to the *Suprema* in Madrid by two Lima Inquisitors, in 1622 stated that the town of Potosí was 'llena de portugueses que acuden a la plata del cerro' [full of Portuguese who come for the silver of the Cerro], that these were virtually all New Christians and that most of them 'judaized' and participated in 'ceremonias de judíos'; in the main, added the Inquisitors, these miscreants were entering via Buenos Aires rather than on the official trans-Atlantic *flotas* to Panama.[12] Silver was clearly acting as a magnet and Potosí had already become notorious as a centre of clandestine crypto-Jewish heresy by November 1609 when the *Suprema* in Madrid directed the Lima Inquisition to tighten surveillance of the Portuguese *conversos* entering Spanish South America via Buenos Aires and then passing via the Río de la Plata or Paraguay, to Potosí and into Peru.[13] Potosí held the attention of everyone concerned with the question of the Portuguese in Spanish America being by far the largest and most important of all the centres of silver production in the Spanish Indies. Silver drove the commerce of the New World and provided the back-bone of the crown's American revenues. If the Portuguese were present in disturbingly large numbers in that place, this could only be interpreted as an alarming symptom of the subversive export of silver from Spanish America via illegal routes which was increasingly reputed to be the prime reason for shortfalls in royal revenues and the decline of the official Indies trade. The trans-Atlantic traffic from Seville, San Lúcar de Barrameda and other outports and especially the *flotas* sailing each year to Cartagena de Indias and Puerto Velo, in Panama, to supply the Peruvian market, were generally perceived in the Spanish world as having lost their dynamism, and to be stagnant if not actually contracting, from at least as early as the 1590s and it was not long before the Portuguese were cited as a major, indeed the major, factor in this disastrous development.

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[9] Böttcher, *Aufstieg und Fall*, 56 Vila Vilar, *Hispanoamerica*, 103.
[10] Ibid., 62; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá*, 81.
[11] BL MS Egerton 344, fo. 98.

While it is certain that there was a prevailing impression in Spain and Spanish America early in the new century that the continued expansion in the (non-Indian) population, and in consumption, in the Spanish New World between the 1580s and the 1620s, had entirely against the logic of the situation failed to produce a corresponding growth in the official trans-Atlantic trade, and indeed that the latter was in fact losing ground, some modern historians have consistently denied that the *flotas* did in fact contract in absolute terms before the early 1620s. However, there are grounds for thinking that the real position was significantly worse than most scholars, who have tended to follow Pierre Chaunu and John Lynch on this question, have supposed.[14] The proposition that 'the great upswing of 1562–92 was followed by a plateau from 1593 to 1622 and a downward swing from 1623 to 1650' and that, as Lynch expressed it, 'the trade then recovered'; and that therefore there was no crisis before 1620, and no long depression in either Spanish South America or New Spain, though often repeated seems on the basis of fresh data relating to the financing and profitability of the traffic to be incorrect.[15] Evidently, it was by no means only in the perception of Spanish contemporaries but also in reality, that the official traffic entered a period of chronic difficulty, recession, loss of profitability, and loss of confidence, from around and very likely from even before 1600.

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[12] 'Carta de los Inquisidores Verdugo y Gaytan a S.A. el Inquisidor General, Lima, 4 May 1622 printed in García de Proodian, *Judíos en América*, 272–4

[13] Ibid., 29.

From the 1580s until around 1605, direct Dutch access, both Jewish and Protestant, to especially northern Brazil was relatively common. Apparently, the first—and certainly the first recorded instance—of trade from Brazil via the Río de la Plata route to Tucumán and Potosí dates from 1585 when the first bishop of Tucumán—actually the first bishop in what is now Argentina—Fray Francisco de Victoria who, as it happens was himself a Portuguese New Christian (and an uncle of the prominent Sephardi merchant Duarte Nunes da Costa of Hamburg) first opened up the route, bringing a large consignment of food and slaves from Brazil to Tucumán, his diocesan capital, and Potosí where he sold the most valuable goods. He initiated the route primarily, it seems, as a way of generating extra resources for the Church and clergy in his far-flung but very poor and thinly populated diocese.[16] It is somewhat ironic, to say the least, that the man who first opened up the River Plate route, and who as a youth left Portugal in straightened circumstances (having presumably refused to participate in the crypto-Jewish milieu of his family) and decided to embark on an ecclesiastical career should have pioneered a commercial route which became the chief strand in the great network connecting western Sephardi Jewry with the Portuguese New Christians of Spanish America. Since the traffic via Buenos Aires and Tucumán with Brazil was just beginning to stir in the mid 1580s, substantial Portuguese New Christian immigration from Brazil to Buenos Aires, Tucumán and Potosí is unlikely to have begun before around 1590. By 1600, however the new contraband route circumventing the official convoy system was fully operative and there is no doubt that it was primarily the Portuguese New Christians who initiated and developed it.

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[14] Chaunu, *Seville et l'Atlantique* viii, part 2, p. 1559, 1643, 1673, 1654; Bernal, *Financiación,* 210–11.

[15] Lynch, *Hispanic World,* 229; Bernal, *Financiación,* 211; on my disagreements with Lynch, see Israel, *Race, Class and Politics,* 27–34, 99–102; Kamen and Israel' Debate', pp. 150–6.

[16] Levillier, *Gobernación de Tucumán,* 178, 209–10, 214, 257; Canabrava, *O comercio,* 61–3; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá,* 5, 75; Lavalle, 'Les étrangers', 132.

By no means all the entrepreneurs arriving from Brazil prospered. Among the earliest Portuguese New Christian immigrants via the Río de la Plata was a humble artisan and shoemaker Juan Vicente, who tried his hand as a merchant in Nueva Castilla as the expanses of north-west Argentina were then rather grandly known. Having been arrested by the Inquisition together with his parents and other relatives in his native Évora where the Holy office had burnt his mother and one of his sisters at the *Auto-da-fé*, of 1585 and where he himself was 'reconciled', he emigrated with his family from Lisbon to Brazil in 1588. In Bahia he met a fellow Portuguese crypto-Jew, a certain Licenciado Nunes da Silva, who had also just arrived but in his case from the south having travelled with a companion from Tucumán via Buenos Aires to buy goods.[17] In 1591, Vicente sailed with his family, together with this and another Portuguese friend from Bahia to Buenos Aires from where he migrated up the River Plate and settled at Santiago de Estero, not far from Tucumán. But failing there, he subsequently sought his living, again not very successfully, as a shop-keeper, in Potosí, Cuzco, Arica and other places until, finally, he was arrested and tried by the Lima Inquisition in 1601. 'Reconciled' in the *Auto-da-fé* of 1612, he was released, moved on once more and enjoyed a few more years of liberty. But after again being arrested for judaizing, he was finally burnt as an obdurate denier of Christ, in Cartagena, in 1625.

Another early pioneer of the Río de la Plata was Francisco Coronel de Acevedo from Galicia who arrived in the 1590s, on a Dutch ship sailing from Viana to Recife in northern Brazil. There he became friends with another young Portuguese and they travelled together, via Rio de Janeiro to Buenos Aires and from there up the River Plate to the ranching district of Córdoba del Tucumán.[18] His Inquisition file reveals that that he came to the Inquisitors of his own accord to confess and 'declare against himself' without anyone having denounced him. He confessed to having participated in Jewish ceremonies in his native Galicia, and, together with Antonio Rodríguez de León (who was arrested as a result of his testimony), 'judaized' in Tucumán and Potosí. He assured the Inquisition that he had believed in the Law of Moses until a few days before but had suddenly realised the truth of Christianity, and therefore come of his own volition to be absolved and reconciled to Christ. As a reward for his new-found piety he was 'admitido a reconciliación secreta sin avito ni confiscacion de bienes' [received into secret reconciliation without *avito* or confiscation of goods] with only a private abjuring of heretical errors and the arduous spiritual penances the Inquisitors imposed on him.[19]

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[17] García de Proodian, *Judíos de America*, 28, 33, 243–4.

Another and still more notable figure among the early Portuguese New Christian migrants to the silver mines of Potosí was an itinerant merchant, Diego Pérez da Costa, an obdurate and frequently denounced crypto-Jew who, remarkably enough, was a brother of Fray Francisco de Victoria, the bishop of Tucumán, and therefore also an uncle of the Duarte Nunes da Costa and Lopo Ramirez, prominent Sephardi merchants and synagogue elders who later settled in Hamburg and Amsterdam respectively. While it is not known whether the two brothers ever collaborated, or even met, during the bishop's fairly frequent business trips around his diocese and to the silver mines at Potosí—they may have preferred not to see eachother—it was later publicised in Peru, and along the River Plate route, not least by the Inquisition which had repeatedly failed to find and arrest him, that Diego Pérez was a 'judaizer', criminal and brother of the bishop. The Inquisition, having gathered ample testimony of his participation in crypto-Jewish gatherings in Potosí, Cuzco and elsewhere ordered searches everywhere but were simply unable to find him. Eventually, in 1601, a public summons requiring that he be turned in, was read out and posted up in the cathedrals of Lima and Potosí but still with no result. The Inquisitors at Lima later received a report to the effect that he had made good his escape via Seville to Venice where he presumably embraced normative Judaism; according to the seventeenth-century Dutch Jewish family record, known as the De Pinto manuscript, he was last heard of in Safed, in the Holy Land having adopted the name 'Abraham Curiel'. He was one of eight persons burned in effigy as a fugitive *judaizante* in the *Auto-da-fé* held at Lima in March 1605.[20]

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[18] Ibid., 29, 496.
[19] Ibid., 265–6.

Among those condemned and 'reconciled' as judaizers in the same *Auto-da-fé* was Antonio Rodríguez de León, the same as who had judaized in Tucumán with Coronel de Acevedo and been betrayed by him, a man who came originally from Bayonne, in France, and therefore may have known some Hebrew and who had entered illegally via Buenos Aires, a physician, Dr Alvaro Núñez, born in Portugal, resident at La Plata, several residents of Huancavelica, the Peruvian mercury mines which were vital to the exploitation of the Potosí silver deposits, a mine-owner from Potosí—and a surgeon, Diego Núñez de Silva and his son—whom he had initiated into Judaism, it later turned out, at the age of thirteen. The latter were described as inhabitants of the town of Córdoba, in the province of Tucumán, where Diego had been living since the 1580s. Another of his sons, Francisco Maldonado de Silva, later claimed to have been a firm Catholic until he was eighteen when, whilst visiting Callao, doubts about Christianity, nurtured by his father's influence, finally led him to Judaism.[21] Having migrated southwards to Santiago de Chile where, in 1619 he became a physician in the town hospital, he devoted himself spiritually to crypto-Judaism going so far, it was later discovered, to circumcize himself. He was arrested by the Inquisition after being denounced by his own sister, Doña Isabel Maldonado who in an argument with him had angrily insisted that Christianity is the truth, and been greatly upset by his denying the virginity of the Virgin. Despite the pressure brought to bear, he persisted in denying that Christ is the Saviour which led to his being kept twelve years in the dungeons of the Holy Office disputing theology with the Inquisitors and sundry Jesuits brought in to assist. Finally, he presented to the crowd, in the Lima *Auto-de-fé* of January 1639 as an obstinate 'dogmatist' and burnt alive at the stake

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[20] Ibid., 267–8; Medina, *Historia de la Tribunal de la Inquisición de Lima* i, 311; Böhm, 'Crypto-Jews', 208.

[21] Ibid., 210; García de Proodian, *Judíos en América*, 57–8, 178, 191–3, 341.

One of the early seventeenth-century tracts which most emphatically ties the question of crypto-Judaism to the decline of the *Carrera de Indias*, that of Pedro de Avendaño Villela, appeared in Madrid in April 1608. By that date the corrosive interplay between the clandestine traffic along the Río de la Plata with the official trans-Atlantic trade which he describes was already far advanced. What he called 'la flaqueza y cortedad a que se ha reduzido el trato y comercio de las Indias' [the weakeness and insufficiency to which the trade and commerce of the Indies has been reduced] was chiefly explicable, in his view, in terms of the excessive influx of European merchandise to Brazil and consequent flow of relatively cheap European textiles and manufactures via the Río de la Plata to Peru. As a resulting of their lower transaction costs and evasion of taxation, the illicit traffic of the Portuguese *conversos* resulted in a general forcing down of prices, imposing price levels at Potosí and Lima which were too low to enable the *cargadores*—i.e. the legal merchants using the official trans-Atlantic convoys—to recover their costs, the latter being intrinsically and unavoidably higher than those of the interlopers since the *cargadores* paid the requisite convoy charges and imposts. The inevitable consequence was the relentless decay of the official trade.[22] 'Y demas deste daño', he added, the Portuguse who ply this commerce via Brazil 'causan otro mayor en henchir la tierra de gente prohibida a passar a aquellas partes, dando mayor cuydado y ocupacion al tribunal del Santo oficio sola esta nacion, que todas las demas juntas' [and on top of this damage, they cause a still greater by filling the land with persons prohibited from passing to those parts, just this nation (i.e. the Portuguese New Christians) giving greater concern and work to the tribunal of the Holy Office than all others put together].[23]

If most of the Portuguese wreaking such havoc to the commerce and faith of the Indies, came directly to Brazil, and then Buenos Aires, from Portugal in ships of their own nation, a considerable portion came via Guinea and Angola; and since it was the Portuguese New Christians who 'navegan la costa, y rios de Guinea, por el trato de los negros' [who navigate the coast and rivers of Guinea to ply the trade in negros], instead of loading these vessels with 'especjos, bonetes y cascaveles, y otras menudencias, con que se haze el trueque y rescate de los esclavos' [mirrors, bonnets and other trifles with which the bartering and procuring of slaves is done], they were accustomed to stow large consignments of valuable merchandise on these ostensible slaving ships which instead of disposing of in Africa they afterwards sell in Buenos Aires, Veracruz, Cartagena or other places where they ship the slaves: 'con la qual tienen destruydas nuestras Indias Occidentales, llenando las de mercaderias, y gente prohibida, y trayendo el retorno de sus empleos, en oro, plata y perlas, sin registro, desembarcandose con ello en los puertos de la corona de Portugal' [with which they have destroyed our western Indies, filling them with merchandise, and prohibited persons, and taking back the returns from their exports in unregistered gold, silver and pearls which they unload in ports of the crown of Portugal].[24]

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[22] BL Printed Tracts 1324 I 10/I: *Pedro de Avendaño Villela dize*, fos. 1v–2.

[23] Ibid., fo. 2.

Avendaño Villela urges the crown to take energetic steps to combat this Portuguese penetration of the Spanish New World and especially to liquidate the double threat posed by the entry of Portuguese New Christians via Buenos Aires and Tucumán. His preferred solution, and the only completely effective one, he contends, was for the king to compel his Portuguese subjects to relinquish Brazil to the Spanish crown in exchange for the Philippines which he deemed a fair barter and which henceforth should form part of the *estado da India*, reserved for the Portuguese trade via the Indian ocean. Once Brazil was brought firmly under Spain, merchants should in future only be permitted to trade with that colony on the same basis as with the rest of Spanish America, that is via Seville and San Lúcar on specially organised and regulated trans-Atlantic convoys.[25] Should it, in practice, prove impossible to exchange the Philippines for Brazil, then it would be essential to establish a special *aduana*, or customs post, at Buenos Aires, with powers sufficient to override corrupt local officials and the town council.[26]

Interestingly, the linkage between the decay of the Indies trade and what Spanish ministers termed 'la entrada y comunicacion de la nacion hebrea de los reynos de Portugal por el Río de la Plata'[27] was particularly insisted upon during the period of the Twelve Years Truce (1609–21) between Spain and the United Provinces, an aspect of the matter which needs to be stressed.[28] For although, as we have seen, the issue was far from being a new one in 1609, it did become a more pressing one subsequently. The reason was that New Christian commercial penetration of Spanish South America via the Río de la Plata thrived most (and therefore was most damaging to Seville and the *cargadores*) when New Christian merchants in Portuguese ports could procure an abundance of northern European textiles and other goods from the Netherlands directly and cheaply something which was not to anything like the same extent the case before 1608 or after 1621. Between 1609 and 1621, the Spanish crown was bound by the Truce terms to permit unrestricted commerce in Dutch vessels between the Netherlands and all parts of the Iberian Peninsula so that far more Dutch ships arrived in Portuguese ports (and with less risk and lower freight charges) than in either the periods before or after. As a direct consequence, the swelling influx of unregistered merchandise, and illegal immigrants to Spanish South America, like the Portuguese Brazil trade itself, reached unprecedented and unparalleled levels. By contrast, the resumption of the Spanish-Dutch war, in 1621, and imposition of an inland customs house at Córdoba de Tucumán (designed to interrupt the flow of contraband between Potosí and Buenos Aires, in 1623, though it certainly did not halt the contraband traffic seems to have reduced it significantly, marking the onset of a new phase in which there was now no direct Dutch involvement.[29]

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., fo. 4; see also Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 100.

[26] BL Printed tracts 1324 I 10/I: *Pedro de Avendaño dize*, fo. 6v.

Furthermore, between 1609 and 1621, Portuguese and other ships sailing from Portuguese ports to Brazil sailed unhampered by Dutch privateers and with much reduced freight and insurance charges.[30] In a remarkable and incisive tract written around 1615, Alonso de Cianca, a former inspector of ships sailing to and from the Indies in the Canaries, discussed the Portuguese New Christian use of the Río de la Plata route during the Truce years, expressly linking it to the dramatic burgeoning of the Brazil trade at that time. According to Cianca, having begun a half a century before with a mere two or three ships per year, by the time of his writing the Portuguese Brazil trade had soared to around 200 vessels yearly.[31] It was all the result, he contended, of the widening price differential between goods shipped to the Spanish Indies legally and those imported clandestinely. Cianca estimated that northern European textiles exported to Potosí and Peru via Brazil and Buenos Aires by the Portuguese traders passing along the Río de la Plata during the Truce sold for 'mas de un tercio menos que pueden venderlas los cargadores de las flotas' [more than a third less than the *cargadores* using the *flotas* are able to sell them for].[32] And at the same rate that Portuguese trans-Atlantic commerce had soared, Cianca maintained, 'a esse mismo passo se ha ydo acabando el de Castilla, porque real, y verdaderamente, le ha quitado, y quita, la contratacion' [to that same extent that of Castile has wained because it has really and truly consumed and consumes, the trade]. A large part of the illicit returns from the viceroyalty of Peru consisted of unregistered silver which was then transported back via Tucumán and Buenos Aires to Bahia where the captains of the Portuguese, Dutch and sometimes also Hanseatic vessels licensed to ship sugar to Portugal concealed the bullion and illegal goods in boxes placed under the chests of sugar.[33] After registering and paying taxes in a Portuguese port, the ships finally returned to Holland or Hamburg.

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[27] BL MS Egerton, fo. 98.

[28] Monteiro, 'Politica de Castela', 225.

[29] Schwartz, 'Luso-Spanish Relations', 44–5; Tiscornia, ''Política económica riotplatense', 21–4, 305; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 275.

[30] Ibid., 194–209.

Estimating the total number of Portuguese in Brazil at the time at only 8,000, Cianca pointed out the glaring disproportion between the undoubtedly vast transfer of European manufactures shipped each year to Brazil from Portugal—from Oporto, Viana and Aveiro, as well as Lisbon and the ports of the Algarve—and the no less indubitably modest dimensions of the Brazilian domestic market.[34] The textile goods, including, he says, every category of linens, silks, woollens, and new draperies were usually destined for re-export via the Río de la Plata, Tucumán and Las Charcas to Potosí and Peru. This merchandise, he added, was normally purchased in the first instance by Portuguese New Christians (whether in Holland or northern Portugal) from Dutch Jewish and other Dutch merchants: 'y por la mayor parte los empleos los hazen en Flandes y Francia, Inglaterra y Alemania por personas de su nacion que viven alli, y por otros encomenderos naturales con lo qual hazen sus compras muy baxas' [and for the most part they invest their money in the Netherlands, France, England and Germany through persons of their nation, and through agents who are natives there with which they make their purchases at very low prices].[35]

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[31] Cianca, *Discurso breve*, fo. 3; Boxer, *Salvador de Sá*, 78; see also Chaunu, *Seville et l'Atlantique* vii part 2, pp. 1328–9, 1833–4; Lynch, *Hispanic World*, 153.

[32] Cianca, *Discurso breve*, fo. 3.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Cianca, *Discurso breve*, 2.

The Dutch evidence concerning the Brazil sugar trade during the Truce confirms that it was plied chiefly by Amsterdam Portuguese Jews working together with New Christian correspondents, in Portugal and often in the northern Portuguese ports rather than Lisbon. Their factors in Portugal were sometimes relatives but probably more often simply from a common Portuguese mercantile background.[36] If Bahia and Recife were their two most important sugar depots in Brazil, the sugar exporters of Rio de Janeiro which was in closer communication with Buenos Aires were also in regular albeit practically always indirect contact with the Portuguese Jewish merchants in Amsterdam. Among the New Christian sugar exporters of Rio during the Truce period were Francisco Alvares, Duarte Vas Pinto and Amadeo Antunes de Carvalho, who were all factors of Jewish merchants in Holland, the latter being a correspondent of the Brothers de la Faya.[37] Another Amsterdam Sephardi merchant who imported sugar from Rio de Janeiro, Luis Pereira de Miranda, dealt through Francisco de Cáceres in Oporto but was also in contact with the latter's factor there, Francisco Alvares Tracaso.

The South Atlantic traffic linking Portugal with Brazil and the River Plate suffered a temporary, but severe, check in 1618, however, the year of a large-scale Inquisition sweep against the New Christian merchant community in Oporto which may possibly have been part of an officially inspired attempt to curb the burgeoning network of trans-Atlantic crypto-Jewish contacts, linking Amsterdam with Brazil, Buenos Aires and the interior of Spanish America.[38] According to the brothers Pedro and João de la Faya (alias Abraham and Moseh de la Faya) Oporto exporters of textiles to Brazil who fled Portugal in the wake of the arrests, abandoning their homes, shops and merchandise, and converting to Judaism in Amsterdam where they joined the Neveh Shalom synagogue, more than one hundred people were arrested and had their property seized, the victims including many of the most prominent New Christian merchants in the city.[39] As a consequence, not a few fugitives arrived in Holland virtually destitute.[40] News of the arrests and confiscation caused deep dismay among the Sephardi merchants in Holland since many valuable cargoes in transit from Brazil indirectly via Portugal to Holland, had been in the hands of their factors and accordingly had now been seized. Nevertheless, Oporto remained one of the prime centres of Dutch Jewish trade with Portugal. New Christian merchants in Oporto who continued dealing with Jewish correspondents in Amsterdam, after 1618, included Fernão Pereira, Thomas Ferreira, Domingos Lopes Vitoria (another merchant denounced by Mendes Bravo, in 1617), Chritovão Rodrigues, João Rabelo Pega, Bartholme d'Andrade, Luis Gomes de Aveiro, Pero Henriques, and Sebastião Pacheco.

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[35] Ibid.

[36] See the 'Deductie' (memorandum) on the subject of the sugar trade submitted to the admiralty colleges by the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish Portugal merchants in 1622 in ARH SH 1358 'Deductie', fos. 1–7 and also RAZ SZ 2102 'Deductie' (1622), fos. 1–5 and in the printed version Ijzerman (ed.), *Journael*, p. 99; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 126; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 106.

[37] 'Amsterdam Notarial deeds', 2348. Amsterdam, 2 feb. 1621.

Among those directly affected, were Manoel d'Oliveira de Pas who on 30 September, appointed the Dutch merchant Enrique Snel, in Oporto, as his proxy authorised to recover several cargoes of sugar consigned to himself from Bahia, by Custodio Nunes, and taken from Francisco de Caceres, his agent in Oporto—one of the New Christian merchants of Oporto denounced by the Inquisition informer Hector Mendes Bravo, in 1617, for having regular links with Jewish merchants in Holland[41]—on the latter's seizure by the Inquisition.[42] At least one consignment, of six chests, had already been loaded onto a Dutch ship which was making ready to depart when the sugar was unloaded again on the orders of the Inquisition. Antonio Fernandes, Manoel Lopes Nunes and Manoel Lopes de Leão were three more

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[38] Oliveira França, 'Um problema', 22, 29.

[39] *Livro de Bet Haim*, 187; Koen, 'Notarial Deeds', no. 3362. Amsterdam, 30 Sept. 1625.

[40] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds' deed no. 3362. Amsterdam, 30 Sept. 1625.

[41] Ibid., no. 2384, Amsterdam, 1 April 1621; Roth, 'Strange Case', 241.

[42] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds' no. 1548. Amsterdam, 30 Sept. 1618.

Portuguese Jewish merchants in Amsterdam who engaged Dutch Protestant proxies, Enrique Snel and Jacob Belten, in Oporto, to reclaim from the Inquisition sugar shipped on their account from Brazil and in the care of Francisco de Caceres and João de Leão, who had also been arrested as a 'judaizer'.[43] Antonio Martins Viegas, in Amsterdam, appointed three proxies—Francisco Flemengo, Daniel de la Pedra and Santo de Sousa, all living in Oporto—to apply for restitution of sugar shipped from Brazil by Melchior Vaz Bartelo to his agent in Oporto, Diogo Lopes Pinto, another Inquisition victim.[44]

In their predicament the Amsterdam Sephardi merchants appealed to the Amsterdam city government, the States of Holland and the States General. In November 1618, the Archduke Albert informed Philip III that the States General was demanding satisfaction for the merchandise, money and other property belonging to 'diferentes portugueses que viven en Olanda' [various Portuguese who live in Holland], seized by the Inquisition following the recent arrests of New Christians suspected of judaizing in Oporto and also Madeira. He asked how he should reply. The Dutch insisted that under the Truce terms 'todos los avitantes de dichas Provincias han de gozar las preheminencias que los vezinos y naturales dellas' [all the inhabitants of the said [United] Provinces must enjoy the privileges of the citizens and natives of them] and thus have the right to unimpeded trade with Spain and Portugal without their goods being endangered.[45] Their factors at Oporto, being themselves New Christians, were deterred (where these had not already fled or been arrested) from seeking restitution of 'leurs biens et marchandises', the States General pointed out, 'par crainte de l'Inquisition'.[46] The Dutch undeniably had a strong case since the terms of the Truce clearly stipulate that freedom to trade, and of movement, should apply to all subjects of either state 'tant les natifs, que tous les autres inhabitants des dites provinces, de quelque qualité ou nation que se fussent'.[47]

But a far more effective and enduring brake on the Río de la Plata contraband trade arose with the resumption of the Spanish embargoes, in April 1621. Admittedly, reports reaching the *Consejo*

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[43] Ibid. no. 1557. Amsterdam, 10 Oct. 1618.

[44] Ibid. no. 1585. Amsterdam, 16 November 1618.

[45] AGS Estado 2306. Archduke Albert to Philip III, Tervuren, 9 Nov. 1618.

[46] Ibid., Etats Generaux to Albert, The Hague, 20 Oct. 1628.

[47] Ibid. enclosed with Albert's letter of 9 November; 'Substance d'une Lettre que les Etats Generales des Provinces Unies ont escrit a leurs Altezes'.

de Estado in Madrid, in the mid 1620s, about the effect of the embargoes usually stress the fact that the Dutch contrived to continue their trade with Portugal, especially via the smaller ports in the north such as Viana and Aveiro.[48] But even here considerable pressure was brought to bear and contrabandists encountered considerably more obstacles, difficulty and risk than before. As a rule, elaborate camouflage was now essential. Thus, for instance, in April 1622, two Portuguese Jewish merchants, Thomas Nunes Pina and Cristobal Mendes Franco, hired an English vessel and skipper, in Amsterdam, to sail with their cargo from Holland, using an English crew to deliver the goods to their correspondents, João de Guarda Maciel and Gaspar Caminha Regio, in Viana, the freight contract stipulating that the ship had first to call in at the Isle of Wight to collect passports and customs documents purportedly confirming that the merchandise was English, and not Dutch, and was being shipped to Portugal by a fictitious English merchant, named 'William Cross'.[49] After 1621, efforts to crack-down on contrabandists in Portugal became, by stages, appreciably more rigorous. In particular, the Spanish crown mindful of the lax implementation of the embargoes of 1598–1608 in Portugal, now refused to rely solely on Portuguese officials to implement the new embargoes and brought in Castilian officers to do the job. Beginning in Lisbon in 1622, Portuguese complaints about the use of Castilian officials to uncover trading irregularities in Portuguese ports became steadily more insistent and more general, especially after the introduction of the *Almirantazgo* in Portugal by decree of August 1628, though admittedly there continued to be substantial evasion of the laws against contraband in the northern ports of Oporto, Aveiro and Viana.[50] According to the memorandum submitted to the Dutch admiralty colleges in 1622 by a group of Amsterdam Sephardi merchants trading with Portugal, the magistracy at Viana was considered especially robust in defying the embargoes and colluding with the Dutch.[51]

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[48] AGS Guerrra 895. Lopez de Haro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 19 May 1623; AGS Estado 2646, *consultas* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 13 Jan 1627 and 24 may 1628; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 138–9, 208–9, 216; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 125, 132, 136.

[49] 'Amsterdam Notarial deeds', 2622, Amsterdam, 26 April 1622.

[50] Rooney, 'Habsburg Government of Portugal', 140–1, 173; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 204; Schaub, *Portugal au tems du Comte-duc*, 297–327.

[51] Ibid., 107; Ijzerman (ed.) *Journael*, 99–100; see also Schaub, *Portugal au tems du Comte-duc* 292, 398–9.

The centrality of these northern Portuguese ports in the commercial world of the Dutch Portuguese Jewish merchant elite during the first quarter of the seventeenth century was, as has been pointed out, due not only to local political and geographical factors—the relative failure there of the Spanish crack-down on contraband—but also to the fact that a high proportion of the early Portuguese crypto-Jewish emigration to Holland came from precisely this part of Portugal.[52] At the same time, the spectacular growth of the traffic between Portugal and Holland, after 1600, reinforcing the special link of Dutch Sephardic Jewry with northern Portugal also helped shape their role in the trade with Brazil, and via Brazil with Spanish America while simultaneously spurring Portuguese New Christian merchants resident in these ports to buy more in the north and therefore send more sugar, bullion, and Spanish colonial products to the Netherlands to pay for what they needed. This, in turn, must have stimulated the exodus of their brothers, sons, cousins and nephews to Amsterdam and Hamburg. Hence, it was no accident that the Twelve Years' Truce was not only the most thriving phase of the Dutch transit trade with Brazil and Buenos Aires via northern Portugal but also saw the climax of New Christian emigration direct from Portugal to Holland.

By contrast, after 1621, the Dutch transit traffic to Brazil and the River Plate via northern Portugal was obstructed not only by the Spanish embargoes but also the interception by Dutch (especially Zeeland) privateers of numerous Portuguese ships plying between Brazil and Portugal carrying cargoes belonging to Dutch Sephardi Jews. In what became a famous test case, the seizure of one of these cargoes by a Zeeland privateer, and a judgement confirming the legality of its confiscation by the Zeeland admiralty college, in 1622, was contested in a petition to the States of Holland and States General by a group of Portuguese Jewish merchants trading with Brazil and Buenos Aires via Portugal headed by Thomas Nunes da Pina (alias Joshua Sarfati). As Nunes da Pina and the other Portuguese merchants of Amsterdam stressed in their submission, it had become both unusual and inadvisable by the Truce years for Dutch vessels to risk sailing to Brazil direct from the Netherlands by-passing the royal bureaucracy and registration procedures in the Portuguese ports.

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[52] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 106.

Although originally, the Dutch had enjoyed some success, particularly in the northern captaincies of Brazil in establishing just such a clandestine direct traffic (as indeed, to a lesser extent had the merchants of Hamburg),[53] after around 1605 there was a sustained and effective bureaucratic drive backed by the use of soldiers in Brazil (as also in the Caribbean) to prevent local colonists trading with the Dutch. As early as June 1609, a group of Dutch Protestant merchants, including two factors who had lived for long periods in Brazil, testified before an Amsterdam notary, that several consignments of unlicensed linens had been seized by officials in Brazil and that attempts to trade direct from Holland even with Recife and Paraíba, previously the two captaincies deemed most open to direct Dutch penetration, had latterly been considered excessively risky.[54] Since the use of Dutch vessels had had to be discontinued, argued Nunes da Pina and his associates, the use of Portuguese shipping and the indirect route via Portugal was indispensable if the Dutch sugar trade with Brazil was to continue. Among the regents there was much discussion of this question over the next months. But, finally, in October 1623, the decision went against Nunes da Pina, the States General deciding that trade by Dutch subjects in enemy bottoms plying between Portugal and Brazil should not be permitted and should be subject to seizure by Dutch privateers, the West India Company and the admiralty authorities.[55]

While some Dutch Sephardi merchants undoubtedly continued to risk investing in this traffic, it is nevertheless certain that there was a marked contraction in activity compared with the period before 1621. Nevertheless, the links connecting the Sephardim of Amsterdam with the Portuguese New Christians in Brazil, and thus indirectly with southern South America, remained intact. One device for sustaining the traffic in the new circumstances was to use Terceira, in the Azores, as an intermediary depot. Thus, for instance, in August 1627, a large consortium of Amsterdam Jewish merchants and Terceira New Christians, participating together to spread the risk, having bought an Enkhuizen ship, freighted it to Terceira from where it was to sail back and forth to and from Brazil, manned by a Portuguese skipper and crew. The two New Christians in Terceira were Sebastião d'Andrade and Manoel Rodrigues d'Oliveira. The eight members of the Amsterdam Sephardic consortium included Antonio Lopes Pereira (alias Joseph Israel Pereira)—a younger brother of Olivares' financial adviser Manuel Lopes Pereira, Manoel Lopes Nunes, and Jacob Franco.[56]

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[53] Kellenbenz, *As relações*, 16–17; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 106–7.
[54] GAA NA 196, fo. 299. Deed, Amsterdam, 30 June 1609.
[55] ARH Verzameling Bisdom vol. 50, fos. 198v–199v.

If the flow of merchandise between Potosí and Holland via Tucumán, Bueno Aires, and Brazil reached its height during the Truce period, it is clear that the traffic in those years was nearly always indirect via the ports of Portugal. The usual procedure during the Truce was for Dutch vessels to be admitted to Brazilian ports provided they carried the requisite papers proving they had been registered, and their goods taxed, in Portugal and provided they paid caution money on departing, to ensure that they sailed first to Portugal to pay their dues before proceeding to their final destination.[57] It was thus the growing success of the Portuguese bureaucracy in enforcing the system of registration in Portuguese ports, and caution money in Brazil, which ensured that the traffic was by 1609 mainly indirect and, arguably, it is precisely this that made the linkage between the Portuguese New Christians in Portugal and their judaizing relatives in Holland so crucial and intrinsic to the functioning of the entire system. In other words the bureaucratic system implemented by the Spanish crown was itself a key factor in the spectacular success of the Jewish-New Christian network in cornering the greater part of the illegal transit traffic with Potosí and Peru via Brazil by 1609 to the virtual exclusion of Dutch and Hamburg Protestant competitors.

The clandestine traffic along the Río de la Plata was a form of commerce, but commerce integrally linked to a clandestine religious network which was clearly integral to the functioning of the trade network. It is often held that the Portuguese *conversos* of the seventeenth century were remote from any genuine knowledge of Judaism and that their religious culture was highly artificial and syncretist. Yet it was clearly resilient enough to help forge closely-knit secretive groups and generate a degree of trust vital to the working of an underground network spread over immense distances and lacking in an exteral authority capable of enforcing agreements or supervising their transactions. This in itself suggests that their crypto-Judaism had more dynamism and vitality than is sometimes maintained. But besides this, it is noticeable, as was also the case with the crypto-Jewish network of New Spain and Central America, that an appreciable proportion of those arrested for judaizing along the Río de la Plata and in Potosí had had direct experience earlier in their lives of more developed and overt forms of crypto-Judaism as practised, in particular, in south-western France. In southern South America as in so many other crypto-Jewish contexts, French crypto-Judaism can justifiably be said to have served for decades as both a spiritual and material bridge between the Iberian world and the religious freedom prevailing in north-west Europe. Thus, for example, Enrique Nunes de Espinosa, arrested by the Lima Inquisition in 1623 though born in Lisbon had been raised in France.[58] Among those appearing in the Lima *Auto-da-fé* of 21 December 1625 was the twenty-two year-old Juan Ortega born and raised in Bordeaux, the thirty-eight year old Bernardo López Serrano, born in Portugal but married in Bordeaux, and Garci Méndez de Dueñas, who had lived and learnt his Judaism in Bordeaux where he had left his wife and children when he migrated across the Atlantic to reside and trade for a quarter of a century in Lima.[59] He did not forget either his family or his co-religionists in Bordeaux, moreover, for every year, reportedly, he sent back substantial remittances on the *flotas*—2,000 pesos in 1613—to his relatives in France through Ruy Fernandes Pereira, his Portuguese New Christian agent in Seville.[60] Another Portuguese New Christian in Peru who had learnt Judaism in south-western France, Alvaro Mendez, was reported, in 1631, to have several times remitted money to relatives in Amsterdam.[61]

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[56] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', no, 3577, 20 Aug. 1627 (Sibrant Cornelisz); on Antonio Lopes Pereira, see Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 249.

[57] GAA NA 197, fo. 173. Deed, Amsterdam, 30 jan. 1612.

The worries of the court at Madrid about the seepage of Portuguese New Christians via Brazil and Buenos Aires to Peru culminated in 1624–5, with the capture of Bahia by a Dutch West India Company fleet (twenty-six ships and 3,300 men) commanded by Jacob Willekens, in May 1624, and the ensuing flurry of rumours to the effect that the New Christians had helped the Dutch take the town.[62] The reports that the *conversos* had betrayed Bahia to the Dutch, were undoubtedly rather exaggerated—though neither should they be de-emphasized since at least one or two Portuguese Jews did accompany the expedition and a few of the New Christians (as also Old Christians) who lived there subsequently decided to remain under Dutch rule. While some four-fifths of the Bahia New Christians fled with the rest of the Portuguese and their slaves wanting, or considering it prudent, to having nothing to do with the Dutch, lurid reports of Portuguese *converso* betrayal persisted unabated for a considerable time.[63] Moreover, strategically, the setback was undeniably extremely serious. For from Bahia, ministers reminded the king, the Dutch could 'infestar por via del Río de la Plata y de Buenos Ayres el etado del Piru no solo con las armas sino con el comercio' [infest the kingdom of Peru by way of Buenos Aires and the River Plate not only with weapons but also with commerce].[64]

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[58] Medina, *Historia del tribunal de la Inquisicion de Lima* ii, 53.
[59] Ibid., ii, 28–9.
[60] García de Proodian, *Judíos en América*, 224, 277, 287.
[61] Medina, *Historia del tribunal de la Inquisición de Lima* ii, 41.
[62] Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 14–15; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 130–2.

It is not surprising, then, that suspicion of, and hostility towards, the Portuguese New Christians in Brazil and Spanish South America, should have intensified further at this juncture. Drawing up contingency plans in case the projected joint Castilian-Portuguese relief expedition of 1625 fail to dislodge the Dutch, ministers in Madrid proposed to the king that Brazil would need to be divided into two Habsburg territories, one north and one south of Bahia with separate governors in Pernambuco (Recife) and Rio de Janeiro respectively. It was also proposed, should it prove true, as it was put, in August 1624, 'que los christianos nuebos de aquella ciudad dieron la entrada a los olandeses' [that the New Christians of that city allowed the Dutch in], that the king would need to take drastic measures against them and 'sacar todos los que huviere en la capitanías del Brasil y embiarlos para Portugal' [deport all those that are in the captaincies of Brazil and send them to Portugal] since it would be impossible to defend Brazil with such 'enemigos domesticos' in the ports and in the interior.[65]

However, the response of the Spanish crown to the Dutch seizure of Bahia was not only energetic and prompt but effective: the joint Castilian-Portuguese expedition sent out, under Don Fadrique de

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[63] Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 22–3; Oliveira França, 'Um problema', 53, 63; Novinsky, 'Sephardim in Brazil', 433–4.

[64] BL MS Egerton 1131, fo. 296; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 131.

[65] BL MS Egerton 1131, fo. 295v. *consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 24 Sept. 1624.

Toledo, in 1625, swiftly recaptured Bahia from the Dutch. But while it was subsequently confirmed that a few Portuguese New Christians had colluded with the WIC,[66] the royal orders authorizing Don Fadrique to expel the New Christians from Brazil, should he deem this necessary or advisable were never put into effect. The evidence of disloyalty and subversion was seemingly regarded as insufficient to justify punishing the Portuguese New Christians as a group or taking the risk of disrupting economic life and driving them into the arms of the enemy by taking such a drastic step. Olivares in any case was strongly inclined to give the New Christians the benefit of the doubt and enlist as many as he could in support of the Spanish crown. No doubt his attitude had much to do with the absence of specific measures against the Portuguese New Christians in the Indies in 1624 as also earlier in the debate about establishing an Inquisition tribunal in Buenos Aires.

Among the Spanish populace of Spanish America, however, allegations and rumours of betrayal by Portuguese New Christians acting in collusion with the Dutch continued to be widely propagated for at least another decade after the retaking of Bahia. One of the most remarkable allegations was that submitted in April 1634 to the Inquisition at Madrid by a certain Esteban de Ares Fonseca, a Portuguese New Christian relative of Lopo Ramirez for whom he had worked, in Amsterdam but who subsequently rejected Judaism and opted for Christianity. Though marred by exaggeration and distortion, his allegations would seem to contain more than a kernel or two of truth and probably deserve somewhat more attention than they have tended to receive from historians.[67] In this document two of the prime architects of the Dutch capture of Bahia are stated to have been veteran spies acting for the Dutch in Brazil, namely the New Christians Nuño Alvares Franco who had lived for twelve years in Bahia and Manuel Fernandes Drago also long resident there; both reportedly having fathers dwelling as Jews in Amsterdam. The former, according to Ares Fonseca, had now for some time been living in Lisbon from where he regularly sent *avisos* to Amsterdam, through his brother, Jacob Franco (alias 'Cornelis Jansen')—doubtless the same man who participated in the Brazil consortium of

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[66] Ibid, fo. 306.

[67] See Adler, 'Contemporary Memorial', 45–6; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 114; Williams, 'Atlantic Perspective', 374–5.

August 1627, described above—who had been born in the Netherlands and travelled back and forth, via Antwerp, using the Dutch language as a cover for his allegedly nefarious activities.

Manoel Fernandes Drago, declared Ares Fonseca, had stayed at Bahia where he was in the habit of teaching Judaism to numerous crypto-Jews 'as he is a great rabbi'.[68] Supposedly, he regularly received false passes and documents from, and sent back *avisos* to, a certain Luis Nunes Machado, in Amsterdam, under cover of carrying on trade with Hamburg. A year previously (thus in 1633), these men were even alleged to have urged the States of Holland to make a second attempt on Bahia. Besides Fernandes Drago, a whole circle of other New Christians resident in Bahia reportedly had close ties with Amsterdam; these he named as Isaac Drago, Lope de Acosta Suares, David de Acosta, Ruy de Lemos, Moseh Israel de Lemos, Luis Franco de Mezquita, Isaac de Mezquita, Juan Alvarez de Andrade, Jacob de Andrade, Manoel de Fonseca Dias, Tubian de Fonseca. Ares Fonseca accusing them in particular of being responsible for the capture by the Dutch of 'many ships' flying the colours of his Majesty of Spain.

In February 1630, a West India Company expeditionary force of fifty-six ships and 7,180 troops arrived near Recife and before long Dutch troops had captured the town. According to Ares Fonseca, it was 'the Jews of Amsterdam' who were responsible for its loss, the principal culprit being Antonio Vaez (alias Moseh Cohen) Henriques who sailed with the Dutch fleet 'and instructed them and gave them plans showing how to take the said place' having spent some time in the town previously and being 'well acquainted with the entrances and the exits'.[69] He says nothing about Cohen Henriques' co-conspirators but other sources reveal that a prominent *converso* merchant of the city who afterwards converted to Judaism under the name Simon Drago had also been instrumental in the city's capture.[70] Cohen Henriques was likewise stated to have accompanied Piet Heyn, in 1628, and helped capture the Mexican treasure fleet off the coast of Cuba. Cohen Henriques reportedly had a colleague, a fellow agent, named Manuel de Torres in Havana and, he claimed, had previously urged the WIC directors to attempt the capture of that port. Nor were these the only examples of alleged treachery cited by Ares Fonseca. The Dutch capture of the small island of Fernando de Noronha, in the Atlantic off Brazil some 400 miles north-east of Recife, he asserted, had resulted from the urging of 'a Jew of Amsterdam named Francisco de Campos' who had been hidden there and was 'now captain of the said island'. The island was not without some strategic relevance to the struggle for Brazil and the Spanish king could easily regain it, observed Ares Fonseca, since there was merely a tiny white population besides the Jew Campos, his brother Manuel de Campos (alias Isaac de Campos) and thirty-two Dutch soldiers with four cannon (in fact the island remained in Dutch hands until 1654).[71] The fathers of these two conspirators, stated Ares Fonseca, lived in Amsterdam where they were said to be held in high esteem by the regents. Finally, the capture of the Portuguese West African castle of Arguim by the Dutch, two years, before was similarly attributed by Ares Fonseca principally to the cunning and treacherous schemes of Amsterdam Jews.

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[68] Adler, 'Contemporary Memorial', 47.

[69] Ibid, 48; Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 129–30; Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 36; Wolff, *A Odisséia*, 89–90; other sources confirm the principal guide employed by the Dutch expeditionary force was a Jew, but name him as Antonio Dias Paparobalos, see Wiznitzer, *Jews in Colonial Brazil*, 57.

[70] Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 130.

Those cited as the leaders of this trans-Atlantic espionage and subversion ring were both extremely well-known names in the Dutch Sephardi community. According to Ares Fonseca, both were large-scale investors in the West India Company and highly experienced in managing espionage and sedition in clandestine collusion with the Dutch leadership: 'one is named Bento de Osorio, alias David Ossorio, the other Lope Ramirez or David Curiel. These Jews do their best, he claimed, to maintain as many crypto-Jewish informers and spies as possible 'in the cities of Castile, Portugal, Biscay, Brazil and elsewhere'.[72] At San Sebastian, their agents were Abraham Ger (alias Juan Gilles) and Rafael Méndez 'who comes and goes solely to report to Holland on what is going on and what ought to be done'. David Osorio and Lopo Ramirez, the most insidious of the Dutch Jews, he claimed, give the orders and make the plans for plundering and raiding, thinking by this means to destroy Christianity which they heartily detest.

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[71] Adler, 'Contemporary Memorial', pp. 48–9.
[72] Ibid., p. 50.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE JEWS OF SPANISH NORTH AFRICA (1580–1669)*

In a letter of 5 May 1669 to the Queen Regent of Spain, and her advisers, in Madrid, the marqués de los Vélez, governor of Oran [Wahran], in western Algeria, jubilantly reported having expelled the Jews—every single one who refused to submit to Christianity—from that Spanish North African enclave.[1] But at the same time he warned the court in Madrid that those who would succeed him as governor, like his predecessors, were unlikely to share his opinion that expelling the Jews benefited the Spanish and Christian presence in the Maghreb. He strongly recommended that the *Consejo de Estado*, in Madrid, having decreed their expulsion, on his advice, should forbid any future governor to readmit Jews to the *plazas* of Oran and adjoining Mers-el-Kebir without the crown's express permission. 'Y no me muevo a pedir esto sin fundamento, porque sé, que en saliendo yo de este govierno had de haver quien introduzga la plática y muchos havía que presumían havían de hazer falta en esta republica los hebreos' [and I am not moved to ask this without solid reason, for I know that when I depart this governorship there are bound to be those who will introduce the proposition, as there have been many who have presumed to say, that the Jews are needed in that republic].[2] After discussing this advice, at its meeting on 27 May 1669, the *Consejo* agreed with the governor's opinion and advised the Queen Regent to issue a royal *cédula* precisely as Los Vélez suggested.

Los Vélez's claim that expelling the Jews reduced the threat from the surrounding Muslim population—as English ministers claimed with regard to Tangiers a decade later—is difficult to assess. The

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[1] On the Expulsion of the Jews from Oran in 1669, see Caro Baroja, *Judíos en la España moderna* i, 231–3; Israel, 'Jews of Spanish North Africa', 71–86; Israel, *European Jewry*, 157–8; Kamen, *Spain*, 306–7; Hirschberg, *History of the Jews in North Africa* ii, 62–7; and Schaub, *Juifs du roi.*

[2] AGS Estado 4128. Los Vélez to Queen regent, Oran, 5 May 1669.


F.D. 2002
FRANCE
PORTUGAL
CASTILE
Madrid
Lisbon
Alicante
Faro
Cadiz
Malaga
Gibraltar
Algiers
Tangiers
Ceuta
Larache
Tetuān
Oran (Wahran)
La Māmora
Melilla
Saleh
Fez
Meknes
ATLAS MOUNTAINS
Madeira
Mazagān
Safi
Tafilalt
Mogador
Marrakesh
CANARY
La Palma
Lanzarote
Tenerife
Fuerteventura
Gomera
Las Palmas
ISLANDS
Túwan
SAHARA
To Timbuctoo
▲ European Enclaves in North Africa

Map 4. The Maghreb, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Canary Islands in the 17th Century enclave Oran and Mers-el-Kebir was the strongest and most heavily fortified Spanish *presidio* in the Maghreb and successfully repulsed both Moroccan and Turkish-Algerian attacks and sieges in 1682, 1688, 1693, 1698 and 1700 before finally succumbing to the Turks after a long and bitter siege, during the War of the Spanish Succession, in 1708. What is certain is that most governors previous to Los Vélez, as he remarked, took the view that the Jewish presence was both a useful and desirable asset not just to the Spanish garrison but also more broadly to the Spanish presence in North Africa.

The original, and in 1669 still the major, justification for the Jewish presence in Oran and the other Christian enclaves in the Maghreb where there were *juderías*—Tangiers (English, since 1661), Mazagán (Portuguese), Ceuta (Portuguese until 1640, subsequently Spanish), Melilla—the first of the Spanish enclaves, captured in 1497, Larache (or Al-ʿAraʾish) likewise Spanish, and La Mámora or Al-Maʾmura (Spanish)—was that the Jews knowing both Arabic and the Spanish tongue formed an indispensable channel of communication and link, economic and diplomatic, with the Moors, *Moriscos* and Turks. This meant that they were seen as playing an auxiliary role in the life of the *presidios* as interpreters, intelligence gatherers and intermediaries which was at once financial, logistical, political and strategic. As a result, in every case where Jews had been permitted to settle under Christian rule in the Maghreb—or, as at Tangiers from where the Portuguese king, João III, ordered their expulsion, in 1542[3]—resettle, they acquired an integral, indeed central role in the life of the *presidio*, and invariably came to represent a considerable proportion of the population not only in such relatively large enclaves as Oran and Mazagán where the Jews represented some 20% of the combined civil and military population but even in a small enclave such a Larache (Al-ʿAraʾish) where there were only some 200 Spanish families and a small garrison in the early seventeenth century, but also several dozen Jews living in a clearly segregated ghetto.

With the passage of time Spain's strategic goals in the Maghreb had tended to shift markedly. The original motivation of the Spanish invasion, in 1509, to combat Islam and continue the *Reconquista*, turning the Maghreb into a Spanish dependency, and subjecting its population to Christian, and specifically to Castilian overlordship, soon gave way to the more modest aim of strategic control over the Mediterranean coast. During the early sixteenth century, when Spain held a string of North African *plazas fuertes* from Melilla eastwards, including several to the east of Oran, King Ferdinand and his successor, the Emperor Charles V (king of Spain 1516–1556) took relatively little interest in the Atlantic seaboard of Morocco. Ceuta, Tangiers, and Mazagán had been in Portuguese hands since the fifteenth century and by treaties with Portugal, Spain had agreed not to interfere in what its kings recognised to be a Portuguese sphere of influence, despite the Castilian colonization of the Canary islands not far from the southern Moroccan coast. What chiefly interested King Ferdinand, as well as, earlier Queen Isabella (d. 1504) and Cardinal Archbishop Ximenes de Cisneros, one of the chief architects of the proposed *Reconquista* in North Africa, had been the coastline opposite the newly conquered and still partly Morisco realm of Granada. This coast was strategically important offering several protected harbours and bays only a day's sailing time, or less, away from Málaga and Cartagena and from the sea routes linking Cartagena, and the kingdom of Valencia, with the three Spanish Mediterranean island viceroyalties of Mallorca, Sardinia and Sicily.

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[3] Rodrigues da Silva Tavim *Os judeus na expansão*, 186.

From the 1520s for half a century down to the 1570s, the Spanish North African cordon spread eastwards as far as Tunis and Djerba and was mainly intended as a barrier against the spread of Ottoman power westwards from Egypt and outwards either side from Algiers. In particular, it was thought strategically advisable, if it could be achieved, to prevent the Turks capturing a viable base for their increasingly formidable fleets anywhere in the Maghreb. Despite some spectacular successes, however, Charles V's North Africa policy ended in disaster, in particular with the failed assault on Algiers, in 1541 an undertaking which he led in person and in which the renowned Conquistador, Hernán Cortes, was ship-wrecked and on swimming to safety, lost much of his Mexican jewellery. Spanish strategic aspirations had to be pruned back. Eventually, after more setbacks in Algeria, the Spaniards were dislodged by the Turks from all their strongholds east of Oran which thus became the eastern bulwark of the Spanish cordon. Acknowledging defeat in Tunisia and what is now eastern and central Algeria, Philip II (reigned 1556–98), adopted, in his North African policy, an increasingly westerly stance.[4] From the 1550s onwards, Spain entered into virtual alliance with the sultans of Morocco who felt just as threatened by the Ottoman advance as did Philip and who, anxious for Spanish support, conspicuously neglected to come to the aid of the Granada Moriscos when they rose in revolt against the Spanish crown in 1566–7. As the Spanish sphere of influence in the Maghreb shifted westwards, there began a continuous dialogue between the Spanish court and the courts at Fez and Marrakesh. In 1564, the Spaniards in collusion with Mawlay Abdallah occupied the strategic fortress, island and bay of Peñon de Vélez de la Gómera, commanding the Mediterranean coast between Melilla and Ceuta.

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[4] Terrasse, *Histoire du Maroc* i, 170–1, 181, 200.

Apprehension lest Ottoman political and naval influence penetrate as far as the Straits of Gibraltar, and threaten Spain's most vital sea-lanes,[5] only gradually gave way, after the great Christian victory at Lepanto, to worries about Muslim corsairs and fears of English and Dutch penetration of the area. In 1580, the year Philip II acquired the crown of Portugal and, with it, the three Portuguese Moroccan *fronteiras* of Ceuta [Sabta], Tangiers and Mazagán, he also tightened his links with the Morocccan court. In that same year, the Sa'adian sultan, Ahmed al-Mansur al-Sa'di (ruled: 1578–1603) even proposed a joint Moroccan-Spanish assault on Algiers to which he would contribute 40,000 men.[6] Acquisition of the three *fronteiras* gave Spain control of both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar, and a foothold further down the Moroccan Atlantic coast, but this still left four important ports in Muslim hands in north-west Morocco lying close to the Straits, the Bay of Cadiz, and the outports of Seville—Larache, La Mámora, Fédala and Saleh-Rabat. That the Spanish crown kept an acquisitive eye on these north-west Moroccan ports from the early 1580s onwards was no secret and in 1583–4, as ministers of Philip III later recalled, negotiations between Philip II and Ahmed al Mansur over a possible exchange of Larache for Mazagán had proceeded to the point that Spanish troops and ships were being made ready.[7]

A fresh cause for Spanish anxiety—and talk of intervention in the Maghreb—were the alarming signs of internal strife and political fragmentation in Morocco following the death of the great sultan Ahmed al-Mansur, in 1603. It was indeed especially during the early part of the reign of Philip III (1598–1621), as the Spanish crown disengaged from war with France (1598), England (1604) and entered into the Twelve Years' Truce with the Dutch (1609), that Spanish strategy in the south came to focus more and more on Atlantic Morocco. Philip III's favourite, the duke of Lerma, judged it expedient to encourage a mood of anti-Islamic expansionism in the Mediterranean as a way of diverting Castilian energies and attention away from Spanish failures in the Low Countries and France. At the same time, the general expulsion of the *Moriscos* from Spain in 1609, a measure intended as part of the same reorientation in policy, permanently fixed large *Morisco* refugee communities along the Moroccan coast, notably at Rabat and Tetuán, thereby creating fresh pools of fierce anti-Spanish resentment in the western Maghreb.[8] During 1607–8, as the army of Flanders was steadily reduced, Philip III built up his galley fleets and garrisons at Gibraltar and in the Bay of Cadiz as well as in the North African *presidios* while at the same time tightening his alliance with Mawlay-al-Sheikh—known to the Spaniards as Muley Xeque—who controlled northern Morocco but was fighting a losing struggle with his vehemently anti-Spanish brother, Mawlay Zaydan who ruled in Marrakesh and who, in 1610, signed an agreement with Philip's 'rebels'—the Dutch.[9] The first attempt to seize Larache by force, in September 1608, involved an armada of sixty-eight gallies and galleons and 8,000 men, a display of strength which astonished those familiar with the current poor state of the Spanish army of Flanders but was unsuccessful.[10] Finally, in 1610, after further elaborate and ostentatious preparations and a good deal of diplomatic intrigue in Morocco, a huge *armada* set out from Gibraltar and this time succeeded in occupying the stronghold and bay of Larache, triumphantly proclaiming the Catholic faith and expelling the local population.[11] Worried by the displacement of the Larache corsairs with their fleet of some seventeen fregates southwards to the next usable port, as well as evidence that the Dutch were planning to install themselves there in collusion with Mawlay

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[5] See *CDIHN* cxii, pp. 487–91, 505–12.

[6] García Figueras and Rodríguez Joulia, *Larache*, 35.

[7] *CDIHN* lxxxi, p. 529. Philip III to Medina Sidonia, 4 Nov. 1607; García Figueras and Rodríguez Joulia, *Larache*, 38–9.

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[8] Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 11–13; on the settlement of the Moriscos at Saleh,see De Castries, *Source inédites* v, pp. vi–viii.

[9] Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 373, 383, 397; García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 18, 22.

[10] Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 345, 348.

[11] Ibid., 524–5, 440, 476.

Zaydan, the Spanish crown in 1614 went a step further and seized La Mámora.[12]

In this complex evolution of relations between Spain and the Moroccan courts during the reign of Philip III, as well as westwards extension of the string of Spanish North African *plazas fuertes*, and general reorientation of Spanish global strategy from north to south, it is clear that a number of individual Jews played a central role. This was due partly to the traditional use of Jews in Sa'adian diplomacy, the Sa'adian sultans being as a rule less distrustful of the Jews, whom they considered able but powerless, than they were of their own relatives and the various Moroccan tribal and regional leaders.[13] Partly this was because the Jews were the only group in the Maghreb aside from the *Moriscos*—about whom both the sultan and the Spanish king were deeply suspicious—who were fully fluent in both Spanish and Arabic and who had the knowledge and contacts to sustain wide-ranging diplomatic and intelligence-gathering activity. Being of Iberian origin but integral to the economic and court life of the Maghreb, the Jews were simply the best available bridge between the Spanish authorities and the Muslim princes, governors and *diwan*s.

Among the key Jewish intermediaries in the fraught politics of the Maghreb during the later part of Philip II's reign, and the reign of Philip III of Spain, were Isaac Cansino whose family, originally from Seville, had been expelled from Spain in 1492 but been allowed to settle in Oran, soon after the Spanish occupation, in 1512. Like his father, Jacob Cansino the Elder, Isaac Cansino held the official post of 'Royal Interpreter in Arabic' at Oran and at the time of Philip II's acquisition of Ceuta, Tangiers and Mazagán, in 1580–1, had been summoned to Madrid and had spent some months there, advising the king's ministers on North African affairs.[14] His son, Hayen (Haim) Cansino, inherited the post of royal interpreter at Oran and spent seven months at San Lúcar de Barrameda, in 1608, helping the king's 'capitán del Mar Océano en las costas de Andalucía', Don Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, duke of Medina Sidonia (d. 1615), conduct his elaborate negotiations over Larache and La Mámora with Mawlay al-Sheikh and other Moroccan princes.[15] A second leading family were the Çaportas—or as they later called themselves—Sasportas of Oran, seemingly descended from the Çaportas who were prominent at Barcelona in the fourteenth century. During the 1550s, Yaho Çaportas the Elder had resided in Tlemcen and become the governor of Oran's best contact in the hinterland of the *presidio*, supplying intelligence on the movements of the Turks. He and his descendants were rewarded by being accorded the *xequía de los de su nación*, or secular headship of the growing Oran Jewish community, a prestigious post which, as a Spanish observer explained in connection with the appointment of, Samuel Çaportas, the last of the *xeques* of the Oran *judería*, in 1668, was in effect 'una tacita dignidad de governador della en quanto a sus constituciones' [a tacit dignity of governor of it as regards its constitutions].[16]

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[12] García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 118–21.
[13] De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 12, 17–19.
[14] Cansino, *Relacion de los servicios*, p. 1.
[15] Ibid.

A third key figure was Solomon Pariente the Elder, special confidant of Mawlay Xeque who also assisted Medina Sidonia in the negotiations over, and preparations for, the occupation of Larache and La Mámora.[17] After the Spaniards took control of Larache, he and his relatives settled there but insisted on living in a curious sub-ghetto consisting of some twenty persons, located at some distance away from the main *judería*.[18] His chief function at that stage was to keep the new governor of Larache, Don Gaspar de Valdés, commander of an 800-man garrison, properly informed about the general political situation in the Maghreb.[19] Much of his business activity was with Jews in the Portuguese enclave at Tangiers. Like the Cansinos, the Parientes held a post as royal interpreter in Arabic which passed virtually as of right from father to son. Later, Pariente transferred to Tangiers, where he was a close confidant of the Portuguese governor, Alfonso de Noronha,[20] and where his son, Abraham Pariente, served first the Spanish crown, and then (after Tangiers joined Portugal in seceding from Spain, in 1643), that of Portugal. After Tangiers was ceded as part of Catharine of Braganza's dowry, to the English crown, in 1661, Abraham and his son, Solomon Pariente the Younger, continued to act as agents of the Portuguese king in

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[16] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relación*, fo. 11v.

[17] García Figueras and Rodríguez Joulia, *Larache*, 107; García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 58.

[18] AGS Guerra 888. Consulta de parte (Solomon Pariente), Madrid, 19 Sept. 1623.

[19] García Figueras and Rodríguez Joulia, *Larache*, 107.

[20] Ibid., pp. 127–8.

Tangiers whilst at the same time collaborating with the English. Under English rule, Solomon Pariente frequently had reason to recall that his forebears had served both the kings of Spain and Portugal 'avec grand soign et fidelité', and received various honours from them and in particular held 'la charge d'interprète, office de très grande importance et dans les fonctions duquel ils se sont conduits avec tant d'approbation, qu'on leur a conferé la charge de secretaire du général de cette cité'.[21]

At Ceuta, a prominent family was that of the interpreter and agent Jacob Mesías who was born there around 1618;[22] while yet another intermediary who participated in the Spanish annexation of Larache and La Mámora was Nathan Ulet, or Nathan Ben-Terny, a Jew of Fez and confidant of Mawlay Es-Sheikh who was sent by him, in 1610, as his representative, to accompany the the armada which occupied Larache, and who, on other occasions was sent by his master to Madrid. A further Jewish notable thoroughly addicted to great power politics and intrigue in the Maghreb was the well-known figure of Samuel Pallache of Fez (d. 1616) who first appeared on the scene in the autumn of 1602 when he was given a royal safe-conduct to pass from Ceuta to Spain to put certain propositions to the king, on behalf of the Sultan Ahmed al-Mansur, and at the same time purchase jewels on the latter's behalf. The sultan died whilst Pallache was in Madrid, conferring with ministers. Pallache, and his brother, Joseph, again visited Madrid, this time for eight months, in 1605 not as anyone's envoy but as a self-proposed intermediary between Spain and Mawlay es-Sheikh, ruler of northern Morocco, and, in particular, to present a detailed plan for the swift seizure by Spain of Larache.[23] Pallache was again in Madrid, making frequent visits to the Escorial Palace, apparently conferring with ministers about the annexation of Larache, for long periods in 1606–7, until finally, short of funds and disappointed to find himself less valued by Medina Sidonia and other ministers than he had been earlier, he suddenly received a royal order, following a brush with the Inquisition, to leave Spain with immediate effect.[24]

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[21] PRO CO 279/2, fos. 10, 107.

[22] Schreiber, 'Juden in Madrid, 482.

[23] García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 18–19.

[24] Ibid., pp. 20–25; Caillé, 'Ambassades et missions', 9–11.

During the years 1605–7 Pallache spent much of the time he was not in Spain in the Portuguese enclave at Ceuta. It was also in 1605, as it happened, that Medina Sidonia compiled, and sent to Madrid, a somewhat critical report on the Jews living in Ceuta. Many Jews had settled there, he noted over the last eleven years, the majority having arrived only in the last four years. They were mostly merchants trading between North Africa and Spain and were rapidly turning Ceuta into a major smuggling depot. To Spain they exported *aljófar* (cheap pearls), emeralds, cochenille, and gold thread, often without paying customs. Those Jews who were not needed in the interests of the *presidio*, he urged, should be expelled outside the city walls. Even so, the duke did not question that it was in the royal interest that 'los judíos mas viejos, y los más acreditados' [longest established and most accredited] should be permitted to remain in Ceuta' and should continue to assist the governor and the garrison.[25]

While the numbers of Jews in the Spanish and Portuguese North African *presidios* often oscillated sharply between 1580 and the expulsion from Oran, in 1669, the general trend, following the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal seems to have been firmly upwards. At Mazagán where the total population was fewer than 2,000, the Jews represented a sizeable proportion by the early seventeenth century.[26] At Oran there were reportedly 476 Jews resident in the ghetto early in 1669,[27] over one hundred of these being adult males, more than ninety capable of bearing arms.[28] This represented a considerable increase over the figure for 1624 when the total number of Jews inhabiting the *judería* stated to be only 350. At that date, it would seem, there were forty houses in the *judería* which was also inhabited by several hundred Muslim slaves, though around 1660 the Jews were required to dispose of these since Jewish ownership of Muslim slaves was regarded as a barrier to the latter's Christianization.[29]

For several years more, after the occupation of port and bay of La Mámora, at the mouth of the River Sebu, in 1614, there was persistent talk at the Spanish court, and in Andalusia, of the need to seize Saleh and Fédala likewise, so as to prevent these evolving into corsair bases. In this new strategic context, Solomon Pariente who was in contact with disaffected Moriscos at Saleh-Rabat, Samuel Pallache's nephew, Moseh Pallache who also provided advice on Saleh,[30] and the Amsterdam Jew, Duarte Fernandez, all provided Spanish ministers with expertise and advice. But the planned capture of Saleh and Fédala never occurred. The year 1618 which marked the onset of the Thirty Years' War in Europe (followed in 1621 by the expiry of the Twelve Years Truce with the Dutch) also marked the end of the era of thrusting Spanish imperialism in North Africa. Combined with the rapid political fragmentation of the Moroccan kingdom, and gradual decay of Ottoman power in Algeria, this created a much more static set of circumstances for the Christian enclaves in North Africa than had prevailed previously. The result was a greater sense of security in the *presidios* which, in turn, lent new plausibility to the arguments of those who made a point of combating the Jewish presence. That the Jews living there had latterly come to lose their usefulness to the Spanish crown became a key premise in the debate. Thus, for instance, the marqués de Los Vélez when pressing for the expulsion of the Jews stressed that they were no longer indispensable, or even particularly helpful, as intermediaries and that in any case there was now no lack of Spaniards equally proficient in Arabic.[31]

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[25] García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, p. 22.

[26] Dias Farinha, 'História de Mazagão', 218, 226.

[27] AGS Estado 4128. Los Vélez to Queen Regent, Oran, 5 May 1669; however Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve relacion*, fo. 20 gives the figure of 466.

[28] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relacion*, fo. 9v.

[29] BL MS Add. 10262, fo. 203. 'Relazion que hizo al Inquisidor general [. . .] el doctor Don Diego de Arce Reynoso, Vicario-general de Oran' (1661).

It is highly improbable, however, that this was really the case. While it is true that at Oran there was also now an official Spanish Christian interpreter of Arabic, very few, if any, Christian Spaniards developed a network of contacts in the Algerian and Moroccan interior comparable with that of the Jews, as indeed several experienced Iberian observers noted. Thus, for instance, the head of the Catholic Church, or *Vicario-general*, at Oran, in 1637, Pedro Cantero Vaca, a man which powerful religious objections to Jews but who, in other respects was remarkably unprejudiced towards them, had no doubt that 'because [the Jews] go into the hinterland and have much communication and correspondence with the Moors, they receive more information from them than does the Christian [interpreter]'.[32] This indeed was the main reason for the strong note of hesitation in his final assessment of the Jewish presence there: 'the question whether it is advisable that Jews should reside in those places [i.e. Oran and Mers-el-Kebir] is debatable and there are weighty considerations both for and against, but even if it is decided that they should stay, it should not be permitted that such a large number live there, for the fewer of such enemies the better'.[33]

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[30] AGS Estado 2300. Archduke Albert to Philip III, Brussels, 28 May 1616.
[31] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relacion*, fos. 3, 4v.
[32] Cantero Vaca, 'Relación de Oran', 102.

Communication between the Spanish and Portuguese strongholds, and the interior, was always tightly regulated by the governors and while Jews were not, any more than Christians, allowed to leave and re-enter the plazas without written passes from the governor, and while Christians also sometimes ventured into the hinterland with such licenses,[34] there are several reasons why Jews did so much more frequently, and had far more contact with the Muslims outside, than did Christian Spaniards or Moors. In the first place the Jews had a considerably more extensive and developed commercial and financial network in the Maghreb, and the Sahara, than either Spaniards or Moors. In the second place, while licensed Muslim merchants did come and go in some numbers, they were not allowed to reside within the walls, as resident Jews were, and the Spanish crown made no use of them for diplomatic or intelligence purposes, having no hold over them of any sort and deeming them an obvious security risk. And then, thirdly, there was a incessant leakage of both military deserters and Christian civilians going over to the Muslims and apostatising from Catholicism becoming *renegados*—Spanish renegades were indeed common among the corsairs—a form of desertion which both the civil and ecclesiastical authorities were extremely anxious to combat. Consequently, throughout the period of the union of crowns, and subsequently down to 1669, Jews were the only regular intermediaries, diplomatic, advisory, commercial, financial and logistical between the *presidios*, Spanish and Portuguese, and the Muslim interior.

Apparently not only the size of the Jewish communities but also their privileges and trading rights increased appreciably during the era of the Conde-duque de Olivares, favourite and chief minister of Philip IV from 1621 to 1643. Olivares was eager to revive the strength of the Spanish monarchy, and expand its commerce and shipping, and among the methods by which he hoped to achieve this result was eager to utilise the financial resources and expertise both of the Portuguese New Christians in the Peninsula, and Spanish Jews in the *presidios*, by getting them to contribute more to the financial needs of the crown in exchange for more security, commercial opportunities, and privileges. Some of the plans for utilising Jewish resources aired in Madrid in the 1620s were indeed simply too sweeping to be feasible in the Spain of Philip IV. One scheme, entitled 'Discurso sobre abrir y introducir contratación y comercio con Berberia', presented at court in April 1625, advocated forceful steps to open up the trade of the Spanish *fronteras de Africa*, and establish a regular convoy system for shipping goods to and from the *plazas fuertes*, arguing that by this means an abundance of cheap grain for Portugal, Valencia and Catalonia, all areas suffering from high food prices, would be assured while, in addition, Spain would monopolise the Maghreb's exports of saltpetre, indigo, gum, gold and ostrich feathers and supply North Africa with Castilian and Catalan textiles. But an integral and indispensable element of this ambitious plan was that the king should publicly pardon and amnesty those Portuguese New Christians who had fled to northern Europe 'para que puedan volver y campear y tratar en este trato con livertad y seguridad' [so that they can return and get to work and ply this commerce in liberty and security].[35] Were the king to encourage these pardoned New Christians to settle and trade in the *fronteras*, the effect, promised the *arbitrista* (who seems to have been lamentably ill-informed on the second point) would not only be to make the enclaves the pivot of North African commerce but deprive the English and Dutch of their best resource for financing their respective East and West India companies.

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[33] Ibid.

[34] BL Add. MS 28440, fo. 10v, 12v1–3; Dias Farinha, 'História de Mazagão', 305.

But if this was unrealistic in the circumstances, other more limited steps could be and were taken in the Olivares period which appear to have enabled individual Jews to travel to and stay in Spain, even for relatively long periods, much more easily than in the past. Of particular significance was the *permisión general* issued by Philip IV, in 1634, authorising Oran Jews to come for purposes of trade to southern Spanish ports, carrying merely a license from the governor without needing, as in the past, a special safe-conduct, from the *Consejo de Guerra*, in Madrid.[36] For eleven years or so, until the *permision general* was cancelled in 1645, visits of Oran Jews to the Andalusian coast, especially Malaga and Cartagena, became matters of routine rather matters of state. The annual visits of two Jews to Malaga to supervise the preparation of *kosher* wine for ritual and other use by the Oran community, mentioned by Cantero Vaca, in 1637, was presumably a recent innovation under the *permisión general*.[37]

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[35] AGS Estado 2847 'Discurso sobre [. . .] comercio con Berbería' (28 April 1625), fo. 4.

There were also more, and in at least one case, that of Jacob Cansino the Younger, 'el sabio' (c. 1600–1666), Royal Interpreter in Arabic at Oran, some extraordinarily lengthy stays by Jews in Madrid. During the 1630s, Cansino resided in Madrid, where he became something of a confidant of Olivares, at least as regards North African affairs, for more than five years in one stretch. Quite a few eyebrows were raised, and there were certainly suspicions, encouraged by the mysterious secrecy surrounding his comings and goings, that more was involved than met the eye as indeed there probably was. Cantero Vaca remarked, in 1637, that 'recently some [Jews of Oran], with no small effrontery, petitioned for no less than permission to move to Madrid and, in fact, the matter proceeded quite far'.[38] From 1633, for some five or six years, Cansino lived openly as a professing Jew in the centre of Madrid, for much of this time in the Calle de Olivo, opposite the residence of the marqués de Valparaíso. No doubt the main burden of the discussions between Cansino and ministers in Madrid was about how the Jews of the *fronteras de Africa* might contribute more to meeting the king's needs. But his undisguised presence at court also encouraged speculation, and adverse comment, some of it to the effect that the Conde-duque must be presumed to have been planning some form of readmission of the Jews to Spain.[39]

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[36] BL Ms Add. 28442, fos. 251v–2. Philip IV to marqués de Viana, Madrid, 31 Dec. 1645; Israel, 'Jews of Spanish North Africa', 74–5; Schreiber, 'Juden in Madrid', 486.

[37] Cantera Vaca, 'Relacion de Oran', p. 100:' bino si esta hecho por sus manos y con sus ceremonias lo beben y no de otra manera. Suelen enviar a dos judíos a Malaga y a otra parte de la costa para que lo hagan y remitan; en falta suya beben agua y aguardiente que lo hacen de ygos y muy bien'.

[38] Cantero Vaca, 'Relación de Oran', p. 102: 'y no ha mucho que algunos dellos con no poco desahogo pretendian trasladarse no menos que a Madrid y estuvo muy adelante la pretension donde si la consiguen haran mas daño que provecho. Dios sea con nosotros.'

[39] Yerushalmi, *Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto*, 167; Israel, 'Jews of Spanish Oran', 239; Schreiber, 'Juden in Madrid', 479–80.

It was whilst he was residing in Madrid, in 1638, that Cansino published Moses Almosnino's *Grandezas de Constantinopla*, describing the Ottoman capital, complete with a preface describing the services of the Cansino family on behalf of the Spanish crown. This was the one and only book published by a professed Jew in Spain between 1492 and the abolition of the Inquisition and one that is not without a special significance. A few ministers and Andalusian grandees may have been fully aware that the Spanish crown had made, and was still making, extensive use of the services of Jews in the *fronteras de Africa*. But Cansino's text for the first time openly proclaimed the fact that the king of Spain valued and rewarded the services of Jewish families of distinction such as the Cansinos. Even the certificate of ecclesiastical approval, written by the *visitador-general* of the Jeronimite friars, Fray Jerónimo de la Cruz, seemed to hint at the onset of a new era in the relationship between Spain and the Jews. For he remarked that it was a useful book which had no other fault than that it was written by adherents of a faith different from 'our holy Catholic religion', but that this was no obstacle to publishing or reading it, since Catholics were permitted by the Church to read rabbinic authorities and the targum as well as numerous pagan authors, including Tacitus 'who speaks so impiously of the Christians'.[40]

Of all the members of the Cansino family who held the post of royal interpreter in Arabic at Oran, Jacob Cansino 'el sabio' who held the post for thirty years, from 1636 down to his death, in 1666, was undoubtedly the most outstanding. His 'friendship' with Olivares—for that is what it was—would probably have begun with his first visit to Madrid armed with a royal pass, in 1625.[41] By the time he obtained his authorization to return to Madrid, in 1633, he was in dispute with the then governor of the *presidio*, the marqués de Flores Dávila, who had imprisoned him briefly and, following the death of his older brother, Aaron Cansino, in a cavalry skirmish with some Moors, in 1633, refused to appoint him in his brother's place, as tradition required. He had instead transferred the post to Yaho (Jacob) Çaportas, *xeque* of the *judería*. By going to Madrid, Cansino got the better of his adversary, quickly persuading the crown to reverse Flores Dávila's decision about the interpretership.

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[40] Almosnino, *Extremos y Grandezas*, approbation of Jeronimo de la Cruz.

[41] Elliott, *Count-Duke of Olivares*, 300.

The period of easier Jewish access to Spain from North Africa coincides then with the era of Olivares' stewardship of the Spanish empire. The later withdrawal of the *permisión general* was decided on by Philip's IV's ministers at the time of the visit to Valencia of Solomon Çaportas and another Jew, armed only with the written permission of the governor of Oran, in 1645, two years after Olivares' downfall and four to five years after the outbreak of the revolts of Catalonia and Portugal. Among other anxieties provoked by those two disastrous developments, within Castile, were fears as to the political loyalties of the many Portuguese New Christian *asentistas* servicing financial contracts for the crown and supplying the North African *presidios*, a worry which seems to be reflected in the decision to cancel the *permisión.* In a royal *cédula* dated 31 December 1645, Çaportas' presence in Spain was stated to be in accordance with the *permisión general* of the year 1634 issued at a time when there were not the problems of religion which the new wars had brought to the fore since 1640: 'en virtud de una permision general del año 1634 en tiempo que no avía en España los inconvenientes de relixion que las guerras han yntroducido por la concurrencia de naciones, a que se debe atender como la principal columna de esta monarquía'.[42] The governor of Oran was told that his reasons for authorising Çaportas to be in Valencia would have to be substantial ones to outweigh the drawbacks ministers now discerned, in the wake of Olivares, in the presence of Jews in Spain and that, in any case, Çaportas must first return to Oran and then return to Valencia should the governor make an adequate case on his behalf with ministers in Madrid.

A crucial factor in the minds of Spanish ministers when assessing the status and usefulness of Jews in the *fronteras de Africa*, as Medina Sidonia stressed in the case of Ceuta, in 1605, was whether or not they were 'viejos', that is long-established in the *presidios.* In the case of Oran, Jewish tradition, underpinned by general opinion in the *fronteras*, held that there had been *siete casas*, seven original families authorized to reside in the city in the time of King Ferdinand and that these were the still the seven foremost and most prestigious families of the community. Thus, for instance, in February 1657, the *Consejo de Guerra*, in Madrid, the council which handled most of the administrative business of the *fronteras*, asked the then governor of Oran, the marqués de San Román, for his opinion of a petition submitted by the Oran Jewish merchant Haim Albo in which he styled himself 'Ayen Albo, hebreo vezino de la ciudad de Oran descendiente de una de la siete casas que su Magestad [i.e. King Ferdinand] mandó se abecindasen en la dicha ciudad' [inhabitant of the city of Oran, descendant of one of the seven families which [King Ferdinand] commanded to settle in the said city].[43]

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[42] BL MS Add. 28442, fos. 251v–2.

For Los Vélez, in the late 1660s, it was a point of some importance to undercut the contention that Jewish families long established in the *fronteras* had not only a special link with the crown, and a proven record of loyalty, but a clearly privileged status enshrined in documents and law. Over the winter of 1668–9, he claimed to have made a thorough search in the city's archives, as part of his preparing the ground for the expulsion of the Jews, and to have found that the story of the *siete casas* was apparently a myth, having encountered only three *cédulas* dating from the reign of King Ferdinand authorizing the settlement of individual Jewish families in the *presidio*. These three unquestioned *casas de permisión* were those of Rubi Sartorra, who was then already in the town serving as royal interpreter in Arabic, and the families Cansino and Zemerro.[44] The published account of the expulsion of the Jews from Oran, which appeared in 1670, denied that Ferdinand and Isabella 'who at so much cost to themselves strove to purge the realms of Spain of pernicious Jewish remnants' and set up the Holy Office of the Inquisition, could possibly have authorized any substantial Jewish settlement or as this text expresses it wished Satan to establish in this new possession of the holy Catholic Church, 'a forbidden tree so hateful in the sight of the Lord'.[45]

Be that as it may, the distinction between the long-established *casas* and newcomers, as well as that between Jews domiciled in the *presidios*, and Jews from outside, was always of fundamental significance in the administration of the Spanish *fronteras de Africa*. There were frequent bouts of rising tension and acute insecurity and all the *presidios* were from time to time subject to hostile probing, raids and sudden attacks in full strength. Security measures had to be rigorous and were constantly under review. One of the first actions of the marqués de San Román on taking up his governorship of Oran (1652–60) was to decree as necessary for the good government of those *plazas* that 'no Jew should dare leave for Barbary without first obtaining a license from me', stipulating that offenders would be treated as prisoners of war and enslaved, 'pena de ser dado por de guerra y tomados por esclavos'.[46] Soon after, in December 1652, he decreed that 'all Jews who are in the *judería* of this city and are not natives of it should leave for the hinterland within eight days of publication of this order'; non-compliance was to be punished with enslavement, a penalty subsequently amended to six years in the galleys and a fine of 200 *reales*.[47] Furthermore, the marquis decreed that 'no Jew from outside, and who is not one of the natives of the *judería* of this city, shall dare enter it without my license and permission'.[48]

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[43] BL Ms Add. 28441, fos. 76–8. Queen Regent to San Román, Madrid, 25 Feb. 1657.

[44] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relación*, fo. 8v; Schaub, *Juifs du roi*, 26.

[45] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relacion*, fo. 8v.

Such rigorous security measures and tight regulation affecting the Jews was only possible with the full collaboration of the *xeque* of the *judería* and other resident Jewish notables and placed great influence and authority in their hands. It was these men who controlled the coming and going of Jews in and out of the *fronteras de Africa* and who, at the same time, were authorized to conduct secret correspondence with Moorish town governors, chieftains and informers. Thus, in May 1654, on reviewing the special royal license granted to Yaho Çaportas, *xeque* of the *judería* of Oran, by the *Consejo de Guerra*, in January 1626, authorizing him to correspond 'with the places of the Turk and Moors of those realms, both because of his services and loyalty and because it is useful to have in those *plazas* a person in whom [the king] has full confidence and who obtains intelligence of what transpires in those parts', San Román, without hesitation confirmed and renewed Çaportas' authority. 'In consideration of how much, and how well, Yaho Çaportas has served in these *plazas* with his person and wealth for over forty years', ruled the governor,' he may freely and securely correspond with the said districts, in the same way that he has hitherto, without registering the letters which he sends out', the marquis ordering the officers in command at the city gates that whenever letters arrived for Yaho

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[46] BL MS Add. 25682, fo. 10v.

[47] Ibid., fos. 12v1–3.

[48] Ibid., fo. 13.

Çaportas, these 'be handed to him without being examined first by the interpreters, notwithstanding the decrees and instructions which I have issued to the contrary'.[49]

Thus, at Oran, both the *xeque* and the Jewish royal interpreter, usually a Cansino, had their own separate—and perhaps to some extent rival—networks of contacts outside the *fronteras de Africa*, particularly at and around Algiers, Tlemcen and north-east Morocco both composed of Jewish, Moorish and Turkish contacts. Incoming and outgoing letters sent by anyone else, apart from these men and the governor, were carefully scrutinized by the royal interpreters, one of the chief tasks of the Jewish interpreter being to check, and if need be report to the governor, on such mail. Every now and again the governor would ask the Jewish interpreter for an account of recent intelligence, the *avisos* sent in by 'Moorish confidants' as well as Jews from Algiers, Tlemcen and other places.[50] This being intricate work requiring specific skills and a record of reliability, it is not surprising there was a tradition of circulation of trusted interpreters around the *plazas*. Thus, in 1652, David al-Hatat, born at Oran, was acting as interpreter for the governor of Ceuta while, in 1650, Judah Pariente was fulfilling the same function at Melilla.[51]

A crucial aspect of the strategic interaction between the *fronteras de Africa* and the Muslim hinterland was the provisioning of the *presidios* with grain and forage and sometimes, when grain prices in North Africa were especially low compared with those in the Peninsula, purchases of grain for shipment to Spain. Normally, North African grain prices, as expressed in silver, were appreciably lower than prices in southern Europe though of course, there were also frequent periods of dearth. Moreover, since the purchasing power of cash was greater in Barbary than in Spain, ministers in Madrid often preferred, where feasible, to supply those *presidios* which had not been assigned to private contractors for provisioning, with money rather than provisions, especially in the case of grain. However, cash remittances from Madrid usually arrived too late for advantage to be taken of the lowest prices for grain available immediately after harvesting. Hence, at Oran at such times, and also when the magazines in the *plazas* were running dangerously low while the royal treasury was low on funds, it was usual for the governor to borrow on behalf of the crown from the *xeque*, the royal interpreter, and other wealthy Jews. Furthermore, during the reign of Philip IV certainly at Ceuta where there was a garrison of 400 and some 2,000 civilian inhabitants and probably others of the *presidios* close to the Straits, whilst provisioning was assigned to Portuguese New Christian *asentistas*, the latter often purchased their supplies of grain at Oran, and then shipped the grain along the coast, this being cheaper than buying in the Peninsula.[52] This was customary, for example, during the 1640s when the suspected crypto-Jew Fernando de Montesinos Tellez was responsible for provisioning of Ceuta.

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[49] Ibid., fo. 57.

[50] Ibid., fos, 59, 71, orders to Jacob Cansino of 19 June and 18 Dec. 1654.

[51] Schaub, *Juifs du roi*, 40.

Repaying such loans was never easy, nor a particularly high priority so that they were often repaid excruciatingly slowly or else in desirable commercial concessions and privileges rather than cash. Thus, for example, in June 1634, the *Consejo de Guerra* in Madrid considered a request from Yaho Çaportas, at that point *xeque* and acting interpreter at Oran, reminding them that he had advanced the crown substantial sums more than ten years before, in the early 1620s during 'diferentes ocasiones de necessidades' which had not been paid back, asking to be reimbursed from the tobacco and other consumption duties collected at Oran.[53] A month later, Isaac Çaporta Cansino reminded ministers in Madrid that he had lent the crown 650 *escudos* for purchase of wheat ten years before which he had not received back, again asking that he be repaid it from the consumption duties raised in Oran.[54] Grain was always the most vital item needed from the interior, but sometimes the garrisons required other things, especially horses. Governors and troops often sallied forth to show the banner and intimidate surrounding villages, as well as raid and capture slaves in hostile localities; and for this sort of raiding a good supply of suitable horses was essential, and again money was often loaned by Jews for the purchase of horses in the interior. Thus, in September 1634, Jacob Cansino, describing himself at that point merely as a 'Jew resident in Oran' advised ministers that 'by order of the captains-general of those *plazas* he had advanced various sums of money, in times of emergency, for the purchase of horses but once again had not been repaid.[55]

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[52] AGS Hacienda 894 consulta *Consejo de hacienda*, Madrid, 29 Oct. 1646, fo. 2v; Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 197.

[53] AGS *Consejo de Guerra* 1097, *consulta de parte*, Madrid, 19 June and 28 Aug. 1634.

[54] Ibid. *consulta de parte*, Madrid, 14 July 1634.

Furthermore, whether the money came direct from the royal chest, or was loaned by Jews, it was invariably trusted old-established Jewish merchants, especially the Cansinos and Çaportas, who were dispatched to transact the purchases of grain and horses, usually from the Banu 'Amir, in and around Canastel or La Zafina de Jafa, fertile districts in the *sierra* some distance away from Oran where grain could be more advantageously bought than in the vicinity of Oran or Algiers. Thus, in 1657, San Román signed an order for 600 *reales* in silver to be handed to Jacob Cansino 'so that he should use it to buy wheat in the Zafina de Jafa and Hamayan at the most advantageous price he can, and as quickly as possible, which he must then bring back and store in the magazines'.[56] A week later the treasurer was directed to hand over another 800 *reales* to Cansino for buying more grain at La Zafina.[57] Six months later, the royal treasurer at Oran was ordered to give Jacob Cansino 1,800 *reales* in silver for the purchase of '200 *fanegas* of barley and fifty of wheat which on my orders, he goes to buy at La Zafina de Jafa, at the price of twelve *reales* for the wheat and six for the barley, and which he must transport with the greatest possible speed to the royal magazines with regard to the shortage of grain presently affecting these *plazas*.'[58] Jacob's son, Aaron Cansino, petitioned the governor, in July 1656, for a paid 'place' in the *presidio*'s cavalry contingent, as recompense for the various forays he made to the countryside around Canastel, Zafina de Jafa and Hamayan to procure grain supplies for Oran at times of chronic shortage and having, 'bought a horse at his own expense' for this purpose.[59]

Whenever a governor of Oran sallied forth with his cavalry, to raid hostile neighbourhoods and capture Muslim slaves, he would do so on the basis of information supplied by the Cansinos and Çaportas and usually accompanied by one or other of them. Slavery was a central feature of life in the Maghreb, and throughout the Islamic world, and it was the king of Spain's policy, in response to the enslavement of thousands of Christian seamen and travellers by the Muslims, to enslave hostile Moors captured on sorties from the *presidios*. Most of the resulting captives were them sold off in Alicante, Cartagena or Malaga and spent the rest of their lives in south-east Spain.[60] They were a major source of the considerable profits which accrued to captains-general of Oran during the course of performing their official duties. But to carry out such slaving expeditions successfully required skilful preparation and guidance and this was the task of the Jews. Successive governors drew up slaving contracts with the head of the Cansino, or Çaportas clan at different times, usually undertaking to pay a stipulated fee per slave taken, as well as a share of any captured cattle or horses plus four slaves, in cases where more than a hundred were captured. But this of course was dangerous work. Several members of the Cansino family were killed or wounded in clashes with hostile Moors in the sixteenth century while, in the early seventeenth, Jacob's father, Haim was shot in the arm and his elder brother, Aaron slain in a skirmish with the Beni-Raxas, in 1633. Isaac ben Haim Cansino, younger brother of Aaron and Jacob, and the most accomplished Hebrew poet of early modern Oran, wrote a funeral poem on his death.[61]

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[55] Ibid., consulta de parte, Madrid, 18 Sept. 1634.

[56] BL MS Add. 28440, fo. 132. Order of San Román, Oran, 8 Feb. 1657.

[57] Ibid., fo. 132v. order of San Román, Oran, 15 feb. 1657.

[58] Ibid., fo. 145. order of San Román, Oran, 9 Dec. 1657.

[59] Ibid., fos. 124v–5.

As principal intermediaries between the *fronteras de Africa* and the North African interior, and between the *fronteras* and Spain, the Jewish communities of the *presidios* played a distinctive and, and it would seem, dominant part in commerce.[62] The products exported to Spain from the enclaves, were obtained in the interior, or from the Sahara. To pay for their purchases of wax, lead, tin, gum, ostrich feathers and other plumage, Moorish slaves and hides, the Jews of the *plazas* imported silver, tobacco, drugs and woollen cloth. Tobacco smoking, first introduced in the Maghreb in the 1590s, despite its undefined, somewhat nebulous status under Islamic law, rapidly became a major factor in the trade of North Africa,[63] while given the relative scarcity of silver in the Maghreb, and its having a higher value there than in Spain, there was money to be made by exporting silver from the plazas to the interior in exchange for local and Saharan products in demand in Spain. It was sometimes even alleged that the reason the rulers of Algiers refrained from making an all-out attack on Oran was their reluctance to eliminate their prime source of bullion.[64] But while Christian merchants came to the enclaves, they could not venture beyond. Like English Tangiers later, the Spanish *plazas* had a meaningful commerce only as long as Jews and Moors came to them from the interior.[65]

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[60] Kamen, *Spain in the later Seventeenth Century*, 285; Schaub, *Juifs du roi*, 44–5.
[61] *Encyclopaedia Judaica* (Berlin, 1928–34) v, 23.
[62] Schaub, *Juifs du roi*, 129, 135.
[63] El-Hesnawi, *Fazzan*, 201–3.

Ostrich plumes from the Saharan oases played a central part in the commerce of the *fronteras* and were in strong demand in Spain notably for adorning aristocratic head-gear. 'It has come to my notice', proclaimed San Román, at the outset of his term as governor, 'that in the *judería* of this city are bought and sold many batches of plumes, both processed and unprocessed which are shipped to Spain without paying the imposts which are due to the king'.[66] To put a stop to the evasion, the marquis directed both 'Jacob Cansino, interpreter of the Arabic language' and 'Yaho Çaportas, *entretenido* of the Jews' together to summon 'all those of your nation who are inhabitants of this city' and warn them in the clearest terms that no-one should dare buy or sell plumage, treated or untreated, to anyone, inhabitant or outsider, without registering the sale with the chief customs officer, on pain of spending six years in the galleys'.[67]

Permission granted to individual Jews to trade with Spain from the *plazas* without setting foot there in person was a highly prized privilege, one of the chief rewards to be gained from performing services for the crown. Hence, in August 1656, Isaac Ballestero, 'Jew of Oran', son of Joseph Ballestero and grandson of Jacob Ballestero', who claimed to be descended from one of the *siete casas*, citing numerous services he and his forebears had performed on behalf of the Spanish crown, applied for permission 'to trade in Spain with the inhabitants of Malaga and other ports, from the city of Oran without leaving it', importing wine, brandy olive oil, and other permitted merchandise and exporting wax, hides, slaves and 'other products of the land'.[68] Similarly, in February 1657, Haim Albo, likewise claiming descent from one of the *siete casas*, asked permission to trade with

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[64] See the remarks of Diego Fernández de Humada, *vicario-general* of Oran of 1661 in BL MS Add. 10262, fo. 201v.

[65] García Figueras and Rodríguez Joulia, *Larache*, 223–4.

[66] BL MS Add. 28440, fos. 13v1–4.

[67] Ibid.

[68] BL MS Add. 28442, fo. 41. 'En nombre de Isaque Ballestero hebreo, vecino de esas plaças'; see also Schaub, *Juifs du roi*, 142, 220, 224.

Spain without leaving Oran, such as 'had been done with others of his nation'. The wine, brandy and olive oil would have been primarily (though not only) for consumption in the plazas, an estimate of 1652 stating that together, the Spanish and Jewish population of Oran and its sea-port, Mers-el-Kebir consumed annually 4,000 *arrobas* of Spanish wine (1 *arroba* = 25lb), 2,400 *arrobas* of olive oil, 1,800 *arrobas* of *aguardiente,* 1,600 *arrobas* of figs, 500 *arrobas* of dried cod, and an unspecified amount of sardines.[69]

Among the merchants in Spain with whom Oran's Jews traded in the last years before their expulsion was Don Felipe de Moscoso (1635–86), a son of Yaho Çaportas who converted to Catholicism at some point in the mid 1650s and who, after several years in Madrid, settled in Alicante around 1660. The apostasy of a son of the *xeque* of the *judería* must have caused a sensation among the Jews of Oran and evidently lent added acrimony to the traditional enmity characterizing relations between the city's two leading Jewish families. Whilst living as a new convert in Madrid, where he was described as 'D. Phelipe de Moscoso, residente en esta corte, recien convertido, hijo de Jacob Çaportas', Moscoso nevertheless vigorously took the part of his relatives on hearing of the affray which erupted in the main square of Oran, in 1657, in which members of the two rival clans had attacked each other with sticks. The ensuing scandal provoked San Román who showed a marked preference for the Cansinos over the Çaportas to banish Yaho Çaportas the Younger, Muxi Çaportas, and the latter's sons, Aaron and Arbi to the *judería* of Ceuta.[70] For venturing to speak disrespectfully of the governor in public, Moscoso was expelled from Madrid and banished for a time to Burgos.

Later, after settling in Alicante, he conducted a lively trade with Oran where his chief agent until 1669 was Samuel Çaportas as well as Livorno, Lisbon, Genua and London where his main correspondents were the former Malaga crypto-Jews, and now major Jewish wine importers, Jorge and Domingo Rodríguez Francia. During the 1660s indeed, Oran played a central part in Moscoso's burgeoning business empire. After a business trip there, in November 1663, he wrote to a correspondent in Genua: 'I purchased twenty-six slave girls and a quantity of wax, lead, and other commodities which have left me with a reasonable profit'.[71] Moorish slave girls, he informed a correspondent at Livorno, the following year, were continually being sent to him from Oran.[72] Remaining an active merchant in Alicante until his death in 1686, Moscoso became one of the principal merchants of the town. He has even been cited by one modern historian as evidence that late seventeenth-century Spaniards lacked neither zest nor aptitude for overseas commerce, a curious conclusion given that he was raised among the Jews of Oran and never set foot in Spain until he arrived there to convert at the age of twenty.[73] A younger brother, Manuel, also converted and later inherited his estate.

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[69] BL MS Add., 28440, fo. 27.

[70] BL MS Add., 28442, fos, 113, 123; Schreiber, 'Juden in Madrid', 481; Kamen, *Spain in the later Seventeenth Century*, 140–2, 267, 270–1, 285.

Conversion from Judaism to Christianity, and talk of conversion, in the *fronteras de Africa* where the supremacy of the Catholic Church was continually assserted, was by no means especially rare. Nathan Ulet spoke of wanting to settle in Spain and convert, in 1611, obtaining a royal *cédula* allowing him to live as a Jew in Spain for two years whilst he prepared to become a Christian.[74] Samuel Pallache discussed the possibility of conversion whilst residing in Ceuta. In June 1634, Don Antonio Josepe applied to the *Consejo de Guerra* in Madrid for a salaried 'place' in the garrison of Oran, declaring himself to be 'de nacion hebreo, nuevamente conbertido, natural de la plaças de Oran'. By rejecting Judaism for Catholicism he had cut himself off from his family and been reduced to destitution. The *Consejo* agreed with him that the king needed actively to support 'those who convert to our holy faith', recommending that Josepe be assigned a 'place' in the garrison, with pay of two *escudos* monthly.[75] When the Jews were finally expelled from Oran in 1669 only one solitary member of the 476-strong Jewish community in the town preferred baptism to exile but that one, Isaac Cansino, was a notable exception being a man of high status in the community, indeed the older brother of the community's spiritual leader, Rabbi Avraham Cansino.[76] When the rest departed, Isaac remained behind, lodging in one of the friaries where he commenced his arduous instruction in the Christian faith.

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[71] Ibid., p. 285.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid., p. 144.
[74] García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 63.
[75] AGS *Consejo de Guerra* 1097, *consulta de parte*, Madrid, 18 June 1634.
[76] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve relacion*, fo. 20v.

Religious tension between Jews and Christians in the *fronteras de Africa*, as everywhere in the Christian world of the time, was incessant and intense. The abject status of the Jews and their religion was emphasized at every turn. As a natural measure of self-defence, prominent Jewish notables in the *plazas* strove to mitigate such friction as far as they could but it was always a severe and immediate threat to themselves and their community. There are numerous references to donations given by the Jewish notables to friaries and churches, to their helping ransom priests captured by Muslim corsairs, and reciting prayers for departed Christian friends. But there was nothing they could do which would appease the hatred and antagonism to which they were continually subjected. Cantero Vaca who despite himself could not altogether stifle a certain admiration for Jacob Cansino, says that he was 'many times' assured by him that the 'Cansinos could not have taken part in the crucifixion of Jesus' since at the time they were already residing in Toledo which simultaneously was a discreet way of reminding his ecclesiastical friend that there were Jews in Spain before there were any Christians.[77] But in the nature of things, incidents apt to inflame sensibilities continually arose. Cantero Vaca relates how he himself clashed with Oran's Jews when doing his best to convert an elderly Hebrew who was on his death-bed and receptive to talk of Christ. He accuses the Jews not just of perversely obstructing his efforts, and keeping him away from the old man virtually by force, but even of stifling him before he could baptise him, a heinous offence which the *vicario-general* afterwards reported to the Inquisition tribunal of Murcia which had responsibility for Oran.[78]

Religious passions were inflamed in a moment and it did not take much to provoke a full-scale riot. Among the memorable disturbances in Oran in the years prior to the expulsion was an incident which occurred on the eve of Easter Friday in 1663. According to a Catholic witness while church services were in progress and both soldiers and Christian civilians at prayer, inside the *judería* which was then locked, and where there were then no Christians, the Jews mounted an openly blasphemous and sacrilegious procession, carrying on their shoulders a Jewish girl called Miriam 'which in our language means Maria', at the climax of which she was thrown in the dirt: 'la escupieron y oprobieron todos, diziendo tratarían assi a la que los Christianos llamavan Madre de Dios a serles possible' [they all spat on and insulted her, saying that thus they would treat the one whom the Christians call Mother of God if it were possible].[79] Some soldiers of the garrison, on duty on the walls, despite being a considerable distance away allegedly heard this and started a furious tumult against the detested Jews which instantly aroused almost the entire Christian population. Fuelled by religious zeal, the people wanted to slaughter all the Jews there and then and could only be dissuaded from doing so by being assured that the authors of the crime were behind bars and that the Church authorities would investigate everything thoroughly and make sure that those responsible were rigorously punished.[80] The Inquisition showed such resolve and fervour that the people were indeed entirely reassured. The only problem was that despite the most prodigious efforts not the slightest scrap of credible evidence could be found against anyone so that, in the end, no-one was punished and the Inquisition had no alternative but to release the incarcerated Jews.

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[77] Cantero Vaca, 'Relación de Oran', 98.

[78] Ibid.

Yet there are signs that what might be described as the normal level of tension between the three great religions of the Mediterranean was exacerbated by developments to an abnormally acute level precisely in the later 1660s. Besides the creation in the late 1660s of the new Moroccan empire of Mawlay al-Rashid which for the first time in decades posed a serious Islamic threat to all the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, including Oran, there would seem to be two further reasons for this. One factor was certainly the Shabbatian frenzy of 1665–6 which briefly but profoundly threw all the Jewish communities of the Mediterranean into the greatest turmoil, infusing them with heady, intoxicating Messianic expectations and a new confidence and boldness which, we learn, frequently resulted in their making provocative remarks in the presence of Christians and, in many places, unsurprisingly, eventually provoked a Christian and Muslim backlash.[81] Morocco and Algeria were among the lands where the upsurge of Jewish Messianism in the 1665–6 caused a sudden heightening of religious tension, and a disturbing of normal relations between the three faiths.[82]

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[79] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relacion*, fo. 4.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Israel, *European Jewry*, 211–12.

There are no direct references to the impact of Shabbatianism in the *fronteras de Africa* but several hints and allusions suggesting a process of exacerbation. We also know that at this point, the community in Oran, like those of Amsterdam, Hamburg and many others in the Sephardic world became bitterly divided among themselves,[83] presumably over the question of the Messiahship of Shabbatai Zevi. Moreover, it seems likely that the strange, cryptic passage in Los Vélez's report to the Queen Regent, of May 1669, where he claims that it was miraculous that the Jews had caused no Christians to waver in their faith 'pues llegó su dominio a tanto que de todos eran tenidos por oraculos' [for their ascendancy (over minds) reached such a point that they were regarded as oracles by everyone],[84] refers to the exceptional and heady atmosphere which would have prevailed in the *fronteras de Africa* in 1665–6, just before La Vélez initiated the moves which two years later led to the expulsion. Los Vélez commenced his campaign following the death of Jacob Cansino—prompted by the question of whether it was really necessary to appoint any Jew to succeed him in the royal interpretership. This occurred around the time, or very shortly after, the apostasy of Shabbatai Zevi in Constantinople. Of course one might prefer to believe that this is mere coincidence. But, if so, it is indeed a remarkable one. In any case it took some months before Los Vélez had reached the stage that he was ready to send his main appeal for expulsion to the Inquisitor-General, the Queen regent's confessor and chief minister, the Austrian Jesuit Juan Everado Nithard (as he was called in Spain), a document dated March 1667.[85]

But besides the Shabbatian frenzy there was an additional reason for the heightened tension between the three faiths of the Mediterranean at this time: the resumption of the Ottoman offensive to eliminate Venetian power (and papal authority) from the Aegaean. The late 1660s saw the climax of the struggle for Crete while at the same time a new formidable Islamic power emerged in Morocco, posing a threat to Tlemcen and Oran itself.[86] A full-scale Turkish siege of Candia (Iráklion) began in May 1667 at the same time as the deliberations in Madrid about the Jews of Oran. This great siege which was to last two and a half years, and cost countless lives, was a drama which greatly exercised the Papacy as well as Venice and caught the attention of all of Europe. During the winter of 1668–9, the Papacy mounted a vigorous publicity campaign to mobilise Christian help for Venetian Crete, pressing Louis XIV, the Spanish Queen regent and the Emperor Leopold to act. It was important to all three to stress their Catholic credentials and this entailed more than just verbal support. Louis sent 6,120 troops under the dukes Beaufort and Navailles, whose efforts however accomplished little and many of whom perished.

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[82] Hirschberg, *A History* ii, 247–50.

[83] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relacion*, fo. 1.

[84] AGS Estado 4128. Los Vélez to Queen Regent, Oran, 5 May 1669; Israel, 'Jews of Spanish Oran', 249–50.

[85] Ibid., 250.

Spain, however, was in a difficult position. With the short but humiliating War of Devolution (1667–8) in the Low Countries barely over, the crown's coffers were empty, Spanish prestige low, and, worst of all, the country was pervaded with awareness of French military superiority. Meanwhile, Spanish power in the Maghreb was visibly crumbling. By the 1660s, all real prospect of recovering Tangiers, lost to the Portuguese in August 1643, had gone. Despite the successful heroic defence of Larache which suffered a full-scale Moorish assault, early in 1666, it was obvious that the 'Alawi sultan Mawlay al-Rashid, 'king of Tafilalt' as the English and other Christians knew him, was succeeding in conquering most of northern Morocco, that he was supported by many Jews, and that his aggressive policy of *jihad* against the Christians, and most of all the remaining Spanish enclaves, posed a real threat.[87] Something zealous but cheap was needed and especially something that impressed onlookers with Spain's Catholic integrity. The Pope's repeated exhortations having turned into complaints about Spanish inactivity, reported the *London Gazette* in March 1668, the Spaniards having 'excused themselves from the assistance which the Venetians desired of them, upon the pretence of their jealousies lest France might create them new troubles at home', the French king deliberately aggravated their predicament by announcing—while dispatching his own expeditionary force in eighteen men of war and fourteen galleys—that 'nothing would be attempted against [Spain] for one year' so as to allow them to fight the Turk also.[88] Spain's embarrassment was all the greater, and the court's authority all the lower, at this point, owing to the virtual collapse of Nithard's position at court in the face of strong opposition to his person among sections of the nobility. Meanwhile, throughout the Christian Mediterranean there was growing anxiety about the future, fear of Ottoman power, and a widespread supposition that the Jews were secret collusion with the Turk. The Pope publicly went down on his knees, in a succession of special services laid on for the preservation of Candia, beseeching the Almighty to intervene.[89]

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[86] Schaub, *Juifs du roi*, 164–5.

[87] Ibid., 182–3, 193; García Figueroa and Rodríguez Joulia, *Larache*, 232–3; De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 40–50; Herrero Sánchez, *Acercamiento hispano-neerlandés*, 245–6.

Ministers in Madrid resolved to expel the Jews from Oran a year after receiving Los Vélez' long letter of March 1667 to Nithard, setting out the case for expulsion.[90] In a letter of 28 April 1668, from the Queen Regent, the marquis was asked how he thought the operation should be carried out and whether extra troops should be sent across to obviate any risk of seditious collusion with the Turks.[91] By April 1668, Nithard's authority at court, in Madrid, though under growing challenge, was still sufficiently intact for him to take this action. His motive, presumably was to bolster his sagging prestige at home and abroad, and that of the court, by a demonstration of faith militant that would be cheap, easy and widely broadcast. It was a way of diverting attention, if only marginally, from Spain's humiliation in the Low Countries and impotence in the Mediterranean.

Sotomayo y Valenzuela, author of the published account of the expulsion, and other officers of the garrison were evidently somewhat embarrassed by the troop reinforcements sent across from Cartagena, in March 1669, under the pretence that there were hostile movements of Turks and Moors potentially threatening to Oran. Quite apart from the delay this entailed—the final decision to expel the Jews had been taken by the *Consejo de Estado*, in Madrid, in October 1668, during the last months of Nithard's doomed ascendancy[92]—'superficial observers', as he remarks, might assume that in dealing with a 'people with so little valour and spirit as the Jews, the ordinary garrison of the *plazas* was enough' and that there was no need for additional troops.[93] But the Jews, he assured readers, are a vengeful people and had they discovered what was about to befall them earlier they would have colluded with the Turks and Moors and had these attacked before the expulsion could be effected, and the garrison been fully occupied in repulsing their assaults 'what defence would there be in the houses of the [Christian] inhabitants containing only women and children against enemies seditious, aroused and antagonised to the point of complete desperation?'[94] As it was, it was almost a miracle, in his view, that the pious work of expelling the Jews had been under active consideration for over two years without their garnering the slightest inkling of what was afoot.

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[88] *The London Gazette* no. 347, report from Rome, 2 March 1668(9).

[89] *Hollandsche Mercurius*, 1669, p. 142.

[90] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relacion*, fo. 6v.

[91] Israel, 'Jews of Spanish Oran', 251.

[92] AGS Estado 4128. Los Vélez to Queen Regent, Oran, 5 May 1669, fo. 2; Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relacion*, 17; Israel, 'Jews of Spanish Oran', 253.

Finally, on 31 March 1669, to the amazement of Christian, Jew and Muslim alike, Los Vélez called out the entire garrison and special reinforcement in parade formation, drawing up 300 horsemen with festive banners in the main square. Penants, crosses and insignia decorated all the main buildings. The marquis then took his seat at the centre of the town square while the hitherto secret decree of the Queen Regent, of 31 October 1668, expelling all Jews from Oran and Mers-al-Kebir except for those who would now acknowledge Christ and receive baptism, was read out to the assembled populace by the secretary of the municipality. The authorities gave those about to be exiled from their homes for ever, eight days in which to sell their houses and immovable possessions, settle their affairs and leave (at their own expense). According to Sotomayor y Valenzuela, immense was the joy of the Christians and no less great the consternation and despair of the despised Jews.

It was not, however, until 16 April that the—for the Jews—dismal event took place. A long procession of exiles and helpers carrying possessions, with the Cansinos at their head, wound its way down to the harbour where the marquis himself spent the entire day supervising the proceedings. The garrison stood at the alert on the walls and along the shore. The Jews boarded the same large Genoese vessel which had brought the soldiers from Cartagena and had been specially engaged to take the Jews wherever they wanted provided it was nowhere in North Africa or in the Islamic world—as it was deemed an essential security precaution that the Jews be prevented from settling among the Turks and Moors, and especially in Algiers 'por el daño que podia seguirse a estas plazas'.[95] After days of deliberation, the Jews had agreed among themselves that they 'should be taken to Villa Franca de Niza [i.e. Nice], a port belonging to the duke of Savoy where he allows a ghetto for the sake of commerce'.[96] The ship sailed away to the rousing applause of the Christian folk, punctuated by triumphant artillery salvos from the bastions. Afterwards, there was a religious procession to celebrate the supremacy of Christ's Church and a *Te Deum* was recited in the cathedral.

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[93] Sotomayor y Valenzuela, *Breve Relacion*, fo. 14v.

[94] Ibid.

A few weeks later, in Madrid, the *Suprema* of the Inquisition approved Los Vélez' proposal to convert the synagogue of Oran into a church named after, and dedicated to, the 'Santo Christo de la Paciencia', after a cult which had begun in Madrid in the 1630s when a group of Portuguese crypto-Jews had allegedly flagelated an image of Jesus.[97] Meanwhile, the English envoy in Tuscany reported to London that '470 Jews are turned out of Oran on the Barbary Coast out of suspicion they corresponded with Taffilalte', an interesting remark which suggests that, at any rate in Italy, it was supposed there was a connection between the Jewish expulsion and the increasing threat to the Spanish *presidios* in Morocco owing to the rise of Mawlay al-Rashid who was known to have extensive Jewish support.[98] A Dutch newspaper soon afterwards reported that the Genoese vessel had arrived at Nice 'with 470 Jews who were expelled by the Spaniards from Oran owing to suspicion of their conduct; these Jews brought great wealth with them and requested the duke of Savoy freedom to establish their godless methods of trading at Villa-Franca'.[99] In fact, the duke of Savoy, as the English envoy in Tuscany expressed it, readily 'fix'd all the rich [Jews] in that port' but 'sent away 300 of the poor ones'.[100] When, however, the Jews in Nice wrote to their fellow Sephardim in Livorno, the latter brought their letter to the Grand Duke which led to their being assured by the court in Florence 'that their poor would be received here, and that the said Duke [of Tuscany] would treat all their nation with more regard than they should meet with from any other prince'.[101]

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[95] AGS Estado 4128. Los Vélez to Queen Regent, Oran, 5 May 1669, fo. 2v.
[96] Ibid.
[97] AGS Estado 4128. Queen regent to *Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 10 June 1669.
[98] see PRO SP 98/10, fo. 176. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 7/17 May 1669; De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 40–44.
[99] *Hollandsche Mercurius* 1669, p. 122.
[100] PRO SP 98/10, fo. 232. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 15/25 June 1669.

In conclusion, the expulsion of the Jews from Spanish Oran and Mers-al-Kebir in 1669, occurring six years after the first expulsion of the Jews from English Tangiers, took place, as did that event, amid a highly fraught situation in North Africa and in the wider Mediterranean world. The old role of the Jews in the Spanish and other Christian *presidios* of North Africa was, it would seem, beginning to disintegrate: the Jews were also expelled from Ceuta, in 1707, again out of fear that they were supporting the enemy whilst Oran was under siege by the Turks and with both the Moroccan sultan and the anti-Bourbon supporters of the Austrian candidate 'Carlos III' seeking to put pressure on the remaining Spanish *presidios*. The traditional political and strategic function of the Jews of the *plazas* would seem to have dissolved in a context of declining Spanish power and the effective reunification of most of Morocco under Mawlay al-Rashid. The new ruler of Morocco, like the Pasha and *Diwan* of Algiers, was sworn to eliminate the Spanish and other Christian enclaves in the Maghreb. The War of the Spanish Succession then delivered the *coup de grace*.

Expelling the Jews from fortress city of Oran created a stir but the statesman at court who authorised it, Nithard, was disappointed to find that, after all, it did little to shore up his own fast waning reputation and position, or that of the crown. Shortly before the surrender of the Venetians on Crete, in September 1669—but just after the expulsion of the Jews from Oran—the Jews of Rome who evidently took a keen interest in all the developments in progress around the Mediterranean were expressly made an example of by their ruler, the Pope, and subjected to a heavy fine, it was reported in the Dutch press, for their irreverent attitude and, in particular, for daring to 'laugh behind their hands that Candia is so weakened that it is unable to resist any more' and about to surrender to the Turks, for generally 'speaking very insolently about Crete', and for having the further insolence to insult the Spanish Inquisitor-General who, shortly after the expulsion of the Jews from Oran, had been forced to flee from Spain and seek refuge, in chastened mood, with the Holy Father in Rome.[102]

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[101] Ibid.; Israel, *European Jewry*, 129–30; an incorrect report of the episode is given in Toaff where he says the Jews cam first to Livorno but only a few were admitted so that 'continuarono per Nizza e Villafranca, dove il Duca di Savoia fu pronto ad accoglierli', Toaff, *Nazione ebrea*, 412.

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[102] *Hollandsche Mercurius* 1669, 102.

CHAPTER SIX

SPAIN AND THE DUTCH SEPHARDIM 1609–1660

1. *Relations during the Twelve Years Truce*

It is indeed a striking and paradoxical phenomenon that the main phases of Dutch Sephardi economic, maritime, and colonizing history down to the early eighteenth century were to a remarkable degree shaped by the strategic and economic concerns of that very power—the Spanish crown—which was for eighty years the chief enemy of the Dutch Republic and which had caused the greatest upheaval in recent Jewish history, the Expulsion from Spain. The Spanish crown, moreover, was the chief patron of the Inquisition. Yet there were numerous reasons why the Dutch Sephardi reality, down to 1713, was apt to be influenced and shaped fundamentally by Spain. Most Jewish emigration to Holland before 1650 was from the Iberian Peninsula and the Spanish Netherlands. The majority of the Sephardim in the Netherlands during the early formative period of the community's existence spoke and wrote only Iberian languages—Portuguese and Spanish. Above all, during the period 1580–1713 Spain controlled politically, for long periods at least, nearly all the regions—Portugal, Brazil, Spanish-America, the Moroccan coast, the Spanish Netherlands and the Caribbean—with which the Portuguese Jewish community in the formative period of existence mainly traded. The unavoidable consequence was that Spanish policies exerted from the outset a continuous and powerful impact on the evolution of Dutch Sephardi activity far beyond the political and economic impact exerted by other powers such as England, France, the Emperor or the Ottoman empire.

Spanish ministers in the early seventeenth century generally viewed what, for them, was the worrying problem of the Dutch Sephardim as an integral part of the wider issue of the Portuguese New Christian diaspora in the Spanish and Portuguese maritime empires. Indeed the openly Jewish diaspora of Sephardic background which evolved in the decades around 1600 in Italy, Holland and (with more disguise) in France was regarded by Spanish ministers and their advisers as


NORTH SEA
Elbe
Glückstadt
Hamburg
G E R M A N Y
Rhine
UNITED PROVINCES
Amsterdam
The Hague
Rotterdam
Antwerp
Middelburg
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
F R A N C E
Rouen
E N G L A N D
London
(converso until 1656)
ENGLISH CHANNEL
▲ Sephardi Communities
○ Converso Communities
F.D. 2002

Map 5. The Sephardi and Converso Communities of North-West Europe the wholly illegitimate result of a pernicious seepage of New Christian emigrants illicitly fleeing the Inquisition and royal insistence on religious uniformity in the Peninsula. The Portuguese New Christians had begun to become a major social and religious problem in Castile and its dominions overseas during the latter part of the sixteenth century, following the political union between Spain and Portugal in 1580, an event followed by a marked increase in immigration of *conversos* from Portugal into Spain, Spanish America and to Antwerp, as well as a continuing emigration to Italy and the Near East. Then, from the 1590s, the new openly Jewish Sephardic diaspora began to take root also in northern Europe. This rise of a widespread Portuguese New Chrisitian and Portuguese Jewish diaspora, or set of diasporas, both within and outside the Spanish empire, created a host of new tensions which were at once religious, economic and political.

Spain and the United Provinces were at war during the early years of the Sephardic settlement in Holland, from 1595 down to 1609, and commerce between Holland and all the lands under the Spanish crown, including Portugal, was at that time officially banned. Nevertheless, most Dutch Sephardi trade in the initial period was with Portugal and the Dutch Sephardim soon came to be perceived as a particular thorn in the side of Castile owing to their skill in developing surreptitious ways of continuing the importing of Portuguese colonial products to the Netherlands in defiance of Philip II's and Philip III's wishes. But the problem of the Dutch Sephardim loomed much larger in Spanish eyes after the signing of the Twelve Years' Truce (1609–21), in April 1609. As emerges plainly from the *consultas* or discussions of the *Consejo de Estado* (council of state) in Madrid, and other high councils of the empire, such as the councils of the Indies and of Portugal, the Truce came to be viewed in Madrid as deeply flawed and detrimental to Spain's interests. By 1618 it had come to be considered the prime the cause of a whole set of new developments deemed highly damaging to the economic viability and cohesion of the empire. 'It has been understood throughout', as the secretary of the *consejo de estado* summed the collective view of the councils, in that year, 'that the Truce has been highly advantageous to the Dutch and that, since it was signed, they find themselves unimpeded, with overflowing wealth, while these realms [i.e. Spain, Portugal and the southern Netherlands] are greatly diminished since the Dutch have, by it, drawn commerce away; and this damage, if not put right, will every day become worse'.[1] This was a complaint heard many times during the years immediately preceding the expiration of the Truce in April 1621, a particularly tense period in international relations when the Spanish court carefully reviewed its general strategy. The harm to the Spanish and Portuguese seaborne empires which was deemed to have flowed from the Truce was particularly obvious in Asia where the further expansion of the Dutch East India Company after 1609 had spectacularly reduced and constricted the Portuguese East India traffic and threatened the Spanish hold on the Philippines. By 1618, the Dutch East India trade was at least four times as great as that of the Portuguese, enabling the Dutch to substitute their own East India products for those formerly shipped to Spain, Italy, Germany and the Low Countries by the Portuguese while Portugal's colonial empire in the east was in obvious danger of collapse. But the Spanish crown was scarcely less worried by the growth of Dutch navigation and trade in Caribbean and the South Atlantic;[2] likewise strongly deplored was the continuance during the Truce of the Dutch blockade of the Scheldt estuary in force since 1572, a closure to seagoing ships maintained by the States General at the behest of Holland and Zeeland which greatly hampered the maritime trade of Antwerp, reducing the southern Netherlands to something approaching economic tutelage to the Dutch.

But no less pernicious in the eyes of many of Philip III's advisers was the fact that, during the Truce years, Dutch ships and cargoes had been allowed back into Iberian ports. For once the pre-1609 restrictions were lifted, the Dutch with their unrivalled stock of shipping and low freight rates had, at the expense of the English, French, Flemish and Hanseatics, rapidly gained a dominant grip over the north-south carrying traffic linking the Iberian Peninsula to the Baltic and northern Europe. This meant that between 1609 and 1621, it was Dutch ships which delivered most of the Baltic grain, timber and naval stores reaching Spain, Portugal and Spanish Italy and Dutch ships which returned with much of the regular exports of the Peninsula (and re-exports of American products, including silver) reaching northern ports. According to Francisco Retama, one of the several merchant advisers summoned to Madrid to assist ministers with their deliberations about trade strategy in the years around 1621, approximately 820 ships yearly entered Iberian ports in the latter years of the Truce, a majority of which were Dutch.[3] He estimated the annual value of all the exports shipped from Iberia, including salt, wines, figs, almonds, Castilian merino wool, silver and other colonial commodities, at thirteen to fourteen million ducats or roughly twice the disposable annual expenditure of the Spanish crown. With the balance of trade tilting more and more to the disadvantage of Spain, the high prices and ready cash of the Peninsula sucked in a rising tide of Dutch manufactures and East India spices much of which was then re-exported on the trans-Atlantic flotas to the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru.

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[1] AGS Estado leg. 634, fo. 318. Memorandum of Juan de Ciriza, Madrid, 2 March 1618: 'tambien se a entendido siempre que la tregua fue muy favorable para olandeses, y desde que se hizo se allan desempeñados y con hazienda sobrada, y estos reynos muy menoscabados por haver tirado asi olandeses el comercio, y que este daño, sino se remedia, crecera cada dia mas. [. . .]'.

[2] Israel, 'Conflict of Empires', 36–41; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 66–95; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 38–120; see also on these issues, Van den Boogaart, *Expansión holandesa*, 99–103; Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 74–5.

The fact that Dutch Sephardic Jews played a central role in this expansion of Dutch trade with the Peninsula and the Indies, and, for Spanish ministers, the equally worrying fact that they were frequently relatives and associates of the Portuguese New Christian merchants active in the commerce of the Peninsula and the Indies was plainly evident and undeniable. Moroever, this growing reality was avidly seized on by both sides in the debate in progress in Spain at this time about whether it would be best for state, church, and society to try to integrate the Portuguese New Christians more effectively within Iberian Catholic society or purge them from the Iberian Peninsula and colonies altogether. Those inclined to take a positive view of the Christian loyalties and economic value of the New Christians argued that if the crown restrained the Inquisition, curbed discrimination, and cultivated the New Christians, showing them greater appreciation, the migration of crypto-Jews to Holland would thereby be halted and reversed, the trading empires of Spain and Portugal strengthened, and the Dutch state and trading empire correspondingly weakened. Hence, the Spanish writer Martin de Cellorigo, a prominent *arbitrista*, or framer of economic and social projects of this period, in 1619 claimed, that 'if those [Portuguese New Christians] that are in the rebel provinces came back to Spain, and ceased to live there, the rebels would have less power against Spain, for it is certain that since those of this nation have gone to those provinces, their power has increased and will continue to grow; for since all those of this nation who have dealings with them are rich people and powerful, and as the rebels do not oppress them but rather, show them regard, they gain advantages from them and become rich and strong'.[4]

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[3] AGS Estado 2847: Francisco Retama, 'Consideraciones' of 27 Oct. 1623, fo. 3; BL MS Egerton 344, fo. 72.

To some at least at the Spanish court at the time this seemed an attractive argument. Olivares, chief minister of Philip IV (ruled: 1621–65), favoured this approach and believed that rather than let things continue as they were, it would be preferable to draw the 'Portuguese' back from northern Europe to Iberia, or the southern Netherlands, in particular by curtailing the Inquisition, reducing discrimination, and introducing if not some sort of toleration—which was simply inconceivable in the Spain and Portugal of that time—then at any rate a pardon for past offences and a more lenient attitude with regard to private dissent discreetly veiled.[5] Several observers apparently thought that it lay within Spain's capability, using the right methods, to severely weaken if not extinguish the Sephardic diaspora in the north by attracting the exiles back to the Peninsula with guarantees and special offers. The idea that many or most of the Portuguese fugitives residing in Holland, France and Hamburg might in the right circumstances, be persuaded to return, to live as New Christians loyal to the Church, under the Spanish crown, to us today seems rather unrealistic. Yet we know that some individuals among the Sephardic diaspora did aspire to return; and there may have been more than we know about. In any case, the project was by no means wholly unrealistic. Retama in his treatise of 1619 says that he had heard—whilst in Holland a few years before—that there were 'Portuguese' there who wished to negotiate with the Archdukes in Brussels with a view to transferring their families which had fled from the Inquisition in the Peninsula to Holland, from there to Antwerp (and therefore back to Catholicism), and by enabling them to conduct their business there, and in other realms of the crown of Spain, deprive the Dutch of it.[6]

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[4] Cellorigo, *Alegacion en qve se funda la ivsticia*, fo. 22v.
[5] Elliott, *Count-Duke of Olivares*, 117–19, 300–04; Israel, European Jewry, 91–2.

In fact, during the years around 1620, various ideas and plans were aired at Madrid for retrieving the Portuguese New Christians from north-west Europe—and for Catholicism from Judaism. Duarte Gomes Solis, a Portuguese New Christian himself, writing in 1622, claimed that for Portuguese born to families once Jewish but which for 'three or four generations' had lived as Christians to be as oppressed as they were in Portugal was absurdly unjust. Moreover, this unjustifiable persecution, in his view, was the reason that many were inclined to 'prevaricate' or adhered to crypto-Judaism.[7] He suggested the king should permit the establishment of formal ghettos of Jews in the Portuguese East Indies as a way of drawing these people away from the Dutch Republic, and from disloyalty to Spain, and re-incorporating them usefully within the hispanic system. For there was no better means for undermining the Dutch East India Company, he urged, or reviving the Portuguese East India trade and navigation, than harnassing the resources of the Jews in this way.[8] Indeed, it suggested that this would also be a way of weakening Judaism. For while some Sephardim would live as Jews under the Spanish crown in these ghettos, others would be won back for 'Christian truth', since the Portuguese New Christians though adroit in commerce were often of two minds, or caught between the two religions, that is, as he puts it, 'ignorant men, neither Jews nor Christians' [porque ni son judios ni Christianos, hombres ignorantes, muy dados al oficio de mercader].[9] A policy such as that which he recommended would terminate this pernicious ambivalence.

Howeover, schemes for sponsoring Jewish religious practice (in however remote a place), as distinct from retrieving waverers for Catholicism, were invariably rejected, as unworthy of the 'his Catholic Majesty'. The plan proposed at court in Madrid, in April 1625, in a memorial entitled *Discurso sobre abrir y introducir contracion y comercio con Berbería* [Discourse on the opening and introduction of trade and commerce with Barbary] for developing the *fonteras de Africa*, that is the Spanish and Portuguese enclaves in the Maghreb, by issuing a general pardon to Portuguese who removed themselves and their wealth from 'England' and the United Provinces and removed themselves and their families to the *fronteras* (whether as nominally Christian crypto-Jews only or as practicing Jews), to trade 'in liberty and security' with the Muslim world beyond, was judged to go unacceptably far. However tempting it was to use such a strategy to strip away 'el mayor poder que las Compañias de los Ingleses y Reveldes tienen para las Indias Orientales y Occidentales' [the greatest power which the Companies of the English and of the rebels possess in the Indies east and west], it was simply out of the question, as one minister, the marqués de Caracena, expressed it, to organise traffic and commerce with 'enemies of God and of Your Majesty' on such a basis.[10]

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[6] AGS Estado 634, doc. 322, fo. 13.

[7] Gomes Solis, *Discursos*, 14.

[8] Ibid., 15–16, 126–7.

[9] Ibid., p. 136v.

The more limited objective of drawing Jews back to live as New Christians secure from the Inquisition, and therefore nominally restoring them to Catholicism as well as the Spanish crown, received far wider support. During the 1620s and 1630s such was the perceived need to halt the drift of Portuguese New Christians to the northern Netherlands, and prevent the further strengthening of both the United Provinces and Judaism by doing so, that even one or two Inquisitiors came to accept that the advantages accruing to Spain, Portugal and Ibero-America from attracting them back into the monarchy justified, at any rate turning a blind eye to religious offences committed in the past, provided such New Christians returning to live in the Iberian realms undertook to adhere loyally to Catholicism in the future. 'One of the things with which the Dutch sustain with such vigour and obstinacy the wars in Brazil, remarked a member of the *Consejo de estado*, in April 1639, are the contributions which those of the nation [i.e. Portuguese New Christians] help them, their expenditure in the war being of the greatest importance'. He reminded his colleagues that on various occasions it had been proposed at court that the 'Portuguese [New Christians] that are here would know how to draw off from Holland many of those who have most capital there, if some concession were made to them as regards pardoning past religious offences, 'asegurando ellos para lo futuro vivir sin offensa de la fee catholica' [should they undertake to live in future without offence to the Catholic religion]. What is most remarkable about this proposition is that its advocate was none other than the king's confessor—the Inquisitor General himself; and not the least bizarre feature of the Inquisitor General's plan was his suggestion that should king proceed, he ought assign responsibility for repatriating the 'Portuguese' returning to the Peninsula from Holland to the Holy Office which would effectively ensure that everything was arranged 'de manera que Dios fuese servido, y la fee aumentada, y Vuestra Magestad tambien fuese servido' [in such a way that God would be served, the faith augmented and Your Majesty also would be served'.[11]

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[10] AGS Estado 2847, *consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, Madrid 23 July 1625, *voto* of the marqués de Caracena.

Critics of this approach argued that however essential it was to weaken the Dutch Jews and, through them, the Dutch, this should be accomplished in a different way, by breaking the links connecting the peninsular New Christians with the Sephardim in northern Europe and in this way stripping the Jews of their commerce and diverting it into more dependably Christian hands and therefore worthier subjects of the king. Francisco Retama, a Catholic Netherlander resident, before coming to Madrid, at Jérez de la Frontera, urged the king to try to inflame the resentment and ill-feeling ordinary Christians felt against the Jews in the Netherlands and in this way contrive their expulsion from that country to Germany or Poland 'so as to wrest from them the trade they conduct through contact with other Jews [i.e. New Christians in Iberia [. . .] whereby they defraud Your Majesty of his imposts and deprive many merchants of these realms of their profits'. The expulsion of the Jews from Dutch Republic, if it could be engineered by Spain, would enable the king 'to divert this trade, and the connections which sustain it, to Flanders so that everything should be to the advantage of Your Majesty's subjects' and the Jews stripped of what they have.'[12] Another memorialist writing in 1621 believed there were stronger grounds for expelling the estimated 20,000 households [i.e. roughly 100,000 people] of 'gente hebrea in Portugal' [Jewish people in Portugal] than there had been to expel the *Moriscos* from Spain in 1609, claiming that such a laudable act of state would cut the ties of the Jews in Holland with the Peninsula and by forcing them to shelter and care for the refugees, utterly exhaust the Jews' resources, thereby weakening Judaism and undermining the Dutch politically and militarily.[13]

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[11] AGS Estado 3860 *consulta* 5 April 1639, fos. 2–2v. *Voto* of the Inquisitor-General.

[12] AGS Estado 634, doc. 322, fos. 13–14.

[13] BL MS Egerton 344, 'Trahe V. Magestad tanto en los ojos las cosas de la fee', fos. 66, 69v–71, 74v, 75v–6; on the 20,000 households, see also Beinart, 'Conversos', 120.

In his eyes, a general expulsion of the Portuguese New Christians from Spain and Portugal possibly to the Portuguese colonies in West Africa (where many could be expected to die) would not only purge the Peninsula of a despicable and unwelcome fifth column but be a devastating blow to the United Provinces.

Iberian observers were clearly given to exaggerating the role of the Sephardim in driving the Dutch penetration of the two Iberian seaborne empires. A pro-Inquisition memorialist of 1621 states incorrectly that Jews were the most important investors in the Dutch East India Company and that altogether as many as 2,000 Portuguese New Christian families had fled to Dutch territory, their real number at the time in fact being less than a sixth of that figure. In July 1622, the duque del Infantado, a leading grandee, remarked in the *Consejo de Estado*, during deliberations about the resumption of war with the Dutch, that 'among the principal merchants and traders who reside in Holland [and who trade with Iberia] most are Portuguese [New Christians]', a considerable exaggeration but one which was typical of the Spain of that time and which could regularly be made at the highest levels at court.[14] By contrast, Retama, who knew Holland at first hand, insisted that most of the 600 Jewish households which he estimated to be resident there were, in reality, relatively poor. Fairly accurately, as it happens, he estimated, in 1616, that there were then only about a dozen or so Jewish merchants in Holland of real stature in international commerce.[15]

Among the most notable Sephardic merchants in Amsterdam in the years around 1621 was Bento (Baruch) Osorio,[16] factor of Andrea Lopes Pinto of Lisbon for whom he chartered some 200 Dutch vessels between 1615 and 1618 to ship grain and timber to Portugal and transport Setúbal salt back to the Low Countries, or the Baltic; Osorio who had the largest fortune among the Dutch Jews at this time,[17] also shipped grain and timber to Tangiers and Ceuta and imported sugar from Lisbon. Other leading traders among this community were Jeronimo Rodrigues de Sousa (Samuel Abrabanel), later a *parnas* of the Beth Israel congregation in Amsterdam, Thomas Nunes Pina (Joshua Sarfati),[18] a founder of the Beth Ya'akov synagogue who in 1631 with an assessed fortune of 25,000 guilders, ranked as the fourth richest of the Amsterdam Jewish merchants, Diogo Nunes Belmonte (Ya'akov Israel Belmonte) another prominent sugar importer, Antonio Martins Viegas (Simeon Viegas) and Francisco Vaz de Leão who had an assessed fortune of 20,000 guilders in 1631.[19] These all traded mainly with Portugal and Brazil which, at that stage, was by far the principal traffic of the Dutch Jews. But quite substantial also was the trade with Castile conducted among others by João de Haro (Rafael Jesurun) who imported Castilian wool and the brothers Duarte and Jeronimo Rodrigues Mendes (Jacob and Isaac Israel Mendes) who settled in Amsterdam, from Malaga, in 1617, had many contacts in Andalusia and who led the field in trade with southern Spain.[20]

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[14] AGS Estado 2036, consulta 6 July 1622, voto del duque del Infantado: 'porque los principales mercaderes y tratantes que ay en Olanda los mas dellos son portugueses'.

[15] AGS Estado 634 doc, 322, fo. 13; J.G. van Dillen, following Cecil Roth estimates the number of Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam, in 1617, at about 500; this is certainly too low, though Retama's estimate, implying a total of two thousand or more is undoubtedly too high; a more acceptable figure would be in the region of 1,000, see Roth, 'Het vreemde geval', 8; Koen, 'Earliest Sources', 39–41.

[16] See Appendix 1.

[17] Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam', 16–17.

Dutch Sephardi Jewry with its ties with the Portuguese New Christians of Iberia and Ibero-America was considered an economic threat to the well-being of the Spanish and Portuguese maritime empires. But the emergence of thriving Jewish communities organized to receive New Christian emigrants from the Peninsula was, understandably, also viewed as a social and religious challenge. The more Jewish life in the United Provinces was tolerated and favoured by the Dutch authorities, and the more the Sephardic community was encouraged to organize synagogues and Jewish welfare institutions, the more attractive Holland, and other northern European destinations with close commercial ties to the United Provinces, became in the eyes of potential New Christian migrants from Iberia. The Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam had become a veritable beacon of hope, a dazzling symbol in the eyes of repressed Portuguese crypto-Jewish networks everywhere in the hispanic world. As a group of Portuguese crypto-Jews living in Mexico City expressed it, towards the end of the 1630s, the Dutch Republic now had 'la mayor judería que hay, que es la de Amsterdam' [the greatest Jewish quarter there is, that of Amsterdam].[21] Those whose relatives had been seized by the Inquisition, and had their wealth confiscated, were, as Cellorigo and others stressed, bound to feel insecure in Iberia and prone, mentally at least, to explore every possibility for escaping with their families and moveable assets. While their best prospects for safety and prosperity continued to be found in the northern Netherlands where officially the Catholic faith was banned, New Christians migrating there, however submerged or barely residual their allegiance to Judaism, were bound to find their Jewish loyalties being reawakened and reinforced.[22] Thus the inevitable result of the continued exodus was a simultaneous strengthening of both Judaism and Dutch economic penetration.

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[18] *Studia Rosenthaliana* iii, 248n; Vaz Dias, 'Over den vermogenstoestand', 166.

[19] Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam', 17.

[20] *Livro de bet Haim*, 71, 190; Mendez Bravo lists 'Hieronimo and Duarte Roiz Mendez' as 'Castilians' coming, he thought, from Salúcar de Barrameda, see Roth, 'The Strange Case', 235.

Public acceptance of Sephardic communal life in Holland was thus in itself perceived as damaging to Spanish interests. Early in the Truce, the marqués del Guadaleste, Philip III's minister at the court of the Archdukes Albert and Isabella, in Brussels, even tried to intervene, as he put it 'by secret means', in the debate in progress in Amsterdam, and more generally in the United Provinces, about the status and privileges of the Jews, trying to stiffen the opposition of the Calvinist ecclesiastical authorities to the building of a public synagogue. In the minds of Spanish ministers it was infamous and insufferable that while Catholic worship was officially forbidden, Jews should be permitted to publicly exercise their religion 'with their rites and ceremonies'. Guadaleste's attempt to combat the initiative to build the first 'public' synagogue in Holland on the part of a group of Portuguese Jewish merchants in Amsterdam, led by Duarte Fernandes (Joshua Habilho), followed the drawing up of a contract for the synagogue's construction with the builders in January 1612. Previously, the Jews had been permitted to worship only in private, in ordinary houses but seemingly someone in the city government, possibly Nicolaes van Campen, a noted champion of toleration, having nodded to them to go ahead, the attempt was made.[23] Predictably, the initiative provoked an immediate outcry from Dutch Reformed Church consistory,[24] and by resolution of 8 May, the Amsterdam city government voted to refuse permission for work on the synagogue to continue. Yet subsequently, the regents seem to have been satisfied with assurances as to the quiet and inconspicuous manner in which services would be conducted and the building did after all come into use as the Neveh Shalom synagogue.[25]

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[21] *Proceso y causa criminal contra Juan Pacheco de Leon*, 398.

[22] BL MS Egerton 344, fo. 64–5; Gomes Solis, *Discursos*, 126–7.

[23] Zwarts, *Eerste Rabbijnen*, 65–71, 116; 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', *Stud. Ros.* v, 241–3; Fuks-Mansfeld, *Sefardim in Amsterdam*, 52–3.

[24] AGS Estado 627, *consulta Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 7 July 1612.

Spanish commentators were right in insisting that by no means all the Portuguese New Christians in the United Provinces, or the rest of north-west Europe, had formally reverted to normative Judaism or joined a synagogue. Particularly before 1620, there were also some who, like the Portuguese New Christians in Antwerp and Rouen, preferred to live outwardly as Christians—a status which facilitated movement between Amsterdam and Antwerp—or who hesitated, or who made the transition only very slowly, or having become Jewish felt an inclination to backslide. Thus, for instance, Manoel Carvalho testified in 1643 that he had come to live in Amsterdam forty years before—thus in 1603—but had not professed the Jewish religion until 1616.[26] For all sorts of reasons, several of these New Christians who had their doubts about, or who resented, organized Judaism, as well as one or two who were firm in their Jewish allegiance entered—both before and after the expiration of the Truce—into secret dealings and negotiations with Spanish ministers. Among this motley and rather remarkable batch of schemers were Luis Vaz Pimentel, Gabriel da Costa, Bartolomé Mendes Trancoso, Francisco Thomas de Miranda, Manoel Mendes Cardoso and Duarte Fernandes.

Vaz Pimentel whose father, Bento Vaz de Evora, had been a victim of the Inquisition left Portugal in 1611 and had been circumcized and admitted into the tiny Portuguese Jewish community in Rotterdam, at the age of twenty-one reportedly under the name Elias Israel. In 1612, he returned via Rouen (where two of his sisters had married Portuguese resident there), and Seville, to his native Lisbon. He had apparently decided to emigrate to Brazil but was arrested by the Lisbon Inquisition on 16 December 1612.[27] 'Reconciled' in the Lisbon *auto-da-fe*, of February 1614, he was released later that year, still owing the Inquisition 2,465 *reals* for the costs of his trial.[28] By the autumn of 1616 at the latest, he was back in the Netherlands where he settled as a 'Portuguese merchant' in Rotterdam, and was well known to the two leading Portuguese merchants resident there at this time—Diogo Gomes Duarte and Gaspar Fernandes Vega. Clearly, though, he lived very much on the fringes of the Portuguese Jewish community in Holland.[29] Short of money, he contacted the Spanish authorities in Brussels, offering, for payment, to reveal useful information about the Jews in Holland to Spanish ministers, their methods of subverting the royal customs and regulations on trade, and details about their *converso* correspondents in the Peninsula.

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[25] Van Agt, *Synagogen in Amsterdam*, 12.
[26] Fuks-Mansfeld, *Sefardim in Amsterdam*, 40.
[27] Salomon, 'Lotgevallen', 144.
[28] Ibid., pp. 150–1.

During 1618, he provided several *avisos* about fraud in the Brazil trade, decribing how as many as ten Dutch vessels yearly sailed direct to the islands of Madeira and the Azores, avoiding royal customs offices and procedures at Oporto and Lisbon, and then illegally loaded unregistered merchandise brought from Holland onto licensed Brazil ships sailing from those ports; and later returned to collect unregistered sugar and Brazil wood at the same places when the Brazil ships arrived back in the islands. He alleged that the king was being defrauded of his 10% on a slice of the Brazil trade amounting to some 80,000 ducats a year.[30] But the most lucrative business among 'the Jews of Holland' currently, he averred, was the surreptitious export of false copper coinage to Spain and Portugal in exchange for which they took out bullion and silver coin. In addition to this sort of information about illicit trade, Vaz Pimentel repeatedly offered, for extra payment, to provide details of all 'los que son circuncidados que vienen en los dichos reynos y los que tratan en ellos y tienen haziendas [que] son mas de doscientos' [who are circumcized that go to the said realms and trade in them and possess wealth, numbering more than two hundred].

His intelligence concerning false copper coinage imports to the Peninsula and other frauds was acted on and led to the Archduke's secretary, Juan de Mancicidor, in Brussels, being warmly congratulated for obtaining such useful information from the United Provinces.[31] In January 1619, Vaz Pimentel, supplied details about a consignment of false coinage destined for Faro in the Algarve as well as about three prominent New Christian businessmen—Antonio Sanches, in Lisbon, Antonio Rodríguez Pato in Pontevedra, and Francisco Diaz, in Viana—who, according to him, were about to depart for Holland.[32] Meanwhile, news got back to Amsterdam of a whole catalogue of arrests and interceptions in Spain and Portugal which, unbenown to the Dutch Jews, resulted from Vaz Pimentel's *avisos*. Two receivers of counterfeit coinage had been arrested in San Lúcar and another taken in Ayamonte where royal officials had found the false copper they had been alerted to by Vaz Pimentel hidden in barrels of butter, on a Dutch ship which was detained and only released on payment of a heavy fine. Also discovered on the basis of his information was a large consignment of forbidden Dutch East India cloves seized in San Sebastian and seventy cases of Brazilian ginger, falsely labelled as sugar, seized in Portugal. Though the latter was found in possession of João de Leon, a merchant seized by the Inquisition for 'judaizing' who insisted the merchandise belonged to his brother, Manoel Lopes de Leon, in Amsterdam, and therefore a Dutch subject whose cargo was arguably protected by the Truce terms, the ginger was confiscated anyway on grounds of fraud.

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[29] AGS Estado 2037, fo. 207: Spanish translation of notarial deed in French dated, Rotterdam, 6 Nov. 1619; Roth, 'Het Vreemde geval', 1; *Stud. Ros.* x, 224.

[30] AGS Estado 2305, anonymous *papel* (by Vaz Pimentel ?) enclosed with Albert to Philip III, Ghent, 18 Aug. 1618.

[31] AGS Estado 2036 fo. 84. Pedro de San Juan to Ciriza, Brussels, 23 Jan. 1619.

In July 1619, Vaz Pimentel supplied information about a Portuguese Jew, named Isaac de Leon who had recently travelled from Rotterdam via San Sebastian to Castile, styling himself 'Juan Perez de Beroy'. This Isaac de León—a close relative, it is known from other evidence, of the crypto-Jew, Juan de León, tried by the Mexican Inquisition in 1642—had been born in Malaga and had come with his parents and his uncles, the brothers Rodrigues Mendes, to Holland three years before 'a ser judíos y estan circuncidados' [to be Jews and they are circumcized].[33] De León was returning to Spain bringing a consigment of linens and other merchandise belonging especially Jerónimo Rodríguez Méndez (Isaac Israel Mendes) and letters authorizing him to realize the cash value of property left in Malaga by his uncles which amounted to a large sum. Jeronimo Rodríguez Méndez, explained Vaz Pimentel, was 'muy conocido en Malaga donde aun tiene mucha hacienda' [very well-known in Malaga where he still has property].[34]

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[32] AGS Estado 2306, fo. 83. *Aviso* of Vaz Pimentel to Pedro de San Juan, undated jan. 1619.

[33] Ibid.; besides the two uncles Rodriguez Mendes, the others in this group from Malaga were Dr Joseph Israel Mendes burried at Oudekerk in 1618, Abraham Israel Mendes and Samuel de Leon, see *Livro de Bet Haim*, 26, 71, 76, 93, 190.

[34] See appendix 1.

In October 1619, Vaz Pimentel, through an intermediary, provided further details about the clandestine traffic in copper coinage. He cited Sebastian Núñez, originally from Galicia, who was forwarding false coins concealed in grain shipments to Pontevedra, assigned to the well-known merchant Gonzalo Dias Pato 'el qual ha mas de quatro años que trata en este negocio que por ser muy rico, la justicia de la tierra no le prende' [who has been involved in this trade for more than four years and since he is very rich the district officer does not arrest him].[35] At some point after 1623, Dias Pato fled to Amsterdam and joined the Jewish community among which he was one of the ten or twelve richest in 1631 with an assessed fortune of 20,000 guilders.[36] 'Juan Gonçalves', reported Vaz Pimentel, was another clandestine trafficker smuggling counterfeit copper into Galicia. João Gonçalves Valverde (or Eliahu Israel Valverde), also from Galicia, had been a prominent Dutch Jewish merchant trading with southern Spain, especially Malaga, but had gone bankrupt in around 1618. Additional Sephardi smugglers informed on by Vaz Pimentel on this occasion were Diogo da Silva who exported forged money to Lisbon and Francisco de Mezquita who shipped counterfeit coinage to San Sebastián. On this occasion, Vaz Pimentel mentioned his urgent need for the 200 *escudos* he expected as remuneration for this intelligence to ransom his brother, Juan Vaz Pimentel (alias Jacob Israel),[37] a trained diamond cutter, who had been on board a ship sailing from the Low Countries to Spain, bearing letters from Luis, and from Brussels, for officials in Madrid when he had been captured by Barbary corsairs and taken to Algiers.[38]

Vaz Pimentel remained in regular touch with the Archduke's political secretary, often via the Count of Egmont who regularly traveled between the northern and southern Netherlands at this time in connection with family lands which had been confiscated during the early stages of the Revolt when the house of Egmont had defected to the Spanish side.[39] Another form of economic subversion of the interests of the Spanish crown committed by Portuguese New Christians denounced by Vaz Pimentel concerned the financier Ruy Lopes Homem of Lisbon, recently appointed *arrendador* (tax-farmer) of the royal customs on Madeira. The latter, he warned, had relatives among the Jewish community in Amsterdam and was planning to flee himself to Holland not just with his own capital but some of the proceeds of the royal imposts in Madeira. From other evidence we know that this Ruy Lopes Homem indeed had both a son, Manoel Homem Vieira, and a brother, Miguel Lopes Homem, then living in Amsterdam.[40] Our informer similarly denounced Blas Ruiz Hortuño, Portuguese New Christian merchant at Malaga, yet another dealer in false coinage who was also illegally importing Dutch East India spices. Ruiz Hortuno evidently went back and forth between Spain and the Netherlands: 'this Ruiz Hortuno', reported Vaz Pimentel, 'has come many times to Holland to buy false coinage and ship it to Malaga and other ports'. He passed on intelligence also about Captain Francisco Ribeiro residing at Paraíba in Brazil who had relatives living as Jews in Amsterdam and corresponded with Dom Manuel, son of the Prior of Crato, the Dutch sponsored pretender to the Portuguese throne who was married to a sister of the Dutch Stadholder. Like others of his leads, including the information about Isaac de Leon which led to the latter's arrest in Madrid, this intelligence was swiftly acted on. A warning was sent to the royal authorities in Brazil concerning Ribeiro who, however, appears to have escaped, presumably to Holland since by 1623 the community there included a 'Captain Ribeiro'.[41]

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[35] AGS Estado 2037 doc. 27: 'Los que embian quartos de Olanda son las personas seguientes' enclosed with San Juan to Ciriza, Marimont, 30 Oct, 1619; Stols, *Spaansche Brabanders*, 15, 71; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 130.

[36] Vaz Dias, 'Over den vermogenstoestand', 166.

[37] Salomon, 'Lotgevallen', 144, 146.

[38] AGS Estado 2307 doc. 208: Vaz Pimentel to San Juan, Antwerp, 11 Oct. 1619.

[39] AGS Estado 2306. Pedro de San Juan to Ciriza, Brussels, 23 Jan. 1619.

Another Portuguese New Christian who strongly resented the 'circumcized' gathered in Amsterdam was Bartolomé Mendes Trancoso. This informer was especially keen to secure a 'safe-conduct so that he, his wife, children, and family on returning to Spain would not be punished by the Holy Inquisition'.[42] He offered extensive information about clandestine commercial activities detrimental to the crown, providing the names of various Portuguese New Christians in Spain who, he alleged, were importing forged copper coinage from Holland. These were Miguel de Lisboa, at Bilbao, Pedro López de Moreyra, at Yanguas, Diego Pereyra and his brothers at San Sebastian, Bartolomé Lopez and Pedro Alvarez, at Valladolid, and the Portuguese *arrendador* farming the pepper duties at Burgos. In this case too, the Archduke's political secretary, in Brussels, passed on the information to Madrid where enquiries revealed that Mendez Trancoso himself had been accused of importing false coinage into Spain, four years before, in 1615, by a *Morisco* named Gabriel de Carmona, who had revealed details about the clandestine activities 'de muchos judíos portugueses que entraron y salían destos reynos y los principales eran Domingo y Diego Pereyra' [of many Portuguese Jews who were entering and leaving these realms and the chief of them were Domingo and Diego Pereyra'.[43] Indeed, it was precisely that brush with the royal bureaucracy which had prompted Mendez Trancoso to migrate to Holland, under guise of fleeing the Inquisition. In this way he had to associate with Jews which he had not the least desire to do.

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[40] Roth, 'Strange Case' 237–8.

[41] Wiznitzer, *Jew in Colonial Brazil*, 47, *Livro de Bet Haim*, 66, 106; Novinsky, *Cristãos-Novos na Bahia*, 41, 122–3, 135.

[42] AGS Estado 2308, doc. 113: 'Lo que en sustancia resulta de los papeles que Bartholomé Mendez Trancoso a escrito'.

Another informer, Gabriel da Costa, an older namesake of the famous freethinker,[44] arrrived from Amsterdam in Antwerp, in July 1619, intent on establishing contact with the Spanish court by forming a connection with Manuel Lopes Sueyro,[45] the well-known Portuguese spy-master who ran his espionage business from there. Da Costa's mostly rather uninformative dispatches to Madrid purporting to contain valuable political information revealed by confidants high in the Dutch state contain little or no commercial news or information about the Portuguese Jews. But when Vaz Pimentel heard of da Costa's visit to Antwerp, he immediately wrote to Brussels, denouncing da Costa and his brother 'Francisco Thomas'—presumably the same person as the Francisco Thomas de Miranda who was in contact with Juan de Mancicidor in 1617—as utterly despicable and untrustworthy people who had themselves been exporting forged copper coinage to Castile. Untrustworthy or not, Francisco Thomas de Miranda was yet another Portuguese New Christian living in Holland who rejected the synagogue and insisted on his Catholic allegiance, describing himself in one report (in a mixture of Spanish and Portuguese) as 'estante em Olanda donde vivo catolicamente como he notorio e se podera emformar' [residing in Holland where I live as a Catholic as is well-known and can be checked].[46]

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[43] AGS Estado 2308 doc. 114 'El año 1615 vino a este corte Gabriel de Carmona'; see also Caro Baroja, *Judíos* ii, 55.

[44] The freethinker Uriel (alias) Gabriel da Costa (c. 1584–1640) was about thirty four and probably living in Hamburg at this time whereas this Gabriel da Costa, one of three Portuguese of that name known then to be living in the north is described by Vaz Pimentel as an 'hombre viejo', Vaz Dias, 'Uriel da Costa', 9.

[45] Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 173–4.

Francisco Thomas de Miranda promised secret economic proposals which would bring added revenue to the crown and, in April 1618, visited Brussels to remind the Archduke and his advisers of his offer, refusing, however, to reveal the details before receiving a royal *cédula* guaranteeing him twenty per cent of the savings accruing from his *arbitrios* as well a full pardon for religious offences securing him from the Inquisition. Soon afterwards, he advised the Archduke that he had decided to go to Madrid to present his *arbitrios* in person.[47] It is unknown whether in fact he did so. In July 1619 Gabriel da Costa wrote to Sueyro—who sent the letter to Brussels from where it was passed on to Madrid—offering to 'show His Majesty the remedy so that [false copper coinage] should not be brought into those realms from which so many bad consequences result' as well a reveal how to keep grain prices in the Peninsula more stable and increase the yield of various taxes in Portugal.[48] He too would only do so, however, if first promised immunity from the Inquisition so that he could safely go to Madrid to explain his schemes at court in person.

More interest was shown by the Spanish authorities in Manoel Mendes Cardoso, a former *arrendador* of the duty on playing cards in Lisbon.[49] Earlier, in 1614–15, he had been in contact, from Amsterdam, with the marquis Spinola, the pre-eminent figure at the Archduke's court and commander of the Spanish army of Flanders, who evidently regarded his *avisos* as being of real value. In February 1619, he resumed contact with Spinola, presenting a set of economic proposals and requesting a royal promise of immunity from the Inquisition so that he could travel to Spain to present his schemes in person at court.[50] Both Spinola and Philip III's representative in Brussels, the marqués de Bedmar, were sufficiently impressed to write to Madrid on Cardoso's behalf, accounting him a 'persona inteligente' and urging that immunity from the Inquisition be conceded since his proposals would materially benefit the royal treasury.[51] He was not, however, as one Spanish historian mistakenly claimed, presenting schemes on behalf 'of the Portuguese Jews resident in Holland'.[52] Far from it, he was acting on his own behalf, responding to the Spanish court's evident interest in projects of economic reform and improvement. Mendes Cardoso, as Spinola realised, clearly had an expert knowledge of the economic and strategic problems of the Spanish empire at the time. The outline of his proposals forwarded to the *Consejo de Estado*, in Madrid, included a scheme for savings on the annual cost of provisioning the Spanish *presidios* in North Africa, modifications to military contracting arrangements in which several Portuguese New Christians in the Peninsula were involved, advice on how to stop the influx of counterfeit coins, recommendations for fiscal improvements in Portugal and proposals about how to organise and improve Spain's intelligence-gathering from Holland and the Ottoman Empire.[53] In contrast to Francisco Thomas de Miranda, Mendes Cardoso requested only a modest two per cent of the proceeds from savings and profits resulting from his *arbitrios* for himself.

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[46] AGS Estado 2303, Mancicidor to Philip III, Brussels, 13 Nov. 1617.

[47] AGR Brussels SEG 182, fo. 58. Archduke Albert to Philip III, Brussels, letter undated.

[48] AGS Estado 2037, doc. 48 Gabriel da Costa to Diego Lopes Sueyro, Antwerp, 3 July 1619.

[49] Roth, 'Strange Case', 237.

Before proceeding further, Philip III's ministers wanted first to know more about Mendes Cardoso's background, and turned to the Portuguese Inquisitor-General for information about him. Despite its supposedly efficient filing and identification procedures, however, on this occasion the Holy Office hopelessly misled the court by confusing Manoel Mendes Cardoso with two other Portuguese 'Manuel Cardoso's who had had sought refuge in the Netherlands. The requested report sent from Lisbon to the *Consejo de Estado* in Madrid supplied details about a Manoel Cardoso de Macedo (1585–c. 1653), an Old Christian who had apostatized and fled to Amsterdam where he converted to Judaism, adopting the name 'Abraham Perengrino',[54] as well as about a Manoel Cardoso de Millão who returned to Judaism, after living in Brazil for some years, and then London, before settling in Amsterdam but contained nothing about the Mendes Cardoso in question.[55]

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[50] AGS Estado 2306. Spinola to Ciriza, Brussels, 28 Feb. 1619.

[51] Ibid.; AGS Estado 2309. Bedmar to philip III, Brussels, 30 June 1620.

[52] Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte*, 133, 250.

[53] AGS Estado 2306, doc. 11 'Manuel Mendez Cardoso digo'.

[54] Teensma, 'Levensgeschiedenis van Abraham Perengrino, alias Manoel Cardoso de Macedo', 1–36; Fuks-Mansfeld, *Sefardim in Amsterdam*, 86.

The Portuguese Inquisitor-General was not at all eager to see suspect New Christians who had fled to Holland being granted immunity from inquisitorial arrest. It would, he assured the king, be a very scandalous matter for 'christãos baptissados sendo publicos judeus circuncidos' [baptised Christians who have become professed and circumcized Jews] to be seen frequenting the 'Catholic court of Your Majesty'.[56] After some delay, Mendes Cardoso seems to have made up his mind, presumably with Spinola's encouragement, to go to Madrid in any case. For in March 1621, the Archduke informed the king that 'Manuel Mendez Cardoso [who] has for some years been giving [. . .] *avisos* here of importance to Your Majesty's service which were sent on to Spain by the marquis Spinola' had now decided out of honest zeal to journey to Madrid to present his projects in person. He was also going to discuss other matters of which account would be given to the king's ministers shortly. Albert requested that 'he be heard and that due favour be shown to him'.[57] It is remarkable that the Archduke, then almost at the end of his life, should discuss a particular Portuguese New Christian by letter directly with the king and request such a favour, and further underlines the fact that Mendes Cardoso had participated over several years in a deep and earnest discussion with Spinola and others at court in Brussels about the administrative, fiscal and economic strategies of Spain or rather the whole of the Spanish-Portuguese world empire.

Yet besides persons such as these whose status between Christianity and Judaism was uncertain and unsteady, there were others who established contact with Spanish ministers whose Jewish loyalties were clear and unquestioned. Duarte Fernandes (Joshua Habilho), a merchant from Oporto who settled in Amsterdam, and later Hamburg, and was, in 1612, described by the marqués de Guadaleste as 'inteligente y prudente' and a man of integrity 'though a Jew' was one such. A founder of the Neveh Shalom synagogue, in Amsterdam, and founding member of the *Santa Companhia de Dotar*, a key Dutch Sephardi welfare institution which also had a proseltyzing function, providing marriage portions for orphaned and poor Portuguese New Christian girls willing to marry in synagogue and become Jewesses,[58] Fernandes entered into secret dealings with Spain seeking various advantages for himself, his family and probably also his group. He went several times to Brussels on political business, bringing *relaciones* on various topics concerning Spain's strategic, political and economic interests and also spent much time in Antwerp. Eventually, he so annoyed the bishop of Antwerp, presumably for speaking against the Christian loyalties of the Portuguese New Christian community there, that he compromised himself in the southern Netherlands and had to defend himself. He then wrote to Madrid, in January 1617, claiming that he was being falsely maligned in Antwerp and Brussels.

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[55] Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 118, 143.

[56] AGS Estado 2035. Inquisitor-General of Portugal to Philip III, Lisbon, 27 Dec. 1620.

[57] AGR Brussels SEG (?) fo. 135. Albert to Philip III, Brussels, 31 March 1621.

Fernandes described himself in that letter as having entered the service of the king two years before and as being a supplier to the king of advice and *relaciones*. But in fact his connection with the court in Brussels seems to go back considerably earlier since he was employed during the secret peace talks of 1611–12 to accompany the Spanish go-between, Rodrigo Calderon's representative, the Portuguese New Christian friar, Martín del Espiritu Santo, to his secret rendezvous in The Hague with the then leading figure of the States of Holland, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt.[59] Nothing came of the negotiations which, had they resulted in a peace, or longer truce, would undoubtedly have benefited the Dutch Sephardic community economically. Subsequently, in 1615, Fernandes seems to have been instrumental in helping the Spanish minister Guadaleste, in Brussels, persuade the flamboyant Moroccan Jewish diplomat, Samuel Pallache who had close links with the court at Marrakesh to re-enter Spanish service.[60]

In August 1615, as these talks about Spain's position in the Maghreb continued, Guadaleste described Fernandes in a report to Madrid as a 'persona de gran opinion a quien escuchaban los Estados' [a person of high standing to whom the States General used to listen].[61] In November 1615 Pallache and Fernandes drew up a proposed secret agreement with the Spanish crown consisting of twelve clauses, the basis of which was that Pallache would receive 200 *ducados* monthly in return for passing 'useful' information to Brussels via Fernandes, especially inside information about the relations of France, England and the Dutch with Morrocco and with the Turks, and anything affecting Spanish interests on the Morroccan coast; the suggested accord also committed Pallache to influencing the Morroccan authorities against extending commercial relations with the northern maritime powers and expressly stated that Joseph Pallache who was a sworn enemy of Spain—and friend of the Dutch and Mawlay Zaydan's faction in Morocco—should, if possible, be removed from the Netherlands and sent back to Morocco.[62] Samuel Pallache died in January 1616. In April 1616, his nephew Moseh Pallache visited the court in Brussels together with Duarte Fernandes and the latter's son, Bento Enriques. There they participated in a high-level strategic conference with Spinola and Guadaleste on the subject of Morocco's warring factions, ports and corsairs. Philip III's favourite, the duke of Lerma, at this time was planning to extend Spanish influence in North Africa and was actively considering occupying Saleh and Fedala to prevent their developing into corsair bases and further to secure the sea-lanes to south-west Spain and the straits. Lerma and Guadaleste wanted to enlist Jewish aid in Morocco should Philip indeed decide to annex Saleh and Fedala and thought Moseh could be instrumental in this.[63] However, there ensued a disagreement between Guadaleste and Spinola on this issue, Guadaleste wanting to deal with Moseh Pallache in lieu of Samuel but Spinola being disinclined to take the young and inexperienced Moseh as seriously as he had Samuel Pallache. The Archduke agreed with Spinola and the negotiation lapsed.

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[58] Koen, 'Duarte Fernandes', 179–80.

[59] AGS Estado 2294, Mancicidor to Philip III, Brussels, 31 dec. 1611; Israel, *Dutch Republic and Hispanic World*, 16–17.

[60] AGS Estado 2302: Duarte Fernandes, 'Memoria de las cosas tratados y asentados con Samuel Pallache'; García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 121.

[61] Ibid., p. 136.

The Twelve Years' Truce was a period of rapid expansion in size and economic activity of Dutch Sephardic Jewry.[64] But their overseas trade activity continued to be almost entirely orientated towards the Iberian Peninsula, Ibero-America and the Maghreb. Using Dutch ships, techniques and facilities, the Jews succeeded in carving out an important niche for themselves within the wider Dutch overseas trading empire, a maritime system which by 1609 spanned the entire globe and dominated more markets than other. But while the United Provinces in the seventeenth century was more tolerant towsards Jews than any of the European monarchies, it was less Dutch toleration which made this possible than the fact that the Sephardic Jews maintained close ties with their Portuguese New Christian relatives and associates in the Peninsula, Ibero-America and Portuguese Africa and Asia of an intensity, durability and breadth unrivalled by any other other diaspora or group. It was surely this above all which enabled them to create their unique trans-oceanic socio-religious as well as commercial network, a system which traversed not only the Protestant-Catholic and Christian-Islamic divides but linked every part of the New World and the East Indies to their chief base in Amsterdam.

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[62] AGS Estado 2302 'Duarte Fernandes, 'Memoria de las cossas tratados y assentados con Samuel Pallache'.

[63] AGS Estado 2302, 'Memoria de lo que yo Moyseh Pallache dijo en Bruselas a Duarte Fernandes'; García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 140.

[64] Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 421–5.

2. *The Trade Embargoes of 1621–49*

If the Dutch Sephardic trading system which arose in the 1590s and opening years seventeenth century had been considerably impeded by the embargoes of 1598–1608, the disruption caused by the reimposing of the embargoes, in April 1621, on the expiry of the Truce, to a now much larger and more complex Sephardic trading system, linking Amsterdam with Portugal, Spain, Brazil and Spanish America which had grown up during the Twelve Years' Truce was bound to be much more severe. Realizing that serious dislocation would follow and that those who surmounted the obstacles would have to exercise considerable determination, resourcefulness and ingenuity, as well as a mobility, some of the Portuguese Jewish merchants in Holland began to leave, many gravitating to the Lower Elbe, well before the Truce actually expired. Hamburg and vicinity had been the chief beneficiary of the Spanish embargoes in the years 1598–1608;[65] and precisely the same happened in and after 1621, in the wake of the new embargoes. Duarte Fernandes moved from Amsterdam to Hamburg with several of his sons and relatives, in 1620. Fernando Alvares Melo (alias Lopo Rabelo) did likewise in July 1622,[66] as did

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[65] Ibid., 194–202; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 56–60.

[66] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', no. 2708.

Diogo Nunes Vega, in November 1622, and Sebastian Núñez, in 1623. Duarte Nunes da Costa, one of the principal Jerish merchants of Amsterdam in the early 1620a moved first to Glückstadt, in 1625, and the following year to Hamburg. Others who transferred their operations from Amsterdam to Hamburg or Glückstadt at this time included Diego da Silva, Manoel Aires, and Miguel Lopes Fernandes,[67] Sephardic merchants trading with the Peninsula who preferred to stay in Amsterdam had to make special arrangements, as Manoel da Cunha did, in November 1623, for the re-routing of precious stones, jewelery and other high-value goods consigned to him 'from Lisbon, Porto, Viana or elsewhere in Portugal or Spain' through an agent, in this case, 'Diogo Carlos', in Hamburg.[68]

The dead-line for the cessation of normal Dutch trade with the Peninsula was stringently enforced. At San Sebastian, the entire contingent of Dutch shipping in the port departed *en masse* on 14 April 1621, the day the embargoes were re-imposed.[69] A Dutch ship which arrived there later that day and ventured into the harbour—as it happens a vessel chartered by Amsterdam Jews and carrying cargo consigned to Enrique Mendez, Francisco de Mezquita and other Portuguese New Christian correspondents in Madrid—was confiscated together with its cargo.[70] Learning of the severity of the royal officials, the skipper of a Monnikendam vessel, chartered by Amsterdam Jews to carry grain from Sicily to Lisbon, having collected the grain and arrived off Lisbon but owing to contrary winds just missed the dead-line by a day or two, decided not risk entry and returned with his commercially now useless cargo to Amsterdam leaving the Jews to sustain the loss.[71] Meanwhile, freight-rates and insurance charges for voyages to the Peninsula, and the Mediterranean rose steeply.[72]

Of course, shortages of timber, grain, copper, naval stores and other essential northern products rapidly developed in both Portugal and Spain and, despite the risk and the high freight and insurance charges, the lure of continuing with the banned traffic, for the sake of profit, by evading the embargoes, was intense and all the usual surreptitious methods restorted to. While it still meant re-routing via Hamburg, one obvious ploy was to cover cargoes sent on Hanseatic or other neutral vessels with false certificates certifying that goods were not Dutch-produced or owned when in fact they were. Thus, in 1622, a New Christian merchant, Jorge Rodrigues da Costa, was arrested by royal officials in Lisbon in connection with a cargo consigned from Hamburg when royal officers found in his possession a letter from Duarte Esteves da Pina, in Hamburg, disclosing that he had secured an order from the Hamburg senate requiring local magistrates to sign his sworn statements guaranteeing there was no Dutch-owned merchandise among his cargoes for the Peninsula without his in fact taking any oath or submitting his cargoes for inspection.[73] Implementation of the general ban on Dutch trade and shipping grew more rigorous, moreover, with the introduction of Castilian officials in the Portuguese ports and following the setting up, in 1624, of the *Almirantazgo*, a kind of royal Inquisition of trade which searched ships arriving in Spanish, and later Portuguese ports, and examined ship's papers, with unprecedented meticulousness.[74] In 1626, three Hamburg vessels loaded with textiles and other valuable merchandise for the (secret) account of Francisco Lopes de Azevedo and other Amsterdam Sephardic merchants, found out as Dutch only after intensive searches, were confiscated along with their cargoes in Lisbon.[75] From 1629, with the rapprochement between Spain and Denmark, the *Almirantazgo* was able to insist—despite vehement protests from the Hamburg and Lübeck senates—that all cargoes delivered in Iberian ports on Hanseatic vessels had to be accompanied by special passes issued by the Spanish royal agent posted in the Danish port of Glückstadt, on the Elbe below Hamburg. This presented a further considerable obstacle to those seeking to evade the embargoes via Hamburg.[76]

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[67] Ibid. no. 3552, 20 July 1627 (Jan Warnaerts), no. 3582, 25 Aug. 1627 (Sibrant Cornelisz.).

[68] Ibid., 3043.

[69] AGS Guerra 873. *alcalde* of San Sebastian to Philip III, San Sebastian, 14 April 1621.

[70] Ibid.

[71] ARH Verzameling Bisdom xlviii/ii, fos. 93–5.

[72] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 134–7; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 204–8.

Another main ploy of the Amsterdam Sephardim for circumventing the embargoes in the early 1620s was to employ neutral ships—often

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[73] AGS Estado 2847. Fernando Alvia de Castro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 19 Sept. 1622 with letter of Esteves da Pina to Rodrigues da Costa enclosed.

[74] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 132–4; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 204–7; Schaub, *Portugal au temps du comte-duc*, 286–90.

[75] Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 381.

[76] Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, pp. 233–34.

Scottish or English—to carry their goods, removing all sign that the cargoes had really originated in the Netherlands, and collecting passes and declarations from appropriate foreign ports *en route* to the Peninsula. Many examples of this form of subversion survive in the Amsterdam notarial archives. Thus, on 5 April 1622, Antonio Martins Viegas and Francisco Lopes de Azevedo in Amsterdam chartered a Hamburg vessel and crew to ship a cargo of rye, clapboard, baize and serge to Faro to be delivered to Francisco Felipe Preto and Manoel Mendes de Oliveira and then load with salt, at Setúbal; in the contract, the skipper had solemnly to undertake to return to Amsterdam even though all documents on board, and the bills of lading, would state 'Hamburg'.[77] Similarly, in August 1623, Miguel Cardoso and Rodrigo Alvares de Pas, in Amsterdam signed a freight contract with Scottish skipper, David Brown of Glasgow; the freight contract stipulating that the skipper must return to Amsterdam after delivering his cargo in Malaga while simultaneously undertaking to sign bills of lading in Malaga stating that everything loaded by his all-Scottish crew was for delivery to 'France, England, Hamburg, or other places' and not the Netherlands.[78] In one contract, drawn up between Francisco Lopes de Azevedo and Scottish skipper Robert Stane, from Leith, on 24 June 1622, it is actually stipulated that on returning from several planned voyages to Portugal, on de Azevedo's behalf, the skipper will invariably sail for Amsterdam despite the fact the ship's papers always state destinations outside the Netherlands since this latter was done only '*pro forma*, owing to the war'.[79]

Frequently, these war-time contracts designed to evade the embargoes, imposed specific obligations on the neutral skipper and crew with regard to obtaining foreign papers. Thus, in September 1622, Duarte Rodrigues Mendes, in Amsterdam, contracted with William Deighton of Hull for a voyage to Malaga, the English skipper agreeing to sail first to 'Yarmouth or Dover' to collect English passports and documents although the venture had nothing in essence to do with England. On 20 October 1622, Thomas Nunes Pina in Amsterdam chartered a Hamburg vessel to sail for his account to the Canary Islands, the papers on board to be made out as if the skipper had been chartered in Hamburg by Rodrigo Alvares and Francisco Vas de Crasto, Sephardi merchants there.[80] On 23 March 1623, Francisco Lopes de Azevedo in Amstedam contracted with the skipper of a French vessel from Calais for the delivery of goods to his agents Francisco Felipe Preto and Manoel Mendes de Oliveira, in Faro, the skipper undertaking to collect false ship's papers in Calais or Dover *en route*.[81]

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[77] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', nos. 2606 and 2610.
[78] Ibid., 2963.
[79] Ibid., 2652.

But even where Dutch Sephardi merchants went to the trouble and expense of hiring genuinely foreign vessels and obtaining authentic foreign papers, success was far from guaranteed. In November 1623, the Spanish authorities declared an 'embargo general' on all foreign ships in the harbours of Andalusia and Portugal, detaining them for as long as was needed to investigate their cargoes and papers. One hundred and sixty-six neutral vessels had soldiers placed on board and were meticulously searched, including forty-four in San Lúcar alone. Among the Dutch-owned cargoes disguised as neutral which were confiscated as a result of this exercise were three in Malaga: a consignment of timber on a Glaswegian ship, consigned it turned out by Antonio Cardoso, in Amsterdam, and a large shipment of Dutch cloth plus 20,000 *reales* in false coinage aboard two Saint Malo vessels consigned by Duarte and Jeronimo Rodrigues Mendes of Amsterdam.[82] In September 1623 a vessel called the *Daniel* with papers issued in Calais, but chartered by Miguel de Pas of Amsterdam, was seized and its cargo confiscated, in Viana, having been given away by an informer in June 1624;[83] Miguel de Pas had a second setback when *The Rose* sailing to Setúbal on his account to load a cargo of salt for Amsterdam was seized when the ship, though Scottish owned and manned, was judged by the Castilian inspectors to have been manufactured in Holland; the skipper had to pay a stiff fine to get it released.[84]

Even when their ruses succeeded and there was no interception, the freight and insurance charges for such high-risk voyages to the Peninsula were swingingly high. The going rate for voyages in Dutch ships to Setúbal to load with salt during the closing years of the

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[80] Ibid., 2725.

[81] Ibid., no. 2837.

[82] AGS Guerra 890. Pedro de Arze, undated memorandum, Malaga, Nov. 1623 and AGS Guerra 894. Pedro de Arze to Olivares, Malaga, 2 Nov. 1623.

[83] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', 3136.

[84] Ibid., 3224.

Twelve Years' Truce, had uniformly been from nine to ten guilders per last. From April 1621 onwards the price structure was spectacularly different. When in October 1623, Duarte Nunes da Costa and his brother, Lopo Ramirez chartered a large East Frisian vessel to sail to Setúbal, they had to pay four times as much—forty guilders per last;[85] in April 1624, the same merchants, hired Christopher Webber of Plymouth to sail on their account, to Setúbal for salt, collecting English papers at Plymouth *en route* and returning to Amsterdam, at a freight price of thirty-eight guilders per last.[86]

The risks and high costs of the trade between Holland and the Iberian Peninsula for over two decades, from 1621, had the side effects of boosting Dutch Jewish trade with Morocco and with south-France. The latter in particular became a major contraband route sustaining commerce with Madrid and the interior of Castile and was to remain such down to the outbreak of war between France and Spain, in 1635. As early as May 1621, the *administrador* of the royal customs on the Basque coast warned the *Consejo de Guerra*, in Madrid, that a new contraband route has started up with banned Dutch textiles and East India pepper and spices being shipped from Holland to Bayonne and Saint Jean de Luz and then transported overland, by mule train, across the Pyrennean passes and then via Pamplona and the so-called *puertos secos* between Navarre and Castile, and Aragon and Castile, brought to Madrid, Segovia and Valladolid; in September 1621, this same official asured the king and his ministers that this new contraband route across the Pyrenees into Castile was primarily the work of 'Portuguese merchants in Holland and at Bayonne'. For it was they, and not other Dutch merchants, who had an arrangement with the *arrendadores*, or contractors who collected the duties at the *puertos secos* on behalf of the crown and who were, as he pointed out, merchants 'of the same nation'.[87] Returning to this theme, in April 1622, he reiterated that 'ningun genero de gente basallos de Vuestra Magestad se atrevieran en pasar las dichas mercaderías sino es la nacion portuguesa' [except the Portuguese nation no kind of vassals of Your Majesty would dare to pass the said merchandise] illicitly in this way into Castile. Royal officials sent to

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[85] Ibid., no. 3014.

[86] Ibid., no. 3142.

[87] AGS Estado 2139 *consulta* of *Consejo de Guerra*, Madrid, 23 July 1621; AGS Estado 2139. Miguel de Manchola to Philip IV, 24 Sept. 1621, and 29 Oct. 1621.

Pamplona to investigate, reported that between August 1621 and May 1622 no less than twenty-two Dutch vessels had delivered cargoes intended for Castile, at Bayonne and Saint Jean, and that this traffic was indeed chiefly the work of 'Portuguese merchants who reside at Amsterdam and Rotterdam', their principal agents in south-west France being the Portuguese New Christian merchants Alvaro and Jacome Luiz at Bayonne.[88] Between, May and September 1622, the 'Portuguese' merchants in Holland reportedly sent another eight ship-loads of contraband to Bayonne with Madrid as the final destination.[89]

The ban on Dutch vessels, goods and merchants in Spain and Portugal as well as Ibero-America, not only generated a wave of emigration from Amsterdam to Hamburg, and for some years made the Dutch Republic a less desirable refuge for fleeing Portuguse New Christians than it had been during the Truce, it clearly depressed the Dutch Sephardi trading system, the economic base of the community, overall. Between 1620 and 1625, the number of Jewish depositors with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, then the world's premier financial institution, dropped by more than a quarter from 106 to only seventy-six.[90] Briefly, during the years 1625–7 when the focus of the fighting in Germany moved towards the north-west, temporarily affecting Hamburg and Glückstadt there was a brief recovery, back to ninety-two, but over the next few years, as the trade depression gripping Dutch Sephardi Jewry continued, the figure fell back again to eighty-nine; meanwhile the total number of depositors, Christian and Jewish, with the Exchange Bank grew from 1202, in 1620, to 1348 by 1631. Nor was there any significant improvement during the mid 1630s a most remarkable and highly significant fact. Furthermore, because the Sephardim in Amsterdam were far more heavily dependent on Iberian trade than any other group of merchants, their relative numerical importance among depositors at the Exchange Bank shrank steadily, receding from around 9% of the total in 1621, to 6% by 1640. Only after the secession of Portugal from Spain in December 1640 and the resumption of normal trade relations between Holland and Portugal during 1641, was there any fundamental change in the position. By 1646, the number of Jewish deposits in the Amsterdam Exchange Bank had risen to 146.

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[88] AGS Hacienda 592. *Consulta, Consejo de hacienda*, Madrid, 24 July 1622; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 141.

[89] AGS Hacienda 592 *consulta* of *Consejo de hacienda*, Madrid, 31 Oct. 1622.

[90] Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 14; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 255.

3. *Negotiating protected Status for the Trade of the Dutch Sephardim (1632–51)*

While the exigencies of the war forced the Portuguese Jewish community to adapt as far as they could, in particular by cultivating links with Morocco and south-west France, their prosperity and prospects remained heavily dependent on Dutch relations with Spain and Portugal. Consequently, they were very much an interested party in the Dutch-Spanish peace negotiations which began in 1632 and broke off the following year and were not resumed with any degree of seriousness until the mid 1640s.[91] One of the demands put by the Dutch side in the abortive peace talks at The Hague, in 1632–3, later known as Article Nine, was that those of the 'Portugeesche natie, inwoonders ende ingesetenen van de Vereenichde Staaten die zijn ofte naemals sullen komen, van wat religie of geloof die souden mogen wesen so wel als andere ingesetenen van de voors. Provintien het effect van 't jegenwoordigen tractaet soo in Nederlandt, als in Spaegnien ende alomme in 't Spaensche gebiet, volkomentlijck sullen genieten' [Portuguese nation, inhabitants and residents of the United Provinces that are here already, or shall afterwards come, of whatever religion or creed they may be, shall fully enjoy the benefit of the present treaty both in the Low Countries and Spain, and the Spanish imperium, on the same basis as the other inhabitants of the said Provinces].[92] The States General, in other words were asking for their Jewish subjects to be given the same status as other Dutch subjects in their dealings with Spain and the Spanish empire.

At this stage, ministers in Madrid were both horrified and scandalized by the suggestion that former Portuguese New Christians who had reverted to Judaism in the Netherlands should receive such protection and privilege. On learning of the initial Dutch terms, Philip IV's regent in Brussels, the Archduchess Isabella, instructed her representatives at the talks robustly to oppose this article, insisting such a thing ran entirely counter to the fundamental laws of

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[91] Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 241–9, 347–74.

[92] Aitzema, *Historie of verhael* xii, 78; De Boer, *Friedensunterhandlungen*, 67, 89–90.

Spain, though she did agree to write to Madrid about it.[93] To this the States General's negotiators replied that the 'Portuguese' were subjects of the United Provinces and ought therefore be comprehended in the peace terms, though they also hinted that they might settle for an assurance that the goods of 'Portuguese' merchants sent from the Republic to Spain and Portugal would not be interfered with.[94] Philip IV's initial response, however, was to reject this demand outright as 'inplaticable', there being no basis on which Spain could make such a concession.[95] But after the initial round of talks of 26–29 March 1633, the Dutch considerably modified their previous stance on various points, including Article Nine. Dropping their demand that the 'Portuguese' should have the same status as other Dutch subjects in the Iberian Peninsula, the Dutch insisted only that the 'biens de la nation portugaise [. . .] inhabitants des Provinces-Unies, de quelle religion ou creaance qu'ilz estoyent seroyent reglez comme les biens des autres inhabitants desdictes provinces'.[96]

With authorization from Madrid, the Archduchess did in fact permit the Flemish delegates to the peace conference in The Hague to agree that merchandise of 'Portuguese' merchants resident in the United Provinces found by royal officers in ships together with goods belonging to other subjects of the Republic 'qualifiez a jouir du benefice du tresve' in Iberian ports would not be liable to confiscation.[97] This limited principle was not actually conceded, however, since the negotiations broke up in disagreement, in June 1633, chiefly over the vexed question of Netherlands Brazil from which the Dutch refused to withdraw, and there was no resumption of substantive talks for many years. Reviewing the position at a meeting of the *Consejo de estado*, in Madrid, in March 1634, the marqués de Leganés, taking a harsh view of the matter, urged that, in any renewed talks, the king should not again offer to respect the goods of 'Portuguese' resident in the United Provinces, let alone concede them parity with other Dutch subjects, and that, given his interests and his honour, he should merely agree that where goods of such 'Portuguese' are found on Dutch ships 'no fuese confiscado mas de lo que les pertenece, punto que seria de gran satisfacion para los rebeldes' [nothing else will be confiscated except what belongs to them, a point which will be of great satisfaction for the Dutch].[98]

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[93] *Actes des États Généraux* ed. Gachard, pp. 95, 202.
[94] Ibid., pp. 106, 215.
[95] AGE Estado 2240. Philip IV to Pierre Roose, Madrid, 6 March 1633.
[96] *Actes des États Généraux*, 134, 144.
[97] Ibid., 294.

In striking contrast to the abortive talks of 1632–3, in the laborious peace negotiations which began in 1645 and ended with the ratification of the Peace of Münster, in April 1648, the question of the 'Portuguese' subjects of the States General, did not figure at all. The issue was simply left to one side despite the fact that it had featured in the negotiations leading to the Dutch-Portuguese truce of 1641. The problem, moreover, had already created complications under a provisional Dutch-Spanish agreement of 1646 for a general exchange of prisoners of war. For when, under an edict of July 1646, the Spanish crown ordered the release of all Dutch prisoners held in Spain and its dependencies, initially an exception was made of four Dutch Sephardic Jews, Abraham and Jacob Bueno and David and Moseh Cohen, captured at sea some years before. The States General repeatedly and vehemently protested. In fact, Spanish ministers had no particular objection to releasing the four Jews but for some time were simply unable to discover what had happened to them. Finally, they were found to have first been placed in the care of the Franciscan friars at Ceuta and then later confined in the Franciscan friary at Gibraltar.[99] Jacob Bueno, the eldest of the four, who had been born in Lisbon and brought as a child to Amsterdam, having been subjected to the most intense pressure to abjure Judaism and be 'reconciled' to Christ had, in January 1647, in despair and 'always constant in the error of the Law of Moses', fatally stabbed himself at Gibraltar, shouting out 'ni ay mas Dios que el Dios de Israel', and uttering 'many foul blasphemies against Jesus Christ our redeemer', obliging the appalled fathers to shut him up in a box as he lay dyeing.[100] Happily for the friars, the other three, who had all been born as Jews in Holland, submitted to Christ more tamely and been duly baptized; they, accordingly, no longer wished to return to Amsterdam.

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[98] AGS Estado, *consulta* of *Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 16 March 1634, fos. 4v1–0v, voto del marques de Leganès.

[99] AGS Estado 2257. Philip IV to *corregidor* of Gibraltar, Madrid, 18 June 1647.

[100] AGS Estado 2167. 'Relacion verdadera del fin y muerte de Jacob Bueno en el convento de S. Pablo de Labrena' (26 January 1647).

But for the king all this was distinctly awkward. Converted Jews restored to Catholicism could not be sent back to a land of heretics and Jews. For some time, it seemed best to Spanish ministers to say nothing at all about what had transpired at Gibraltar. But with singular persistence, the States General kept bringing up the issue the reason being, the Spanish court was informed, that 'tanto instan por su livertad los parientes que tienen en Holanda' [so hard do their relatives in Holland press for their release].[101] Haughtily impervious to these demands, Spanish ministers found it hard to comprehend why the Dutch side should continue to make such a fuss about four Jews. They were almost incredulous at the States General's impertinence on learning that Colonel Ambrosio Mexia and three other captured Spanish cavalry captains would not be released until the four Jews were returned. It is not clear how the matter was finally resolved.

The question of the status of the Portuguese Jews residing in the United Provinces having thus been deliberately left unresolved, it was inevitable that the issue of Dutch Jews' commerce with Spain and its dependencies should in the wake of the peace immediately become a bone of contention between the States General and the Spanish crown. For with the lifting of the ban on Dutch trade, in the summer of 1647, and the vigorous resumption of Amsterdam's commerce with Spain which followed, it remained entirely unclear whether or not goods belonging to Dutch Jews enjoyed the same protection, under the peace terms, as those of other Dutch subjects and what would be the status of their goods found by the Inquisition in the keeping of Portuguese New Christian correspondents in Spain arrested for judaizing. For their part, the Portuguese Jewish merchants of Amsterdam raised the matter with the city burgomasters and through them, in July 1649, in the States of Holland.[102] The matter was then taken up by leading regents of the States General with Antoine Brun, the Burgundian who served as first Spanish ambassador to the United Provinces who was asked to convey to Madrid the States' request 'que de la part du Roy d'Espagne soit accordé au plutost un acte portant declaration que les Juifs inhabitants de cest estat puissent traffiquer en Espagne, et autres lieux de l'obéissance de sa Majesté soit par leurs facteurs ou autres personnes de leur party employez' and that also, in cases where, through mishaps at sea, or storms, they were obliged to put in temporarily at a Spanish port, they would be treated 'de la mesme façon' as other Dutch subjects.[103]

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[101] AGS Estado 2167. Marques de Castel-Rodrigo to Philip IV, Brussels, 28 March 1647 and Francisco de Galaretta to Pedro Coloma, 25 Sept. 1647.

[102] Res. SH, 27 July 1649; Koenen, *Geschiedenis der Joden*, 151–2; Silva Rosa, *Geschiedenis der Portugeesche Joden*, 84–5.

A thorny issue about which Philip IV initially had no desire to make any declaration, there was at first no response at all. The States General then took the matter up again, in February 1650, pressing Brun to write to the king asking that a declaration be published to the effect that 'los judíos que residen en Amsterdam y demas villas de aquellas provincias pudiesen venir a comerciar con la misma facilidad y seguridad que los demas burgeses dellas, en virtud de la generalidad que contiene el articulo segundo del tratado de las pazes' [the Jews who reside in Amsterdam and the other towns of those provinces should be able to come to trade [in Spain] with the same facility and security as their other subjects by virtue of the general point contained in the second article of the peace treaty'. Brun thought the king ought concede that 'dichos judios pudiesen dirigir las cosas de su trafico por factores de otra religion y caso que por algun accidente de temporal arribasen a los puertos de Vuestra Magestad que no se les haria daño ni en sus personas ni en sus bienes' [that the said Jews can send their goods through factors belonging to another religion and that in case of any mishap or storm they should come into Your Majesty's ports, that neither their persons nor their goods shall be harmed].[104]

After due deliberation, the king conceded that Jews resident in the Republic 'pueden dirigir sus mercancias por factores de otra religion, y no de otra manera, sin que les pueda ser permitido el que entren en mis puertos por ningun accidente de temporal que subceda porque las provanzas del [. . .] en estos casos son poco averiguables' [may send their goods through factors of another religion, and not otherwise, but without it being permitted that they may enter my ports through any accident of weather, since proof in such cases is not easily verifiable].[105] But when Brun duly presented this declaration in the name of the king, before the States General, it was dismisssed as not good enough.[106] He was told in no uncertain terms that the king's response flatly contradicted articles two, four and eleven of the peace treaty. Visited at his ambassadorial residence by a delegation of the States, Brun reported to Madrid that the pensionary of Amsterdam, spoke vigorously 'en favor de los judíos, diciendo que harto les devia la Cristiandad por haver hecho tan fiel guardia de las sagradas escrituras, y que pensar perder toda aquella nacion era contra la voluntad de Dios que decia por sus prophetas que las reliquias de aquella gente se convertirian al fin un dia' [in support of the Jews, saying that Christianity owed them much for having been such faithful guardians of the Holy Scriptures and to think of doing away with that nation was against the will of God who declared through his prophets that the remnants of that people would be converted at the end of time], adding that likewise Saint Augustine taught in his *City of God* that the Jews worship one God as do the Christians, and that believing as they do in Moses and the other prophets they were all the readier to receive the texts of the Christian religion'.[107] He rounded off by reminding Brun that the city governments of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and other towns regarded the Jews that had settled in them as their subjects, and were well satisfied with them, and that even the Pope, head of the Catholics and the Emperor admitted Jews into their territories.

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[103] AGS Libros de la Haya 284. 'Copie de la lettre escrite par les estats Generaux à M. l'ambassadeur de Brun à La Haye, 12 Aoust 1649 en faveur des Juifs leurs sujects à ce qu'ils puissent traffiquer en Espagne'.

[104] AGS Estado 2072, *consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 27 June 1650.

[105] AGS Libros de La Haya. Philip IV to Brun, Madrid, 9 July 1650; Aitzema, *Verhael ofte historie* vii, 178.

Brun replied that every realm had its own particular laws for its own reasons and that, in any case, the Dutch plenipotentiaries at the Münster peace negotiations had never once raised the question of the Jews. Reporting to Madrid, Brun advised that some further concession be made and, on reconsidering, the king reluctantly agreed to declare that henceforth Jewish subjects of the United Provinces, driven by bad weather into the ports of Spain or Spanish southern Italy would be treated like other Dutch subjects except where they had been baptized (and had reverted to Judaism) or were former subjects of the king, implying that these would still be subject to arrest and trial by the Inquisition.[108] However, neither the States General, nor the Amsterdam burgomasters were satisfied with this, any more than the *parnasim* of the Portuguese Jewish community. But nothing further could be obtained, the king remaining adamant that there could be no detraction from the general Expulsion of the Jews from Spain.

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[106] AGS Libros de la Haya. Brun to Philip IV, The Hague, 30 Sept, 1650.

[107] Ibid.

[108] AGS Estado 2076, consulta Consejo de Estado, Madrid, 30 Nov. 1650; AGS Estado 259. Philip V to Brun, 4 Dec. 1650.

The principle that the Inquisition could not confiscate merchandise belonging to Dutch Jews when found in the possession of arrested Portuguese New Christians became firmly established. In the mid 1650s, there were several pertinent incidents regarding the Indies trade. In 1655, for example, the Inquisition of Seville arrested two Portuguese New Christian *cargadores*, Manuel de Aledo and Manuel Jorge de Acosta, involved in the trade on the official convoys to the Spanish Indies. Following their arrest, the Dutch consul in Seville, Isaac Swanenburg informed the *Consejo de estado* in Madrid that Acosta and Aledo were factors of several Amsterdam merchants—who were later named under their aliases as 'Manuel Centeno, Melchior Mendez Franco (i.e. Abraham Franco Mendez) and Francisco Gomez Barbosa'—asking for assurances that goods belonging to these men found in the possession of the alleged judaizers would be promptly restituted. After the question was considered in the *Consejo*, the king instructed the Inquisitor General to ensure that assets belonging to the Amsterdam merchants concerned (who were obviously all Jews) were speedily returned to them.[109] The Inquisitors, it transpired, had, by arrangement with the arrested men and a third factor, Manuel de Mercado who had not been arrested, permitted the valuable consignment of cloth to be loaded on the *flota* for New Spain so as to realize the expected profits. The returns would not be received back from New Spain until the following year. The Inquisitors had reluctantly to accept, however, that they were going to get their hands on only a small part of the proceeds and that most would have to be restored to the Jews in Amsterdam. In October 1656, the Spanish court reiterated that the Inquisition would in this, as in other comparable cases, restitute everything belonging to merchants resident in the United Provinces.

The case which effectively concluded the discussions in The Hague and at Madrid over the status of Dutch Jewish trade with Spain and its colonies was the affair of the ship named the *Perel* captured by an Irish privateer in Spanish service and brought into San Sebastian in 1657. The vessel carried twenty-seven Sephardi emigrants from Amsterdam to Barbados and a valuable cargo, including textiles, valued at over one and a quarter million guilders belonging to Portuguese Jewish merchants at Amsterdam but covered by a bewildering mixture of English and Dutch papers. Since Spain was then at war with England, the *almirantazgo* authorities judged in favour of the privateers that ship and cargo were a justly taken English 'prize'. The Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam, however, persevered with great determination to get this judgment reversed, in June 1657 sending a delegation to lobby the States General in The Hague. According to the secretary of the Spanish embassy, who was gathering information about the Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam through a 'Jew who is an enemy of his nation', the leader of this delegation was none other than the merchant Abraham Pereyra, himself an exile from Spain.[110] A few weeks later, the States General drew up its famous resolution of 17 July 1657 which became the classic Dutch formulation of the principle that 'those of the Jewish nation who live in these provinces are true subjects and inhabitants of them and must enjoy the conditions, rights and privileges stipulated in the treaties of peace and commerce [with Spain].[111]

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[109] AGS Estado 2088 *consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 18 Oct. 1656 and enclosed *consulta* of the Inquisition Suprema.

The Spanish court was reluctant to restitute the valuable cargo of the *Perel*, but at the same time needed to avoid any deterioration in relations with the Dutch at a time when Spain was at war with both France and England. When, therefore, in July 1658, the Spanish court learnt from The Hague that the Jews were urging the States General to retaliate against Spanish shipping as a result of the *Perel* affair, and other seizures of ships by Biscayan privateers, and were being encouraged in this by the English resident who saw the opportunity to generate friction between the Dutch and Spain, ministers decided they would have to yield.[112] Vincent Richard, the embassy secretary, explained, in a report to the Spanish court, that the regents 'no sufriran por ningun caso que los hebreos naturales destas provincias y moradores dellas sean peor tratados que los demas vasallos suyos siendo cierto que tiene esta nacion grandisimo poder con los magistrados de las villas y especialmente con el de Amsterdam por ser los que tienen sin disputa el mayor comerzio y por consiguiente que les causan el mayor provecho y assi sera muy del servico de Vuestra Magestad que se les administre no solo recta justicia pero que se les haga la mayor gracia que se pudiera' [will not suffer in any case that the Jews born in these provinces, and inhabitants of them, should be worse treated than their other subjects, it being a fact that this nation wields very great influence with the town magistrates and especially those of Amsterdam since they certainly have the most trade and consequently bring them the most advantage and hence it will be very much in your Majesty's service not just to administer exact justice toward them but show as much favour as possible].[113]

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[110] UCL Mocatta Library MS Netherlands vi. Richard to Gamarra, Amsterdam, 26 June 1657.

[111] AGS Libros de la Haya xl, fo. 186. Gamarra to Philip IV, The Hague, 30 July 1657; UCL Mocatta MS Netherlands vi. Gamarra to Philip IV, The Hague, 31 October 1658 and enclosed States general resolution; 'no anno 5417 [July 1657]', recorded the Sephardi chronicler, David Franco Mendes, 'resolverão os Estados de Holanda e o ratificarão os Estados Gerais en 17 dito que serião reputados os Judeos dahi em diante por verdadeiros subditos da Republica e que como tais gozerião de todos os privilegios', Franco Mendes, *Memorias*, 63.

[112] AGS Libros de la Haya, Gamarra to Philip IV, The Hague, 4 May 1658;

4. *Dutch Sephardi Jewry and the Portuguese New Christians in Spain, 1647–1660*

A major remaining source of friction between the United Provinces and Spain after 1648 arose precisely from the relatively favourable terms of commerce which the Dutch obtained at Münster and in the subsequent Dutch-Spanish maritime treaty of 1650. Whatever the defects and evidence of corrupt practice in the regulation of trade before the Dutch-Spanish peace, after 1648 there was indubitably a marked further weakening in the Spanish crown's ability to regulate the traffic with the Spanish Indies, not least in the Bay of Cadiz henceforth the main Spanish terminal for the American trade, and in the administration and taxing of commerce in the ports, and there was a widespread perception that this was especially the fault of the Dutch who were allegedly abusing the terms of the peace to subvert and dominate Spain's commerce, and, among the Dutch, especially of the Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam who were

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UCL Mocatta MS Netherlands vi. Richard to Don Luis de Haro, The Hague, 26 July 1658.

[113] AGS Estado 2091. V. Richard to Philip IV, The Hague, 3 Sept. 1658.

frequently identified in Spanish diplomatic and other official correspondence as the prime culprits responsible for subverting royal trade regulations and defrauding the crown.

In October 1654, the *Consejo de estado* in Madrid pondered a series of reports and complaints sent in from Cadiz, Seville, Malaga, Alicante and the north coast ports, trying to penetrate the causes of the increasing decay of the official Indies trade, the growing evasion of regulations and customs duties, and the obvious and increasing inability of the *almirantazgo* to control the influx of banned French and Portuguese products. The highly unsatisfactory state of affairs was attributed in particular to the sweeping concessions made to the Dutch under the marine treaty of 1650 and especially their immunity from boarding and inspection in Spanish ports. To preclude fraud and evasion, Dutch skippers were supposed, under the treaty, to present certificates signed by officials of the Dutch admiralty colleges specifying cargo and certifying that goods were not of French or Portuguese origin. Spanish officials claimed that it was especially the Jews who were exploiting the weakness of this provision as well as the inconvenient fact that the certificates were in practice usually not issued by the admiralty colleges (who gave out that they knew no Spanish) but by ordinary notaries. Ministers in Madrid concluded that the only solution was to persuade the States General to accept the need for all Dutch cargoes destined for Spain and the Canaries, or for re-export to Spanish America, to be covered by certificates issued, checked and counter-signed by the Spanish consul in Amsterdam and assistants to be appointed for Rotterdam and Middelburg.

Reporting to Madrid, in August 1656, the new Spanish ambassador at The Hague, Don Esteban de Gamarra, urged that it was essential to proceed quickly with introducing such a system of certificates and consuls in the United Provinces if the rising tide of fraud and economic subversion being organized from the Netherlands was to be effectively combated, assuring the king that 'no hay quien se oponga a ello sino los judíos y algunos mercaderes de Amsterdam, para que no se descubren sus villanías' [no-one will oppose it except the Jews and a few other merchants at Amsterdam lest their villanies be discovered].[114] To prove that it was chiefly the Jews who were subverting Spain's maritime commecial regulations, Gamarra supplied copies of several false certificates stolen by his secretary from the offices of one of the Amsterdam notaries, Benedict Baddel, who had most dealings with the Jews.[115] One falsely witnessed by several non-existant witnesses concerned a vessel carrying cargo to Malaga chartered by a non-existent merchant 'Francis Henriksen' who turned out to be the merchant Simon Rodríguez Núñez, a prominent Dutch importer of Malaga wines and fruit.[116] Another concerned a consignment of 10,000lb of Brazilian tobacco—banned in Spain as were all Portuguese products between 1641 and 1668—being sent by Bernard Jan Armer (alias Jacob Ferro López) to his Portuguese New Christian relative, Manuel Ferro, at Betanzos, in Galicia. Richard also supplied details of a Sephardic master forger named 'Judas Maccabeo' who, he reported, had specialized during the later stages of the Dutch-Spanish war in counterfeiting documents for merchants trying to circumvent the ban on Dutch commerce and was still providing false trade documents, for use in Spain, at the price of fifty guilders each.[117] Another report discussing illegal Dutch commerce with the colonists in the Spanish Indies, observed that Amsterdam merchants were using 'pasaportes falsos por haver allí un judío que los contrahaze' [false passports there being a Jew there who forges them].[118]

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[114] AGS Estado 2089. Gamarra to Philip IV, The Hague, 31 Aug. 1656; Herreo Sánchez, *Acercamiento hispano-neerlandés*, 134.

A notable initiative against commercial fraud devised by the Spanish consul in Amsterdam, Jacques Richard, was to piece together, by infiltrating the offices of Baddel and other notaries who dealt with the Jews, a comprehensive list of Jewish merchants trading with Spain and its possessions together with their aliases and Iberian correspondents. Helped by a notary's chief clerk, an Antwerp Catholic named Emanuel Laville, who was the illegitimate son of an Italian by the sister of a Portuguese New Christian, Gaspar Fernández Leon, resident in Paris, Richard succeeded in breaching the cloak of secrecy surrounding the Jews' commercial aliases, compiling two lists, comprising in total the names of thirty-three Amsterdam Sephardic firms trading with Spain, Spanish America and the Canaries which are set out in Appendix B below.[119] Such aliases were, and had long been, regularly employed to veil Dutch Jewish commerce with Spain but during the 1650s despite being false names, they acquired a curious quasi-legality not only being used in lieu of real names in notarial deeds and freight contracts but also by the States General and the Dutch consuls in Spain when interceding to protect a particular Jewish merchant's assets in a Spanish commercial centre or port. Hence, for example, in December 1655, the States General wrote to Swanenburg, the Dutch consul in Seville, instructing him to intervene to protect goods belonging to 'Balthasar Mendes Franco' and 'Francisco Gomes Barbosa', both of these being cover names, the latter that of Francisco López de Azevedo who mainly traded with Lisbon and the Algarve but sporadically also with southern Spain.[120]

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[115] AGS Estado 2089. *consulta* of *Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 16 Nov. 1656.

[116] GAA NA 2887, p. 816 and NA 2892, p. 1223; a few years later Simon Rodrigues Nunes, Portuguese Jewish merchant of Amsterdam was employing a different alias that of 'Justo Aurelio vanden Bergh', see GAA NA 2892, p. 1191. deed, Amsterdam, 16 Au. 1663 (P. Padthuysen).

[117] doubtless the same personage as the 'Iehudah Machabeu' of Amsterdam who rendered Jewish texts into a very fine Spanish script, see Fuks and Fuks-Mansfeld, *Hebrew and Judaic Manuscripts* ii, 47, 93–4.

[118] UCL Mocatta MS Netherlands vi. J. Richard to Gamarra, Amsterdam, 20 Dec.; AGS Estado 2198 consulta Consejo de Estado, Madrid, 1 Feb. 1661.

The commercial network revealed by the Laville lists embraced the Spanish north coast wool trade, the Indies trade both direct and indirect, ties with Alicante and Malaga, and the Canary Islands. Of these, the legal and illegal traffic with Spanish America via Cadiz, the Canaries, or direct, was the web of activity which most concerned Spanish ministers. Whereas before 1621, the Portuguese New Chrsitians had not yet been an especially prominent element among the leading exporters based at Seville and Cadiz to the Spanish Indies, the vital role Portuguese New Christian financiers had played in the royal *asientos* in the Olivares era, from 1627 onwards, had enabled this group to gain a central position in the Indies trade during the 1630s and 1640s. Personalities closely linked to the Amsterdam entrepot such as Gaspar and Alfonso Rodriguez Pasariño, Esteban Luis Diamante, and various relatives of Simon Váez Sevilla in New Spain, had their own networks of correspondents in Mexico City, Lima, Cartagena de Indias, Havana, Buenos Aires and Puerto Velo and, at the same time, were under close Inquisition surveillance, having in several cases been denounced as crypto-Jews. During the trial of Salomon Machorro in Mexico City, in 1642, for example, the Brothers Pasariño and Marcos Fernandez Monsanto, then the richest of all the Portuguese New Chrstians in Seville,[121] were repeatedly alleged to be crypto-Jews.[122]

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[119] UCL Mocatta MS Netherlands xi. J. Richard to Gamarra, Amsterdam, 12 Sept, 3 Oct. and 31 Oct. 1655; Brants, 'Une page de sémitisme', 587; Swetschinski, 'Spanish Consul and the Jews', 158–72; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 120–1

[120] ARH SG7047/i. SG to Consul Swanenburg, The Hague, 9 Dec. 1655; for the alias 'Ruy Gomes Barbosa' being that of Francisco Lopez de Azevedo, see GAA NA 1556A, p. 321.

The north coast wool trade, however, was scarcely less important for the Dutch Sephardim even though the largest part of this traffic too was handled by Dutch Protestant merchants. During the second half of the seventeenth century the Dutch market absorbed practically two-thirds of Spain's total wool exports, the fine cloth industry at Leiden having become heavily dependent on this raw material.[123] The specific advantage of the Amsterdam Sephardim during the 1650s and 1660s was that many or most of the big wool exporters from Spain at the time were Portuguese New Christian merchants resident in Madrid who had, as we have seen, social, cultural and religious as well as economic reasons for preferring to deal with the Amsterdam Jews.[124] Men such as Manuel and Sebastian Cortizos, Fernando Montesinos Téllez (1587–1659)—and the latter's sons, Manuel and Bartolomé, relatives of Samuel Montesinos in Amsterdam, Francisco Duarte Mendez and Simon de Fonseca Piña, *arrendador* of the royal wool tax in the years 1637–53, every year exported great quantities of Castilian merino wool through Bilbao, San Sebastian, Santander, Cadiz, and Seville.[125] But being under suspicion of cryptojudaism, they were also liable at any time to become entangled with the Inquisition. Montesinos—who had two brothers, Diego and Pedro López Tellez (alias David and Jacob Arari Telles), residing as Jews in Amsterdam, the former having been a *parnas* of the Beth Israel congregation[126]—having already spent four years (1633–7), together with his wife, in the Inquisition dungeons at Cuenca was arrested again, at the age of sixty-six in 1654 and presented in the *auto-de-fe* at Cuenca, in 1656.[127] Before his re-arrest, he and his colleagues, moreover, were often involved in complex financial and commercial operations which they preferred to conceal from the watchful eyes of government and Inquisition. Alongside the official licensed and taxed traffic through the north coast ports, for example, the contraband trade via the *puertos secos* of Navarre and via Pamplona the Pyrennean passes and Bayonne, a Sephardi speciality, as we have seen, since 1621, revived after the death of Richelieu and in the later 1640s had again become an important trade route especially as a channel for evading the war-time ban on commerce between Spain and France.

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[121] García Fuentes, *Comercio español con America*, 48.

[122] *Proceso y causa criminal contra Juan Pacheco de Leon*, 398; Dias Avelino, 'A naturalização', 490.

[123] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 233–4.

[124] Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 395–6; Herrero Sánchez, *Acercamiento hispano-neerlandés*, 135.

[125] In October 1658, the crown ordered an *embargo general* on all consignments of wool due for export to force the sentistas into compliance in a dispute about cash advances to Flanders, the largest shipments were those of Sebastian Cortizos and the Brothers Montesinos who had shipments detained at Malaga, Seville, Alicante and Bilbao, see AGS Estado 4165. Philip IV to *corregidor* of Guipuzcoa and enclosed documents.

[126] *Livro de Bet Haim*, 80; Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 180–3.

Between 1647 and the mid 1660s, the number of Dutch Sephardic Jews engaged in trade with the Iberian Peninsula and Ibero-America grew at a rate never seen before or afterwards. These years were indeed one of the most decisively formative episodes in the entire history of Dutch Jewry. Whereas in 1646, Dutch Sephardi depositors with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank still represented only 8% of the total, by 1661 the comparable figure had risen by more than a third to 12.5%, despite the continuing rapid increase in the total. In absolute terms, the number of Jewish depositors, at this time mostly active merchants, jumped from 126 to 243, thus nearly doubling in a mere fifteen years.[128] The cause of this uniquely dramatic transformation in the economic history of Dutch Jewry was, of course, the lifting of the Spanish ban on commerce with the Dutch, and the transformed context of Dutch Jewish trade with the Peninsula and Ibero-America after 1647, but in conjunction with the marked deterioration in the position of the Portuguese New Christians in Spain. It was in the late 1640s that the main emigration of Portuguese New Christians from Madrid, Seville and other parts of Castile to the Dutch Republic (and to a lesser extent Hamburg and London) began; it continued down to 1672.

There were plainly two connected factors driving the new exodus from Spain: the resurgence of Inquisition persecution in Spain from the end of the 1640s, reaching a peak in the 1650s and 1660s,[129] and the reversal of Olivares' policy of favouring the Portuguese New

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[127] Caro Baroja, *Judíos* ii, 124–5.

[128] Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 14.

[129] Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', 48–9; Ebban, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 214–17, 292; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 77.

Christians in tax-farming and the servicing of the royal *asientos* and *arrendamentios*.[130] Of the thirty-three financiers and *arrendadores* affected by the royal suspension of payments of October 1647, no less than twenty-seven were Portuguese New Christians; almost all the major Genoese bankers being exempted from the procedure.[131] As a consequence, numerous Portuguese New Christian banking and merchant houses were severely shaken, just as the merchants themselves were becoming less secure from the Inquisition. Remarkably, both of these shaping impulses tended to reinforce and extend the links between the increasingly suspected and persecuted Portuguese New Christian element in Spain and the Jewish community in Holland and in ways which increasingly injured royal financial asssets and priorities, as well as subverted trade regulations. The rising persecution in other words, and effort to reduce the role of the Portuguese New Christians in Spain's economic life, intensified and widened the scope of the collaboration between the *conversos* in Spain and Dutch Sephardic Jewry in a manner which more and more fuelled the exasperation and paranoia of the Spanish authorities.

The exodus of leading Portuguese New Christian financiers from Spain, and from Antwerp (where their partners in the *asientos* for the Spanish army of Flanders were based) began in 1646, at a time when the Inquisition made a series of high-profile arrests in Seville, but just before the crown, now in hopeless financial disarray and indebtedness, suspended the current *asientos* in October 1647, unilaterally cancelling existing agreements with the bankers. One of the first incidents in the remarkable and highly complex financial-political-religious drama was the arrest of the Sevillian Indies merchant and *assentista* Alfonso Rodríguez Pasariño (or Pasarinho)—a merchant-financier reported to have lost up to 50,000 ducats as a result of the Inquisition's arrest of Simon Váez Sevilla and his associates in Mexico City, in 1642[132]—just as he was moving his establishment to Madrid, and his brother, Gaspar, moving to Antwerp, to service a newly arranged royal *asiento*, to advance 400, 000 ducats for the army of Flanders during 1647.[133] The arrest of Rodríguez Pasariño, apart from the financial disruption it caused, was a signal that the Inquisition, released from the restraints of the Olivares era, was now ready and able to arrest any suspected judaizer no matter how prominent or active in the royal *asientos*. Other leading Seville Portuguese New Christians who were arrested and had their assets sequestrated by the Inquisition during 1646 included Estevan Luis Diamante, a leading investor in the Pasariño undertaking, and the elderly financier, Manuel Enrique.

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[130] Ruiz Martín, *Finanzas de la monarquía*, 144; Herrero Sánchez, *Acercamiento hispano-neerlandés*, 133.

[131] Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers*, 162–3; Echevarría Bacigalupe, 'Relaciones económicas hispanoholandesas', 50.

[132] Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers*, 128.

[133] AGS Hacienda *consulta* of the *Consejo de Hacienda*, Madrid, 10 May 1646; AGS Estado 2066, *consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, Zaragoza, 27 Sept. 1646.

Among the most notable departures from Spanish lands at this point, prior to the financial crash of October 1647, was that of Tomas Rodriguez (alias Abraham) Pereyra, father of the future Dutch Jewish military contractor, Jacob Pereira, an *asentista* and wool exporter who fled from Madrid to Amsterdam with his family along with some disputed money considered by ministers—very possibly unjustly—to belong to the king,[134] in 1646, and that of the Gil Lopes (alias Abraham) de Pinto and his brother Rodrigo Alvares (David) de Pinto, key members of the financial elite of Antwerp,[135] also in 1646, to become pillars of the Sephardic community of Rotterdam while Diego Teixeira de Sampayo (Abraham Senior), another of the principal Antwerp bankers left to join the Sephardic community of Hamburg. Salvador Váez Martínez, knight of Alcantara, Teixeira de Sampayo's Madrid agent and one of the nine Madrid bankers who handled the Flanders *asientos* in 1646, a relative of Pereyra, having been seriously damaged by royal suspension, in 1647 pre-empted some of his losses by fleeing Madrid—according to Spanish officials owing some 70,000 ducats to the crown—apparently to Rouen.[136]

The crisis intensified with the financial crash of October 1647. While some of the Genoese financiers also suffered, the operation was deliberately handled by the court so as to damage, and reduce the role of, the Portuguese New Christians in particular. 'The king of Spain', as one Spanish writer put it, 'shook off the Portuguese, took their assets and left them with debts which were said to be substantial, indeed very large and some of a million. The groans and laments were great, the [Portuguese] talked of their utter and total ruin in wealth trade and government finance'.[137] The specifically punitive aspect of the suspension is illustrated by Philip IV's order to the *Consejo de Estado*, of October 1647, in which ministers were directed to pass over Portuguese New Christians as far as possible in future assignments of *arrendamentios* for salt, wool and other taxes even to the extent of accepting financially less advantageous terms from non-Portuguese financiers.[138] Also in 1647, the Antwerp Portuguese New Christian financier Adam Dias Solis, a close associate of Teixeira and the De Pintos, son of the Seville *asentista* and tax-farmer Francisco Fernández Solis was arrested in Antwerp by the governor of the Spanish Netherlands on suspicion of sedition (including support for the Portuguese Secession); after his release, Dias Solis immediately left Spanish territory, surfacing as what Jacques Richard called 'a rich Jew of Amsterdam' in the early 1650s.[139] While a number of Portuguese New Christian firms, including the Cortizos, Montesinos and that of Simon de Fonseca Piña, son-in-law of Gaspar Rodríguez Pasariño,[140] returned to the scene of government finance in subsequent years, the role of the Portuguese New Christians in the Spanish royal *asientos* was never again as considerable as during the two decades 1627–47.

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[134] Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers*, 174; Schreiber, *Marranen in Madrid*, 143–4.

[135] Salomon (ed.)' The De Pinto Manuscript', 7, 30–1; Schreiber, 'Entre las sociedades', 356.

[136] AGS Estado 2070. Brun to Luis de Haro, Cambrai, 27 Aug. 1649; Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers*, 174.

Meanwhile, the Inquisition intensified its persecution and the new exodus from Spain gained momentum, thirty-six families, it was reported in 1654, fleeing from Madrid alone in the last three of four years.[141] As more and more left, reports and rumours about pending and planned escapes proliferated. In July 1650, Brun sent intelligence gathered in Holland, to Madrid, about a large number of Portuguese New Christian families, some wealthy, who were allegedly planning to flee Spain with their assets for Holland 'in order to have liberty to profess Judaism openly'. According to his information a particularly large group were planning to leave Seville: Francisco Hurtado, Francisco Mendez, Jacob Correa, Manuel Antonio, Simon Gomez, Don Luis da Cunha and Antonio de Belmonte. Those about to abscond from Madrid he named as Sebastian Mendez, Doña Isabel de Belmonte, Jeronima Suarez, Juana Ribera, Don Fernando

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[137] Novoa, *Historia de Felipe* IV, 365; Ruiz Martín, *Finanzas de la monarquía*, 137–44.

[138] AHNM MS Estado leg. 727. Philip IV to Consejo de Estado, Madrid, 31 Oct. 1647.

[139] UCL Mocatta MS Netherlands xi. J. Richard to Gamarra, Amsterdam, 21 Oct. 1655; *Memorial Histórico Español* CODOIN xix, 195.

[140] Sanz Ayán, *Banqueros de Carlos II*, 337, 342–3.

[141] Caro Baroja, *Judíos* ii, 88–90; Schreiber, *Marranen in Madrid*, 396–8.

Correa, and his brother-in-law Antonio Mendez, Jeronimo Henriquez and Jeronimo Hurtado. In the Indies, the known culprits were Francisco de Oliveira, reportedly preparing to flee Mexico City and Manuel de Oliveira and Antonio Mendez Indiano, from Quito. After being seen by the *Consejo de Estado*, copies of this list were sent to the Inquisition Suprema and the *Consejo de hacienda*.[142]

Flight for nervous crypto-Jews had plainly become much easier since the peace treaty of 1648 given that Dutch vessels—and also those of Hamburg which had been granted the same exemptions—could no longer be searched in Spanish ports. The *corregidor* of Malaga, a port where the authorities had a certain reputation for laxness, emphasized this point in a report to the king of August 1656. Two Portuguese New Christians, Juan Enriquez and Simon Nuñez, had gone bankrupt in January of that year and fled on a Hanseatic vessel to Livorno.[143] Dutch and Hanseatic vessels were in fact regularly accepting on board escaping Portuguese New Christians, their families and their possessions, and shipping them to Holland and Italy with complete impunity. In May 1654, noted the *corregidor*, Luis de Acosta, Manuel de Olivera, the latter's wife, Dona Justa Correa, and 'many other Portuguese' had been taken aboard a Dutch ship that had arrived from Amsterdam, chartered by 'Matheo Butelar' and been brought to an unknown destination. Fortunately for his reputation, in February 1655, the *corregidor* successfully prevented a vessel from Livorno, embarking at Malaga unregistered merchandise and several families of 'Portuguese'. He was able to catch two of these families and hand them over to the Holy Office.

High-profile post-1647 departures for the Sephardi diaspara included those of Gaspar and Balthasar Rodríguez Cardoso who had come to Madrid in the late 1620s, and in the 1640s acted as *arrendadores* of various Castilian *salinas*. In 1651, Balthasar was arrested and tried by the Inquisition; in 1653, both brothers fled to Livorno.[144] More prominent still, Fernando de Montesinos, having been 'reconciled' by the Inquisition at the Cuenca *auto-da-fe* of 1656, left the following year for Antwerp.[145] It is true that he remained outwardly a

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[142] AGS Estado 2072 *consulta, Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 6 Sept. 1650.

[143] AGS Estado 2673. Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba to Philip IV, Malaga, 29 August 1656.

[144] Schreiber, *Marranen in Madrid*, 125.

[145] Not 'Amsterdam' as stated in Sanz Ayán, *Banqueros de Carlos II*, 336.

Catholic in the Spanish Netherlands, but this seems to have been more a ploy to protect his sons' vast business in Castile than a reflection of his religious views. At any rate, on his death, in 1659, his remains, in accordance with his last wishes, were secretly exhumed from his Christian burrial place in Antwerp and (after being posthumously circumcised by a rabbi brought specially from Amsterdam), transferred to Holland and reburried at the Sephardic cemetery at Oudekerk.[146]

The flight of prominent Portuguese New Christian financiers who had been in one way or another involved in the royal *asientos*, from Madrid, Seville and Antwerp, not only agitated the court, and had an unnerving effect in the financial markets, but frequently involved the surreptitious transfer of large sums of money from lands under the Spanish crown to Amsterdam in circumstances where the rightful possession and status of the funds was unclear or disputed, and in ways which further heightened the apprehensions of the Spanish crown about the links between the Sephardi diaspora and the Portuguese New Christians in Spain and Spanish America. In 1651, for example, the Inquisition in Madrid was dismayed to find, on the death of Manuel Cortizos de Villasante, *arrendador* of the Castilian wool renvenues in the years 1631–6,[147] and formerly one of the richest men in Spain, when commencing proceedings against his widow and several other relatives for 'judaizing', that he had remitted much of his estimated 600,000 ducat fortune to be kept for the family in Amsterdam by David Osorio (who had previously assisted the De Pintos), Abraham del Pardo and Juan de Paz.[148] The flight and removal of wealth abroad on the part of such high-profile merchants and financiers only confirmed Spanish ministers'—and the Inquisition's—view of the Sephardi diaspora as a subversive force seriously menacing the resources, laws and integrity of the monarchy.[149]

It became one of the regular concerns of Spanish diplomats abroad to keep the movements and activities of former Portuguese New Christian *asentistas* and *arrendadores*, and their associates, under surveillance, investigate their 'villanies' and, where possible, retrieve for the crown sums clandestinely transferred from Spain. In August 1649, Brun reported to Madrid from The Hague that he had information about Thomas Rodriguez Pereira (alias Abraham Pereyra) who, he says, 'salio tres años ha de Madrid y vino a Amsterdam, haviendo quebrado alli, y quitado a su Magestad gran sumo de dinero que se avia encargado remitir en Flandes' [left Madrid three years ago and came to Amsterdam, having bancrupted there and taken from his Majesty a large sum which had been entrusted to him for remitting to Flanders].[150] He requested documentation and all relevant details so that he could pursue him, and others who had become Jews in Holland, in the courts and hopefully retrieve if not all then 'por lo menos parte de lo que ha hurtado y deve a su Magestad'. The *Consejo de Estado* would doubtless have initiated proceedings against Pereyra except that it was apparently unable to find any documentation sufficiently incriminating to make such action worthwhile. In October 1655, Jacques Richard having learnt about Pereyra from a certain Simon de Suasso urged ministers in Madrid to retaliate by seizing goods belonging to Pereyra's correspondents in Spain whose identities were now known, thanks to the Laville lists.[151] But seemingly again no action was taken.

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[146] Caro Baroja, *Judíos* ii, 78, 80, 113; Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 175–6; Schreiber, *Marranen in Madrid* 166.

[147] Phillips and Phillips, *Spain's Golden Fleece*, 261.

[148] Caro Baroja, *Judíos* ii, 112; Yerushalmi, *Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto*, 179.

[149] Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 238–9.

When Montesinos was arrested, in 1654, at which point he held the *asientos* for provisioning the garrison of Ceuta and farming the salt imposts of Galicia and Asturias, the Holy Office successfully laid its hands on all his immediate assets of 474,096 ducats. But to the consternation of the Inquisitors, it was soon found that this was insufficient to pay his creditors, since his debts, including 400,000 ducats owed for grain purchases for Ceuta made in the royal service in 1653, were for a still larger amount. Having discovered that he possessed a further 100,000 ducats of assets deposited in the Low Countries, in Amsterdam and Antwerp, the Inquisition asked the king to instruct officials in Brussels, and the ambassador at The Hague to try to retrieve this money through the courts—of course without mentioning the Inquisition—on the (elegant) grounds that it was owed to creditors in Spain. The Inquisition *Suprema*, via the *Consejo de Estado*, provided the Spanish embassy in The Hague with the information that Montesinos had recently shipped a valuable consignment of 1,745 sacks of Castilian wool, through his agents, Tomas de Santa Coloma, in Bilbao, and Francisco López de Fonseca, in Cadiz, to the following Amsterdam correspondents: 'Gerardo and Carlos van Narden', 'Melchor Mendez' and 'Geronimo Rodriguez Perez'. Whether or not the Inquisitors were aware of it, the first two and last of these were of course the aliases of Abraham and Isaac Pereyra, and Enrique Mendes de Silva (see Appendix 2). In addition, he had recently shipped 500 pipes of olive oil from Sanlúcar de Barrameda to the 'Van Nardens'. Richard successfully traced the bulk of Montesinos's assets in Amsterdam to the warehouses of 'Francisco and Antonio de Agurre' [i.e. Abraham and Isaac Pereyra] and had them impounded in September 1654.[152] Abraham Pereyra then promptly challenged the distraint order. But the Amsterdam magistrates upheld it until May 1655 when it was lifted, in favour of Montesinos's sons, Manuel and Bartolomé Montesinos, in Seville, after they had taken steps to satisfy the crown.

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[150] AGS Estado 2070. Brun to Geronimo de la Torre, Cambrai, 27 Aug. 1649.

[151] UCL Mocatta MS Netherlands xi. Richard to Gamarra, Amsterdam, 31 October 1655; UCL Mocatta MS Netherlands vi. Richard to Gamarra, Amsterdam, 14 July 1657.

Gaspar and Balthasar Rodríguez Cardoso, for their part, though reported in June 1655 to have fled to Amsterdam taking 250,000 ducats in cash and a further 200,000 ducats worth of wool, in fact seem to have fled to Bayonne or Livorno.[153] It was correct, however, that they had remitted sizeable assets to Amsterdam. In August 1655, Gamarra at The Hague was informed, from Madrid, that the brothers owed the royal treasury 30,000 ducats in unpaid revenues from the salt taxes of Atienza and Espartinas; before fleeing they had shipped two cargoes of wool to agents in Amsterdam named as 'Francisco and Antonio de Agurre' and remitted 4,000 *escudos* by letter of exchange issued by Simon Méndez Soto,[154] one of the principal Portuguese New Christian financiers in Madrid during the 1650s, payable by 'Jacob Bandenbergh', the alias of Jacob del Monte, in Amsterdam, and another for 1,000 *escudos*, issued by Doña Isabel de Miranda again drawable on 'Bandenbergh'. The Spanish embassy promptly traced the wool to the Pereyras and had it impounded; and asked for documentation with which to press the case against the Cardosos. By March 1656, however, the *Consejo de hacienda* in Madrid has still not managed to produce any relevant evidence.[155]

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[152] AGS Estado 2085. 'Desembargo que se ha hecho en Amsterdam'.

[153] Barrionuevo, *Avisos* I, 332.

[154] Mendez Soto was to be arrested by the Inquisition in Madrid, in 1662, at the age of seventy-four, see Schreiber, *Marranen in Madrid*, 224,

[155] AGS Libros de la Haya xxxix, fo. 87. De la Torre to Gamarra, Madrid, 22 March 1656.

It is apparent, then, that the fifteen years or so following the Spanish-Dutch peace of 1648 witnessed not just a significant migration of Portuguese New Christians from Spain to the Sephardic diaspora of northern Europe and Italy, but a substantial shift of resources removed physically from Spain to Amsterdam, Bayonne, Bordeaux and Livorno, in particular in Dutch and Hanseatic ships. This transfer of population and resources was chiefly driven by Inquisition persecution and a government backlash in combination with the economic and religious attractions of Amsterdam, Hamburg and Livorno. The idea that it was caused by simple economic depression in Spain, and a quest for easy profits elsewhere, as one historian has suggested, is far wide of the mark.[156] Rather this transfer of people, goods and cash was part of a complex process of 'push factors' in Spain combined with a system of trans-Atlantic maritime, commercial and religious penetration which pivoted especially on Amsterdam, Antwerp, Livorno and Hamburg.

A major historical process which has been far too little understood by historians of Spain, it was also a process which affected Spain and Spanish America in very different ways. The vast and growing subversion of the Spanish Indies trade regulations in the 1650s and 1660s especially by the Dutch and Dutch shipping was indeed a major reason for the decay of that system and one of the chief factors in the decline of Spanish power, and of the Spanish economy more generally. In Spanish America, however, the shift to a trade pattern only weakly controlled by the Spanish crown which took place in the years 1647–72, to a considerable and growing extent opened up the continent up to the influence of north-western Europe, and in the first instance to Amsterdam, Curaçao and the Dutch trading system. Before long, this was followed by large-scale French and English penetration. If Spanish ministers were prone to exaggerate the role played by the Sephardic Jews of Holland in driving that process, insufficiently stressing the role of Protestant merchants, there can be little doubt, that modern historians for their part have inadequately understood and stated the part of the Sephardim in undermining the Spanish system and, not least, the element of poetic justice in the perpetual laments and complaints of Spanish ministers regarding the Jews.

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[156] Lynch, *Hispanic World*, 195.

Appendix A: Amsterdam Sephardic Merchants trading with the Iberian Peninsula in the early 1620s: their Jewish names, secular names, business aliases in the Peninsula and correspondents.

Merchant	Synagogue name	Business alias in Spain and Portugal	Peninsula Correspondents
Alvares Mello, Fernando	—	Simon de Mendonce Lopo Rabello Leonardo Figueira da Silva	—
Coutinho, Francisco —	Belsalel Coronel —		
Dorta Henriques, Felipe —	Moseh Dorta —	João Fernandes —	
Esteves de Pina, Miguel —	Mordechai da Costa	—	
Gomes de Lisboa, Pero	—	Lopes d'Azevedo, Estevao Joseph Henriques	—
Haro, João de	Rafael Jesurun —	Rafael d'Oliveira —	
Henriques, Jeronimo —	Joseph Cohen —	Joseph Henriques	
Lopes de Azevedo, Francisco — (1582–1664) —	Abraham Farar —	Ruy Gomes Barbosa	
Lopes de Leão, Manoel —	Jacob Judah Leon (d. 1661) —	Diogo Lopes, Manoel da Costa d'Oliveira —	
Martins Viegas, Antonio —	Simeon Viegas —		
Mendes Madeiros, Francisco — (d. 1623)	Isaac Franco Madeiros —		
Mendes Trancoso, Francisco —	Jacob Franco —		
Nunes Belmonte, Diogo — (1573–1629) —	Jacob Israel Belmonte —		
Nunes Pina, Thomas —	Joshua Sarfati	—	Gaspar Caminha Rego (Viana)
Osorio, Bento —	Baruch Osorio	—	Andrea Lopes Pinto (Lisbon)
Palacios, Duarte de Pinheiro, Daniel	—		Alfonso Peres d'Olivenca (Lisbon) Martin Gonsalves Baixela
Ramires, Lopo (1594–1666) —	David Curiel —		
Ramires Pina, Francisco —	Isaac Naar		
Rodrigues de Sousa, Jeronimo	Samuel Abrabanel	—	Luis Gomes d'Aveiro (Oporto)
Rodrigues Mendes, Duarte —	Jacob Israel Mendes —	Valerio Bonduin —	
Rodrigues Mendes, Jeronimo	Isaac Israel Mendes —	Henrico Stefano —	Pero Henriques (Viana)
Silva, Diogo da —	Tobiau Israel da Silva —		
Vas de Leão, Francisco —		Francisco Henriques	—

Appendix 2: The two lists of Dutch-Jewish firms trading with Spain, complete with aliases and Spanish correspondents, the first naming eighteen firms and the second fifteen obtained from Emanuel Laville, in Amsterdam, by Jacques Richard and sent by Richard to the Spanish embassy at The Hague and then sent by Don Esteban de Gamarra with his despatches of 16 October and 16 November 1655,[a] to Madrid, represent an important source of information for researchers. While they have been published by modern scholars several times, they have appeared usually in very incomplete and inaccurate versions and without the essential supplementary material needed to indicate synagogue names and other vital information concerning the merchants listed.[b] What follows is an attempt to render the lists more useful by correcting errors and providing the Jewish names and other essential information.

'*Los Nombres de los principales judíos de aquella ciudad [Amsterdam] que contratan en los reynos de Vuestra Magestad en España y de sus correspondientes*'*

Jewish Merchant	alias	Spanish Correspondents
1) 'David Osorio'[c]	Bento Osorio	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin de Montiano Santander: Fernando Antonio Herrera Calderon San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola
2) Jacob del Monte[d] [Jacob del Sotto]	Jacobus van den Berg	Bilbao, Santander and San Sebastian (as above) Madrid: Simon Mendes Soto Madrid: Luis Flores de Valdes
3) Abraham Isaac Pereyra[e] [Thomas Rodriguez Pereira]	Francisco y Antonio da Gurre *alias* Gerardo y Carlos van Narden	Madrid: Fernando Montezinos Madrid: Balthasar Rodrigues Cardoso Seville: Manuel Montezinos Seville: Bartolomé Lopez Telles Santander: Fern. Anton. Herrera Calderon
4) Joseppe de los Ríos[f] [Martin Rodrigues]	Michiel van der Rivieren	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Madrid: Luis Flores de Valdes
5) Antonio Lopes Suasso[g] [Isaac Israel Suasso]	Willem del Monte	Bilbao: Juan Baptista dela Rossiunda San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Madrid: Luis Flores de Valdes Cadiz; Antonio Perera Torres

6) Abraham Franco Mendez	Melchior Mendez Franco	Seville: Juan del Soto Martinez
7) Andrea Cristoval Nunes[h]	Henrique y Robert Moyenberg	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano Santander: Fern.Ant. Herrera Calderon San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Caceres: Laurenzo Pan y Agua[i] Seville: Manuel Gomez de Acosta Seville: Fernando Nunes
8) The widow of Diego Nieto de Paiva	. . . .	Santander: Fer.Ant. Herrera Calderon San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Cáceres: Laurenzo Pay y Agua Seville: Manuel Gomez de Acosta Seville: Fernando Nunes
9) Duarte y Manuel Faro[j] [Abraham Isaac Faro]	. . .	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Madrid: Manuel Serrano Montero Madrid: Pedro del Prado
10) Fernando Alvarez y Antonio Correa de Mezquita	Henrik y Robert van den Sterre[k]	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Madrid: Manuel serrano Montero Alicante: Gaspar y Francisco de Moxica
11) Balthasar da Cunha	[Alberto van den Bergh] [Gonzalo Fernandes]	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Madrid: Manuel Serrano Montero
12) Manuel Toralto [Isaac Henriques Faro]	Albert Dircksen den Ouden	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Madrid: Manuel Serrano Montero Madrid: Don Antonio de Anaya Seville: Bernardo Estendorpe
13) Sebastian Coutinho[n] [Isaac Henriques Countinho]	Andres Martensse *alias* Julian Galle	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola

Appendix 2 (*cont.*)

Jewish Merchant	alias	Spanish Correspondents
		Madrid: Manuel Serrano Montero Madrid: Don Antonio de Anaya
14) Jeronimo Nunes da Costa[o] [Moseh Curiel]	Giuglio Bentivoglio	San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Alicante: Gaspar y Francisco de Moxica
15) Diego Enriquez y Juan de Crasto[p]	Hendrik y Jan van Leeuw	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin de Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Madrid: Manuel Serrano Montero Madrid: Don Antonio de Anaya Seville: Bernard Estendorpe
16) Manuel Coutinho	[Manuel Mendes Henriques]	San Sebastian: Francisco Verois y Fagola Madrid: Manuel Serrano Montero
17) Isaac de Prado[q] [Juan Nunes de Prado]	Jacques del Prado	Cadiz and Seville: Vincente Zegers y Comp.
18) Balthasar Alvares Noguera	Albert Dirksen den Jonghe	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin de Montiano San Sebastian: Franciosco de Verois y Fagola Madrid: Manuel Serrano Montero
	Second List	
19) Juan Gonçales[s]	Albert Wighman alias Jacobus y Abraham van Gruenendal	Cadiz: Antonio Perera Torres Malaga: Rodrigo and Bernardo Elers
20) Benjamin de Chaves	Gaspar de Chavarría	Madrid: Alvaro de Mora
21) Simon Francisco Bernal[t]	Simon Frans	San Sebastian: Santiago de Tilleria Seville: Pedro Fernández de Tovar
22) Manuel Nunes Mendez[u]	Hector Henriques de Leon	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin de Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Alicante: Enrique de Figueredo

23) Manuel Mendez de Crasto	Manuel Henriquez de Aguilar	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin de Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola
24) Diego Mendez de Brito[v]	Jacob Alberts	Bilbao: Juan Baptista de la Rossiunda San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola
25) Manuel Mendez Henriques[w]	Fernando de Baeza [Joris van Campen]	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin de Montiano Santander: Fern.Ant. Herrera Calderon Madrid: Don Antonio de Anaya
26) Juan de Paz y Andres de Azevedo[x]		Santander: Fern. Ant. Herrera Calderon Madrid: Fernando Montezinos Seville: Bartolomé Lopez Telles Seville: Manuel y Bartolomé Montezinos
27) Henrique Mendez da Silva[y] [Isaac Mendes da Silva ?]	Geronimo Rodriguez Perez	Madrid: Fernando Montezinos Seville: Bartolomé López Telles Seville: Manuel y Bartolomé Montezinos
28) Francisco de Medina[z]	Frederick Wolf	Tenerife: Don Diego Perera
29) Francisco Mendez Chillon[aa]		Malaga: Antonio de Silva
30) Cristoval Mendes	Manuel Franco Mendez	Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola Seville: Agustín García
31) Antonio Luis		Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano San Sebastian: Francisco Verois y Fagola
32) Joseppe Mendes da Costa		Bilbao: Matheo y Agustin Montiano
33) Isaac Serrano	[Jacques Serrano ?]	San Sebastian: Francisco de Verois y Fagola

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* Names in square brackets are supplementary information supplied by me from the Amsterdam notarial archives and are not found in the original lists

[a] See AGS Libros de la Haya vol. 38, fos. 143 and 150

[b] The first list was published from an evidently very poor copy with numerous errors and seven of the eighteen names missing by E.N. Adler which was then reproduced marred by the same mistakes in H.I. Bloom, see E.N. Adler, 'The Jews of Amsterdam', pp. 224–9 and Bloom, *Economic Activities*, pp. 92–3; The *Consejo de Estado* in Madrid advised the king to send the first list to the Spanish Inquisition *Suprema* whither it was sent with a covering letter of Philip IV to the Inquisitor-General dated Madrid, 30 December 1655; see AGS Estado leg. 2085, *consulta*, Madrid, 26 Dec. 1655 and Castillo, 'Dans la Monarchie espagnole', pp. 311–16. The second list discussed by the *Consejo de Estado* in

January 1656 was remitted initially at least not to the Inquisition but to the Council of Finance (*Consejo de Hacienda*); see AGS Estado leg. 2089, *consulta*, Madrid, 18 Jan. 1656. Lucien Wolf received a transcript of much better quality than the Adler list, though still with a few small mistakes, which is now in the Mocatta Library at University College London, see UCL Mocatta Lucien Wolf transcripts, The Netherlands vol. xi. Gamarra to Philip IV, The Hague, 16 Oct and 16 Nov. 1655; for corrected versions of the lists, see Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 411–15; Swetschinski, 'Spanish Consul and the Jews', appendix

[c] This is the son of the Bento (Baruch) Osorio and the wealthiest of the Amsterdam Sephardim in the 1630s and 1640s; he refused to support the Portuguese crown or the Brazil Company in the late 1640s. Here, in contrast to his usual practice, Laville has supplied the Jewish rather than the business name first and his normal business name as the trade alias; Osorio is entered as a *hoofdparticipant* in the lists of investors in the WIC in the 1650s as 'Bento Osorio', see Oppenheim, 'Early History', 14–15. In 1647–8, he was exporting a good deal of East India pepper to Venice, on one occasion sending 50 bales of 14,700lb in one go; during that year he was one of the largest Dutch exporters to and importers from, Venice see ARH Levantse Handel 264, fos.23v, 37, 38v, 40; Wätjen, *Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet*, 357–9; Don Francisco Beroiz y Fagola was inspector-general for the king's naval stores and warehouses on the north coast and a key figure at San Sebastian, see Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 203

[d] Both Jacob del Monte and 'Willem del Monte', [i.e. Antonio Lopes Suasso (see no. 5.)], were still importing wool and other goods from Spain in 1663, see GAA NA 2892 p. 1259, 1223 notarial deeds, Amsterdam, 5 Sept. and 20 Sept. 1663 (P. Padhuysen); according to Swetschinski, 'Jacob Delmonte alias Jacob del Sotto alias Cornelis Cox Dircks, died in Amsterdam in 1670', see Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 252–5

[e] Should read 'Abraham y Isaac Pereyra' and presumably refers to both Abraham Pereyra and his son Isaac who together in 1655 established the first Jewish-owned sugar refinery in Amsterdam, see Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 154

[f] 'Il y a un riche juif qui à présent se trouve à Anvers', Richard reported to Gamarra, in October 1655, 'c'est un nommé Miguel de los Rios, alias Miguel van der Rivieren [. . .] il va y épouser une demoiselle de Tovarre, fille d'un riche portugais défunt qui demeurait à Anvers. Ce Miguel a environ 30 ans, il est né et a été baptisé à Rouen paroisse de Saint Denis. Il a été circuncisé à Amsterdam, il y a 14 ou 15 ans. Son père s'appelle Martin Rodriguez (alias Joseph de los Rios) don't la fortune est estimée à trois ou quatre tonnes d'or', see UCL Mocatta Library Lucien Wolf transcripts The Netherlands xi, Richard to Gamarra, Amsterdam, 20 oct. 1655; see also Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 122; the business alias of Miguel de los Rios, in 1648 was 'Salvador Rodrigues', see GAA NA 1532, p. 89. deed, Amsterdam, 11 Sept. 1648 (J.V. Oli)

[g] The similarity of Lopes Suasso's business alias when trading to Spain is doubtless to be explained by his often importing wool together with Jacob del Monte and also his being a relative, see Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 136; Lopes Suasso continued importing fine Segovia wools from Spain under his alias 'Willem del Monte;' at least down to 1663, see GAA NA 2892, p. 1089 deed, Amsterdam, 25 July 1663 (P. Padthuysen); however on other occasions, Lopes Suasso apparently used the alias 'Jullio Bentivolly'

[g] In July 1650, Andrea Christoval Nunes together with Jacob del Monte and Juan Nunes Henriques together freighted the *Vergulden Ster* to Santander to bring 600 sacks of fine wool, half for del Monte and a quarter each for the other other two; in July 1655, Andrea Cristobal Nunes together with Lopes Suasso alias 'Willem del Monte' together freighted *de Liefde* to collect 700 sacks of fine wool from Santander; see Israel, 'Further Data', 17–18; in July 1668, two merchants using the aliases 'Michiel en Jacobus Moyenberge', presumably relatives of Nunes, were trading with Cadiz, see GAA NA 2898, p. 139. Amsterdam, 26 July 1668 (P. Padthuysen)

[h] The personage with this improbable name is mentioned as a minor *asentista* for the Spanish crown in 1646, see Domínguez Ortiz, *Política y hacienda*, 149

[j] In July 1651, Duarte and Manuel Faro were one of several Amsterdam Sephardic firms which imported consignments of Castilian wool from Santander, 'Israel', 'Further Data', 17; 'Duarte and Manuel Faro' actually seem to have been one person whose synagogue name was Abraham Isaac Faro, see GAA NA 2890A, p. 453. deed, Amsterdam, 5 Sept. 1661 (P. Padthuysen)

[k] In 1650 a prisoner of the Inquisition of Cuenca, Diego Rodriguez Indaña testified that he had sent 132 sacks of Ciudad real wool to 'Enrique Roberto Bendeestar' of Amsterdam and been paid for the wool via letters of exchange remitted by Simon Dias Vaez of Antwerp and Felipe de Nis in Madrid, Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos* ii, 148; in January 1655, Fernando Alvarez and Antonio Correa de Mezquita (alias 'Enrique and Roberto van der Ster) freighted a Dutch vessel to Betanzos in Galicia to load a cargo of sardines destined for Alicante but the ship was taken by Barbary corsairs off the Bay of Cadiz, see GAA NA 975, p. 328 (B. Baddel). Deed, 13 May 1655. In May 1655, the partners Van der Ster freighted the *Wapen van Hamburg* to carry cargo to Velez Malaga, Motril, Almería, Alicante and Mallorca. In July 1656, the partners 'Vandestar' freighted a vessel to New Foundland to load with cod for Malaga, Motril and Alicante; see GAA NA 975, pp. 352, 385

[l] in July 1655, the Dutch consul at Alicante reported the arrival there of two Dutch vessels, the *Postilion* of Medemblik and *St Pieter* of Schiedam with cargo of cloth, pepper, cinnamon and 4,500lb of Brazil wood consigned to Gaspar and Francisco de Moxica by 'Roberto Vandestar' of Amsterdam, see ARH SG 7047 ii. Vinck to SG, Alicante, 29 July 1655

[m] For Balthasar da Cunha's business alias see GAA NA 1537, pp. 118, 130 (J.V. Oli); in June 1651, Andrea Christoval Nunes, Jacob del Monte, Balthasar da Cunha and 'Fernão da Baeza' together freighted a vessel to Santander to fetch 800 sacks of wool, one third part for each of the former and one sixth each for the accounts of da Cunha and Baeza; the same four merchants then freighted the *Arca Troyana* to Santander, the following month, to collect another 850 sacks, three eighths for the 'Moyenberghes', one quarter for del Monte, and three sixteenths each for da Cunha and Baeza; see Israel, 'Further Data', 17

[n] Under his alias 'Andres Martenssen', Isaac Henriques Coutinho, in September 1661, sent power of attorney to Don Pedro de Truxillo y Aguila, merchant at Malaga, to regain Merchandise and money, belonging to him in Malaga held by Juan Bueno Guipponi, see GAA NA 2890A, p. 393 *carta de poder*, Amsterdam, 16 Sept. 1661

[o] Jeronimo Nunes da Costa in fact only occasionally traded with Spain as when he turned to Spanish sources to obtain marine salt during the 1657–61 war between the Netherlands and Portugal; thus, in February 1659, he freighted the 250 last *Olijfboom* to ship timber to Cadiz and then to load with Spanish salt for Amsterdam, see Israel, 'Further Data', 14

[p] In December 1656, 'Hendrik and Jan van Leeuw' bought cotton goods from the East India Company in Amsterdam which they consigned to Daniel Runtvleesch, Dutch merchant at Cadiz, see GAA NA 980, p. 401. deed, Amsterdam, 8 Dec. 1656 (B. Baddel); it seems that 'Diego Enriquez' was just an alias of Juan de Castro and that 'Henrique y Juan van Leeuw' were in fact one and the same person, see GAA NA 2898, p. 375. Deed, Amsterdam, 6 Sept. 1668 (P. Padhuysen)

[q] In September 1648, Isaac de Prado together with Miguel de los Rios, and Abraham Isaac Pereira freighted a vessel to Santander to collect wool, see GAA NA 1532, p. 89. Deed, Amsterdam, 11 Sept. 1648

[r] In 1650–1, Alvares Noguera seems to have been trading in fact mainly with Cadiz, see Israel, 'Further Data', 12–13

[s] I assume this is João Goncalves Valverde whose alias, however, was 'Ludovico van Dalle' (GAA NA 1556A, p. 321); the Dutch merchants Rodrigo and Bernardo Elers, at Malaga, in May 1657 received a consigned of Leiden *bays* exported there by Andrea Cristobal Nunes, GAA NA 981, pp. 164–5 deed, Amsterdam, 11 may 1657 (B. Baddel)

[t] Bernal, a recent immigrant to Amsterdam from Spain, was one of these who imported Castilian wool smuggled through the *puertos secos* to Bayonne to Amsterdam, see Caro Baroja, *Judíos* ii, 152

[u] Nunes Mendez, another recent immigrant, worked together with Bernal in importing Castilian wool via Bayonne, see *ibidem.*

[v] Another importer of Castilian wool was presumably a relative of the crypto-jewish Madrid *asentista* Francisco Diaz Mendez de Brito who, in turn was close to Antonio Nuñez Gramajo, *arrendador* of the Castilian wool taxes between 1651 and 1657; his business alias seems to have been 'Jacques Alberts' rather than 'Jacob Alberts'; he was still dealing in Castilian wool in 1661, see GA NA 2890B, pp. 721, 771, 985

[w] Laville may have given the first name incorrectly here; in June 1648, at any rate, it was not Manuel but Fernando Mendes Henriques who was importing wool (together with da Cunha) under the alias 'Fernando de Baeza', see GAA NA 1532, p. 16. Deed, Amsterdam, 27 June 1648 (J.V. Oli)

[x] Swetschinski refers to 'Andre de Azevedo and Jõao de Pas' as an Antwerp firm and then later as a 'Portuguese Jewish' firm, see Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans,* 109, 123; in any case they traded with Amsterdam Portuguese Jews as in July 1651 when together with 'Gerardo and Carlos van Naarden', the Vandersters, and Diego Henriques de Granada (alias Hendrik Jan Baleu), Juan de Paz and Andre de Azevedo freighted a Dutch vessel to Santander to collect 800 sacks of Castilian wool for the Amsterdam exchange, see Israel, 'Further Data', 17

[y] In May 1654, 'Geronimo Rodriguez Perez' freighted a Dutch vessel to collect 600 sacks of wool at Almería and then a part cargo of salt, at La Mata (Reino de Valencia), all for Amsterdam, Israel, 'Further Data', 10; in the spring of 1655, he freighted a ship-load of salt from San Lúcar for Zeeland, see GAA NA 975, deed 22 June 1655 (B. Baddel); in June 1659, March 1660 and June 1660, Isaac Mendes da Silva and Isaac levi Ximenes together freighted three cargoes to Santa Cruz de Tenerife and other ports in the Canaries, see Israel 'Further Data', 16; in May 1663, he was importing olive oil from La Coruña, see GAA NA 2892, p. 707. Deed, 16 May 1663 (P. Padhuysen); Mendes da Silva was still active in Spanish trade in 1667 when he imported a consignment of almonds from Malaga, see GAA NA 2898, p. 175

[z] See *infra* pp. 277, 285–6

[aa] Mendez Chilon traded mostly with Malaga: in June 1659, he freighted a ship to Malaga to load with wine, olive oil and raisins, see GAA NA 1540, p. 49. Amsterdam, 18 June 1659 (J.V. Oli); in August 1660, he chartered the *St Dominicus* to Malaga and Velez Malaga to load with wine, olive oil, raisins, syrup and almonds and in May 1661 a vessel for Malaga to be loaded by his correspondent Antonio de Silva again with wine and fruit, GAA NA 1540, p. 210. Amsterdam, 16 Aug. 1660 and NA 1541, p. 77. Amsterdam, 13 may 1661; during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–7), he chartered a vessel to sail to Norway to collect ship's timbers and then to Malaga to load with raisins, wine, lemons, olives and almonds, see GAA NA 1543, p. 49. Amsterdam, 2 July 1666 (J.V. Oli); the connection between Mendes Chilon and Antonio de Silva of Malaga evidently endured for a long time, since the former acted as de Silva's Amsterdam proxy in a suit against Jacob Gomes Serra and others in May 1664, see GAA NA 2892, pp. 885, 887 deed, Amsterdam, 6 May 1664 (P. Padhuysen)

CHAPTER SEVEN

CRYPTO-JUDAISM IN 17TH-CENTURY FRANCE: AN ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS BRIDGE BETWEEN THE HISPANIC WORLD AND THE SEPHARDIC DIASPORA

Geographically but also economically and culturally, the crypto-Jewish communities especially in the extreme south-western corner of France formed, from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth century, a remarkable bridge between the fraught suppressed world of the Portuguese New Christians in the Iberian peninsula, and Ibero-America, and the freer world of the western Sephardi diaspora. By the early seventeenth century, their religious status was undoubtedly more firmly, confidently and knowledgeably crypto-Jewish than that of the New Christians of the hispanic world, even though they only gradually evolved into a normative Jewish community, with the transition to unconcealed, open Jewish observance taking place mainly during the latter part of that century. From the late sixteenth down to the mid seventeenth century, this French Portuguese *Marrano* society was in part specifically crypto-Jewish but by no means wholly so, being very much a half-way house—with all the complexity and psychological intricacies which this entailed—between Iberian submersion (and outward submission to the Catholic Church) and Dutch freedom of practice.[1] By the 1680s, however, the Christianizing element had weakened or broken away and the French 'Portuguese' communities were sufficiently strong and cohesive, and circumstances sufficiently conducive, for them finally to discard the pretence and hesitation of the past and emerge as fully-fledged Jewish communities with rabbis, services in Hebrew, rigorous observance and an institutional structure modelled on that of Amsterdam.[2]

Furthermore, quite apart from issues of religious status and observance, there were other highly significant respects in which France, and south-west France in particular, became a staging post between

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[1] Roth, 'Immanuel Aboab's Proselytization', 127–31; Israel, *European Jewry*, 42–3.
[2] Nahon, *'Nations' juives*, 3, 133, 259.


▲ Converso-Sephardi Communities in South-France
■ Puertos Secos between Navarra and Castile
FRANCE
BAY OF BISCAY
Bordeaux
Dax
Peyrehorade
Bidache
Labastide-Clairence
Bayonne
Saint Jean de Luz
San Sebastián
Santander
The Pass at Roncesvalles
Pamplona
NAVARRE
PYRENEES
ARAGON
CATALONIA
Logroño
Cervera
Agreda
Burgos
Valladolid
Madrid
Cuenca
CASTILE
F.D. 2002

Map 6. The Converso-Sephardi Communities of South-West France the hidden suppressed crypto-Jewish networks of the Iberian world and the comparatively free Jewish world of the Netherlands and the Dutch colonies: it was, in the first place, the closest and one of the chief points of exit, and of refuge, for Portuguese New Christians fleeing the Iberian Peninsula and remained such for well over a century; then, secondly, the region, and especially Bayonne, was one of the main transit points for Dutch-Jewish trade with Spain and via Spain with Spanish America; and, finally, the region evolved into a kind of border control point for Sephardi Jews collecting or administering legacies left by deceased New Christian relatives in Castile, especially Madrid, as well as for Portuguese New Christians resident in Spain receiving legacies inherited from relatives in the Sephardi diaspora.

The concentration in the south-west corner of France is indeed a striking historico-geographical phenomenon and raises many questions about the precise relationship of French Sephardi Jewry to the Spanish frontier and the inland trade routes running to Pamplona, Burgos, and Madrid. Before 1619, by far the largest Portuguese New Christian community in France evolved virtually on the Spanish border, at Saint Jean de Luz. Then owing to an outbreak of popular hostility towards the Portuguese in the town which erupted that year when a Catholic priest caught a sixty year old *Marrano* widow named Catherine Fernandes, newly arrived from Portugal, spitting out the holy wafer on emerging from mass, their position there became untenable. Enraged, the crowd and their priest seized her and had her locked up. She was then denounced, harassed and, finally burnt to death, with such demonstrations of faith and fury that all the other Portuguese New Christians seem to have fled the town. Although this horrifying incident did not entirely end the crypto-Jewish presence in Saint Jean de Luz, the bulk of the Portuguese New Christians who had lived there never returned.[3]

Most moved only a short distance away settling in Bayonne, Bidache, Labastide-Clairence and Peyrehorade. Nevertheless, the crypto-Jewish network which developed in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth in south-west France remained over many decades insecure, furtive and transitional. Already, in April 1615, following the gathering of the French Estates General of 1614 at which, among much else, there were strident calls for the expulsion of the 'juifs déguisés' from France, Louis XIII ordered a general expulsion of Portuguese New Christians, and it would seem that some effort to be rid of them was actually made in one or two places where they had settled, notably Nantes from where the refugees moved on to Holland. For the most part, though, the decree seems to have been ignored and except for Saint Jean to which only a tiny handful of Portuguese ever returned, their other centres in the south-west seem to have been only marginally affected.[4]

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[3] Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos Cristãos Novos*, 373; Nahon, 'Communautés', 115. Nahon, 'Raports', 44; Nahon, *Métropoles et péripheries*, 102; Zink, 'Juifs d'eau douce', 210.

It had been the invariable practice at Saint Jean until 1619, and in Bordeaux and the other places of settlement in France subsequently, that the refugees should conduct themselves outwardly as Christians, defer to priests and attend mass in church. This applied to committed crypto-Jews among them, the uncommitted, and the sincere Catholics alike. Numerous Portuguese New Christian families fleeing from the Inquisition in Madrid during the early part of the century are known to have travelled overland and to have crossed the frontier at Saint Jean, often spending several years there before moving on. Among them, in July 1611, arrived Lopo Ramirez (David Curiel) together with his mother, sisters and other relatives; they stayed several years, Lopo moving on to Amsterdam, and converting to formal Judaism there, in 1614.[5] Another resident of Saint Jean was the Antonio Fernández Cardado later denounced as the leader of the crypto-Jewish group at the silver mines of Pachuca in New Spain, and arrested by the Mexican Inquisition, in 1634.[6] Cardado who also arrived in Saint Jean in 1611, later admitting, at his trial that it was there and in that year, that is specifically in Saint Jean that he inwardly 'apostatised' from the Catholic religion and embraced Judaism as his creed.[7] Cardado had first come to southern France with his father, in 1605, when the latter had needed to spend some time for business purposes in Bordeaux. There they conducted themselves entirely as Catholics engaging in trade with La Rochelle.[8]

It is undeniable then that crypto-Judaism was strong among the

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[4] Nahon, *Métropoles et péripheries*, 96, 100; Swetschinski, 'Reluctant Cosmopolitans', 79.
[5] Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, 198.
[6] Wachtel, 'Marrano Religiosity', 151, 166.
[7] AGN Inqusición 378, fo. 287. 'Processo contra Antonio Fernández Cardado'.
[8] Ibid., fo. 300.

Portuguese New Christian immigrants to early seventeenth-century France. At the same time, though, it is equally clear that opinions and loyalties concerning matters of faith diverged widely and sharply even within the same family. Hence, while there is a variety of evidence to show that the brothers Curiel, their mother and sister were all firm crypto-Jews, even before arriving at Saint Jean, and that they had been influenced in Portugal apparently decisively by the fervour of their family friend and relative by marriage, Dr Eliau Montalto,[9] other family members, such as Dr Pedro Rodrigues, another learned physician, and his wife, Isabel da Fonseca, sister-in-law of Montalto and aunt of the Curiel brothers clearly preferred, now that they had reached the comparative safety of France, to live as good Catholics.

An often vehement three-way theological contest between Judaism, Christianity, and a hesitant *Marrano* neutrality somewhere in between, for the heart and soul of the Portuguese New Christian refugee community in France arose at the outset and continued for many decades. This, indeed, is the main theme of the four surviving letters sent by Montalto, (now living in Venice), to Saint Jean de Luz addressed to Dr Pedro Rodrigues, in 1611–12. Eliahu Montalto (alias Felipe Rodrigues), physician and zealous crypto-Jew, having been born in Castelobranco, in Portugal, a noted source of crypto-Jewish sentiment, and 'judaized' in Lisbon, had spent some years, in the 1590s and after, living outwardly as a Christian, first in France and then teaching at the university of Pisa. In both places he sought to deepen his knowledge of Judaism, studying with Daniel Franco (alias Fernando Gómez) who seems to have been a professional judaizer at work among the crypto-Jewish diaspora in France and Italy and who eventually returned to Portugal expressly to proselytize among the Marranos there. He was burnt at the stake in Evora on 22 June 1608, the records of his Inquisition trial noting that he had taught 'a ley de Moyses a hum medico [. . .] que chamava Montalto assi em Bordeos come em Florença' [taught the law of Moses to a physician called Montalto both in Bordeaux and in Florence].[10] After reverting to formal Judaism in Venice, Montalto remained there for some time before being called to attend at the French court after the death of Henri IV, in 1610. Returning to France, in 1613, he died at Tours in February 1616, to the last acting as one of the most determined opponents of Christian influence and ideas among the Portuguese New Christians in France.

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[9] Montalto was certainly an active judaizer who influenced family and friends against Christianity and 'hera grande letrado nas cossas da Ley de Moyses e sabia muito dellas' whilst still living as 'Felipe Rodrigues' in Portugal, see ANTT Inqusição de Lisboa vol. 7192 'Proceso de Duarte Nunes da Costa', fos. 9, 12v; Israel, *European Jewry*, 69.

[10] Roth, 'Quatre lettres d'Elie de Montalte', 138.

A month after receiving a letter from Lopo Ramirez, in July 1611, describing the arrests of family members by the Inquisition in Lisbon and Madrid, and the great danger in which the remaining relatives found themselves, Montalto, in Venice, was overjoyed to receive the news of the successful escape of most of the family from Madrid to Saint Jean. He wrote at once to congratulate his relatives and encourage their open reversion to Judaism.[11] When Montalto received a reply from Rodrigues indicating that he put prudence before committing himself to a specific theology, Montalto wrote back insisting that the reason the Almighty had brought him forth safely from Spain to France was precisely so that he should forsake 'blind idolatry' and follow the holy law which God gave to the Hebrews at Mount Sinai. He also reminded him that the reason God had imposed so many and such terrible punishments on the Jews in the past was 'por não guardar os mandamentos e ceremonias que o Sr deo a Mosseh no Monte de Sinay' [for failing to keep the laws and ceremonies which the Lord gave to Moses on Mount Sinai].[12] When Rodrigues retorted in no uncertain terms that he was not interested in following those laws or living as an observant Jew, Montalto replied that 'por mais offensas que me fasa não hey de cessar de procurar sua saluação, porque me doe summamente ver hum homem de semente de Israel tão bem entendido nas letras humanas, e tão cego nas divinas, ver caminhar obstinadamente a perdição' [however much you insult me I shall not desist from seeking your salvation because it pains me greatly to see a man of the seed of Israel so learned in human studies, and yet so blind in matters of the divine, go obstinately to perdition].[13]

Another judaizing proselytizer in both France and Italy was Immanuel Aboab (c. 1555–1628), a Portuguese New Christian, son of Henrique Gomez, who migrated to Italy as a young man and lived at Pisa in the late 1580s; later he resided in the ghetto at Venice, and other places in Italy as well as on Corfu.[14] Finally, late in life, he settled in Jerusalem where he ended his days. Aroused against the non-committal, apathetic attitude of many Portuguese New Christians in Italy and France, and determined to show them the urgency of reverting to strict Jewish observance he wrote his *Nomologia* (1625) a work addressed to the New Christians outside the Peninsula in general which was printed, at Amsterdam, a year after Aboab's death. He also penned more specific missives which he sent to a friend at La Bastide-Clairence, one of the main centres of Portuguese New Christian settlement in south-west France but which were intended for circulation more widely among the New Christians in France.[15] These discreet 'open letters' were written around 1626. Here again the *Marranos* of south-west France are exhorted to abandon outward allegiance to the Catholic Church, and obey the commandments of the Lord being expressly warned against thoughts of trying to return to Spain and Portugal.[16]

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[11] Ibid., pp. 148–9.
[12] Ibid., p. 151.
[13] Ibid., p. 153.

It was indeed apparent that many, having sampled the tense, inner theological civil war among the New Christians in France, and experienced the economic difficulties that their situation there confronted them with, became absorbed, like Cardado, in thoughts of returning to lands where the Inquisition held sway. Aboab urged them not to go back and again live as Catholics but instead migrate to the Venetian or Ottoman Levant, castigating their new way of life—in freedom but between two religions—as the worst of all worlds: 'antes allo que fuera menos dañoso para sus almas estar privados de su libertad en España que con ella, en Ytalia, Francia y Flandes vivir fingida y disimuladamente' [I find that it would be preferable, less dangerous for their souls, to live stripped of their liberty in Spain than to live freely in Italy, France and Flanders falsely, in dissimulation].[17]

Catherine Fernandes burnt at the stake in Saint Jean in 1619 for committing sacrilege with the holy wafer during *semana santa* seems to have been a relative of Cardado and later, during the latter's trial, in Mexico City, in 1634, the story of the expulsion from the town was retold, before the Inquisitors there by a witness who had known Cardado in France.[18] As we have seen, while the events of 1619 did not put an end the Portuguese New Christian settlement in Saint Jean, it certainly displaced the main crypto-Jewish presence in the region to Bayonne, Labastide and Peyhorade; while Bayonne became the chief pivot of the maritime and financial network linking Amsterdam with Madrid and the wider hispanic world in which south-west France came to play so notable a part.

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[14] Roth, 'Immanuel Aboab's Proselytization', 125.
[15] Ibid., pp. 127–8.
[16] Ibid., p. 131.
[17] Ibid., p. 144.

With the imposition of the Spanish embargoes against Dutch ships, merchants and goods, in April 1621, the Portuguese New Christian communities of south-western France became a vital economic link in a hidden commercial chain connecting Amsterdam to Spain. As has been shown, the embargoes exerted a profound effect on global trade patterns for over a quarter of a century and one of their prime consequences was to compel the western Sephardi maritime trading network to devise new methods, often risky and precarious, of restoring the interrupted links between the Dutch entrepot and the Iberian maritime empires. Dutch trade with the Iberian Peninsula was undoubtedly suddenly and drastically curtailed.[19] Almost overnight, as has been observed, France largely replaced the Iberian Peninsula as the Dutch Republic's principal western trading partner.[20] The percentage of salt entering the Baltic in Dutch ships which came from the Peninsula (mainly Portugal) fell from over 40% in the second decade of the seventeenth century to as low as seven to eight per cent between 1622 and 1630.[21] But for the Sephardim, the shift was a more complex phenomenon than for most other Dutch merchants, with France becoming not so much a surrogate as a concealed channel of access.

The principal method employed to circumvent the Spanish embargoes via France—at any rate prior to 1635 when France entered the Thirty Years' War against Spain and Austria—were the inland Pyreneean mule tracks from the French coast across the border to Navarre. An intricate system of clandestine overland traffic developed which was presided over for many years at the French end by the brothers Alvaro and Jacome Luiz, then the leading 'Portuguese' merchants at Bayonne.[22] Alvaro had resided in Bayonne at least since

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[18] AGN Inquisición 378, fo. 293.

[19] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 121–97; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 204–12.

[20] Collins, 'Role of Atlantic France', 241.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Nahon, 'Raports', 41; Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim'.

1600 and after 1615 had been Bayonne correspondent of the Amsterdam Sephardi Dotar (dowry) society.[23] Alvaro and Jacome Luiz and their consorts, acting as factors for Amsterdam Jews, evidently imported large quantities of Dutch and German linens, East India spices, fine cloth, metal goods and other merchandise destined for Madrid and the Castilian market, by sea to Bayonne, a port conveniently situated close to the Spanish frontier, then transported the goods into the interior by mule train to the passes into the viceroyalty of Navarre where officialdom was less stringent than in the Castilian sea ports, whence the consignments were conveyed over the Pyrenees to the Navarrese capital Pamplona from where they could be readily transported via the so-called *puertos secos* (dry ports) into the interior of Castile and Aragon, to Madrid, Zaragoza and Barcelona.

The returns which travelled by the same route in reverse, via the dry ports to Bayonne and then by sea to Amsterdam chiefly consisted of Castilian merino wool, silver, and other Spanish American products such as dyestuffs and tobacco. The Spanish drive to eliminate Dutch trade from the Caribbean area since around 1603 had been sufficiently effective by the 1620s,[24] in combination with the April 1621 embargoes, to force Dutch merchants, including Amsterdam Jews, to obtain Spanish Caribbean products such as tobacco by highly intricate and indirect methods and routes. Thus in late 1627, a consignment partly or all 'Varina'—i.e. Variñas tobacco from Venezuela which in Holland was worth seven guilders per pound—having arrived from Spain, was sent from Bayonne by the Portuguese New Christian merchant Antonio da Costa Cortissos on a Dutch vessel to Amsterdam where his correspondent was Matias Rodrigues Cardozo.[25] It is noteworthy that in a notarial deed of July 1627, concerning consignments of tobacco to Amsterdam from Bayonne, Jacome Luiz, the merchant in Bayonne who sent the goods is described as a 'correspondent and factor' who acts on the orders of Diego Fernandes Dias in Amsterdam and other Portuguese merchants and who sends the goods Fernandes Dias and the others consign to him, and goods which he receives for them, to and from other places.[26]

So successful was this trans-Pyreneean overland route to begin with that just within the seventeen months from April 1621 to

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[23] Nahon, *Métropoles et peripheries*, 99.
[24] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 66, 106–8.
[25] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds' no. 3631, 10 Dec. 1627 (Sibrant Cornelisz).
[26] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', no. 3546, 1 July 1627 (Sibrant Cornelisz).

September 1622, it was reported to Madrid, no less than thirty Dutch vessels delivered cargoes in Bayonne for consignment by mule into Spain via the Pyreneean passes and Navarre, almost all this trade being organized by Amsterdam Sephardim and their Portuguese factors in Bayonne and the latter's representatives in Peyrehorade, Bidache and—the most southerly and closest to the Navarrese border of the inland marrano communities—Labastide-Clairence. These merchants residing in south-west France collaborated closely with other Portuguese *conversos* resident in Castile and Aragon.[27] A key factor in this highly effective method of commercial penetration was that Alvaro and Jacome Luiz and their Madrid correspondents could work hand in hand with the administrators (*arrendadores*) of the *puertos secos* of Logroño, Agreda and Cervera, between Navarre and Castile, who in the early 1620s were Juan Nuñez de Vega and his brother-in-law Manuel Núñez de Olivera, Portuguese New Christian businessmen who cultivated close contacts with Labastide and Bayonne. The former who had lived for many years in Vitoria and knew the whole Basque-Navarrese area thoroughly, had won the contract to farm the *puertos secos* for the decade 1620–30, in 1620, despite a certain reluctance to appoint him, in the royal council of finance, in Madrid, precisely on the grounds of his being a Portuguese New Christian.[28]

Despite energetic efforts by the Viceroy of Navarre, and special commissioners from Madrid, to eradicate the traffic, the flow of clandestine trade between Madrid and Amsterdam via Bayonne persisted, albeit with interruptions. In February 1630, a senior financial official writing to the royal council of finance (*Consejo de Hacienda*), in Madrid, recalled having repeatedly stressed the need to 'close that passage to the Dutch because they trade on a large scale through the Portuguese [*conversos*] who reside in Holland and who have established a community in France of those of their nation in order to go passing from hand to hand into Spain merchandise from the rebel provinces'.[29]

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[27] BL Egerton MS 343, fo. 249; AGS Estado MS 2139, *consulta* of the *Consejo de Guerra*, 23 July 1621; AGS Estado MS 2139. Miguel de Manchola to Philip IV, 24 September 1621, 29 October 1621 and 22 April 1622; in the last despatch Manchola writes: "ningun genero de gente basallos de Vuestra Magestad se atrevieran en pasar las dichas mercadurias sino es la nacion portuguesa"; see also Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', pp. 20–1.

[28] AGS Consejo de Hacienda MS 592. *Consulta*, 31 October 1622.

[29] AGS Estado MS 2044. *Consulta*, 28 February 1630: Hortuño de Urizar avisa [. . .] que algunas vezes had representado a Vuestra Magd. quan importante sería

This was indeed exactly correct. In September 1630, the council of the *Almirantazgo*, in Madrid, received a report estimating that two to three million ducats worth of Dutch and Dutch East India commodities were illegally entering Castile each year via the Pyrenean passes, and then Navarre and Vizcaya, imported by Portuguese New Christians exploiting the *puertos secos* and generating a large stream of silver and merino wool flowing in the reverse direction to Bayonne and Amsterdam.[30] Of course, this contraband traffic attracted much lucrative new business to Bayonne and Labastide and clearly did much to stimulate the growing web of crypto-Jewish communities which became firmly established during the early seventeenth century in the extreme south-west corner of France.

While the Portuguese New Christian community in France, a group half way between the secret Judaism of the Peninsula and the normative Judaism of Amsterdam, became a vital economic conduit connecting the Jews of Holland with the *conversos* in Castile, the theological war rending their society seems to have intensified. Among the bitterest feuds between the crypto-Jewish and pro-Catholic factions dividing the Portuguese New Christians in France were in progress in Bordeaux, Nantes and Rouen. But everywhere, it would seem, both camps were powerfully entrenched. In Rouen the crypto-Jews were headed by Antonio de Cáceres and Antonio Rodrigues Lamego—a relative and business correspondent of the Curiels in Amsterdam and Hamburg—in whose house Jewish religious services took place and Sephardi visitors from Amsterdam were put up.[31] To an extent no doubt, these rivalries pivoted not only around personal beliefs but also family alliances. Certainly both these Rouen families can be shown from earlier Inquisition evidence to have previously been active judaizing clans whilst in Portugal.[32] In 1627, the most eminent poet among the Portuguese crypto-Jews in northern Europe writing in Spanish, João Pinto Delgado, published his Jewish poems at Rouen.

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cerrar aquel passo a olandeses porque negocian por el muy en grueso por medio de los portugueses que residen en Olanda los quales tienen hecha poblacion en Francia de los de su nacion para yr metiendo de mano en mano en España las mercadurias de las islas rebeldes.'

[30] AGS Consejo de Hacienda 664 *consulta*, Madrid, 15 Sept. 1630; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 375.

[31] Caro Baroja, 'Proceso de Bartomé Febos', 60, 79.

[32] ANTT Inquisição de Lisboa 7192. 'Proceso de Duarte Nunes da Costa', fos. 14v, 15v, 40–4; Israel, *European Jewry*, 96.

But if the crypto-Jewish faction was strong, at Rouen it appeared to be the 'Catholic' faction, supported by local judicial officers and spurred on by two disguised Spanish priests who were gaining the upper hand as the tussle of consciences and allegiance reached its climax, in the early 1630s.[33] The Parlement of Rouen was mobilised against the judaizers several of whom were arrested and imprisoned. At this point, however, Cardinal Richelieu, influenced it would seem by Alphonse López his (supposedly *Morisco* but probably) *Marrano* confidant, intervened, halted the proceedings and reversed the position. The case against the defendants was quashed by royal order. Whoever drafted Louis XIII's decree of 12 July 1633 on the subject of the 'Portuguese' appears to have a had a finely wrought sense of humour: the charges of 'Judaism' were dismissed on the grounds that the accusers were well-known to be themselves of Jewish extraction and in several instances to have been punished in Portugal for the 'crime of Judaism', so that their testimony was condemned as unreliable. In the name of the king, the good people of Rouen were warned not to insult or harass the released merchants.[34]

At Rouen, the rival factions were divided by religion, and the legal proceedings, into feuding family networks. At the same time, these seem to have constituted competing commercial networks as well since the crypto-Jewish grouping in Rouen traded exclusively with crypto-Jewish merchants in Madrid while the pro-Catholics made a point of dealing only with sincere Christians. Hence, De Cáceres and Rodrigues Lamego conducted their business in Madrid through correspondents such as Bartolomé and Fernando Montesinos, Jorge Enríquez, Pedro Enríquez Feho, and the widow of Melchor Núñez Peña all later condemned as, or strongly suspected of being, 'judaizers'.[35] It seems also that the atmosphere of hostility and suspicion besetting Portuguese New Christian life in the northern French commercial centres, Nantes and Rouen, prevented the consolidation of more than a small and transitory Jewish community.[36] In fact, the community at Nantes shifted definitively towards a Catholic stance during the 1630s.[37] The case was different in the south-west, however, where the same bitterness, hatred and intimidation failed to prevent the gradual evolution of a network of congregations from a clandestine crypto-Judaism covered by a thick veil of pretended Catholicism into normative Judaism. Here the *politique* policies pursued by Richelieu would seem to have played a vital part. For this policy provided a sufficient buffer to enable the judaizing proselytizers—reinforced by Jewish visitors from Holland and Italy, and helped by the distribution of imported Jewish books in Spanish and Portuguese—despite the vehement hostility of the wider Catholic host society, eventually to gain the upper hand within the southern French *converso* diaspora.

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[33] Revah, 'Autobiographie d'un Marrane', 63–76.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Caro Baroja, 'Proceso de Bartomé Febos', 79.
[36] Brunschvigg, *Juifs de Nantes*, 13–14, 17.
[37] Révah, 'Les Marranes', 66; Nahon, 'Rapports', 43.

Patterns of immigration and trading opportunities, then, rather than any difference in the attitude of the host society, or the government, determined that French Sephardic Jewry became heavily concentrated in the south-west. One of the Spanish priests involved in the struggle to buttress the Catholic allegiance of the New Christians in France, and repel the judaizing tendency, in the 1630s, the Licenciado Diego de Cisneros, reported that there were sixty *converso* families living in Bayonne at that time, around forty at Bordeaux, another forty at Peyrehorade, ten or twelve at Dax, and an impressively large number, no less than eighty at the most southerly of the inland south-western communities—Labastide-Clairence—as compared with a mere twenty Portuguese *converso* families dwelling in Rouen, ten at Nantes—among them an uncle and probably also the father, Michael de Spinoza (1588–1654),[38] of the philosopher, Spinoza, and ten or twelve at Paris.

The communities of the south-west, then, like those of Nantes and Rouen, remained psychologically entrapped in an internal religious and cultural struggle which lasted for decades. This was a contest in which the intricacies of reality and appearance, mask and identity, became so entangled and convoluted, that no-one took anything at face value. In November 1637 and March 1638, testimony submitted to the Madrid Inquisition against the Montepellier educated Dr Francisco López (c. 1585–1659), professor in the medical faculty of Bordeaux, confirmed that both he and three of his sons (two doctors who both married French Christian women and an ecclesiastic) lived outwardly as Catholics and were scrupulously deferential to priests, but concluded on several grounds (notably that much of his professional work was in monasteries and nunneries and one of his sons had a church benefice so that it was directly contrary to his and their material interests to reveal the slightest crypto-Jewish tendency) that all this could be deliberate deception and pretence.[39] The modern scholar is apt to suppose that most of this must have been overwrought suspicion and paranoia and that, given the circumstances, Francisco López and three of his sons were almost certainly sound Catholics. Yet two other sons went into commerce—and perhaps in large part for that reason—eventually became integrated into Sephardic society and opted finally for Judaism, as also, as a consequence of their marriages, did all four of Dr Lopez' daughters.[40]

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[38] Nadler, *Spinoza. A Life*, 31–2.

The elder of the sons who reverted to Judaism, Antonio Lopes Suasso (1614–85), as he called himself, though seemingly originally destined for the priesthood, chose instead a life of business and began by travelling back and forth between Bordeaux and Spain, visiting Valladolid, Segovia and Madrid, in connection with the wool trade, in which he was to become a leading dealer. Doubtless his trips to Spain further polished his grasp of how to appear both as a Catholic and a Jew in the appropriate context. Between 1621 and 1648, as we have seen, south-west France was the indispensable conduit in the export of Castilian wool to the Netherlands. But after 1648, the Dutch carried the bulk of Spain's wool exports directly from Spanish ports to the Netherlands in their own ships;[41] consequently, Lopes Suasso's original business role became redundant and it is perhaps not surprising that in the summer of 1653, he migrated to Holland where he settled as a fully-fledged Sephardic Jew, marrying Violante (alias Rachel) de Pinto.[42]

Convenience and opportunism obviously loomed large in shaping the final outcome. Yet it would be wrong to underestimate the zeal, and emotional intensity, of the theological strife within the Portuguese New Christian community in France. In September 1637, Cisneros submitted to the court, in Madrid, a powerful report summing up his experiences during the years he had laboured in France, for the 'conversión de los judíos huydos destos reinos de España', that is conversion back to Catholicism of men and women of Jewish descent who wholeheartedly, or half-heatedly, left the Catholic fold. It was his unshakeable conviction that 'entre ellos ay muchos buenos christianos y algunos mui zelosos de la sancta fee católica' [among them there are many good Christians and some who are very zealous for the holy Catholic faith]. Cisneros was indeed an intelligent and sincere man with a remarkable theological perspective on the New Christians. Since the very beginnings of the Christian Church, he argued, the Hebrew people had been divided into two implacably antagonistic factions, those who venerate Christ and his Church and the hateful 'incrédulos y rebeldes que se obstinaron en la Ley de Moisen y sus tradiciones pharysaicas' [unbelievers and rebels who obstinately adhered to the Law of Moses and their Pharisaic traditions].[43]

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[39] Swetschinski, 'Waardige kooplieden', 18–19.

[40] Ibid., 23; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 98, 252.

[41] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 193–4, 200–1, 233.

[42] Swetschinski, 'Waardige kooplieden', 24–5.

Ultimately, he believed, there was nothing new about this deep rift among the Portuguese New Christian diaspora—in and outside Spain and France—of his day. Yet he also identified a major new element in the situation: the growth of a Sephardic diaspora in Venice, Amsterdam and south-west France since the late sixteenth century which had begun to exert a powerful magnetism on hesitant or doubtful New Christians, disastrously stimulating the revival and growth of crypto-Judaism not only in France and Italy but also in the Peninsula and therefore leading to the perdition of more and more lost souls.[44] In claiming that the new diaspora had generated an intensified religious pull among the Portuguese New Christians in the Peninsula, Cisneros was surely correct. Indeed, it is arguable that generations of modern historians have given far too little weight to the attraction and cultural impact of a new entity such as the crypto-Jewish diaspora in France on *conversos* throughout the hispanic world. A classic instance would be that of the poet and playright, Antonio Enríquez Gómez, a half New Christian, married to an Old Christian woman who was the sister of an Inquisition familiar in Spain. A merchant in Castile, as far as is known he only began to judaize as a result of business trips to Portuguese New Christian communities in France. Drawn to the crypto-Jewish life-style and mental world of Peyrehorade, Bordaux and Rouen, he apostatised only inwardly—but wholeheartedly—from Catholicism to Judaism and in the 1640s and 1650s published a series of Spanish poetical works with Jewish themes, at Rouen, including his epic *Sansón Nazarino* (1656). Having returned to Spain, he settled in Seville under the name Fernando de Zárate but was eventually identified by the Inquisition, arrested, and tried for judaizing and apostasy in Peyrehorade, Bordeaux and Rouen.[45] He died in the Inquisition dungeons of Seville while the Inquisition were preparing to parade, condemn and burn him in Christ's name in the *Auto-de-fé* of 1660.

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[43] BL MS Egerton 343, fo. 249.

[44] Ibid., fos. 256–256v.

While Cisneros was full of sympathy for the plight of what he calls the 'Christianos hebreos', in Spain and Portugal and the horrible calamities and oppression which he believed them to suffer, he was appalled and revolted by 'la confusion que ay entre Christianos y Judios desta nation, que no se destinguan los unos de los otros' [the confusion which prevails between the Christians and Jews of this nation, in that one can not distinguish the one from the other', a confusion prevalent in both the Peninsula and France.[46] There was, in his estimation, no greater calamity in the world than the hesitation of many of the *conversos* between Christ and Judaism. More than a little far-fetched, however, was his explanation as to why numerous genuinely Christian Portuguese *conversos* flee from Spain to France. It was due, he maintains, to the vicious malice of the firm Jews among them: 'no huyen los catholicos de los Tribunales Sanctos, sino de la espada de la lengua sacrilega de los Judios con la qual mataron tambien a Jesu Chrissto nuestro señor, como dize S. Agustin' [the Catholics do not flee the holy tribunals of the Inquisition but the sword of the sacriligious tongues of the Jews with which they also killed Jesus Christ, our Lord, as Saint Augustin says]. The Jews 'of the synagogues' among the Portuguese New Christians in France, held Cisneros, actually dare with the greatest effrontery and insolence in the world to threaten the true Catholics among the Portuguese New Christians, telling them that for every one of theirs whom the Christians have arrested by the Holy Office, they will make sure a hundred believing Christians suffer through false denunciation. These malicious blasphemers were sworn, Cisneros assured ministers, to contrive by means of written correspondence 'la ruina de los Catholicos, particularmente los de Ruan, Nantes y Burdeos' [the ruin of the

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[45] Révah, 'Les Marranes', 50–1; Yerushalmi, *Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto*, 144–5.
[46] BL MS Egerton 343, fo. 256v.

Catholics, particularly those of Rouen, Nantes and Bordeaux].[47] They had after all succeeded in turning the authorities against the true Christians among the Portuguese in Rouen. It was because of their pernicious campaign against the loyal Catholics, he insisted, that so many genuinely Christian merchants, and much Christian capital, had been lost to Spain.

One of those in France who ultimately responded to Cisneros' summons to return to Christ and shake off the 'dead' Law of Moses, was Abraham Cardoso, a Portuguese Jew born in Bayonne in 1614 to a *converso* family which had fled from the Spanish Inquisition. As a young man he had left France and eventually arrived in (Dutch ?) Brazil where, in or around 1637, he had had himself baptized. Subsequently, he returned to Peyrehorade and reverted to Judaism. Finally, though, in Madrid, in 1641, he resolved to be a loyal Catholic and entirely 'reconciled' to the Church, although his detractors claimed that he had attempted to rape his sister, severely assaulted his mother, and been expelled by the community of Peyrehorde for his evil conduct, prompting him to leave for Spain swearing to be revenged on the Jews. Appearing before the Inquisitor Adam de la Parra, one of the most vehement haters of Jews and Judaism in the country, in Madrid, in June 1641, he denounced a number of judaizers whom he had known particularly in Bayonne and Peyrehorade.[48]

Among these was Joseph Sánchez (or Joseph Falcon), a native of Malaga who had settled in Labastide-Clairence, and then Peyrehorade, and for economic reasons taken, like so many others, to going back and forth between France and Spain, being in Madrid at the time the Inquisition arrested him. Another denounced by Cardoso, Domingo Gutierrez, was also a Portuguese *converso* resident of Peyrehorade and vecinity and was likewise arrested by the Inquisition as a result of his informing. A third denounced by Cardoso and then, in turn, by both Sánchez and Gutierrez, was Diego Rodrigues Cardoso, founder of the most important Jewish merchant family in Bayonne. The son of a certain Jorge Rodrigues Cardoso who was nicknamed 'el Brasilero' having made a fortune in Brazil, Diego, according to this Inquisition testimony, emigrated from Portugal to Bayonne and for many years specialised in transporting goods between Madrid, Segovia and other

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Caro Baroja, *Judíos* ii, 145–8.

Castilian towns and Bayonne both by the sea route via San Sebastian and overland via Pamplona. Over the years, the Inquisition gathered more and more material against this prominent figure including a denuciation, freely made in November 1661 by a certain Portuguese New Christian named Joseph García de León, a forty-four year old merchant, originally from Lisbon, who had been living for some years in Bordeaux and then latterly settled in Madrid. According to him, Diego Rodrigues Cardoso was a powerful merchant and a circumcized Jew who from Bayonne regularly corresponded not only with Jews in Amsterdam but with Simon Mendez Soto and with Simon de Fonseca Piña two of the most important *converso* financiers and wool exporters of Madrid.[49] He described a voyage he had made in 1659 on a ship sailing from Bayonne to Amsterdam, loaded with Castilian wool consigned by Rodrigues Cardoso to Manuel Nunes Mendez and Simon Francisco Bernal.[50]

The number of Portuguese New Christians residing in France was obviously considerable. As against 400 adult men capable of bearing arms in the synagogue of Amsterdam, Diego Cisneros provides the following detailed estimates for the French Portuguese New Christian communities:

Table 1: Portuguese New Christian Communities in France in 1637[51]

Town	Number of Families	Individuals
Bastide-Clairence	80	[400?]
Bayonne-Saint Esprit	60	[300?]
Peyrehorade	40	[200]
Bordeaux	40	[200]
Dax	10 to 12	[50?]
Rouen	22	[110?]
Paris	10 to 12	[50?]
Nantes	6 or 7	[30?]

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[49] Ibid. ii, 151–2.

[50] Ibid. ii, 152.

[51] BL Egerton MS 343, fo. 259; Révah, 'Les Marranes', 66; see also Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', p. 21; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 79.

Only by the middle of the century, did the crypto-Judaism of the Portuguese settled in south-west France begin to surface as undisguised Judaism. In Peyrehorade, second largest of the inland communities of Portuguese New Christians in France—there were around 275 members of this community in 1640—it became usual to inscribe Jewish rather than Catholic names on gravestones in the Portuguese cemetery from as early as 1641, a definite indication that at least the core of the community had now been firmly won over to Judaism; thereafter, the tradition of using Jewish names remained unbroken.[52] The same transition occurred at Labastide-Clairence which, by that time was no longer the largest of the Portuguese communities, a little later, as from 1659.[53] Hence, by the last years of Mazarin's regime, not only had open Judaism won the battle over concealed Judaism, but the Jews among the Portuguese New Christians in France had managed to marginalize the Catholics, except at Nantes. In Bordeaux, committed Catholics among the Portuguese, seeing their defeat, became increasingly defensive and dispirited. An Inquisition informer reported, in 1651, that there were only twenty or so genuine Catholics still left among the Portuguese community in Bordeaux, with another three at Dax. Worse still, in Bayonne and Peyrehorade there was now no-one at all who was prepared to stand up and insist on his submission to Christ and the Church—a most remarkable outcome.[54]

A bridge between Holland and the Iberian Peninsula, in one notable connection the Sephardic merchants of south-west France constituted a key link between Amsterdam and Morocco. The corsair republic of Saleh needed the Jews of Amsterdam to supply them with arms, munitions and naval stores and to organize the resale in northern Europe of certain kinds of captured cargoes. But on occasion they also needed their services to organize the business of ransoming captive Christian seamen. They could sell them as slaves within the Maghreb but it might well be more lucrative to ransom them back to their families. French seamen from the south-west captured by Saleh corsairs in any case were sometimes ransomed back in this manner. Thus, on 1 August 1625, Francisco Vaez de Leon

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[52] Nahon, 'Inscriptions', i, 355–8 and ii, 349, 351.

[53] Nahon, 'Une approche des attitudes', 7; Nahon, *Métropoles et péripheries*, 238.

[54] Révah, 'Les Marranes', 67.

[alias Moseh Cohen Henriques] in Amsterdam drew up a contract with Jeannes de Molaco of Hendaye in France through the mediation of an Amsterdam Jewish broker, Juan Gonçalez, under which Vaez de Leon instructed his factor at 'Saleh in Barbary' to ransom six men, presumably ship's crew, all from the Hendaye-Irun region, one of whom, Beltram de Xail was described as a 'master carpenter from Hendaye' at a rate to be negotiated in Saleh but of not more than 400 guilders per person.[55] A still more remarkable procedure arranged in Amsterdam by Diogo Nunes Belmonte, in August 1625, witnessed by Abraham Querido, authorized Jacome Luiz,[56] at Bayonne, to collect from eleven relatively prominent persons living in the Saint Jean de Luz-Ascain-Bayonne area varying sums ranging between 207 and 607 reals of eight, and from Monsieur de Foise Cabel, in Bayonne 438 livres tournois. These sums had been paid by Aaron Querido, Belmonte's factor in Saleh, 'as ransom money for prisoners and slaves who were ransomed and released by him, according to letters from the said prisoners that Belmonte sent to Luis'. Luiz was to collect the money, guaranteeing that the ransomed people would freely depart from Saleh for France, or failing collection to arrange for them to revert to their first captivity or slavery.[57]

After the end of the war between France and Spain, in 1659, Bayonne and Bordeaux resumed their role as way-station and financial bridge between Madrid and Amsterdam. However, while networks linking Seville, Madrid, Navarre, and south-west France with Amsterdam survived after the end of the war, many of the most notable ties were seriously endangered or eliminated by the renewed Inquisition drive of the 1650s and 1660s and subsequently. In 1654, thirty six Portuguese New Christian families were reported to have fled Madrid alone in the last three or four years, two-thirds of them to settle in France, mostly Bayonne.[58] Isabel Enriquez, widow of the Madrid *asentista*, Duarte Coronel Enríquez, one of farmers of the Aragonese *puertos secos* in the 1620s and 1630s, fled Madrid for Bayonne in that year. Fernando Montesinos, having been reconciled by the Inquisition in 1656 fled the following year via France to Antwerp. In 1662, Simon Mendes Soto, another leading Portuguese New Christian of

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[55] GAA NA 646B, pp. 1250–1. Deed, Amsterdam, 1 Aug. 1625.

[56] On Luiz, see the entries under his name in the Index to this volume.

[57] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', no. 3349.

[58] Schreiber, *Marranen in Madrid*, 396.

Madrid was arrested by the Inquisition, at the age of seventy-four. He was a close relative of Francisco Mendes Soto who had moved to Rouen from Saint Jean de Luz early in the century, and of the Madrid merchant, Antonio Mendes Soto who fled to Rouen in the early 1630s as well as an uncle of Antonio Lopes Suasso and the Jacob del Monte (alias Jacob del Soto; alias Jacob Vandenberg) who likewise set up as a leading merchant in Amsterdam in the 1650s.[59] In addition to the wealthy elite, there was a continuous stream of poor Portuguese New Christians migrating from Castile to south-west France on a sufficient scale indeed to make possible the development of a small craft or industrial sector. The Sephardic workshops of Bayonne in particular processed chocolate, tobacco, and soap.[60]

In contrast to Bayonne, the initially smaller Sephardic merchant community of Bordeaux imported colonial products from the Caribbean and East India goods from the Netherlands in part for the wider French market as well as for Spain. The evidence of cargoes consigned from Middelburg to Bordeaux, on two vessels the *Wapen van Borstel* and the *Rouen* captured by the English in 1664 lists Diego Cardozo Lainez, Fernando Lopez Lamaire, Manuel Fernandez Miranda, Gaspar Gonsales, Raphael Henriques, Paulo de Porto, and the physician-merchant, Pierre Lopez, son of the Dr Francisco López discussed above, and brother of Antonio Lopes Suasso, as importers of Dutch East India calicoes, pepper, nutmeg, cinnamon and as well as woollens and other European textiles.[61]

By the mid seventeenth century, and during the next few decades, Sephardic merchants in Bordeaux and Bayonne, both those who were wealthy and their more modest co-religionists, usually had close relatives with whom they were simultaneously trading, on the one hand in the Peninsula and, on the other in Holland. This was a situation which not only convoluted religious identities but greatly complicated marriage negotiations and the administering of legacies. Thus, for instance, when Moseh Mendes Sereno, Jewish merchant of Amsterdam became ill and drew up his will there, in June 1661, he left equal amounts, 200 florins to his brothers, one of whom, Francisco Mendes Sereno, lived in Bordeaux where their father, Hector Mendes, resided, and another of whom, Diogo Mendes Sereno, had remained in Lisbon.[62] This can not have been an easy matter for the executors of the will. In the not infrequent cases where legacies cut right across the gulf between hispanic catholic society and Sephardic Judaism, it often seemed advisable in France as well as Holland (and perhaps even in Spain and Portugal) to enlist rabbinic supervision over the executors to ensure that the rightful heirs received their full legacies. In this respect, Amsterdam served as the ultimate arbiter between Spain and the Portuguese crypto-Jews in France. Thus, for instance, in September 1661, two young Jewish men who had emigrated to Holland from France but had earlier lived in Spain, Diego Mendes Peixoto (alias Joshua Peixoto) and Antonio de Sierra (alias Pinhas Jehuda) appeared before the notary Pieter Padthuysen, in Amsterdam, at the request of Haham Isaac Aboab. Their task was to confirm on oath that the 'Simon de Sotto', living at Bidache and the 'Alvaro de Sotto', living in Peyrehorade, were the persons of those names designated to receive legacies under the will of D. Antonio Henriquez 'in syn leven woonachtich tot Madrid' [during his life living at Madrid], and that they knew this having known both of them for a long time and having been much in their company as well as in that of Dr Henriquez, in Spain.[63] In this way Aboab could make clear the factual basis of his dispositions.

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[59] Ibid., 223–4.

[60] Zink, 'Juifs d'eau douce', 212.

[61] PRO HCA 30/503. Claims regarding the intercepted ship the 'Arms of Borstell' (1664–5).

On the same day, again at the request of Haham Isaac Aboab, the same two men, certified that they had long known Maria Fonseca, Leonor Fonseca and Ana Henriques da Fonseca, the last the widow of Juan Fernandez Raposo, all three living at Peyrehorade, and could confirm they were all daughters of Francisco Gomes da Fonseca and consequently were the persons designated to receive money in Dr Antonio Henriquez' will.[64] This last testament was an important one and a panel of three executors had been appointed in Amsterdam who were all prominent merchants and all originally from Madrid—João Nunes Henriques, and Abraham and Isaac Pereyra, the latter two using their business aliases (Francisco Antonio de Gurre, and Antonio de Aguirre) when trading with Spain so as to be able, without difficulty, to correspond with Spain.[65]

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[62] GAA NA 2890B, p. 695. deed, Amsterdam, 28 June 1661 (P. Padthuysen).
[63] GAA NA 2890A, p. 361. deed, Amsterdam, 21 Sept. 1661 (P. Padthuysen).
[64] Ibid., p. 363. deed, Amsterdam, 21 Sept. 1661 (P. Padthuysen).
[65] Ibid., p. 577. deed, Amsterdam, 29 July 1661 (P. Padthuysen).

The controversial partial expulsion from the south-west ordered by Louis XIV in 1684, whatever the original intentions of the monarch, seems ultimately to have affected only a number of poor mainly recent immigrant families deemed superfluous to requirements. The king adopting a more and more intolerant stance in the early 1680s, and piling the pressure on the Huguenots, had already, in 1683, expelled the Jews from Marseilles, and also decreed their expulsion from Martinique and Guadaloupe.[66] Colbert was clearly opposed to any sort of expulsion of the Jews from south-western France but since the arrest of two Bordeaux Sephardim for sacrilege, in 1682, the king insisted there must be some resounding demonstration of royal condemnation and Catholic zeal. Yet the king decided against an immediate general expulsion, as Colbert informed the intendant of Bordeaux, in January 1683, knowing that the 'expulsion générale de tous les juifs' would be damaging to French interests 'comme le commerce presque général est entre les mains de ces sortes de gens-là, sa Majesté connoit bien que le mouvement qui en arriveroit au royaume seroit dangéreux'.[67]

The king's plan, explained Colbert, was first to reduce the numbers and economic significance of the Jews in south-western France and gradually whittle down their position so that at a later date they could be expelled with impunity. Accordingly, the intendant was directed to expel a few families as retribution for the blasphemy and sacrilege, and prepare a selection of other families to be expelled later, and to allow no more Portuguese to settle in Bordeaux: 'et ainsy sa Majesté croiroit qu'en huit ou dix années elle pourroit les chasser entièrement du royaume'. Expulsion by stages then was Louis' intention, aimed at eliminating the Portuguese Jews from French commerce 'insensiblement', little by little transferring their commerce to 'marchands françois sujets du Roy'.[68] Similar orders were presumably sent to the other intendants. Some ninety four families were reportedly expelled by the authorities in all: thirty-six from Perehorade, twenty from Bordeaux, nineteen from Bayonne, fifteen from Bidache, and three from Dax.[69]

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[66] Arbell, 'Jewish Settlements in the French Colonies', 294.
[67] *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert*, vi, 188–9.
[68] Ibid.; Israel, *European Jewry*, 133–4.
[69] Nahon, *'Nations' juives*, 3–7.

In the end though Louis' planned general expulsion of the Portuguese Jews from France in contrast to the expulsion of 1683 from the French Antilles, came to nothing. The economic haemorage, and severe and evident damage to commerce and industry, caused by the flight of the Huguenots commencing in the early 1680s and culminating in the wake of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), caused a rapid change of heart at court and among the French royal bureaucracy: in fact no more measures were taken against the crypto-Jews in the south-west. Indeed, the effects of the partial expulsion of 1683 were barely noticeable only a few years later. According to one estimate, the Sephardic Jewish population of Bayonne alone rose as high as 800 by the end of the seventeenth century.[70] While the inland communities were now in decline, the Portuguese Jewish communities of Bayonne and Bordeaux entered on a veritable golden age in the 1690s, a period of prosperity and expansion which was to continue down to the Revolution.

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[70] Zink, 'Juifs d'eau douce', 209.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CANARY ISLANDS AND THE SEPHARDIC ATLANTIC TRADE NETWORK (1620–1660)

The Canary Islands had since the earliest stages in the evolution of Spain's trade with the New World been an ideal way-station on the trans-Atlantic convoy routes to New Spain and Spanish South America. During the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal (1580–1640), they were also regularly resorted to as a way-station on the route from Europe to Brazil. Owing to their advantageous geographical location, numerous bays and harbours and status under the Castilian crown, as well as their thriving viticulture and seafaring Spanish-speaking population, the Canaries were ideally suited to serve as a maritime link between the Old World and New and as a link in the global web of Sephardi maritime trade networks. Even so, as the relatively brief involvement of northern European Sephardi Jews with the Canaries—via the Portuguese New Christian trade diaspora in the islands—in the early and mid seventeenth century demonstrates, it was also, for the them, very much a high-risk sector.

Various Spanish institutional bodies kept a watchful eye on the maritime commerce of the Canaries and for compelling reasons, given that those islands were always a likely loop-hole in Spain's trans-Atlantic maritime system. The royal *Consejo de Indias* in Madrid and the *consulado* of the Indies merchants, at Seville, shared a strong interest in curbing the contraband traffic with Spanish America that was endemic there, in the former case seeking to stop evasion of royal trade regulations and imposts, and prevent illegal emigration to the New World, and in the latter hoping to combat interloping of a sort apt to undermine the profits of the official Indies trade. Since 1611, royal policy stipulated that licences could be issued for vessels sailing from the Canaries to the northern coast of South America and the Caribbean (but not New Spain, Cuba or Buenos Aires), and back, but only to export *frutas de la tierra*—the wines and other agricultural products of the Canaries themselves—over half of which came from the island of Tenerife and much of the rest from La Palma. Although the five other principal islands—Gran Canaria, Fuerteventura, Lanzarote, Gomera and Hierro—also participated in the trans-Atlantic trade, and developed their own links with northern Europe, they did so only on a comparatively small scale.[1] Santa Cruz on Palma and Oratava, on Tenerife, were always the pre-eminent harbours for larger vessels. Shipping goods direct from northern Europe to the Spanish New World was, at all times, strictly forbidden and so, equally, was the indirect traffic with America via the Canaries by-passing the royal tax and registration procedures at Seville and Cadiz and their out-ports.

Northern Sephardic Jews seem to have first become involved in trade with the Canaries during the Twelve Years' Truce period (1609–21) when what was then their principal trade, that with Portugal, became closely associated with the trans-Atlantic traffic between Portugal and Brazil. At that time, a former inspector of ships sailing for the Spanish Indies from the Canaries, Alonso de Cianca, published a well-informed tract denouncing the illegal Portuguese trade via Buenos Aires and the River Plate route to Potosí as the principal cause of the weakness and stagnation of the official Spanish Indies trade from Seville and its outports. Of the more than 200 ships reported to be sailing from Portugal to Brazil each year during the latter part of the Truce—many of them Dutch or Hanseatic vessels licensed to load sugar in Brazilian ports and bring the sugar back to Portugal—he claimed that a considerable proportion, even perhaps as much as a third, was putting in, *en route*, to load with wine and other products of the Canaries supposedly for the Brazilian market but in fact often for Buenos Aires and the contraband trade via the Río de la Plata to Brazil.[2]

That Amsterdam Sephardi Jews participated in this transit traffic, via the Canaries, to Brazil before 1621 is not only to be presumed from the fact that Portuguese New Christian merchants in Oporto, Viana, Aveiro and Lisbon (who were often factors of Amsterdam Jews) dominated this traffic but is also plainly evident from several complex Dutch admiralty court cases that arose in the early 1620s, after the resumption of Dutch-Spanish hostilities in April 1621. A remarkable instance is that of a Dutch vessel, *De Coninck David*, for five sixths owned by Thomas Nunes Pina (Joshua Sarfati), a prominent Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish merchant trading with Portugal and Brazil, which sailed from Holland to Viana where Nunes Pina's factor, Gaspar Caminha Regio, had the goods registered and taxed, installed a new crew and renamed the vessel *A Senhora do Carmo*. It then sailed to the Canaries to load with wine before proceeding to Bahia where it was unloaded and reloaded by Caminha Regio's factor, Francisco Vas, with 125 cases of sugar, nine casks of ginger and other American products.[3] On the return voyage from Bahia to Viana, the vessel was captured by a Dutch privateer and brought in to Rotterdam, its papers seemingly proving that it was an enemy vessel and that its cargo was consigned to Caminha Regio, in Viana. Nunes Pina was then faced with trying to persuade the Rotterdam admiralty authorities that ship and cargo actually mainly belonged to him.

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[1] García Fuentes, *Comercio español con América*, 96–8.

[2] Cianca, *Discurso breve*, fos. 4–4v.

The Spanish ban on Dutch ships and cargoes, imposed in April 1621, did evidently discourage Dutch Sephardi involvement in the Canaries during the 1620s and 1630s. As in the Mediterranean, one notable consequence of the ban on 'rebel' commerce was to assure the general ascendancy of the English in the foreign trade of the Canaries, an hegemony challenged briefly, by the Dutch, in the years after 1647 down to the 1660s, but which in the longer run became more and more marked as the seventeenth century wore on.[4] Insofar as the Amsterdam Sephardim succeeded in continuing with their indirect trans-Atlantic trade with Brazil and the River Plate, during these years they seem to have found it easier to use the island of Terceira, in the Azores, as their chief mid-Atlantic entrepot rather than the Canaries.[5] Nevertheless, Amsterdam Portuguese Jews did continue to organise some voyages to the Canaries during these difficult years. Thus, for instance, in November 1627, Diego Lopes Telles, Portuguese Jewish merchant in Amsterdam, freighted a fifty-last Rotterdam vessel, *De Fortuijne* to sail to Santa Cruz, on Tenerife, bringing 150 pipes in sheaves and other goods with instructions to load with wines and other items, presumably Ibero-American goods there, with permission, if his holds were not full, to sail also to Lanzarote to top up with salt, before returning to Amsterdam.[6]

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[3] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', no. 2613, Amsterdam, 6 April 1622.

[4] Torres Santana, 'Visitas de navios', 439–40, 443.

[5] See, for instance, 'Amsterdam Notarial deeds' nos. 3575, Amsterdam, 18 Aug 1627 (Jacob and Nicolaes Jacobsz.); no. 3577, Amsterdam 20 Aug. 1627 (Sibrant Cornelisz.); no. 3592 Amsterdam, 14 Sept. 1627 (Jacob and Nicolaes Jacobsz.); no. 3594, Amsterdam 16 Sept. (Jacob and Nicolaes Jacobs); no. 3635, Amsterdam, 17 Dec. 1627 (Jacob and Nicolaes Jacobsz.)

Despite the beginnings of regular Canary wine imports into England, well before 1640, most wine exported from the Islands at that stage was still being shipped to Brazil, Guinea, and Angola. Consequently, the Portuguese secession and ensuing ban on trade with the Portuguese colonies in force from 1641, precipitated a severe slump in the Canaries and a temporary but steep fall in the value of rents and tithes.[7] This obliged the Islanders to re-orientate their trade towards northern Europe and the Spanish Indies, a task made easier by the drop in price of their wines. While this development undoubtedly boosted the commerce between the Canaries and England, it also stimulated participation in the still prohibited commerce with the United Provinces. In January 1643, Samuel Dias in Amsterdam, using the alias 'Michael Smit',[8] chartered a Hamburg vessel to sail to Tenerife and back and, in October of the same year, a second ship, to sail again to Tenerife to load Canary wine and other goods for Amsterdam.[9] It is quite possible, moreover, that the beginnings of Portuguese New Christian activity in the Canaries trade, at London, dates from precisely this time. Certainly, Antonio Fernandes Carvajal, the leading Portuguese crypto-Jewish merchant then based in London (and later, in 1656–7, one of the leading figures in the founding of the London Sephardi congregation), began importing wine from the Canaries in the early 1640s.[10]

Whether or not the wider phenomenon of increased traffic between the Canaries and northern Europe after 1640 was connected with his arrival, there can be no doubt that the markedly increased involvement specifically of northern Sephardim and Portuguese New Christians in this trade was also directly linked to the arrival in the Canaries in 1641 of Duarte Enríquez Alvárez. Enríquez Alvárez was a Portuguese New Christian *arrendador*, and soon himself also a prominent local merchant, who had been assigned the royal *asiento* for the customs duties on commerce and shipping in the Canaries but who, however, is known to have entered on this undertaking with little or no capital of his own. While it may be that he had been placed in his crucial position by a consortium of Portuguese *converso* businessmen in Seville who presumably regarded the arrangement as beneficial to their commerce with the Spanish New World,[11] at least some onlookers later suspected that the hidden consortium behind Enríquez Alvarez consisted, as we shall see shortly, of Portuguese *conversos* in Rouen and Sephardim in Amsterdam.[12] In any case, for eleven years he administered the customs, and developed new commercial ties between the Islands and northern Europe, together with his Portuguese New Christian deputy in the port of Santa Cruz—his nephew, Antonio Rodrigues Robles who likewise engaged extensively in trade with both England and Spanish America, and a whole team of assistants—his cousin, Manuel López Suárez, his brother-in-law, Enrique Fernandez Ibarra, and Francisco Rodríguez Cardoso—who were all likewise Portuguese New Christians.[13] Enríquez Alvárez prospered and besides his main residence in La Laguna also acquired property at Orotava and elsewhere in the Islands.

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[6] 'Amsterdam Notarial Records' no. 3618, Amsterdam, 4 Nov. 1627 (Sibrant Cornelisz.)

[7] See the report on Canaries trade of 15 June 1654 printed in Millares, *Historia de la Inquisición en las Islas Canarias*, 154; Anaya Hernández, 'El Converso Duarte Enríquez', 379.

[8] See footnote 17 below and Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 413.

[9] GAA NA 1527, p. 162. Amsterdam 28 Jan. 1643 (J.V. Oli); 1528, p. 24. Amsterdam, 13 Oct, 1643 (J.V. Oli).

[10] Woolf, 'Foreign trade of London Jews', 44.

In the course of regular business trips to northern Europe, he developed close connections with London and, in August 1652, apparently having previously freed up and remitted part of his assets,[14] suddenly left the Canaries and settled there on what proved to be a permanent basis. It is apparent, moreover, that along with the rest of the Portuguese New Christian merchants there, he lived until the mid 1650s, (officially at least) as a Catholic, attending mass at the Spanish embassy, conscious, no doubt, among other considerations of the need to protect his reputation and property in the Islands.[15] Whether he was a committed crypto-Jew already whilst developing his business in the Canaries during the 1640s, or whether it was his post-1652 contacts in Amsterdam, and especially his decision to court and then marry an affluent Jewish widow, Beatriz de Vega (alias Leila Enriquez), daughter of one of his correspondents there, which influenced him in this direction, in April 1654, he went to Amsterdam to be circumcized, to join the synagogue and marry her.[16] He assumed the synagogue name Daniel Cohen Enriquez.

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[11] Anaya Hernández, 'El Converso Duarte Enríquez', 368, 415.
[12] Israel, 'Further Data', 14–15.
[13] Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, p. xxxvi.
[14] Millares, *Historia de la Inquisición en las Islas Canarias* vol. iii, 26.
[15] Ibid., 358.

After moving back to London some months later, he summoned his two sons by the Old Christian Spanish woman, doña Magdalena de Rojas y Guzmán with who he had been living extramaritally in La Laguna, one of whom, Thomas de Rojas, was then aged around eight, to board an English ship in the Canaries and come to join his household in London. At that stage, he may still have been living outwardly as a Catholic in that city, together with the other *converso* merchants there. But with the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish War (1655–60), and the threat of being treated as Spanish subjects and having their goods confiscated—Antonio Rodríguez Robles who had also meanwhile settled in London did actually have his assets (40,00 ducats in cash, two ships and 120 pipes of Canary wine) temporarily seized—the London *conversos* submitted their petition to Cromwell declaring themselves to be Jews not Christians and repudiating all allegiance to Spain.[17] Their Jewishness and close ties with Amsterdam were now a publicly proclaimed reality.

It was of course not long before the apostasy of Enríquez Alvárez was known in the Canaries. Evidence against him was collected and he was tried by the Canariote Inquisition *in absentia*. Publicly condemned in the small *Auto-da-fé* held at the cathedral church of the Canaries, on 1 June 1659, an effigy dressed in his clothes and with a face reportedly much resembling his (a portrait of Enríquez Alvarez having been found amongst those of his belongings which he left behind) was brought out and paraded by the Inquisitors.[18] A *sambenito* with the insignia of the condemned man were placed upon it with his name in large letters on the back and a paper crown with flames placed on his head. After the introductory procession, the reading out of crimes and sentences and the celebration of Holy Mass, the Inquisitors delivered the effigy to the deputy *alguazil mayor* of the island who solemnly took it to the place of execution. The effigy was duly cast on the conflagration and consumed.

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[16] Ibid., 359.

[17] Anaya Hernández, 'El Converso Duarte Enríquez', 361–2.

[18] Millares, *Historia de la Inquisición en las Islas Canarias*, iii, 28; Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, pp. 180–1.

A regular maritime traffic between the United Provinces—as distinct from England, and the Canaries, had become much easier in the wake of the Spanish-Dutch peace treaty of 1648. Among those who engaged in the traffic in the late 1640s were Spinoza's father, Michael d'Espinoza, and Manoel and Affonso de Tovar who freighted a vessel in Amsterdam to sail to the Canaries in November 1648.[19] In December 1649, a certain Canariote called Pedro de Peru, resident in La Laguna, departed Amsterdam, as the factor of Manuel de Chavez (Benjamin de Chaves ?), Sephardi merchant at Amsterdam, on board the *Prins*, a vessel carrying merchandise for the account of Chavez reportedly worth 14,000 florins; De Peru, as his commissary, had to dispose of the goods in several ports of the Canaries to best advantage and take charge of the returns.[20] Before long, the mounting evidence of a thriving new contraband commerce between Holland and the Canaries alarmed the *Consejo de Indias* in Madrid who, as always, worried lest the official Indies trade was being undermined and also the *Consejo de estado* who were also anxious to prevent evasion of the ban on the importing of goods from France and Portugal (with which Spain was then at war).[21] In February 1652, the first Spanish ambassador to the Dutch Republic, the Burgundian Antoine Brun, submitted a formal protest to the States General in The Hague concerning this illegal Dutch traffic with the Canaries. It is striking that the chief thrust of the Spanish complaint was about the role of the Portuguese Jews living in the United Provinces, working together with Portuguese *conversos* living in Rouen, in particular.[22] 'L'on a advis', read Brun's text,

> que les marchands d'Amsterdam et autres lieux de la jurisdiction de Messieurs les Estats font des insignes fraudes au grand préjudice de sa Majesté envoyant des vaisseaux chargés de marchandise aux Indes sans aller en Espagne y prendre registre n'y payer aucuns droicts. Ils passent à cet effect droict aux Isles de Canarie où, sous pretexte de charger des fruits du pais, vins et autres, ils prennent registre seullement desdicts fruits, défraudant sa Majesté du droict de toutes les autres marchandises. Il y a encore à présent dans le port de Tessel trois vaisseaux chargés de toiles de Rouen, et quoyqu'on dit qu'elles appartiennent à

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[19] GAA NA 1532, p. 135. Amsterdam, 7 Nov. 1648 (J.V. Oli).

[20] GAA NA 1557A, p. 449. Amsterdam, 6 December 1649 (J.V. Oli).

[21] Morales Padrón, *Comercio Canario-Americano*, 288–9.

[22] ARH SG 7044. Brun to States General, The Hague, 1 Feb. 1652; Israel, 'Further Data', 14–15.

> d'autres maistres, il est néantmoins vray que les dites toiles appartiennent à des Portugais [i.e. New Christians] de Rouen qui ont formée une compagnie en laquelle entre un certain nommé Pereyra,[23] et pour mieux parvenir à leur dessein, ils ont faict en sorte qu'un frère du dit Pereyra, qui a sa demeure aux Canaries, a ajustée à leur compte et de quelques juifs d'Amsterdam et quelques uns des principaux du pais, les Douanes desdites isles, afin qu'estant par ce moyen maistres de tous les ports ils y puissent introduire toutes les marchandises qu'ils voudrant.

It is in fact known from other sources that Enríquez Alvarez had close business ties with a number of Portuguese New Christian merchants residing in the Canaries and in particular with the brothers Tomas y Diego Perera de Castro, prominent merchants whose parents reportedly lived as Jews in Amsterdam.[24] Brun told the States General that he had information that two of the ships at Texel were sailing to Tenerife while a third, and a fourth being made ready at Middelburg,[25] were inended for Palma 'afin de ne poinct faire de bruict'. The skippers on these vessels were Portuguese apart from one who was Dutch. 'On en équippé encore', he added, 'un autre à Amsterdam qui est de six cent tonnelades, monté de 34 pièces de canon, appartenant à quatre frères qui sont de Seville, au compte desquels il va chargé et de quelques marchands et juifs de la ditte ville, et il ira aussy prendre registre aux Canaries comme les précedents.' Brun had no doubt that the States would appreciate 'assez l'extrême préjudice qui resultera à Sa Majesté si ce négoce passe plus avant, puisque par ce moyen on élude toutes les ordres qu'elle a mis pour empescher que l'on n'introduisit en ses royaumes les marchandises de France, et particulièrement les toiles, pour estre transportés aux Indes. Cette insigne fraude si elle continue, destruira les royaumes d'Espagne car outre les millions qu'en tirerent de proffit ses ennemis et rebelles, il est à craindre qu'ils ne se servent du mesme chemin pour tirer les barres d'argent des Indes, les amenant de là en France ou en Hollande'.

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[23] Presumably Diego Perrera's brother, Gaspar de Vitoria Perera who was born at Rouen in 1627 and was seized by the Inquisition on Tenerife in 1662, see Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, p. xxxiii, 183n, 184.

[24] Anaya Hernández, 'El Converso Duarte Enríquez', 354.

[25] during the course of the 1650s several of the Pereira family of Rouen settled in Middelburg after a period in Antwerp, see Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, 139–40, 184.

From this it clearly emerges that Dutch Sephardic Jews—and closely linked with their activities, crypto-Jews at Rouen—were by 1652 intensively engaged in a traffic which not only involved evading Castilian regulations and imposts regarding the Indies trade but also the smuggling in of French manufactures which had been prohibited by the Spanish crown since 1635. At Middelburg, the leading figure apparently—and the only merchant expressly named as trading with the Canaries and being a correspondent of Don Diego Perera, in the Laville lists compiled in the autumn of 1655[26]—was Francisco de Medina who, as we learn from those data, traded in the Canaries under the alias 'Frederick Wolf'. He was the father of Sir Solomon de Medina,[27] the first professed Jew to be knighted in England and according to the testimony to the Inquisition in the Canaries given by his brother-in-law, Gaspar de Perera in 1662, originally from Bordeaux whence he had arrived in the Dutch Republic around 1649.[28] Actually, he must have arrived at least a little earlier, for by December 1648 he was already in business in Amsterdam, one of his first ventures being to charter a vessel to sail to the islands of St Michael, Terceira and Fayal, in the Azores.[29] His wife, Gaspar's and Diego's sister, was named Gracia Perera. For many years, he resided and traded mainly in Middelburg from where he also cultivated strong links with Antwerp. Later, after the Dutch-Portuguese peace was ratified in 1663, he was nominated 'Agent van den Coninck van Portugael' in Zeeland and as such dealt with the Middelburg admiralty college over intercepted Portuguese cargoes.[30] In 1654 'Frederick Wolf', we learn from the Amsterdam notarial archives, freighted at least two Dutch vessels, *De Vergulde Fortuyn* and the *Eendracht*, to spend respectively six and seven weeks unloading and loading, in the harbour at Santa Cruz de Tenerife.[31] His correspondent on Tenerife, and the lynch-pin of the crypto-Jewish trade network in the islands for several years, Don Diego Perera, had actually succeeded Enríquez Alvárez as *arrendador* of the royal customs in the Canaries when the latter had left in 1652.[32] Under his guidance, as under that of his predecessor, contacts with Sephardi merchants in northern Europe flourished as never before and were by no means confined only to commerce but extended also to cultivating social and religious ties with the Sephardic communities of Amsterdam and London.

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[26] See *infra* p. 241.

[27] Rabinowicz, *Sir Solomon de Medina*, 1, 82.

[28] Beinart, 'Jews in the Canary Islands', 61n; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 415.

[29] GAA NA 1532, pp. 147–8. Amsterdam, 14 Dec. 1648 (J.V. Oli).

[30] ARH SG 5581/i. Middelburg Admiralty College to States General, Middelburg, 23 Jan. 1664.

[31] See Israel, 'Further Data', 16.

The high-point of Portuguese crypto-Judaism in the Canaries, and of the crypto-Jewish Canaries trade with Holland and England, was undoubtedly the quarter century from 1641 under the joint influence of Enríquez Alvárez and Diego Perera. Between 1647 and the introduction of the English Navigation Act in 1651, the most profitable way of organizing this trade evidently was to use Dutch ships and goods and then ship the wine into London, its best market. In September 1650, for example, 'Manuel and Alfonso Tovar', Portuguese merchants at Amsterdam, chartered a Dutch vessel to load goods in the Canaries at Orotava, Garachico and Santa Cruz de Tenerife and then proceed with their cargo of wine and other produce direct to London.[33] Manuel (alias Isaac de Tovar) was, or had been, an associate of Michael de Spinoza and like him, in the early1640s had also exported 'Spaensche wijnen' (Canary wines?) to Brazil.[34] By 1650, the quantities of Canary wine being handled by Amsterdam Jewish merchants were indeed such as to permit a very substantial incursion into the English market which had rapidly replaced the Portuguese colonies as the principal market for Canary wine. It is striking that Benjamin Worsley remarks in his pamphlet *The Advocate* written at this time that 'at Spain, Canaries, Zante, with several other places in the Streights where they [i.e. the Dutch] formerly rarely laded hither one ship of goods; they now lately laded hither more than wee'.[35] That the Dutch did indeed briefly threaten to outstrip the English in the Canaries trade and even in ferrying Canary wine—then the most frequent category of wine imported into England—to London does in fact seem to have been the case. No doubt the Dutch invasion of this sector of the British import market was not just a new phenomenon but a cause of considerable friction, one more to that bitter accumulation of commercial grievances felt by the English which so soured Anglo-Dutch relations in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the First-Anglo-Dutch War (1652–4).

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[32] Beinart, 'Jews in the Canary Islands', 61.
[33] Israel, 'Further Data', 16.
[34] GAA NA 1502, p. 100. Deed, 9 Dec. 1642 (J.V. Oli).
[35] Worsley, *The Advocate*, 7; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 204.

By 1651 Anglo-Dutch relations had worsened to the point that dozens of Dutch ships were being seized on the high seas on a variety of pretexts and, not surprisingly, some of these captured vessels were returning from the Canaries. One such was the *De Prins*, carrying Canary wines on behalf of Spinoza's father, Michael d'Espinosa (c. 1588–1654) and confiscated by the English during its return voyage in 1651; in November 1651, d'Espinoza in Amsterdam signed a power of attorney, empowering his London agent, Antonio Fernandes de Carvajal, to seek restitution of the cargo from the High Court of the Admiralty.[36] In the same month, 'Jacques Serrano', Portuguese Jewish merchant at Amsterdam, chartered *De Vergulde Fortuyn*, to anchor for six weeks lay time at Tenerife while Spinoza's father—Spinoza himself was then nineteen years of age—chartered and loaded another vessel, the *Eendracht*, to sail for Tenerife anchoring for seven weeks there before returning with mixed cargo, presumably wine and American goods, to Amsterdam.[37] The Canary trade was by no means the main strand of the Spinoza business empire which the notarial deeds show was orientated chiefly towards the Algarve and Morocco; but neither was it insignificant and the loss of this second cargo was one of a series of blows which led to the eventual bankruptcy of the Spinoza business, in 1655, just a few months before the great philosopher's expulsion from the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam.[38]

Meanwhile, determined English opposition and obstruction to the growth of the Dutch Sephardi Canaries trade was an obvious encouragement for Sephardi crypto-Jews to settle in London and enter the Canary wine trade from there. One of the key figures was Diego Rodrigues Arias, a native of Marchena in Andalusia, who after several years in Amsterdam where he lived as a Jew and imported wine from the Canaries,[39] settled in London in 1651. He was a ship-owner and sailed to Santa Cruz, on La Palma, in January 1653, during the First Anglo-Dutch War, on board one of his own ships to buy and load wine. But unfortunately for him, was promptly denounced by a Cuban black who had served him in London and knew of his Jewish practices. Arrested in Orotava in the house of his brother-in-law Gonzalo Rodríguez Váez, apparently also a crypto-Jew, he was locked up but somehow managed to escape from the Canaries the following year and return to London. Less fortunate were his brother-in-law, sister, Lucina Rodrigues, and nephew, Lorenzo Lindon, who were all arrested in 1656 and held in Canariote Inquisition cells for two and a half years.

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[36] GAA NA 964. Amsterdam, 27 November 1651 (B. Baddel); Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 166.

[37] Israel, 'Further Data', 16.

[38] On the bankruptcy of the Spinoza business, see Israel, 'Philosophy, Commerce and the Synagogue: Spinoza's Expulsion from the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish Community in 1656' in Israel and Salverda (eds.) *History and Culture of the Jews in the Netherlands* (forthcoming).

In most of the documented voyages chartered by Amsterdam Jewish merchants to the Canaries in these years, the procedure was for Dutch vessels to be freighted to lay for six weeks to two months in various bays and harbours of Tenerife or La Palma, and load with both local produce, especially wines, and (presumably) unregistered returns from the Spanish Indies. Only rarely is there an instance, as in October 1651, when northern Sephardi merchants were directly involved in voyages expressly via the Canaries to the Spanish Indies. In that particular case a veteran Spanish seaman, Captain Pedro Rodríguez Henríquez, described as a 'vezino de la ciudad de Sevilla' (inhabitant of the city of Seville), temporarily present in Amsterdam, chartered the vessel *The Angel Gabriel* owned by Manuel de Toralto, number twelve on the 1656 Laville list of principal Dutch Jewish merchants clandestinely trading with the Spanish realms.[40] Under their notarial agreement, witnessed by Manuel Duarte Brandon, Rodríguez Henríquez, Toralto and the third main party to the transaction, the Amsterdam merchant 'Diego de Castro', apparently the alias of another Sephardi merchant, the ship, manned by an all-Dutch crew under skipper Pieter Carel Christoffel Janssen, was to undertake an approximately eight-month voyage, first to Palma, in the Canaries, for unloading and reloading 'y de alli hara su viaje a Caracas y entrará en los puertos de Cumaná, Santo Domingo y Puerto Rico, en todos o en los que dellos sea necessario y no en otro ninguno' [and from there it will voyage to (the coast of) Caracas and will enter into the ports of Cumana, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico, in all or whichever of these will be necessary and not in any other ports].[41] The merchants involved were clearly anxious that the ship should not venture beyond the American ports normally allowed to vessels sailing from the Canaries. On the return voyage the ship was to anchor to refresh, and adjust cargo, in any of the Islands of the Canaries, or else Terceira, and then to proceed to Amsterdam.

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[39] Woolf, 'Foreign Trade of London Jews', 42.

[40] See *infra* p. 239; similarly he appears in the list of nine Dutch Sephardic aliases of merchants trading with western Guyana and elsewhere in the Caribbean in the period 1658–66, drawn up by Samuel Oppenheim: Diego Mendes de Brito (Jacques Albert); Antonio Henriques de Granada (Carlos Guemp); Samuel Dias (Michel Smit); Antonio d'Elgado (Antonio van Duren); Manuel Toralto (Albert Dirksen); Joseph Penha (Carlos de Water); Abraham Antunes (Dirk Janssen); Isaac Aboab (Dennis jennis) and Isaac Henriques Marão (Spycker Veth), see Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 90; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 413.

The contract further stipulated that Captain Rodríguez Henríquez, being a Castilian and legally entitled to apply, was responsible for securing a valid license from the governor of the Canaries for the crossing to the Caribbean with Canariote commodities and ensuring that the Spanish royal regulations were complied with so that the ship would not be confiscated by the Spanish authorities. No payments were due until the vessel returned to Amstedam. Toralto was then to receive 3,300 florins per month in freight charges to be paid by the Captain or by 'Diego de Castro' commo fiador y principal pagador' [as guarantor and principal investor] of the expedition. Should the ship and its cargo be confiscated by officers of the king of Spain, the captain or 'Diego de Castro' was then obliged to reimburse its value to Toralto.

In 1656, Diego Perera was suddenly forced to flee the Canaries, the Canariote Inquisition having been alerted to his family's Dutch Sephardi connections apparently following the arrival of the Laville lists in Spain.[42] This event clearly threatened—but did not in itself the put an end to—the Sephardic commerce with the Canaries. Indeed, the fact that Spain and England were at war between 1655 and 1660 seemingly gave a further temporary boost to the Amsterdam Jewish Canary trade though, despite the war, direct traffic from London by no means ceased entirely. Risks, in any case, remained high for both Amsterdam and London Sephardi merchants participating in the trade. In June 1657, a Dutch vessel, the *Nieuw Stadhuis van Amsterdam*, chartered and loaded by Simon Rodrigues Nunes and probably other Amsterdam Jews was seized at Santa Cruz, and its entire cargo confiscated and sold off, by Don Alonso de Ávila y Guzmán, captain-general of the Canaries.[43] The offense was that it was about to depart for 'Caracas y la Costa de Tierra Firme', having sailed from Holland via Malaga where it had loaded with merchandise unregistered for re-export to Spanish America. Antonio Fernández Carvajal chartered an English ship, *The Irish Merchant* to sail to the Canaries, in December 1655, which had almost completed its voyage successfully, returning loaded with fifty three pipes of Canary wine and 677 West India hides 'for his accompt, and brought back in the said ship to the said port of London' when the goods were pounced upon by an English privateer in the Thames estuary and seized 'as Spanish'.[44] In 1658, an English vessel, the *Mary and Joyce* was captured by the Spaniards but then recaptured at sea by Commonwealth ships, obliging Antonio Rodrigues Robles, the London merchant responsible for forty pipes of wine on board and one now known to be a Jew and not a Spaniard, to explain to the admiralty authorities why he was trading under the alias 'Adrian Turin'.[45] It emerged in the ensuing proceedings that over the last several years he had imported over 300 pipes yearly and in one year, 1657, brought in no less than 600 pipes.[46]

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[41] GAA NA 1557A, p. 1007. Amsterdam, 4 Oct. 1651 (J.V. Oli).

[42] See Beinart, 'Jews in the Canary Islands', 61n; Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, p. xxxiii.

According to testimony given before the Canariote Inquisition, in October 1665, Rodríguez Robles had moved to England together with his uncle, Duarte Enríquez Alvárez, and the two had remained in business together. The nephew as well as the uncle were now regular members of the London Creechurch Lane Synagogue.[47] But by no means everyone in their milieu, in London, sympathized with, or approved, this open discarding of Catholicism. Diego Rodríguez Arias, even after many years living there, was reported to the Inquisition, in the Canaries, to be doggedly and loyally Catholic in sentiment, a regular participant at mass at ambassadorial chapels and always prompt to speak ill of Jews.[48] Still more striking is the case of Enríquez Alvarez' half-New Christian son, Thomas de Rojas, who came voluntarily to see the Canariote Inquisitor Fray Juan García, at Orotava, in November 1665, to testify that whilst he had been living in London, his father had repeatedly urged him to become a Jew, claiming that the Jewish religion is better than the Catholic, and that his stepmother, Lela Henriques, was constantly quarrelling with his father because the latter did not put greater pressure on him to adopt Judaism.[49] Finally, after nine years in London, de Rojas had quit his father's house because he did not wish to hear such things, or live among Jews, and eventually been able to find passage on a ship back to Tenerife.

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[43] GAA NA 2890B, p. 785. Amsterdam 2 June 1661 (P. Padthuysen).

[44] PRO HCA 15/6 part 1, petition of Antonio Fernandez Carvajal, London, 30 June 1656.

[45] Woolf, 'Foreign Trade of London Jews', 49.

[46] A pipe was reckoned at 126 gallons and sold in London at the time for between £30 and £40, so that 600 pipes would be worth the massive sum of £18,000, ibid., p. 48.

[47] Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, 202, 206.

[48] Ibid., pp. 208–9.

In 1659, a Dutch vessel named the *Samuel* chartered to sail to the Canaries by the Amsterdam Sephardi merchant Juan López Chillon, was captured en route by a Basque privateer, and brought into Santander, which led to the Dutch States General interceding in Madrid, with the Spanish king's Ministers, on 'Lopez Chillon's behalf.[50] In June 1659, March 1660 and June 1660, Isaac (Enrique ?) Mendes de Silva and Isaac Levi Ximenes collaborating together, at Amsterdam, organized three voyages to Santa Cruz de Tenerife and other ports in the Islands and then back to Amsterdam.[51] In April 1660, Manoel Rodrigues Carreon, also at Amsterdam, freighted a Dutch vessel to sail to either Santa Cruz, or La Palma, at the discretion of the merchant's commissary on board, unload, load and return to Amsterdam.[52] In August 1660, Affonso Gomes Dias, who was one of those who associated with Diego Perera's brother, Gaspar, in the Netherlands, freighted a Dutch vessel to sail to Tenerife and back to Amsterdam.[53]

However, comparatively little is to be found in the Amsterdam notarial archives regarding Jewish involvement in the Canaries trade dating from after 1662,[54] that is after Inquisition officials on Tenerife arrested Don Diego's brother, Gaspar de Pereira, a merchant and correspondent of merchants in the north, residing chiefly at Orotava, under a warrant issued by the tribunal of Seville, in 1662.[55] Indeed, it seems clear, as Lucien Wolf long ago observed, that with the arrest and trial of Gaspar de Pereira, and the attendant gathering of information that this entailed, the backbone of Portuguese crypto-Judaism in the Canaries was broken, its leading figures if they had not already fled, now all fleeing or being seized. It would seem that it was likewise for this reason that there was also at this time a temporary but marked break in imports from the Canaries on the part of the Jewish merchants resident in England. Indeed, there is no indication that Antonio Rodrigues Robles imported Canary wine to London at any point between 1660 and the early 1670s and when he did resume importing it was on a much smaller scale than in the 1650s.[56] Accordingly, it would seem that this arrest, and the considerable body of information which the Inquisition culled from it about the Portuguese Jewish and New Christian diaspora in northern Europe and the Atlantic Islands, marks a genuine hiatus—the end of the classic phase of northern European Sephardic involvement in the Canaries.

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[49] Ibid., 210.

[50] ARH SG 7053. States General to Philip IV and States General to Reede van Renswoude, The Hague, 19 April 1659.

[51] Israel, 'Further Data', 16.

[52] GAA NA 1540, p. 147. Amsterdam, 14 April 1660 (J.V. Oli).

[53] Ibid., p. 210. Amsterdam, 16 Aug. 1660 (J.V. Oli); Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, 194.

[54] I rely here partly on my own research in the Amsterdam notarial archives and partly on Swetschinski who records only one Amsterdam Jewish freight contract for the Canaries for the whole of the fifteen year period 1661–1676 as opposed to seventeen for the years 1643–1660, see Schwetchinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 328–9.

Despite repeated denials, Gaspar de Pereira, eventually confessed, under torture, to having apostatized, renounced Christian 'truth' inwardly, embraced the Mosaic creed and participated in secret Jewish prayer gatherings and ceremonies with other Portuguese crypto-Jews. The Holy Office, in its usual manner, exacted full retribution for such heresy. A pivotal figure in the crypto-Jewish network linked to the Sephardim of Amsterdam and London, Perera finally emerged from the Inquisition dungeons of Las Palmas, on Gran Canaria, in November 1663, only to be transported to Andalusia to spend the rest of his life incarcerated in the Holy Office's dungeons in Seville, subjected to unremitting Catholic indoctrination. But in the depths of his cell, he at least had much to reflect on. Not only did he have an unrivalled knowledge of the Canaries, and especially their shipping and trade but, having lived in Antwerp and Brazil, he had seen a good deal of Portuguese New Christian society; and, moreover, having several times visited the Netherlands to transact business with Francisco de Medina, knew Middelburg, Amsterdam, and had even seen the mansions of the De Pinto family in Rotterdam—at least from a nearby waterway. Furthermore, during his several prolonged stays in Lisbon, he had participated in extensive discussions about the Sephardi Jews in Holland and the (for him and his group) vital question of 'Christianity versus Judaism' more generally. At Lisbon, he had discoursed not only with New Christians of varying views but even with the great Portuguese Jesuit Father Antonio Vieira.

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[55] Millares, *Historia de la Inquisición en las Islas Canarias* iii, 77.

[56] Woolf, 'Foreign Trade of London Jews', 47.

During his interrogation of 8 March 1662, Gaspar gave details about his sister, Gracia Perera and her husband Francisco de Medina who, he stated, resided in Middelburg where they lived openly as Jews and his brother Manoel Lopes Pereira—or, as he is called in the *Ascamoth* of the London Sephardi congregation, Isaac Haim Raphael Pereira (1633–1709)—who, like himself, had been born in Rouen but who later, at the time of the *de facto* Readmission, in 1656, had migrated to London. This Manoel, known from other sources to have also employed the aliases 'Manoel de Velazquez' and 'Jacques Vandenber' (or Vandepeere) in his commercial dealings, subsequently resided and traded—in part at least still in liaison with his brother in Tenerife—for some years in Dublin. It emerges from the testimony of a deponent before the Canariote Inquisition, of September 1665, that in 1661 a ship called *the Prophet Daniel* came to Tenerife from Ireland consigned to Gaspar de Pereira Victoria, sent the deponent supposed, by his brother in Dublin. The same witness, who had himself been in Dublin, also declared that as far as he knew 'Vandenber' was the only merchant in Ireland who traded with the Canaries. Within a few years of Gaspar's arrest, his brother returned to London from Dublin and in 1668/9 served as *gabay* (treasurer) of the London Sephardi congregation.[57]

Informing the Inquisitors about his wealthy merchant brother-in-law, Francisco de Medina, in Zeeland, Gaspar referred to his involvement in Dutch colonizing schemes at Essequibo, in western Guyana. Whilst lodging with his sister in Middelburg, Francisco and she had continually tried to involve him in Jewish observances, or so he assured the Inquisition, in an effort to suggest opposition to Judaism and win their sympathy. One evening he had attended a supper party, at which there were three guests, one of whom was called Gabriel de Paz, a native of Seville, the second a certain Jorge Nunes

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[57] *Libro de los Acuerdos*, 38.

Nieto, native of Viana, and the third a Dominican friar who had fled from the Spanish Indies to become a Jew in Amsterdam and whose name he did not remember. These three, he said, had then gone with many others to a new possession of the Dutch 'in Brazil'. In fact the destination was Essequibo in Nova Zeelandia (western Guyana) where the Zeeland towns had, in 1657, granted full religious rights and exceptionally liberal economic privileges to Jews willing to settle there and help colonize the territory.[58] Francisco de Medina's role seems to have been as a kind of organizer and inspirer of this venture and it was he who applied, on 8 April 1658 to the committee of the States of Zeeland for passports for various persons of the Hebrew nation who wished to settle there.[59]

Under torture, Gaspar also bore witness against his aunts, his mothers' sisters, Simona Lucena and Catalina Diaz as judaizers since they had left the Portuguese New Christian community in Antwerp and gone to live in Middelburg which, as he remarked, was an action tantamount to public acknowledgement that one renounced Christianity and embraced Judaism.[60] Continuing the interrogation on 11 September, Gaspar claimed to know nothing 'suspicious' regarding his mother and assumed that she had died in Antwerp in loyal obedience to the Church. However, should it prove that she had also moved to Middelburg then he would admit that she too must have renounced her Christian allegiance and, hence, he would denounce her too, since he believed the only possible motive for deciding to live there was so as to live freely as a Jew. In Antwerp, most of the Portuguese New Christians, including the crypto-Jews and undecided, among them, kept up a scrupulous show of Christian devotion but there were also one or two expatriate Dutch Sephardim, notably—as Gaspar several times remarked—Lopo Ramirez and his son-in-law, Isaac Aboab—who enjoyed a special dispensation from the royal governor of the Spanish Netherlands to live as observant Jews albeit only in private. These men were not just scrupulous in their Jewish observance but, even in Antwerp, were generally known to be such.[61] Just as Perera testified, from 1653 to 1660 whilst living in Antwerp, Lopo Ramirez was indeed the most conspicuous Jewish figure in the city—but for that very reason it was evidently inadvisable for the Portuguese New Christians living there too closely to associate with him. Gaspar added that he never saw Dr Espinosa, doctor of medicine, or the brothers Gaspar and Melchior Rodrigues Resio, both Portuguese by birth, go to mass the whole time he was in Antwerp from which one could infer, he remarked, that they were secret Jews.

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[58] Cohen, 'The Edgerton Manuscript', pp. 333–47.

[59] Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, 191; Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society xvi, p. 164.

[60] Lucien Wolf identifies these two as Rachel Dias de Lucena (d. 1671) and Ester de Lucena (d. 1670) who are buried in the former Jewish cemetery at Middelburg, see TJHSE vii, 126; Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, 184.

In Amsterdam, he recalled having participated in several lively discussions reviewing the arguments for and against Christianity while in the Rua Nova, in Lisbon where the New Christian merchants discussed business, Gaspar had discoursed with several leading merchants who later fled from Portugal, and the Inquisition, and reverted to Judaism in Holland, including Geronimo Gomez Pessoa and Estevan Luis de Acosta.[62] Through discussion and examining books on religion, we see once again, how the western Sephardim and the New Christians continued their perennial tug-of-war between Christianity and Judaism. Nor were public defections by any means always away from Catholicism to Judaism. A resident questioned by the Canariote Inquisition in September 1668, by the name of Manuel Antonio, declared that he had been born in Recife in northern Brazil, in 1646, and that his parents David Vello and Judith Pereira who had been married in Amsterdam before emigrating to Brazil, and had had him circumcized and brought up as a Jew.[63] Until the age of twenty-two he had steadfastly remained a Jew. But on arriving at the Cape Verde Islands, on a an English fleet *en route* to the East Indies, he had found and read a book which had revealed to him the power and truth of Christian doctrine which, he assured the Inquisition, had filled him with sublime joy and led to his seeking entry into the Catholic Church that very year.

But often the flow was the other way. In Lisbon where Gaspar de Pereira read as well as talked—and where, he mentions, he received a number of forbidden books from Amsterdam, sent among others by Balthasar Alvares Noguera,[64]—he had also known Jerónimo de Cáceres, a relative and correspondent of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, who was apparently an active proselytiser among the Lisbon New Christians. Gaspar confessed that it was in fact De Cáceres who had been instrumental in leading him personally to adopt Judaism inwardly, shortly before he emigrated to Brazil.[65] Nothing could be clearer than that Gaspar de Pereira had lived in, and become the victim of, two linked and yet antagonistic cultural worlds, that of the Jews of the Netherlands and that of the crypto-Jews and New Christians of Antwerp, Lisbon, Brazil and the Canaries. His role as a link between the Sephardic diaspora of the north and the New Christians of Lisbon and the Canaries, a well as between the merchants of Europe and America, was indeed a highly remarkable one, though in the end he paid a terrible personal price for his part in sustaining it.

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[61] Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, 185, 190, 194–5; Israel, 'Lopo Ramirez (David Curiel)', 115–18.

[62] On Antonio Luis, see the Laville lists no. 31.

[63] Ibid., 214.

Yet the rupture in 1662 was not final. Although there appears to have been no subsequent significant revival of the Dutch Jewish trade with the Canaries, or resurgence of an externally orientated Portuguese crypto-Jewish social and trade network in the Islands,[66] a limited trade subsequently resumed with Sephardi merchants in London, importing Canary wines direct from the Spanish producers in the Islands. The chief Jewish importers after 1662 were the brothers Jorge (Abraham) and Domingo (Isaac) Rodríguez Francia who had been born at Almeida, in Portugal and had lived and traded for many years in Malaga before fleeing to London, in 1655. Despite their long stay in Spain, they reportedly continued to speak correct Portuguese but noticeably defective Spanish. They obtained their shipments of Canary wine from several different suppliers in the Islands, including a Vergara de Grimon and a 'Pasquill de Attochia', the latter a former Madrid businessman who had set up as a wine producer in the Canaries and who sent his initial cargoes in 1656–8 to Fernandes Carvajal. What was probably their most important link was with Don Thomas de Nova Grimon who owned several vineyards in Tenerife and over many years continued to send them some 800 pipes yearly.[67] None of their Canary suppliers in the 1670s seems to have been a Portuguese New Christian.

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[64] See the Laville list no. 18.
[65] Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, 192.
[66] Ibid., p. xlii.
[67] Woolf, 'Foreign Trade of London Jews', 48.

The brothers Rodríguez Francia acquired an almost legendary status in the Canary Islands where everyone seemingly knew they were Jews who had fled the Inquisition.[68] But their correspondents in the Canaries being irreproachably Catholic and Old Christian by extraction, and their own status as English subjects trading with the realms of the king of Spain being covered by the peace terms of 1660, it was a situation which compromised no-one and left the Inquisition powerless to interfere. The Holy Office could do no more than impotently gather testimony confirming the Jewishness of the brothers. As Thomas de Rojas testified before the Canariote Inquisitors,in London the brothers were never seen participating at Holy Mass, had had themselves circumcized, and lived openly as Jews. Interestingly though, as de Rojas, among many others, confirmed, they could see that absorption into the Jewish community was not for everyone among their group, and had actually advised him that it would be best if he returned to the Canaries. Safely ensconced in London, the Rodríguez Francia also continued mixing readily with all the Spaniards and Portuguese that came there, including a pious Basque merchant named Ignacio de Landjola who became so incensed on hearing the younger brother's irreverent and sarcastic opinion of the Inquisition that he had started a fight, and had to be restrained by some passing Englishmen. Even then he kept on loudly shouting for all to hear that the Inquisition was holy, absolutely holy in all its works, and, were it possible for Inquisitors to have made any mistake, it must surely be their lamentable failure to have burned the Rodríguez Francia, and all their race, as Jews.[69]

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[68] Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands*, 207.
[69] Ibid., p. 212.

CHAPTER NINE

PIRACY, TRADE AND RELIGION: THE JEWISH ROLE IN THE RISE OF THE MUSLIM CORSAIR REPUBLIC OF SALEH (1624–1666)

In 1626–7, the sister towns of Saleh, Rabat, and the fortified Kasbah of Saleh-Rabat, either side of the estuary of the river Bou Ragrag, linking the three, rebelled and seceded from the Sa'adian Moroccan dynasty, forming a self-governing pirate republic which was to remain independent for forty years. According to the Dutch writer Simon de Vries, those who assumed control in the corsair republic of Saleh were not the Moors of Saleh but the old and new Andalusian *Moriscos* of Rabat supported by the Jews. 'For those who there now assumed full governing powers themselves', he wrote, 'were in large measure the Andalusians who had been expelled by the Spanish king [in the year 1609]. Also there lived there a great number of those [i.e. Muslims and Jews] who had been expelled from Granada [in 1492]; all of them, on account of the injustice and ruin inflicted upon them, implacable enemies of the Spaniards.'[1]

Some three or four thousand of the *Moriscos* expelled from Spain in 1609 had indeed settled on the south side of the Bou Ragrag, at Rabat [New Saleh] and around the Kasbah; but Saleh proper, on the north side, also contained Andalusians, those expelled in and after 1492 as well as again, numerous expelled Spanish Jews.[2] After the Spanish occupation of La Mámora in 1614, many of the corsairs previously operating from Larache and then La Mámora, had moved down to Saleh.[3] During the next few years their influence in the locality had grown rapidly. After 1627, to administer their 'free republic', the rebels chose an elected *Alcaide*, or governor who held office for a year, and a governing council or *diwan* of fourteen elders.[4]

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[1] De Vries, *Historie van Barbaryen*, p. 73; see also Moüette, *Relation de la captivité*, 14.

[2] De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 42.

[3] Coindreau, *Corsaires de Salé*, 41.

[4] De Vries, *Historie van Barbaryen*, 74; De Castries, *Sources inédites* v, pp. vii–ix; Coindreau, *Corsaires de Salé*, 37–42; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 221; De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 42.

As the chief basis of their economy, they had at hand fitted out for active service some sixteen or seventeen well-armed frigates with which to ply their trade of maritime piracy. They appointed as their naval commander the celebrated Dutch renegade and corsair Jan Janz. van Haarlem whom they called Murat Reyz or 'Admiral of the Sea'.[5]

There had for several years been acute tension at Saleh between the local inhabitants and the sultan of Marrakesh, Mawlay Zaydan (ruled: 1603–27) over imposts and the administration of trade. According to De Vries, the opposition to the sultan was rooted in the harsh and oppressive character of his rule and especially his efforts to engross all of Saleh's lucrative seaborne trade in his own hands. Not only did he insist on buying up most incoming cargoes himself, 'leaving nothing over for his subjects',[6] but in doing so, and exempting himself from paying customs, severely depressed normal revenues from imposts on imports and exports. 'The Jews farmed the imposts on trade', explains De Vries, and since 'everything the king purchased was toll-free, this meant the tax-farmers could not raise the amounts they had pledged to pay the king. He however had them locked up and forced them to pay the full sum owed. From this arose among his subjects a general hatred against him'.[7]

Their quarrel being with the sultan, and with Spain, the corsair captains at Saleh had ample reason to retain the sultan's alliance with the United Provinces, their prime source of both arms and naval stores. This was the case even before the final break with the Mawlay Zaydan as was clearly shown, for example, in August 1624, when Moseh Pallache, the sultan's Jewish adviser and interpreter, wrote to the States General from the sultan's military camp informing the regents that Murat Reyz [alias Jan Janssen van Haarlem] had, with his, Pallache's, help, obtained a patent from the sultan, proclaiming that no subject of the United Provinces should be captured or enslaved.[8] To help the sultan and the corsairs distinguish between Portuguese Jewish merchants resident in the Dutch Republic and the Christian Iberians who were supposedly the main target of the corsairs' depradations, the States General, in October 1624, forwarded a list supplied by the Amsterdam burgomasters naming the 'marchants portuguois qui, s'estans retirez de la tirannie du roy d'Espagne, se sont transportez en leur ville pour y vivre et exercer leur commerce'.[9] Though incomplete, the list included the names of some of the most prominent figures among the Portuguese Jewish merchants of Amsterdam at that time: Francisco Vaez de Leon [alias Moseh Cohen Henriques], Francisco Lopes Henriques [alias Dr David Farar], Diogo Lopez Tellos, Michael de Crosse, Manuel Lopes Nunez, Duarte Nunes da Costa [alias Jacob Curiel], Jeronimo Henriques [i.e. Joseph Cohen], Manoel da Cunha, Michael Cardozo, Diogo Nunes [alias Jacob Israel] Belmonte, and Manoel de Pina.[10]

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[5] De Vries, *Historie van Barbaryen*, 74; Coindreau, *Corsaires de Salé*, 67.
[6] De Vries, *Historie van Barbaryen*, 74.
[7] Ibid., 73.
[8] De Castries, *Sources inédites* iv, 10–11. Moseh Pallache to SG, 18 Aug. 1624.

By the mid 1620s there was also a small resident community of Portuguese Jews from Amsterdam residing in Saleh, servicing the pirate republic's burgeoning commerce with Holland.[11] The then thirty-one year old Lopo Ramirez [alias David Curiel], brother of Duarte Nunes da Costa, and one of the leading Jewish merchants in Amsterdam had a factor in Saleh (shared presumably with his brother) named Eleazar Ribeiro. The *Alcaide* and Admiral of Saleh noted, in 1624, that not only were they themselves supplied with munitions from Holland but that the resident Dutch Jewish merchants in Saleh, 'Benjamin Cohin, Haron Querido and others' also supplied arms and munitions to the sultan of Marrakesh with whom they, the men of Saleh, were on increasingly bad terms. Querido, apparently, went originally to Saleh on behalf of Belmonte, Vaz de Leon and other Amsterdam Portuguese Jews, seeking restitution of a Dutch ship *Die Vergulde Starre* [The Gilded Star] in which they were interested.[12] Benjamin Cohen was to remain, a leader of the western Jewish merchants at Saleh, for decades. As one might expect, the westernized Jews were, and continued to be, sharply differentiated by life-style and customs from the majority who continued to dress in Moroccan fashion. By around 1670, 'le plus riche de ceux qui alloient vêtus à la mode des Chrétiens', reported the former French captive, Germain Moüette, was Jacob Bueno de Mezquita.[13] But the westernized Jewish residents were by no means all wealthy men.

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[9] Ibid., pp. 26–7. SG to Mawlay Zaydan, The Hague, 22 Oct. 1624.

[10] Ibid., Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 77.

[11] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 85, 129.

[12] De Castries, *Sources inédites* ist.ser. iii, p. 503 and iv, p. 41.

[13] Moüette, *Relation de la captivité*, 31.

Among humbler members of the group residing in Saleh in the mid 1620s was the son of Sara Nunes, a destitute widow living off the charity of the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam. Her son worked for the Dutch Jewish merchants as an interpreter, and assistant; in 1625, he dutifully sent his mother, from Saleh, via Lopo Ramirez, four quarts of capers and a cask of delicacies, together with a bag of almonds and a case of Spanish soap.

There were also other Amsterdam Sephardim who stayed in Saleh for shorter periods. On 1 May 1626, a young Sephardi of twenty-five named David Gaon attested before an Amsterdam notary, for Antonio Martins Viegas and Pedro Homem de Medeiros, Portuguese Jewish merchants at Amsterdam, that he had been present, and had witnessed the scene, in November and December 1625, when the ship *De Vergulde Valck* of skipper Reijnke Pietersz, of Stavoren, was brought in to Saleh harbour by the corsairs. It carried figs and other goods loaded in Faro, in the Algarve consigned to Pedro Homem de Madeiros, in Amsterdam. Gaon had watched the Moors consume the figs and sell other items and when he left, on 17 January 1626, on a Dutch vessel bound for Amsterdam, Pietersz was still battling to get his ship released, though some of his crew had already left for Spain.[14] Also during the autumn of 1625 Gaon had watched the bringing in of another Dutch ship, this time intercepted outward bound for the Algarve with its outgoing cargo still aboard. The vessel, *De Margriete* of Enkhuizen, chartered by Martins Viegas, was unloaded at Saleh, its cargo of timber and other useful stores being scrupulously divided among the interested parties.[15]

In the years immediately preceding the revolt, Mawlay Zaydan, keeping a wary eye on his disaffected subjects at Saleh, had become increasingly uneasy about the importing of munitions and weapons, ships' stores and gunpowder in considerable amounts from Amsterdam. On 13 November 1624, his Jewish envoy at The Hague, Joseph Biscayno, asked the States General to summon Diogo Nunes Belmonte (b. Belmonte c. 1572–d. Amsterdam, 1629) and require him to show by what authority he was supplying arms and munitions to Saleh since both he, Bizcayno, and the States General had officially refused authorization but 'nonobstant cela il a envoyé quantité de monitions et escopètes d'Amsterdam passé deux mois en environ'. Bizcayno also complained on Mawlay Zaydan's behalf that 'il y a quelques navires de Portuguez en Tessel prest pour partir à le coste de Barberie', asking the States to search the ships, assuring them they would find more unlicensed arms and munitions consigned to Saleh.[16]

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[14] 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds' no. 3428.

[15] GAA NA. 633, fos. 56v–57. (Sibrant Cornelisz.)

The States General asked the Admiralty authorities at Amsterdam to interrogate Nunes Belmonte concerning recent shipments of munitions to Saleh.[17] The latter justified himself by producing a license, authorizing him to export arms and munitions Saleh, issued the previous July by the Amsterdam Admiralty college in response to a request from Aaron Querido, 'zijnen factor te Salée [his factor at Saleh] who had applied 'uyt den naam van den Alcaida ofte gouverneur ende den Admirael aldaer [in the name of the Alcaide and the Admiral there].[18] The authorization was for shot, 2,000 pounds of powder, 150 fire-arms, 200 pikes and 200 *riemen.* The ship dispatched two months before, the *Witte Leeuw* had carried 10,000 pounds of shot, 2,000 pounds of gunpowder, 120 muskets, 200 *riemen*, and 200 pikes, all consigned by Belmonte and Francisco Vaez de Leon [alias Moseh Cohen Henriques][19] to Querido, their factor at Saleh who had ordered the arms in Amsterdam 'sur la demande formulée par le Caïd [i.e. Alcaide] de la Kasba et par l'amiral de Salé, Jan Jansz, dit Murat Raïs'.[20] Unhappy with this situation, the States General decided by resolution of 27 November, that henceforth the Admiralty colleges must allow no munitions of war of any kind to be shipped to 'Barbary' except by 'speciaal consent' of the States General 't welk niet gegeven sal worden, als alleen op 't verzoek van de Coninck zelfs' [which will not be granted except at the request of the king himself].[21]

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[16] De Castries, *Sources inédites* 1st ser. iv, pp. 41–2. Joseph Bizcayno to SG, The Hague, 13 Nov. 1624.

[17] ARH Verzmeling Bisdom (admiraliteitszaken) vol. 51 (1624) fo. 91. Res. 13 may 1624; Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 76–7; Nunes Belmonte who engaged in a wide range of commerce appears to have been the second wealthiest of the Amsterdam Sephardim at the time the new communal cemetery was established at Oudekerk in 1614; he was married to Guiomar Vaz (Simcha Belmonte), sister of Diogo Dias (David) Querido, see Koen, 'Notarial Records', 236.

[18] De Castries, *Sources inédites* iv, 42.

[19] On Vaez de Leon's collaboration with Belmonte, see 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds'. 3476, a freight contract jointly signed by Belmonte and Vas Leon, on 2 November 1626, for the voyage of the 48-last *De Liefde* to Saleh and back; see also Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 76.

[20] De Castries, *Sources inédites* iv, p. 42.

[21] Ibid.

During these years while Dutch vessels bound for Moroccan ports and the Mediterranean were generally regarded as under safe-conduct,[22] the Saleh rovers by no means always refrained (what ever the sultan may have agreed to) from attacking Dutch ships, especially vessels trading with Portugal or Spain, including some owned by Amsterdam Sephardi Jews. As a rule, though, the Dutch seamen thus captured, were not enslaved or at least were fairly rapidly released, though it might well mean nerve-wracking experiences for the men, and the intervention of high political authority, before their release was finalized. In September 1625 making a statement in Amsterdam at the request of the Moroccan Jewish envoy David Pallache, 'servant of the king of Morocco', Albert Evertsz. Brederode, skipper from Amsterdam, 40 years old, and 23 year-old boatswain Jan Jansz van Nieuwenhuys, testified that their vessel, *De Rode Leeuw*, owned by several leading Protestant merchants of Amsterdam had been captured by the corsairs near Lisbon, and brought in to Saleh.[23] There, through the timely intervention of Isaac Pallache, likewise in Mawlay Zaydan's service, they were rapidly released from slavery. Upon their deliverance, Isaac gave the men food and drink in his house and, successfully albeit, reportedly, with some difficulty, dissuaded one of the boatswains from embracing Islam.

The ships too were regularly released but it was otherwise with the cargo. The corsairs were on fairly strong ground here since with the Spanish embargoes in force from April 1621 the papers and passes on Dutch ships sailing to and from the Iberian Peninsula were specially devised to hide the fact of Dutch ownership so that, in a sense, Dutch merchants trading with Spain and Portugal after April 1621, down to the Spanish-Dutch peace of 1648, who lost their cargoes to the corsairs, entered a trap of their own making. Another risk confronting Dutch Sephardi merchants trading with Saleh and generally with the Maghreb, specific to the years of the Anglo-Spanish War of 1625–30, was the considerable likelihood of seeing their cargoes seized by English warships or privateers. Especially at first, English naval captains showed precious little patience with, or sympathy for, merchants with Spanish and Portuguese names, trading with Barbary or the Iberian Peninsula and claiming to be Jews and subjects of the States General, especially when this fact failed to emerge clearly from the ship's papers. One way of circumventing this difficulty was to secure a pass issued by the Prince of Orange. Such a document was included, for instance, in the terms of a freight-contract signed in Amsterdam on 28 May 1626 in which Duarte Nunes da Costa, Lopo Ramirez, Michiel de Pas and Francisco Countinho together hired the vessel *Den Vergulden Haring* armed wish six 1,600 pound guns, manned by eleven men and a boy, and to sail with the merchant's commissary from Enkhuizen to 'Salé in Barbarye' with full cargo.[24] The cost of the passport was to be defrayed by the four merchants.[25] The skipper undertook to anchor at Saleh for seven weeks whilst the commissary unloaded, negotiated deals and reloaded the vessel. On the return voyage, three or four (presumably Jewish) passengers from Saleh were to be accommodated in the cabin, and, the skipper and crew had to defer to the commissary, should his latest information suggest that it would be wise to sail 'northabout'—round Ireland and Scotland—to evade Dunkirk as well as English privateers in the Channel.

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[22] De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 15, 56.

[23] *Studia Rosenthaliana* xxxi (1997) p. 146: 'Amsterdam Notarial Deeds', no. 3357.

In October 1626, Nunes Belmonte and Vaez de Leon together with their insurers, declared, before an Amsterdam notary, that the *Blauwe Duiff* of Rotterdam had sailed on their account to Saleh 'twelk commende van Salé in Barbaryen nae dese landen [. . .] bij de schepen vanden Coninck van Groot Bittanien aengehaelt ende in Engeland ingebracht' [which coming from Saleh, in Barbary, to these lands was intercepted by the ships of the king of Great Britain and brought to England]; they were following the usual procedure, in such circumstances, for contesting the seizure of a vessel, and cargo, before the High Court of the Admiralty in London.[26] Also interested in the cargo, two other Portuguese Jewish merchants of Amsterdam, Jacob Mezurado and Joseph Cohen, did likewise. Belmonte and Vaez de Leon the next month sent a representative, David Franco, to England to reinforce their suit.

In such risky and precarious times, Amsterdam Jewish merchants frequently joined forces when hiring vessels and loading cargo, distributing both outgoing merchandise, and returns, among as many vessels as possible, to spread the risk. However, as most surviving freight contracts provide very little detail, only rarely is it possible to reconstruct what the outgoing and return cargoes were like. *Den Gulden Harinck* of Enkuizen, skipper Jan Jansz. Dol, was seized by the English on its return from Saleh, and brought into to Plymouth in the autumn of 1626, its cargo being consigned to virtually the entire fraternity of Amsterdam Jewish merchants trading with Saleh. After the ship's capture, David Curiel—who, like other Amsterdam Sephardim, evidently preferred to use his Jewish name rather than his usual business name, 'Lopo Ramirez', when trading with Morocco—drew up before an Amsterdam notary an authorization for a proxy to act for himself, his brother, Duarte Nunes da Costa (who had now moved to Glückstadt) and also for his colleagues, Francisco Coutinho, Francisco Mendes de Porto, Diogo Nunes Belmonte, Francisco Vaez de Leon, Isaac Mesurado, Michiel de Pas—the latter for himself and for Antonio Gomez de Alcobaça, Joseph Cohen, Benjamin Cohen 'in den name ende als volmachtige van sijn broeder Jehuda Cohen residerende in Salé [in the name and as proxy for his brother Yehuda Cohen residing at Saleh] and for Abraham and Michiel de Espinoza, all described as 'Portuguese merchants of this city' and all having merchandise aboard.[27]

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[24] GAA NA 633 fo. 56v–7; deed, Amsterdam 26 May 1626 (Sibrant Cornelisz).
[25] Ibid., fos. 57v–8 deed, Amsterdam, 26 May 626 (Sibrant Cornelisz).
[26] Ibid., fos. 96v–97v. deed, Amsterdam, 4 Oct. 1626 (Sibrant Cornelisz).

Although Spinoza's father, Michiel d'Espinoza (1588–1654), was already in his late 30's by 1625,[28] very few notarial deeds documenting his commercial activity survive for the period before the birth of his son, the future great philosopher, in 1632. Michiel is thought to have moved to Amsterdam in 1622 or 1623 from France, almost certainly from Nantes where he had lived probably since leaving Portugal as a boy.[29] As implied by his being mentioned alongside his uncle, Abraham d'Espinoza (alias Manoel Rodrigues d'Espinoza) (d. 1637), in the list of November 1626, Spinoza's father, after arriving in Holland, had entered into a joint venture with his uncle for trade with Saleh and was to remain one of the regular participants in this traffic down to the end of his life. Presumably, as a child Spinoza heard quite a lot, from his father and others, about the Saleh corsairs, and the exotic medley of commodities that the Amsterdam Jewish merchants imported from there.

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[27] GAA NA. 632, fo. 227. deed, Amsterdam, 9 Nov. 1626.

[28] On the age of Spinoza's father see Vaz Dias and Van der Tak, 'Spinoza Merchant and Autodidact', 127–8.

[29] Nadler, *Spinoza*, 31–2.

While full details of the returns on the *Gulden Harinck* are lacking, and we do not know what the Spinozas had on board, there is a partial list made by the ship's skipper, whilst preparing to depart for Amsterdam, at Saleh, dated 1 October 1626, stating that he had taken on board, for delivery in Amsterdam to Jacob and David Curiel (i.e. Duarte Nunes da Costa and Lopo Ramirez) one barrel and thirty-nine cases of sugar, 246 elephants' tusks, 15 caskets of raisins, 80 baskets of raisins, 7 bags and 5 caskets of aniseed, 328 quintals of Saint Martin wood, 10 anchors, 44 hides, 2 bags of wool, seven casks of syrup, 2 mats of soap and a casket of gum. The captain further acknowledged receipt, from Eleazer Ribeiro, of a purse with 617 Moorish ducats and two jewels, a case with merchandise, and two rolls of silk again all consigned to Jacob and David Curiel.[30]

By 1627, the inhabitants of the three towns were in open revolt against the sultan and control of the pirate confederacy passed to a particular group of Moriscos, based in the Kasbah, or Alcázar, known as the *Hornacheros*, after the town of Hornachos, in Extremadura, which, before 1609, had been their home locality. Priding themselves on having preserved the Islamic faith, and Arabic language, more purely than other *Moriscos*, and subsequently having evolved, at Saleh, into a kind of mini-Janissary corps, a military caste originally installed by the sultan in the *Alcázar* to guard the estuary, at first the Honacheros dominated the new corsair republic. By 1627, the revolt and independence of Saleh was a *fait accompli* but one which, in his foreign relations, the sultan was not yet willing to acknowledge. Hence, in September 1627, through his agent in Holland, Joseph Pallache, the sultan lodged a formal complaint with the States General about the continual supply of war munitions to Saleh, and especially of large stone slabs and blocs, demanding that his representative be allowed to check vessels leaving for Saleh and that the admiralty colleges conduct more rigorous searches of the 'navires que d'orenavant partiront envers Salé avecq tables [i.e. *tablas*] et pières, lequelles sont de plus grand domaje que la monition, car aveq icelles ils fabriquent forts et baluvarts contre la volunté de sa Majesté et son service, et se peuvent rebeler contre icelle'.[31] In particular he asked that the vessel *Nachtegael* allegedly loaded with materials for fortifications which

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[30] Koen., 'Notarial Deeds no. 3471.

[31] De Castries, *Sources inédites* iv, pp. 171–2. Joseph Pallache to SG, The Hague, 1 Sept. 1627.

'les Portugues d'Amsterdam transportent en Salé en Berberie' be examined and, if munitions were found, prevented from sailing. According to the ships' papers, though, the *Nachtegael* carried only the usual merchandise exported from Holland to Morrocco, namely cotton cloth, Dutch linen, iron, tobacco, drugs, nails, and planks.[32] While directing the admiralty authorities to inspect the ship once more before it left, the States General thereupon passed a resolution allowing the *Nachtegael* to sail and refusing Mawlay Zaydan's representative in the United Provinces 'l'autorisation de visiter les navires en partance pour Salé'.[33]

The governor of the *Alcázar*, Ahmed ben Ali Becher, wrote to the States General announcing the assumption of power by the new authorities, in February 1628, describing the corsair republic as the 'estado de la alcaçaba y fuerças de Çale y su tierra' [the state of the Kasbah and forces of Salé and its environs].[34] Another missive, sent a few months later, called the inhabitants of the corsair republic 'los Andaluzes' [the Andalusians], assuring the States General that that they were 'mui amigos y servidores' of the Dutch state and that to seal the friendship between the two states, Achmed ben Ali Becher and his colleagues were sending a representative, Mohammed Vanegas. This personage duly arrived, albeit not until October 1629 when he petitioned the States General 'en nombre de los señores Governador y Diwan de la Alcassava de Sallé', explaining that in view of the great insecurity, and endemic state of civil war, prevailing in Morocco, 'y mala sospecha que tienen del rey de Marruecos' [bad suspicion they have of the king of Morocco], that they 'pertenden aserse provincia libre' [they aspire to be a free province].[35] The States General was sufficiently impressed to admit him, together with Aaron Querido who was now back in Amsterdam and who served as his interpreter and adviser in negotiating with the regents. The corsair republic required recognition and good trade relations, including an assured flow of munitions and naval stores, offering protection for Dutch ships and seamen in return. The Dutch response was positive and as a first sign of the new relationship, the States General, on 1 November, approved Aaron Querido's application for permission to export 30,000 pounds of canon balls, (each of six to eight pounds) and 6,000 pounds of powder for the garrison of the Saleh *Alcazaba*.[36]

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[32] Ibid., iv, 189.

[33] Ibid., iv, 188–9. SG to Amsterdam Admiralty College, The Hague, 24 Sept. 1627.

[34] Ibid., iv, pp. 200–1. Achmed ben Ali Becher to SG, Kasbah de Saleh, 15 Feb. 1628.

[35] Ibid., iv, p. 235. Vanegas to SG, The Hague, 23 Oct. 1629.

Portuguese Jewish merchants continued, as before, to handle most of the supply of munitions from northern Europe—in practice mainly Amsterdam—to the corsair republic which, however abhorrent to the Christian world, considerably benefited the Jews of both Holland and Morocco, helped cement Jewish-Islamic relations and, up to a point, and for the time being, also served Dutch interests. While the corsair crews themselves were nearly always *Andaluzes* supplemented with European renegades (since the local Moors showed little inclination for this business), the foremost *commanditaires* and financial backers of the sixteen or seventeen corsair frigates operating out of Saleh from the 1620s onwards appear to have been Jews.[37] Under the rules imposed by the *Diwan*, half the value of captured booty taken from Christians was divided between the *raiz* (captain) and Jewish *commanditaire*, 40% shared among the (otherwise unpaid) crew, and 10% paid in tax to the *Diwan*.[38] The system functioned reasonably harmoniously in the main, though occasionally there were also disputes between captains, between captains and *commanditaires*, and between local and Dutch Jewish merchants. In 1629, a quarrel erupted between Vaez de Leon and Belmonte's former Saleh agent, Aaron Querido which resulted in a highly charged legal contest in Amsterdam. During the course of the feud, Vaez de Leon urged the States General to write, as they did, asking the governor and *Diwan* of Saleh, to ignore any request from Querido for the impounding of Vaez de Leon's merchandise stored at Saleh in the keeping of his new agent there, Isaac Espinoza, since such a seizure would cause him great and unjustified damage and loss.[39]

The corsair republic needed the Jews of Amsterdam to supply them with munitions and naval stores and to handle the resale in northern Europe of captured high-value merchandise. In addition, they relied on them to organize the business of ransoming captive

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[36] Ibid., p. 239. Res SG, The Hague, 1 Nov. 1629.

[37] Coindreau, *Corsaires de Salé*, 56.

[38] Ibid., p. 64.

[39] De Castries, *Sources inédites*, iv, 241. SG to Alcaide and Diwan of Saleh, The Hague, 21 Nov. 1629.

Christian seamen. The corsairs could sell captives as slaves within the Maghreb but in some cases, it seemed preferable, or more lucrative, to sell them back to their families.


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Fedala
Mazagán
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Island of Mogador
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▲ Iberian Enclaves

Map 7. Saleh and the West Moroccan Coast c. 1630

The French were indeed among the Christian nations most aggrieved and incensed by the activities of the Saleh corsairs. A memorable French attempt to suppress, or at least muzzle, the troublesome corsair nest occurred in 1629. The Chevalier Isaac de Razilly (1587–1635), an enterprising nobleman close to Richelieu, who had commanded the royal blockade fleet at the siege of La Rochelle, and subsequently, in 1632, occupied the Canadian region of Arcadie for the French crown, and who, since his visit to Safi, in 1624, as head of an abortive French mission to the court of Mawlay Zaydan, was considered something of an expert on Morocco, had drawn Richelieu's attention to a scheme for suppessing the Saleh corsairs while simultaneously bolstering French influence along the Moroccan Atlantic coast which, in essence, entailed blockading Saleh from the sea and occupying the island of Mogador (which had been fortified by the Portuguese for a time early in the previous century). By building a fort and posting a garrison of a hundred or so men with some twenty canon on Mogador which could be used as a base from which to patrol the Moroccan Atlantic coast, due respect for French shipping and seamen could supposedly be restored.[40]

De Razilly cruised down the Moroccan coast in 1629 with eight warships. After sinking three corsair frigates and bombarding Saleh, he dispatched one of his vessels to reconnoiter Mogador. However, it turned out that the rock to which he had pinned his hopes could not after all be used as a permanent naval base lacking a supply of fresh water and being also in other respects untenable. Since, furthermore, the fortifications of the Kasbah were too strong to be reduced by naval gunfire. De Razilly had little choice but abandon Mogador, suspend his blockade, and return to France, with little accomplished. He returned the next year, though, determined at any rate to release, or ransom, the fairly numerous body of French captives enslaved at Saleh and neighbouring places, in a manner which would win prestige for the French crown. In this he was successful and in addition, in October 1630 captured a Dutch vessel carrying munitions of war freighted in Holland by the Pallaches.[41]

But however formidable the Kasbah of Saleh, and flourishing the port's trade and navigation, the tensions between and among the several groups making up the independent confederacy remained acute.[42] Whilst the semi-hispanicized *Andaluzes* disdained and, in turn, were loathed by the non-Morisco Moorish inhabitants, the *Hornacheros* were just as contemptuous of the *Andaluzes* and made little effort to moderate their ambition to monopolize political, military and fiscal power in the corsair state. Steeply rising bread and grain prices early in 1630 spurred the poor of Rabat to rise against the governor and garrison of the Kasbah and demand a proper share of the revenues from the taxes on trade and privateering. When the governor urged the malcontents to be patient, and await what Allah would provide, they declared they had waited long enough for what was rightfully theirs and would wait no longer provoking the governor to reply that, in that case, he would pay them in powder and shot, at which a brief civil war erupted. When a small Dutch naval squadron of three vessels, sent to tour the ports of the Maghreb and effect the release of captured Dutch seamen, arrived in the river estuary, in April 1630, they were astounded to find a fierce battle raging between the inhabitants of Rabat and the Kasbah.[43] Only after a tremendous expenditure of powder and shot lasting some weeks, could a settlement be reached. It met most of the demands of the *Andaluzes* and for a time restored some semblance of stability. Under this agreement, Rabat henceforth shared in the administration of the Kasbah, membership of the *Diwan* was increased to sixteen with eight each for Rabat and the Kasbah, while the proceeds of the republic's imposts on slave sales, trade and privateering were equally divided

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[40] Coindreau, *Corsaires de Salé*, 178–9; Driss Ottmani, *Une cité*, 93–4.
[41] García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 155.
[42] Brown, 'Urban View', 47–8.

The working alliance between Saleh and the Dutch remained purely a matter of commercial and maritime convenience. There was practically no real collaboration against Spain. With their strong anti-Spanish attitude, the political and naval leaders of the corsair republic continued to regard the Dutch in a relatively favourable light, as they did also the English until they heard about the peace signed between England and Spain in 1630. In and after 1630 a few disillusioned Protestant hispanophobes, expert in matters Moroccan, seem to have hoped, that the States General could be persuaded, to take on the role of active military ally of Saleh against the neighbouring Spanish *presidios* which the English king had been expected to assume. The English agent sent to liaise with the Tetuán *Moriscos* during the Anglo-Spanish war, John Harrison, despairing of the English crown, tried to interest the States General in a joint military undertaking with Saleh against the nearby Spanish enclave of La Mámora, assuring the regents that the Moriscos were eager to co-operate with the Dutch in their conflict with Spain, and that both they and Cidi Ahmed el-Ayyashi, the Marabout who controlled the northern area of Morocco, wished for nothing more ardently than to join with the Dutch in attacking La Mámora.

Ahmed al-ʿAyyashi (d. 1641), a *mujahid* (holy warrior), had for decades been in revolt against Mawlay Zaydan and, since 1615, had been a close ally of the *Andaluzes* of Saleh, By the early 1630s he had all but demolished Sa'diyan authority along most of the coast of 'al-Gharb' [the West]. A key theme of his austere and unbending brand of religious politics was his fervent call to assail and eliminate the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, especially those close to Saleh at La Mámora (al-Ma'mura) and Larache (al-ʿAra'ish). The advantages to the Dutch in helping Al-ʿAyyashi conquer La Mámora, claimed Harrison, would be very considerable. Reputedly the best port on the Moroccan Atlantic coast, La Mámora's loss would be a resounding and humiliating check to Spanish prestige throughout the Maghreb, added to which, Moors and Jews would flock there from all sides to establish their commerce. The town would be especially important, he urged, as a grain depot, since grain from its hinterland was both abundant and cheap.[44] Yet the Dutch in the event proved no more zealous than the English in encouraging or offering to assist, attacks on the Spanish North African *fronteras*.

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[43] De Castries, *Sources inédites* iv, pp. 268–9.

The 1630s, like the 1620s, a decade of ceaseless intrigue and periodic instability at Saleh, was at the same time again one of flourishing trade with the United Provinces. In December 1631, at a time of severe grain shortage in northern Europe, and relative abundance in Morocco, the States General advised the *Alcaide* at Saleh that Abraham and Aaron Querido, 'cooplieden ende onderdanen deser landen' [merchants and subjects of these lands] had with the States' backing resolved to send their trusted representative, David Israel, with one or several ships to Saleh to load grain for the United Provinces 'tot soulagement van d'arme ingesetenen deser landen'.[45] At this stage, the Dutch, by comparison with other Europeans, continued to be distinctly favoured and respected. When one of the corsair captains, Machique Achafar, seized a Dutch ship, in June 1634, the *Alcaide* and Diwan very promptly declared 'la presa por mal tomado', ruling its capture an illicit action, punishing the captain and crew, and releasing all the goods on board to Benjamin Cohen, at this point still the pre-eminent resident Dutch Jewish merchant in Saleh to whom, 'conforme los conocimientos', the cargo was consigned.[46]

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[44] Ibid., iv, 288, 294. 'Mémoire de John Harrison aux États Generaux' (March 1631).

[45] Ibid., iv, 311, SG to Alcaide of Saleh, The Hague, 12 Dec. 1631.

[46] Ibid., iv, 352–3. Ahmed ben Ali Becher to SG, Saleh, 12 June 1634.

But it was impossible for the Jewish merchants who dominated Saleh's commerce to steer clear of dangerous political entanglements since the three constituent parts of the corsair republic were ceaselessly immersed not just in intrigue but open or only half-concealed strife. In 1631, the Marabout Cidi al-Ayyashi, allied with Saleh, suddenly attacked Rabat and the Kasbah, besieging the latter until October 1632 when he lifted the siege and departed to resume his harassment of the Spaniards at La Mámora and Larache. Later, by means of a ruse, the *Andaluzes* seized control of the Kasbah, in September 1636, expelling all the Hornacheros after exiling their leaders to Algiers and Tunis; nevertheless, they failed, the following year, to consolidate their hold on Saleh. Then, towards the end of the decade a new and still more chronically unstable situation arose. The sultan of Marrakash succeeded in surprising, and installing a garrison in, the Kasbah which, however, was now besieged by the men of Rabat and the Marabout al-Ayyashi who continued to preside over northern Morocco in alliance with the *Andaluzes*.

Surrounded by this interminable instability, most prominent Jews participating in the Saleh trade unequivocally sided with the corsairs, and the Marabout, against the sultan. In March 1639, Joseph Cohen (alias Jeronomo Henriques) in Amsterdam, representing his brother Benjamin Cohen, at Saleh, was conducted into a secret States General committee meeting consisting of three of the most senior regents of the States, to help deliberate over the conflict in the pirate republic and the turmoil in Morocco more generally.[47] Cohen assured the regents that 'el Morabito', the Cidi Mohammed ben-'Ayyashi, had both greater military capacity and more prudence than the sultan, pointing out that, at Saleh, he had promptly freed numerous captured Dutch seamen at the urging of Benjamin Cohen. Mawlay Zaydan, by contrast, would neither be able to assert firm control of Saleh, or the Moroccan coast more generally, nor be a reliable friend to the United Provinces. It would in short, he advised, be imprudent to offend the Marabout who had requested Benjamin Cohen to supply his forces with 200,000 pounds of powder. Joseph asked that a license be issued at once enabling him to export this powder to Tetuán or Saleh.[48] Mawlay Zaydan's agent in Holland, David

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[47] Ibid., iv, 484–5. 'Remonstrantie voor Joseph Cohen, The Hague, 26 March 1639.

[48] Ibid., iv, 485.

Pallache, vigorously opposed this advice at which, his own brother, Isaac Pallache, then at Leiden, intervened, siding with Joseph Cohen, and accusing his brother, David, of deliberately misleading the States. Mawlay Zaydan, he insisted, had lost control of all the Moroccan ports except Safi and the Kasbah of Saleh. Since the Dutch interest was to maintain their trade with Morocco and especially the strategically valuable supply of saltpeter, the best policy for the regents would be to support 'el Morabito'.[49]

As the siege of the sultan's troops in the Alcázar continued, both sides looked to the Dutch for essential war supplies which, as before, were chiefly shipped in by Amsterdam Sephardim who frequently collaborated in the trade and shared shipping space. On a Dutch vessel chartered in Amsterdam to sail to Saleh, in August 1639, for instance, half the space was booked by Moseh Cohen Henriques (alias Francisco Vaez de Leon), one eighth by João Rodrigues Faro, one sixteenth each by Raphael Nunes, Paulo Pinto and Diogo Cardoso, and one twenty-fourth by Antonio d'Oliveira.[50] In November 1639, David Pallache, 'agent of the king of Morocco', reminded the States General that the sultan's garrison at the Kasbah remained under tight siege by the forces of 'el Morabito' and could only be supplied from the Bay. He requested authorization to export 50,000 pounds of powder, 1,000 pikes, and 500 muskets for the fortress, for which permission was given.[51] When however the relief flotilla carrying the weaponry, powder and provisions appeared in the Bay, the Dutch vessels anchored there, notably that of skipper Pieter Pietersz. who had brought munitions to the camp of Al-ʿAuyyashi, helped the latter' ships drive the vessels away. Only later, with the help of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, captain-general of Andalusia, who was eager to prevent the Kasbah falling into the hands of a fervent a foe of Spain and sent supporting vessels, was Mawlay Zidan finally able to get his weapons, powder and ammunition through to the Kasbah.[52] The intervention of the Dutch in Saleh harbour against his men was long remembered and resented in Marrakesh, and all the more so in that the Marabout's camp was abundantly supplied with powder, muskets and munitions, in particular by Benjamin Cohen and Aaron Querido, the merchants for whom Pietersz worked.[53]

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[49] Ibid., iv, 492–3. Isaac Pallache to SG, Leiden, 15 April 1639.

[50] GAA NA. 1525, pp. 149–50. Deed, 23 Aug. 1639. (J.V. Oli).

[51] De Castries, *Sources inédites* iv, 503–4. David Pallache to SG, The Hague, 23 Nov. 1639.

[52] Ibid., iv, 505–6.

Whereas during the 1620s and 1630s the traffic between Amsterdam and Saleh mostly followed a straightforward there and back pattern, in the 1640s, the Dutch Jewish trade with Saleh was typically tied to a more complex network linked to the western Mediterranean and incorporating Italy. Thus, in October 1640, Joseph Cohen freighted a Dutch vessel to sail from Amsterdam to Saleh unload, load and then proceed to Venice.[54] In September 1641, Joseph Cohen chartered a Dutch vessel to sail to Saleh, unload, load and proceed to Genoa.[55] In August 1642, Henrique d'Azevedo frighted a vessel to sail with goods from Amsterdam to Saleh, unload, load various commodities including a consignment silver and gold bullion, and then to proceed to Tetuán and Livorno before returning to Holland.[56] In April 1643, Rafael Nunes and David del Soto freighted a large 180 last Dutch vessel to sail to Saleh, unload, load with cargo including silver and gold bullion and then proceed to Livorno.[57] In December 1643, Henrique d'Azevedo chartered a vessel to sail to Saleh unload and load with goods which were to include both minted and unminted silver, then proceed to Tetuán where more bullion was to be collected and then on to Livorno.[58] In September 1644, d'Azevedo freighted yet another vessel to sail to Saleh, unload, load with bullion proceed to Tetuán and then on to Livorno.[59] During 1645 Joseph Cohen and Henrique d'Azevedo both again chartered vessels to sail to Saleh, unload, load with bullion among other merchandise and proceed, in the latter case via Tetuán to Livorno.[60] In April 1646, 'Jeronimo Henriques' [i.e. Joseph Cohen] and Henrique d'Azevedo joined forces to freight a large heavily armed vessel to Saleh, where it was to unload, load with gold and silver bullion, and then proceed, via Tetuán to Livorno.[61] Interestingly, this pattern seems to have lapsed around 1647 one of the last voyages of this type, chartered by Henrque d'Azevedo in June 1647 specifies that the merchant's commissary on board would decide, in the light of the latest information available to him at Saleh, whether it was more advantageous to sail on to Italy or return directly to Amsterdam.[62]

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[53] Ibid., v, pp. 45–6. *Alcaide* of the Kasbah to SG, Saleh, 2 Oct. 1643.
[54] GAA NA. 1526, p. 35. Deed, Amsterdam, 22 October 1640 (J.V. Oli).
[55] Ibid., p. 223.
[56] GAA NA. 1527, pp. 125–6, deed, Amsterdam 20 Aug. 1642 (J.V. Oli).
[57] Ibid., p. 229. Deed, Amsterdam, 21 April 1643.
[58] GAA NA. 1528, p. 51. Deed, Amsterdam, 29 Dec. 1643 (J.V. Oli).
[59] Ibid., pp. 248–9. Deed, Amsterdam, September 1644 (J.V. Oli).
[60] GAA NA. 1529, pp. 93, 115. Deeds, Amsterdam, 20 March and 6 April 1645.
[61] GAA NA. 1530, p. 69. Deed, Amsterdam, 9 April 1646 (J.V. Oli).

The next sultan of Marrakesh, Mawlay Mohammed al-Sheikh el Asegher, in July 1646, submitted a formal complaint to the States General about the Dutch Jews trading with Morocco and about Benjamin Cohen in particular. They, and he most of all, were accused of diverting all the trade between Morocco and Holland to ports under the control of the sultan's enemies and away from Safi and other places under his rule. Cohen was singled out as the largest supplier of powder and arms to the sultan's enemies.[63] The Dutch authorities responded courteously but while keeping a close eye on the intricacies of Moroccan politics, and the continually changing situation along the Moroccan coast, made no attempt to alter their stance. While it was obvious, as one observer put it, in 1647 that 'de principaelste negotianten op Barbaryen zyn joden die daer hare residentie hebben' [the chief traders to Barbary are Jews who have their residence there], it was also clear that the Dutch state had a considerable interest in protecting their relationship with Saleh. In the first place, Morocco each year imported considerable amounts of iron, linen, drugs and manufactures as well as arms, munitions and naval stores from the Netherlands and was a useful source of supply of bullion, captured Spanish America and Brazilian goods, saltpetre, and gum; and, secondly, the security of Dutch ships, seamen and cargoes around the entrance to the Straits and off the coasts of Iberia and the Atlantic Islands depended to no small degree on cultivating good relations with Saleh.

For the Dutch, the great disadvantage of the progressive disintegration of the Moroccan kingdom during the middle decades of the seventeenth century was precisely that it became impossible to maintain a coherent relationship with Morocco, or any part of Morocco, at state level. The growing anarchy after a time undermined the special status which during the 1620s, 1630s, and early 1640s, Dutch ships and seamen had consistently enjoyed. In particular, the relationship between Saleh and the United Provinces deteriorated sharply in the late 1640s as a result of the Spanish-Dutch peace and the new and comparatively friendly relationship which developed between the Dutch and the Spanish authorities. The *Andaluzes* and heirs to the legacy of the Cidi al-ʿAyyashi, led in the north by the latter's successor, Cidi Ahmed al-Khadir Ghaylan—the same leader as confronted the English in Tangiers during the early 1660s—strongly disapproved. Harassment of Dutch shipping by Saleh corsairs increased sharply; the pool of Dutch captives imprisoned at Saleh escalated; continual recrimination and retaliation became the pattern. As more Dutch ships trading with Spain and Portugal were intercepted and pillaged, States' warships sent to protect Dutch shipping around the coasts of Iberia took to attacking Saleh corsairs more or less on sight. Thus, a spiral of violence set in which not only considerably complicated and disrupted the Dutch Jewish Morocco trade but inevitably in some measure curtailed it. By 1649, the Dutch and the Saleh corsairs were effectively at war. In June 1650 when an army of 18,000 Moors assailed the Spanish fortress at La Mámora, three Dutch warships cruising nearby entered the bay to help the Spaniards repel the attack, firing salvoes at their assailants.[64]

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[62] GAA NA. 1531, p. 93. Deed, Amsterdam, 27 June 1647 (J.V. Oli).

[63] De Castries, *Sources inédites.*, v, p. 112. Mawlay Mohammed Esh-Sheikh to SG, Marrakesh, 14 July 1646.

Hostilities continued until a new settlement was negotiated and ratified in February 1651, under which mutual trade was restored, the corsairs agreed to release their Dutch prisoners, and guarantees given that no more Dutch merchant vessels would be intercepted or seamen enslaved. A new Dutch consul, David de Vries, was dispatched to Saleh. But despite some temporary improvement, Dutch ships continued to be chased and attacked at sea by Saleh corsairs. Among other incidents in the early 1650s, De Vries reported the case of *De Witte Valck*, a Dutch vessel intercepted by the corsair captain Rays Corteby off Cape Saint Vincent. Seeing that it was Dutch, the corsairs opted to release ship and crew but first removed its stores and cargo, much of which belonged to 'Michiel Spinoza, Joodts coopman tot Amsterdam', Spinoza's father, who had been among those who chartered the ship.[65] This was one of an whole catalogue of setbacks and losses which afflicted the commercial house of Spinoza in the early 1650s and which drove the firm to virtual bankruptcy by the time Spinoza himself took over responsibility for the business, on his father's death, in 1654.[66]

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[64] Ibid., v, 199–200.

[65] Ibid., v, 431. De Vries to SG, Saleh, 20 Sept. 1654.

During the last five years of Saleh's independent existence as a corsair republic, the early 1660s, the Dutch could again rely on reasonably friendly relations with the corsairs. During that period, Cidi Ahmed al-Khhadir Ghaylan, the ally and protector of the *Andaluzes*, was the foremost enemy of the English occupation (from 1661), of Tangiers and during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–7) blockaded that heavily fortified port in collusion with the Dutch until the decisive defeat of June 1666 in which Ghaylan's army was shattered by the forces of the great reviver of Sa'adian power and authority in Morocco, Sultan Mawlay al-Rashid, the ruler who reunited the kingdom. It was a crucial juncture in the history of Morocco. No sooner was Ghaylan defeated than the corsair towns, seeing no alternative, voluntarily abandoned their independence, calculating that their interests were now best served by submitting with good grace to the authority and protection of the sultan.

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[66] Israel, 'Philosophy, Commerce,' 132–5.

CHAPTER TEN

THE SEPHARDI DIASPORA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PORTUGUESE INDEPENDENCE FROM SPAIN (1640–1668)

Portugal's rebirth as an independent kingdom and empire after sixty years of subordination to the Spanish Habsburg monarchy, began in December 1640. News of the Lisbon *coup d'état*, and the overpowering of the Castilian officials and troops stationed in the country, as well as the enthronement of the duke of Braganza as the new Portuguese king, 'João' (John) IV (reigned: 1640–56), aroused powerful emotions throughout Portugal and the Portuguese seaborne empire. The public abjuration of the Spanish king, Philip IV and proclaiming of João IV rightful monarch, won the immediate and enthusiastic assent and loyalty of Christian Portuguese across the globe but also marked the commencement of a long and bitter struggle between the Portuguese and Spanish maritime empires fought out not only in the Iberian Peninsula but also Brazil, North Africa and the East Indies.

Furthermore, for various reasons, the Portuguese Revolt against Castilian power elicited (at least initially) considerable enthusiasm and widespread sympathy among the two far-flung trade diasporas of Portuguese origin situated outside the Portuguese empire—the Portuguese Jewish diaspora in Europe and the Portuguese New Christian diaspora in Spain and Spanish America. Indeed, these two diasporas were to contribute valuable support and a considerable amount of material assistance in the fight against Spain. This may seem surprising given the history of vehement persecution of crypto-Judaism in Portugal and its empire since the 1540s, the upsurge of anti-*coverso* feeling in Portugal in the 1630s, and the marked anti-Jewish and anti-*converso* attitudes of the Portuguese Cortes, convened by the new ruler in January 1641—not to mention the virulently antisemitic tone of many of the anti-Spanish propaganda tracts published in Portugal during the 1640s.[1] Yet despite all this, and the powerfully entrenched position of the Inquisition in Portugal, numerous Portuguese Jews and New Christians were quickly convinced that the Lisbon *coup d'état* heralded a new era in the relationship between Portugal and the 'men of the nation' with the consequence that the reborn Portuguese monarchy attracted, and for a time retained, their enthusiastic backing and loyalty.

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[1] Schaub, *Portugal au temps du Comte-duc*, 77–9.

Nor is this as surprising or illogical, as it may seem. For there undoubtedly was, from 1641, a definite lull in the persecution of crypto-Judaism in Portugal so that to both the New Christians, and the European Sephardi diaspora it seemed entirely plausible to believe—at any rate for some two decades—until the resurgence of persecution in the 1660s and 1670s definitively extinguished such hopes—that the advent of João IV heralded the dawn of a new relationship between Portugal and the *conversos*, and even perhaps a new age of incipient religious toleration.[2] Thus, while there were also some Portuguese New Christian supporters of the Spanish cause, most prominent New Christian merchants in Portugal, including such wealthy figures as Duarte da Silva and Manoel Fernandes Vila Real, ardently and consistently backed the Revolt.[3] Even to Sephardic Jews living in Netherlands Brazil or the United Provinces, groups soon to be trapped between the overseas aspirations of Portugal and those of the Dutch, it seemed entirely possible initially that allegiance to Judaism, and the Dutch, could be successfully combined with zeal for Portuguese independence from Spain. After the arrival of the first Portuguese ambassador in The Hague, in April 1641, and subsequent Dutch-Portuguese Truce, down to the outbreak of the Portuguese rebellion against Dutch rule (and the Jews) in northern Brazil, in 1645—years in which, officially the Portuguese crown acknowledged Dutch possession of (and the Jewish presence in) northern Brazil, Portugal and the Dutch Republic effectively stood shoulder to shoulder as allies in the war against Spain.

Given the exiles' recollections of persecution in Portugal, and their families' tribulations there in the sixteenth century, there was also a certain plausibility to attributing the fearsome Inquisition drive which had set in in the 1570s and 1580s to the annexation of Portugal

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[2] Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos Cristãos Novos*, 236–8; Contreras, *Santo Oficio*, 594–5; Gonçalves Salvador, *Os cristãos-novos*, 216.

[3] Ibid., pp. 207–9, 214; Valladares, *Rebelión de Portugal*, 72–3.

and its empire by Philip II. Persecution of New Christians in Portugal indubitably became more intense and systematic after 1580 than it had been before, while in the immediate the aftermath of the Portuguese Revolt, the Inquisition was possibly the only body in Portugal known to be lukewarm in its support of, and perhaps actually opposed to, the secession from Spain.[4] Moreover, it was obvious that the restored monarchy, and especially its military and naval forces and overseas governors, struggling for survival against heavy odds, needed all the assistance they could find; and that the New Christian business community of Lisbon and Oporto working together with the Portuguese Jewish diaspora outside the Portuguese empire were better placed to raise the finance, and procure the supplies and munitions, required than any other segment of Portuguese society. Consequently, there was reason to expect that in return for their help and loyalty the new Portuguese king would seek—out of elementary *raison d'état*, if for no other reason—to curb the Inquisition's power in Portugal and its overseas territories, improve the lot of the New Christians throughout the empire, and enter into a positive dialogue with the Portuguese Jews of northern Europe, Italy, and the Maghreb.[5]

Nor was the enthusiasm only of a hard-headed variety. Nostalgia for the lost world of Portugal and Brazil played a role, as did other kinds of emotion. Among some Portuguese New Christians in Spanish America the events of December 1640 were rapidly invested with powerful messianic and Millenarian overtones.[6] In Mexico City, several members of the Portuguese crypto-Jewish community were so elated by the Portuguese secession from Spain—among them Luis Núñez Perez who, on being arrested by the Inquisition on 14 June 1642, was found in possession of the full text of the Dutch-Portuguese Truce of 1641, a circumstance which greatly aroused the suspicions of the Inquisition[7]—as to become convinced that by some miraculous mechanism a great armada would shortly arrive from Portugal and liquidate Spanish power, destroying the Mexican tribunal of the Holy Office in the process. In this way they would be delivered from persecution and (in the case of those already arrested) the misery of incarceration in Inquisition dungeons. This was the stuff of dreams and yet such yearnings seem to have generated a surge of messianic expectation throughout the crypto-Jewish diaspora in the New World which was only intensified by the wave of arrests.

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[4] Ibid., 241–3, 255; Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos Cristãos Novos*, 237–8.

[5] Valladares, *Rebelión de Portugal*, 73, 75–6.

[6] Israel, 'Portuguese in seventeenth-century Mexico', 29–30; Wachtel, 'Marrano Religiosity', 163–4.

[7] Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 128–9; Alberro, *Inquisition et société*, 284.

In the Portuguese enclaves in Morocco, a bitter contest of loyalties, psychological more than military, began almost at once. Tangiers, Ceuta and Mazagán, had all effectively come under Castilian military control but remained predominantly Portuguese in sentiment. In Tangiers, the priests, monks and friars were mostly Portuguese as was the Catholic population. While the Spaniards retained a precarious grip on Ceuta, the other two *plazas fuertes* broke away, Tangiers after an extremely tense period aggravated by chronic shortages of provisions and deep divisions in the town, in September 1643.[8] Following this success, João IV appointed a Lisbon New Christian contractor, Alvaro Fernandes, to provide the newly retrieved colony with essential supplies while Fernandes for his part did not hesitate to turn to the Jews of Amsterdam for much of what he needed, collaborating in particular with Rafael Nunes, a merchant with extensive commercial ties with Portugal. A large Dutch vessel Nunes chartered for this purpose, in April 1644, the 160–last *St Anna*, was engaged to sail to Tangiers and entrust its cargo specifically 'aende factor van sijne Majesteit den Coninck João van Portugal [to the factor of His Majesty King João of Portugal].[9] After 1643, not unnaturally, the fact that Ceuta, the last surviving former Portuguese North African possession under Spanish control, was supplied by a Portuguese New Christian contractor resident in Castile caused at least a hint of unease in Madrid. When, in September 1646, the bread supply at Ceuta fell to a level adequate only for a fortnight, and there was fear of trouble with the Portuguese inhabitants, the Spanish governor, the Conde de Torres Vedras, did not fail to remind royal ministers in Madrid that the contractor, Francisco López Capadocia 'es portugues y Christiano Nuevo y que en su mano esta el perderse esta plaça com se hiço la de Tanger por falta de asistencias' [is Portuguese and a New Christian and that in his hand lies the [possibility] for this place to be lost, as happened at Tangiers, through lack of supplies].[10]

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[8] Valladares, 'Inglaterra, Tánger y el "Estrecho", 978–9.

[9] GAA NA 1527, pp. 137–8. Amsterdam, 18 April 1644 (J.V. Oli).

[10] AGS Hacienda leg. 894. Torres Vedras to Junta de inteligencias, Ceuta, 7 Sept. 1646 and *consulta* of the *sala de presidios*, Madrid, 27 Sept. 1646.

For the leading Jews residing in the Portuguese *presidios* it was natural, given their ties with the various Portuguese governors, officials and clergy that had administered them before 1640, to support the Revolt against Spain and with no small show of enthusiasm. This applied in particular to Abraham Pariente royal interpreter in Arabic at Tangiers, despite the fact that he was originally descended from a distinguished family of Spanish Jews. He had moved to Portuguese-speaking Tangiers from Spanish Larache several decades before and, as João IV's successor, Affonso VI (reigned, 1656–83), declared, in a royal missive, sent from Lisbon in September 1663, had subsequently 'always been acknowledged to be very zealous in the service of my crown'.[11] A testimonial subsequently obtained by his son, Solomon Pariente, from the canons of the Portuguese cathedral in Tangiers, in 1677, affirms that his father, Abraham had zealously served the Portuguese crown, and been one of the town's chief secretaries during the restored Portuguese regime between 1643 and 1661. He had reportedly been entrusted with many secrets and, as the French translation of the text puts it, 'appellés aux deliberations tant politiques que militaires, en campagne ou dans la cité'.[12] As a mark of their special status, the Parientes of Tangiers, as earlier at Larache, dwelt in fine houses among the prominent 'separés des autres personnes de leur crojance'. As a reward for his zealous support for the restored Portuguese crown, Abraham Pariente received from João IV 'revenues et dons effectifs dans le royaume de Portugal'.[13]

But at the court of João IV, the Jewish connections which mattered most were those linked to the great international financial and commercial centres of Amsterdam and Hamburg. As it happened, an envoy from Lisbon arrived in Hamburg just a few weeks after the *coup d'état*, in January 1641, bearing news of the change of regime, letters of credit for the purchase of arms and munitions, and a warning for the king's younger brother, Dom Duarte, then commanding a cavalry regiment stationed at Regensburg in the service of the Habsburg Emperor, Ferdinand III.[14] This envoy immediately contacted the leading figure among the Portuguese Jewish community of Hamburg, the prominent merchant Duarte Nunes da Costa (Jacob Curiel) (1585–1664). This was both natural and logical, as was the Jew's prompt co-operation, since not only did Nunes da Costa and his sons, speak German as well as Portuguese and command a good network of contacts throughout Germany, but they had extensive experience of the munitions business and had already been acting for some time as Dom Duarte's personal banker, postal agent, and main link with Portugal. Dom Duarte had actually stayed in Nunes da Costa's mansion in Hamburg, in 1639,[15] and was on fairly friendly terms with him; and the fact that this cavalry officer had now been elevated to the rank of royal prince, and brother of a monarch, could only further enhance the prestige and status of the Curiel family both in Hamburg and internationally.

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[11] PRO CO 279/2, fo. 106. French translation of Affonso VI to Solomon Pariente, Lisbon, 6 Sept. 1663.

[12] PRO CO 279/2 107. 'copie d'une attestation donnée par les chanoînes de l'église cathedrale de Tanger', Tangiers, 22 Dec. 1677.

[13] Ibid., fo. 107v.

[14] Wicquefort, *Lettres*, 130–1.

Duarte Nunes da Costa readily acceded to the king's offers and requests, breaking his ties with the Spanish regime in the southern Netherlands for which he had supplied gunpowder and other munitions during the late 1630s. This was no small step for he was well established as a leading supplier, to the Spanish army of Flanders, and in recent years had gained the trust of no less a figure than the governor-general of the southern Netherlands, Philip IV's younger brother, the Cardinal-Infante. When, in the summer of 1639, a shipment of 200,000lb of gunpowder consigned by Duarte from Hamburg to Antwerp for the Spanish troops in Flanders, and doubtless accompanied by false papers designed to elude the Dutch navy, was embargoed by the king of Denmark at Glückstadt, the Cardinal-Infante, Philip IV's younger brother, in Brussels, had at once written, assuring the Danish king that the two merchants involved, Duarte Nunes da Costa and Silvio del Monte (Selomoh Cohen) were working for Spain (then in virtual alliance with Denmark), and were in good standing with the Spanish crown. When the powder was duly released, the Cardinal-Infante wrote again, thanking the Danish monarch for his co-operation 'in the matter of Duarte Nunes da Costa'.[16] In terms of status, contacts, and profit, therefore, much was sacrificed when Duarte quitted Spanish service, in January 1641, and switched his allegiance to Portugal, becoming in effect agent of the Portuguese crown in Central Europe.[17] Moreover, on transferring his loyalties to Lisbon Duarte knew that he was exchanging established links, and assured favour, in Brussels and Antwerp, for that of an upstart monarch whose pretended monarchy might very possibly soon collapse under the weight of Spanish power. He knew also that he himself had been condemned and sentenced as a 'judaizer' by the Portuguese Inquisition, over a quarter of a century before, and burnt in effigy at a Lisbon *Auto-da-fe.* Yet he did not hesitate to leave Spanish service to serve the precarious cause of Portugal.

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[15] ANTT Miscellanea da Graca cela O, caixa 17, tomo 4B pp. 552–3. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Conde de Vidigueira, Hamburg, 27 June 1643; Ramos-Coelho, *Historia do Infante D. Duarte* i, 267.

[16] AGR (Brussels) SEA 558, fos. 92–3, 98–98v, 102.

The warning from Hamburg either arrived too late or else Dom Duarte was too slow to act on it. He was arrested by the Emperor, at the Spanish king's request, and incarcerated first at Passau and then Graz where he remained for over a year. Later, he was transferred into Spanish custody at Milan. The confinement of the 'prince' which continued until his death in the royal fortress at Milan, in September 1649, became a European *cause célèbre* in which numerous illustrious personages, including Queen Christina of Sweden, took an avid interest. There were numerous pleas for his release but all were rejected by Philip IV. Duarte Nunes da Costa meanwhile was entrusted with the practicalities of establishing and maintaining a line of communication from the Portuguese court to the imprisoned 'king's brother', organised by letter via a factor in Nuremberg whilst Dom Duarte was still at Graz, a method continued after the prince's transfer to Milan. Besides mail from Portugal, Nunes da Costa sent him money, books and confectionary. Among other letters which he addressed to the Jewish merchant, Dom Duarte wrote in July 1642, from Graz castle, warmly thanking him for the 3,000 florins he had received thus far and expressing the hope he would one day be in a position to reward all that Duarte had done for him.[18]

João IV and his diplomats employed their Jewish agent at Hamburg, and the latter's relatives and business correspondents, in three different capacities. Firstly, Duarte's business network became a key element in their arms and munitions procurement web extending from the Netherlands to the Baltic, an factor crucial especially for the supply of naval stores to Portugal and Portuguese Brazil. Secondly, Duarte provided an auxiliary and information-gathering service in support of the Portuguese drive for court and diplomatic recognition around Europe. Thirdly, Duarte remained throughout the principal link with the king's imprisoned younger brother at Graz and then Milan. All three roles, and especially the second and third, afforded Duarte and his sons opportunities for involvement at a relatively high level on the international political stage. Thus, for instance, after King João's first envoy to the Swedish crown, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, obtained Swedish recognition for the new Portuguese monarchy and court, in the summer of 1641, he then, on explicit instructions from the king, consulted Duarte, as to how best to lodge a formal protest before the princes and Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, gathering at Regensburg, concerning the arrest and imprisonment of Dom Duarte, whom the Swedish Queen, among others, now called a royal prince. Duarte seeing that it would be neither safe nor dignified for Sousa Coutinho to travel to Regensburg without the Emperor's safe-conduct, and that the latter's sympathies were wholly with Spain, instead first recommended and then, on Sousa Countinho's instructions, organised, a publicity campaign, publishing and distributing throughout Germany, a Latin manifesto appealing to the German princes, and Diet, for Dom Duarte's release over the Emperor's head.[19]

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[17] Mauro, *Portugal et l'Atlantique*, 46.

[18] ANTT Misc. da Graca, cela O, caixa 17, tomo 4B, pp. 609–11. Dom Duarte da Braganza to Duarte Nunes da Costa, Graz, 14 July 1642.

From August 1642, co-ordination of Portuguese diplomacy in northern Europe was entrusted to the Conde de Vidigueira, later known as the Marquês de Niza, João IV's ambassador to the court of Portugal's principal ally, the king of France. While Duarte continued to correspond with ministers at Lisbon, and with the Portuguese envoys in Holland, Sweden and later at Osnabrück, at the Westphalian peace congress, his main official correspondence after that date was with Niza in Paris. This correspondence, like much of Niza's mail from Portugal, Holland and Sweden passed via Rouen through the hands of Duarte Rodrigues Lamego, son of Antonio Rodrigues Lamego, a well-known crypto-Jew and another strong supporter of the Portuguese secession who also regularly supplied the court at Lisbon with 'avisos' from France.[20] Rodrigues Lamego, one of the leading Portuguese New Christians established in France, and a prominent Rouen merchant, also happened to be a nephew of Duarte

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[19] ANTT Misc da Graça, cela O, caixa 17, tomo 4B, p. 652; Ramos Coelho, *Historia do Infante D. Duarte* I, 411; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 354.

[20] Schedel de Castello Branco, *Vida de Francisco Mello Torres*, 302.

Nunes da Costa, being the eldest son of Antonio Rodrigues Lamego and his wife, Beatriz Henriquez (Sarah Rodrigues Lamego) who was a younger sister of Nunes da Costa.[21]

Although he still held no formal, public title as 'Agent of the Crown of Portugal', Duarte's position in the Portuguese diplomatic network was fully acknowledged and regularized. In reward for his support, he had been ennobled and made a *cavaleiro fidalgo* of the royal household by royal edict of 14 June 1641.[22] He was listed in the secret Portuguese diplomatic cipher as number '14'. Plainly, he enjoyed access to numerous court secrets especially regarding Portuguese affairs in Central Europe and Scandinavia. When Sousa Coutinho arrived in Holland, in July 1643, to take up his new post as Portuguese ambassador there, he received a letter from Vidigueira in Paris which, among other things, stressed the reliability of Duarte Nunes da Costa and his son, Jeronimo. In his reply, Sousa Countinho said that his colleague had pre-empted him in praising Duarte Nunes da Costa 'for I would have written likewise to you, having long known these men, with regard both to the general debt of the kingdom [of Portugal] to them, and my personal debt to them, and thus it is most willingly that I acknowledge Your Excellency's recommendation'.[23]

Duarte Nunes da Costa had originally left Portugal, moving to Madrid, out of fear of the Inquisition, in or around 1609, at the age of twenty-four and hence knew Lisbon at first hand albeit at some distance back in time.[24] From Inquisition depositions against him and his relatives, it seems clear that like his brother, Lopo Ramirez (David Curiel) (1585–1664),[25] he had been brought up in a doggedly crypto-Jewish milieu strongly influenced by Dr Felipe Rodrigues, the family's Torah teacher and informal rabbi, who later became famous, after his escape from Portugal and re-entry into normative Judaism, at Venice, as Eliahu Montalto.[26] No doubt the exceptional character of Duarte's and Lopo's crypto-Jewish commitment before 1609 helps explains their unusually active involvement in synagogue affairs in Amsterdam and in Hamburg after 1621.[27] Duarte and Lope were apparently always fervent in their Jewish commitment whether living as New Christians in Lisbon and Madrid, or as observant Jews in Amsterdam and Hamburg. After some two years in Madrid, then still unmarried, he left Spain in or around June 1611 along with other members of his family when the Inquisition Tribunal of Toledo (which had jurisdiction over Madrid) arrested his cousin, Duarte Nunes Vitoria on charges of judaizing. He migrated to Florence where he lived for a decade, after which, in 1621 he moved to Amsterdam where he remained until 1625 when he migrated to the North German seaboard, staying briefly in Glückstadt before settling definitively in Hamburg.

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[21] See my forthcoming history of the Curiel family.

[22] BL MS Add. 46912, fos. 11–11v; Israel, 'Diplomatic Career of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa', 167–8.

[23] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* i, 21.

[24] ANTT Inquisição de Lisboa tom. 6172, 'Proceso de Duarte Nunes Vitoria', fos. 23, 38, 40, 44.

[25] On Lopo, see J.I. Israel, 'Lopo Ramirez (David Curiel) and the Attempt to establish a Sephardi Community in Antwerp in 1653–4', *Studia Rosenthaliana* xxviii (1994), pp. 99–119; in the late 1640s, Lopo became an agent working for Spain.

[26] ANTT Inquisição de Lisboa tom. 7192 'Proceso de Duarte Nunes da Costa', fo.s. 9, 12v.

After 1626, in contrast to his earlier mobility, Duarte only very rarely left his adopted city. However, he did make the journey to Amsterdam and The Hague in August 1643, partly for family reasons but also to participate in consultations at the Portuguese embassy where he was asked to brief Dr Botelho de Moraes, an envoy sent from Lisbon on his way to Portugal's ally, Sweden, where his task was to co-ordinate diplomatic strategy, and then, under Queen Christina's protection, represent Portugal at the Westphalian peace congress for which preparations were already in progress. It was important for Portugal's standing in the world, that João IV succeed in establishing himself as one of the accredited negotiating parties, something which France and Sweden were committed to support but which Spain and the Emperor would assuredly do everything possible to prevent. It was also at the Portuguese embassy in The Hague that Duarte and Sousa Coutinho hatched their newest and most picturesque design to effect Dom Duarte's escape from Milan. The scheme was to smuggle some commoner's rags into the fortress and then spirit the prince away, disguised as one of the wagoners who daily came and went with the supply wagons. This plot, like all the rest, came to nothing.

Dr Botelho proceeded to Stockholm and after completing his business there, boarded ship for Germany, landing on the Baltic coast at Wismar. This was decidedly the wrong place at the wrong time.

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[27] Israel, 'Duarte Nunes da Costa', 338–40, 351–53.

Eloquent in Latin but knowing no German, Botelho arrived seriously ill, amid the war between Sweden and Denmark that had just broken out only to find himself stranded in Wismar by the movement of Swedish troops towards Jutland. Duarte sent his younger sons, Manoel and Jorge Nunes da Costa, who both spoke German, to look after him there.[28] He only finally arrived in Hamburg in February 1644. There he spent two months recuperating in the Curiel household where he rested, conferred and had his portrait engraved. As part of the propaganda drive to establish the legitimacy of the new Portuguese monarchy in Europe, Duarte had had the portraits of the new king and several of his principal ministers, and also that of Dom Duarte, prepared and printed in Hamburg and distributed not only throughout Europe but also in the Portuguese colonial empire. This was a typical service of the Portuguese agent in Hamburg; for the technique of engraving, so crucial to the propaganda methods of the time, and so typical of northern Europe and Italy, was then almost wholly unknown in Portugal. When the Botelho portrait was ready, Duarte had it published alongside an engraved portrait of Queen Christina so as to underline Sweden's support for the Portuguese cause.[29] During these months, Duarte's residence became a regular focus of diplomatic activity, the Hamburg burgomasters appearing several times to pay their respects to Botelho and discuss problems encountered by Hamburg vessels in Portuguese ports.

Because of the special circumstances, Portugal was the only Catholic power whose delegation at the Westphalian peace negotiations was lodged in the Protestant town of Osnabrück with the Protestant delegations rather than with the French and Spaniards in Catholic Münster (where, however, the Dutch lodged). When Dr Botelho finally left Hamburg for Osnabrück, on 11 April 1644, he needed to cut an appropriate figure and as no funds had reached him from Lisbon, it was only with Duarte's help that he could find the money to furnish himself with the obligatory coach, horses, servants, outfits and livery.[30] He was escorted all the way from Hamburg to Osnabrück by Swedish cavalry. However, his health was fragile and with little or no progress being made over the ensuing months in Sweden's negotiations with the Emperor, Botelho found little to do other than pen a scathing Latin tract denouncing Spain for trying to preclude Portuguese participation in the peace congress. This he sent to Hamburg, in August 1644, where Duarte arranged for it to be published and distributed.[31] Four months later, in December, Botelho died, and Duarte was obliged to arrange transportation of his body, papers and possessions first to Hamburg and then back to Lisbon. His successor, Luis Pereira de Castro, was no less dependent on Duarte's assistance, especially as regards organising Portugal's German publicity campaign. Thus, for example, in June 1645, Pereira de Castro sent the text of a carefully composed Portuguese propaganda declaration from Osnabrück, asking Duarte to have it printed in Hamburg and distributed in Poland, Scandinavia and Italy this time as well as Germany.[32]

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[28] ANTT Misc. da Graça, cela O, caixa 17, tomo 4B, p. 441, 447–9; Ramos-Coelho, *Historia do Infante D. Duarte* i, 430–1.

[29] ANTT Misc. da Graça, cela O, caixa 17, tom. 4B, p. 416. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 19 Aug. 1644.

[30] Ibid. p. 422; Ramos-Coelho, *Historia do Infante D. Duarte* ii, 186.

Duarte Nunes da Costa did not act as a banker for the Portuguese crown except in the case of his remittances to Dom Duarte. Amsterdam rather than Hamburg was the main financial centre of the day and it was both more advantageous and more convenient for the Portuguese king to organize his European payments system through the United Provinces—indeed during the four years (1641–4) when he too backed Portugal—through Duarte's brother there, Lopo Ramirez. Although the first Portuguese ambassador to the United Provinces, had arrived armed with an initial letter of credit for 10,000 *cruzados* with which to pay his diplomatic expenses, issued by the Lisbon New Christian banker, Manoel Garcia Franco, to be drawn not on Lopo but on Francisco Ramires Pina, his cousin, the latter's death a few weeks later, created an opening into which Lopo adroitly stepped despite the obvious risks of pinning his colours to the mast of the Portuguese Revolt.[33] Subsequently, even with the Portuguese envoy at Stockholm who regularly received mail from Portugal through Duarte in Hamburg, as well as dispatches from Osnabrück,[34] money was received by letters of exchange issued by the New Christian bankers, in Lisbon, usually

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[31] ANTT Misc. da Graça, cela O, caixa 17, tom. 4B, p. 419. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 19 Aug. 1644.

[32] Ibid., pp. 691–2. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 17 June 1645.

[33] GAA NA 1555B, p. 1355. Amsterdam, 14 July 1641; Sousa de Tavares, 'Relação do tratato', 7–8, 14; Swetschinski, 'Amsterdam Jewish Merchant-Diplomat', 13.

[34] 'Relações diplomáticas entre Portugal e a Suecia', I, pp. 267, 269, 274, 277, 278.

Manoel Garcia Franco or Balthasar Rodrigues de Mattos, remitted invariably through their Amsterdam correspondent, Lopo Ramirez. Nor were these the only services, Lopo performed for Portugal in the early 1640s. He also provided money and arranged shipping space enabling several hundred Portuguese soldiers who, on learning of the Revolt, had deserted the army of Flanders, and fled to the Dutch lines, hoping to return to Portugal to participate in the fighting; this he did also for substantial numbers of Portuguese soldiers and seamen captured by Dutch West India Company forces during their conquest of Angola from a newly independent Portugal, in 1642.[35]

Even so, Duarte also provided notable financial support for Portugal's war effort. João IV was chronically short of ready cash; consequently, royal remittances to diplomats, and for munitions purchases in the north, were usually seriously delayed. Indeed, it was often only Duarte's readiness to advance funds for urgent purposes on the optimistic assumption that Portugal's hard-pressed monarch would eventually find a way to pay him back which rescued a whole series of Portuguese envoys, Dr Botelho among them, from acute embarrassment. This was in marked contrast to what became his brother's attitude. The latter, following a bad experience with Ambassador Mendonça Furtado who had still not repaid money he had borrowed from him in 1641 as late as July 1646, had to engage a Lisbon New Christian merchant, João Baptista da Fonseca—presumably a relative on his mother's side—to initiate legal proceedings against the Mendonça Furtado family on his behalf.[36] After this, he remained entirely deaf to all further entreaties for loans from Portuguese diplomats.

During the years 1643 to 1650 whilst he was posted there, the Portuguese resident at Stockholm—then, of course, one of the most crucial Portuguese postings—Dr João de Guimarães, had particular cause for gratitude to Duarte. Entrusted with maintaining Portugal's alliance with Sweden against the Habsburgs, he received his salary and expenses so tardily that at one point he had received nothing from Lisbon for over two years.[37] Beholden to the Nunes da Costa family, he assured Luis Pereira de Castro that he considered the Jewish merchant, 'a noble, truthful and courteous man and extremely zealous for the service of his Majesty, such that it seems to me that in him Your Excellency has a true friend'.[38] When the time came to leave Sweden, in March 1649, he was practically in despair, believing he would not be allowed to depart on account of his debts. In this predicament, Guimarães wrote to Pereira de Castro, saying that he did not dare again 'ask Duarte Nunes da Costa to extricate me from this as I already owe him 3,000 *thalers* which he advanced out of friendship and his innate goodness'.[39] Yet he had no alternative and once again Duarte rescued him. After leaving Sweden, Guimarães spent several weeks in the Curiel household at Hamburg where, as was Duarte's habit, he was lavishly entertained despite his now owing the Jewish merchant no less than 6,000 *thalers*.

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[35] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* i, 12, 17, 46, 195; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 315.

[36] GAA NA 1556B, p. 891. Amsterdam, 20 July 1646 (J.V. Oli).

[37] ANTT Misc. da Graça, cela O, caixa 17, tom. 4B, pp. 495–6. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Vidigueira, Hamburg, 2 Jan. 1649.

As an international depot for arms, gunpowder and naval stores Hamburg came second in the mid seventeenth century only to Amsterdam. João IV was in the unusual position for a warring prince of the Thirty Years' War period of needing simultaneously to equip an army to defend his land frontiers and war fleets to secure his seaborne communications—and with almost equal urgency. For if his prime enemy, the Spaniard was his landward neighbour and could be presumed to be planning his main attack by land, Portugal could only succeed in the long run in her struggle for independence from Spain by mobilizing the resources and potential royal revenues of (Portuguese) Brazil and the *estado da India* and, and for this both sea power, and merchant fleets were indispensable which meant that large quantities of naval stores were needed. In fact, Duarte played a part of some significance in sending munitions to Portugal at least in the early 1640s, albeit his activity in this respect was on a smaller scale than that of his brother, Lopo, in Amsterdam.

Duarte never handled a contract as large as that which Lopo signed in Amsterdam on 14 July 1641 drawn up at the behest of the first Portuguese ambassador to the United Provinces, Dom Tristão de Mendonça Furtado, for the delivery of 100,000 *cruzados* of arms and ammunition for the newly formed Portuguese royal army and navy, including 4, 000 muskets, 30,000 pounds of gunpowder immediately with another 50,000 pounds to follow, 20,000 pounds of shot, siege mortars, artillery, ships' rigging and 113 'large grenades' for demolishing besiegers' mine-shafts.[40] Under the contract which he helped finance—in part by loaning the ambassador an exceptionally large and fine diamond set in gold which he then pawned back—Lopo received a commission of 12%. Yet Duarte's role was not inconsiderable. During 1641–3, he consigned to Lisbon masts, ropes, pitch, gunpowder and, in one case, an entire warship, the Saint Peter, which he hired, manned and had fitted out, at a cost of 30,000 *cruzados*. But while the king settled his bills in Holland he showed no comparable urgency to pay his supplier in Hamburg and between 1643 and 1646, Duarte, not unnaturally, seems to have consigned very little else. It was indeed obvious that he had taken an overwhelming risk in backing the Portuguese cause to the extent he had; for not only was payment for his services long overdue but given the precariousness of the revived Portuguese maritime empire, and likelihood that Spain might eventually reconquer Portugal, there was every possibility that Duarte might finally lose his considerable investment altogether. Late in 1644, as a reward for his services, he was officially designated 'Agent' of the Portuguese crown at Hamburg; but still no cash arrived. He complained repeatedly to the marquês de Niza in Paris, and to Sousa Coutinho, at The Hague; but it was only in the summer of 1646, on Niza's urging, that finally a ship loaded with Portuguese East India pepper worth 40,000 *cruzados* consigned to Duarte arrived from Lisbon, clearing the royal debt.

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[38] 'Relações diplomaticas entre Portugal e a Suecia' ii, 28; already in an earlier letter (p. 6) Guimarães described Duarte as an 'homem de muita verdade e mais que ordinario primor'.

[39] Ibid. ii, 29.

Being designated 'Agent' of the Portuguese crown in Hamburg produced a noticeable change in Duarte's status and life-style. He had hitherto remained active as an ordinary merchant dealing in sugar, diamonds and other Portuguese colonial products. But from 1645, he increasingly left routine commerce to his younger sons and concentrated instead on a combination of diplomatic activity and synagogue business. Writing to Paris to thank the marquês de Niza for his intercession, he remarked that he could only serve the king as he would wish if reimbursement for expenditure on arms and munitions was made less tardily than hitherto and also that he ought now be paid a regular salary 'to befit the honour His Majesty has now conferred on me', adding that 'your Excellency well knows that I have to affect the same ostentation as the agents and residents of the other crowns in this city and that I must ensure that I am respected as they are, and consequently keep a carriage with two horses. For we must not show lack of means for that would only corroborate what our enemies say about the precariousness of our realm.'[41] An annual salary was granted, Duarte acquired his carriage with two horses, and generally he raised his life-style, among other things adopting a new style of dress and introducing two male servants to his household. Soon after, by royal patent issued in 1646, Duarte's second son, Manoel Nunes da Costa (Selomoh Curiel) was designated heir to the title of Agent as a matter of right together with the same annual stipend of 600 *thaler*.[42]

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[40] GAA NA 1555B, pp. 1103–4; Rau, 'A embaixada', pp. 115–16; Israel, 'Lopo Ramirez', 104–5.

By this time the activity of Duarte's eldest son, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (Moseh Curiel) (1620–1697) on Portugal's behalf, had begun to rival his father's in importance. Duarte had sent his son to Amsterdam early in 1642, when Jeronimo was only twenty-two years of age, expressly at the wish of João IV's ministers who were eager to strengthen Portugal's representation in the—from a commercial, shipping and financial perspective—crucially important Dutch entrepot.[43] While Lopo Ramirez remained correspondent of the Lisbon bankers until the mid 1640s, João IV's diplomats knew that he was less ardent for the Portuguese cause than his brother, or had become so. Indeed, by 1643, he acted for Portuguese interests only on a purely business basis. 'O tal Lopo Ramirez', remarked Portugal's second ambassador in Holland, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, in July 1643, 'não he tão dizenterecado como seu irmão Duarte Nunes da Costa' [Lopo Ramirez is not so disinterested [in backing Portugal] as his brother Duarte Nunes da Costa].[44]

In later years, it suited both Jeronimo and the Portuguese to stress that he had been expressly summoned to Amsterdam by João IV, especially when Anglo-Dutch hostilities threatened to disrupt the seaborne supply of munitions to Portugal. Thus, when the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–7) began, in December 1664, the English monarch was assured by the Portuguese ambassador in London that 'Jeronimo Nunes da Costa who is, and has been these twenty yeares Agent for the king my master, in Amsterdam, for providing him with munition for war and all necessaryes for shipping, as well for his royal navy as allsoe for that belonging to the Brazil Company, is the only person that acts these and such like businesses, for which end the king my master sent for him from Hamburgh to reside at Amsterdam.'[45] On these grounds it was requested that his cargoes be declared exempt from interception by the English.

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[41] ANTT Misc. da Graça, Cela O, caixa 17, tom, 4B, p. 673. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 7 Feb. 1645.

[42] ANTT livros das matriculas dos moradores da casa real VI, unpaginated. Patent in favour of Manoel Nunes da Costa.

[43] BNL (Lisbon) MS 661, caixa 14, fos. 89v–90. Jeronimo Nunes da Costa to Vidigueira, Amsterdam, 19 Sept. 1644.

[44] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* i, 195; Swetschinski, 'Amsterdam Jewish Merchant-Diplomat', 14.

Hence, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, though living in Amsterdam, was not a Dutch subject and, especially during the early part of his career as a diplomatic agent, made no secret of the fact that he represented Portuguese interests specifically even where these openly clashed with those of the Dutch, as in Brazil, southern India and also West Africa. Yet, Jeronimo, like his father, became exceptionally prominent and active in synagogue affairs—in 1675 it was he who paid for the magnificent ark of Brazilian jacaranda wood installed in the great Portuguese Synagogue in Amsterdam—and there is every reason to suppose that he was always eager not only to help Portugal but also promote and protect the wider Sephardi and *converso* interest insofar as he could. From this one may infer that until 1645 and the uprising in Brazil, it seemed to Jeronimo, as it did to his father, that Jewish interests could be most realistically furthered by supporting Portugal in her struggle against Spain. Again like his father, he was careful, however, not to allow his Jewish loyalties obtrude unnecessarily on his activity in the service of Portugal, though on one occasion Sousa Countinho could not refrain from remarking that Jeronimo always referred to the Atlantic Island of Saint Helena as plain 'Helena' being such a scrupulous Jew that if he called it 'Saint Helena' he would consider himself failing in his religious duties.[46]

The young merchant made himself useful not only to Sousa Coutinho's embassy at The Hague but also to other Portuguese diplomats in London, Paris, and Osnabrück. One of his prime tasks was to obtain favourable coverage in Dutch news-sheets and pamphlets for Portugal's successes on land and sea against Spain and, for this purpose, he was regularly sent details of Portuguese military successes from Lisbon.[47] Another task was to obtain news from, and about, Spain from fellow Sephardic merchants in Holland and from Portuguese New Christians there and at Bayonne. Pleased with some intelligence Jeronimo had procured from Madrid, in July 1643, Sousa Coutinho assured Lisbon that 'with him and his father it matters much to His Majesty that there should be the good correspondence which their services merit and, were it not for the fact that they are Jews, I do not know how His Majesty could repay what he owes them'. But being mere Jews, they would naturally have to be content with more modest titles and rewards than would otherwise have devolved on them. In May 1645, the king, conferred on Jeronimo the title of 'Agent of the Portuguese Crown' in the United Provinces and the status of *cavaleiro fidalgo* of the royal household.[48]

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[45] PRO (London) SP 89/6, fo. 200. Petition of 28 Dec. 1664.

[46] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Countinho* i, 318.

After his desgination as 'Agent', Jeronimo regularly sent dispatches to Lisbon, reporting all kinds of Dutch political and colonial news. This was of considerable importance since the Netherlands at the time was the principal exchange for news about the East Indies, Africa, and other regions of great relevance to a newly reborn Portugal struggling to achieve independence from Spain and salvage her colonial empire from being overrun and subverted by the East and West India Companies. Especially crucial was the intelligence Jeronimo provided about Dutch activities and intentions in Brazil. Until 1645, the uneasy truce between Portugal and the United Provinces signed in 1641, remained intact. But Brazil remained tensely divided into two separate zones, the Portuguese south and the Dutch north, and the friction between them–religious, political and economic—was such as to generate constant ill-feeling and an obvious likelihood of renewed conflict.

Nevertheless, Portugal and the Dutch Republic remained nominal and to an extent actual allies during these years and until 1645 assisting Portugal against Spain continued to command the support of numerous diaspora New Christians and Sephardic Jews while, for its part, the Spanish crown viewed the Portuguese New Christians living in Spain and Spanish America as a potential security risk while simultaneously seeking to preclude loss of access to their resources, or pushing them into the arms of Portugal, through too obvious a show of suspicion and disfavour. Then, as Portuguese-Dutch relations deteriorated sharply, from 1645 onwards, with the uprising of the Portuguese planters in Dutch Brazil, a revolt surreptitiously nurtured from southern Brazil and Portugal, a certain unmistakable tension between Jeronimo's role as Agent of Portugal and as a committed Jew began to show. Following the burning of the sugar plantations in northern Brazil, in 1645–6, a setback which paralyzed the Dutch Sephardic sugar trade with Brazil, and rapidly undermined the Jewish community which had recently begun to flourish there under Dutch protection, it was indeed far harder than before to square Jewish loyalties with positive support for the Portuguese cause, especially for Jews living in Holland.

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[47] BPE (Evora) MS CV1–2–1, fos. 150–1. Vidigueira to Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, Paris, 27 Aug. 1644 and Affonso VI 'Carta de padrão' *Anais da Academia Portuguesa* 2nd ser. VIII (1958), pp. 120–1.

[48] BL (London) MS Add. 46912, fos. 11–11v.

In areas other than Brazil, Jeronimo continued to further Portuguese interests with energy, as for instance in Africa where the Portruguese, despite losing their last fortress on the Gold Coast, Axim, to the Dutch, in February 1642, staged a convincing recovery, thanks in no small measure to the financial support of Duarte da Silva, Manoel Rodrigues da Costa, Gaspar Dias de Mezquita, Jeronimo Gomes Pessoa, and other prominent Lisbon New Christians.[49] The king personally expressed satisfaction regarding intelligence from Jeronimo, sent via Niza, revealing the weakness of the Dutch garrison on the sugar island of São Thomé,[50] information which may have materially assisted the Portuguese in their successful recovery of the island from the Dutch, following their reconquest of Angola, in August 1648. When, in May 1649, Sousa Coutinho in The Hague presented the text of the humiliating terms on which the Dutch garrison in Angola had capitulated the previous summer, the States General angrily refused to acknowledge the surrender. The ambassador then sent the document to Jeronimo, in Amsterdam, who had copies circulated and arranged for it to be printed.[51]

But Netherlands Brazil was the chief issue and about that Jeronimo's feelings must soon have been thrown into a considerable turmoil.

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[49] Smith, 'Old Christian merchants', 237.

[50] João IV to Niza, Lisbon, 8 July 1647 in *Cartas de el-rei D. João* IV ii, 119.

[51] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* iii, 244–5.

The marked change for the worse in relations between Jeronimo and Sousa Coutinho after 1645, if partly due to temperament, was undoubtedly caused mainly by differences concerning Brazil. What for the ambassador was a glorious triumph for Portugal and Catholicism was for the Jewish merchant in large part an unmitigated disaster. When, late in 1647, the two men clashed about the likelihood of powerful Dutch reinforcements reaching Brazil in the near future, the ambassador, when reporting to Lisbon, actually accused Jeronimo of deliberately seeking to mislead ministers by exaggerating Dutch strength, and pending reinforcements, and, in this way, inhibiting efforts to complete the destruction of Dutch Brazil.[52]

With the great majority of the Amsterdam Sephardi Jewish community adopting an increasingly anti-Portuguese attitude in the wake of the Portuguese planters' revolt, a rebellion aimed as much against the Jews of Recife (who were often their creditors) as against the West India Company and its army, Jews and crypto-Jews associated with the Portuguese cause inevitably re-examined the nature of their relationship with Portugal, and sought fresh reassurance as to the benefits and the rewards to be expected in exchange for their help. Of particular relevance here was the relationship between the Nunes da Costa and the celebrated Jesuit and missionary, Father Antonio Vieira (1608–97), adviser to João IV, one of the most fervent standard-bearers of Portugal's revival, and a Portuguese Old Christian strongly committed to curbing inquisitorial power. A powerful advocate of the policy of securing the help of the New Christians, and the Portuguese Jewish diaspora, for Portugal's struggle against Spain and the Dutch, he had been chosen by the king to visit Holland and France to encourage the Sephardim, and the New Christians in exile, to expect tangible concessions and rewards in return for their backing.

While little is known about Father Vieira's first mission to Holland during the months April to July of 1646, it is certain that he was entrusted with secret business on behalf of the king which involved talks with Jeronimo Nunes da Costa and other Amsterdam Jews as well as Portuguese crypto-Jews in Rouen.[53] In a letter addressed to the latter, sent from the Hague, dated 20 April 1646, Vieira claims the schemes he had urged the king to adopt, and which would further harnass Dutch Jewish and Portuguese New Christian resources behind the secession from Spain in return for far-reaching benefits, had assuredly gained ground now that he was in direct contact with the Rouen New Christians.[54] No doubt Vieira was referring to his projects for limiting the powers of the Inquisition in Portugal, and its colonies, and forging a new reciprocal relationship between crown and New Christians both in Portugal and overseas.

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[52] Ibid., ii, 265–6; see also *infra* pp.

[53] Lúcio d'Azevedo, *Historia de Antonio Vieira* I, 109.

Part of his mission was to encourage both crypto-Jews and Jews, once safe from the threat of arrest by the Inquisition, to return to Portugal. By means of such a policy of understanding, leniency, benevolence and royal favour, he hoped ultimately to win them back for Christianity. He sought to rally additional Portuguese New Christian support, strengthen ties between Portugal and the New Christians, and further prise them away from Judaism and the Dutch, by securing the removal of institutionalised discrimination rigidly excluding New Christians from holding offices and positions of honour in the kingdom. Abolishing such discrimination, he argued, would be 'o meio mais efficaz de se extinguir o judaismo, como a experiencia tem mostrado em todos os reinos' [the most effective means to extinguish Judaism, as experience has shown in all realms'.[55] But the most urgent priority was to obtain Jewish capital and New Christian resources for the immediate struggle, and especially for the revival of Portuguese Brazil, by forming a joint-stock Brazil Company, to take over and revitalise the sugar trade with that colony, a company capable of organising trans-Atlantic convoys sailing to Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, strongly enough armed and manned to fend off the Dutch privateers. In this projected new company, capital invested by New Christians whether in Portugal or abroad, and by Jews, would be exempt from confiscation by the Inquisition.[56]

Parts of this programme were precisely the sort of thing Duarte and Jeronimo Nunes da Costa had been urging their friends among the Portuguese diplomatic corps to undertake, a move capable of lending real credibility to João IV's earlier hesitant steps towards curbing the Inquisition.[57] Finally, under a decree of 6 February 1649, the king stipulated that the Inquisition was no longer permitted to confiscate property and money of imprisoned suspected judaisers before final sentencing and that all New Christian capital invested in the projected Brazil Company would be, and would remain, exempt from confiscation by the Holy office even in cases of proven 'crimes of heresy, apostasy or Judaism'.[58] Both Duarte and Jeronimo warmed to Father Vieira's mission and proposals, and doubtless approved his fierce criticism of the Inquisition. Needless to say, when, finally, the new joint-stock company, entitled the *Companhia Geral do Comercio do Brasil*, was set up, during 1649, Jeronimo and his father were respectively appointed the new Company's Amsterdam and Hamburg representatives.[59] The Company did not possess a monopoly of the Brazil sugar trade but it did play the leading role in it and did officially monopolise the export of wine, olive oil, flour and salted fish to Brazil as well as imports of Brazil wood. Consequently, after 1649, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa was regularly the chief importer of Brazil wood to the Netherlands.

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[54] Vieira, *Obras Escolhidas* i, 87–9.

[55] Lúcio de Azevedo, *História de Antonio Vieira* i, 110–11.

[56] Ibid. i, 109–110; Lúcio de Azevedo, *História dos Cristãos Novos* 245–6; Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 208–13; Boxer, 'Padre Antonio Vieira S.J.', pp. 474–97.

But long before this, Vieira's plans and the Brazil Company project had so fired Duarte's imagination that he had been inspired to make his most sensational contribution to the Portuguese cause in that connection. Before setting up the Company, the king needed to collect the necessary ships, resources and armaments together. The success of the Company obviously depended in large part on the effectiveness of the naval escorts which were to shield its vessels from the attacks of the West India Company and Zeeland privateers who had, since 1645, been capturing a vast proportion of the Portuguese shipping attempting to sail to and from Brazil. Yet it was quite impossible to find either suitable ships or enough naval guns and stores in Portugal itself so it was clear from the outset, in 1647, that in this case the help of the Jews in the north would be essential. Father Vieira was sent back to Holland to advertise the king's promise that capital invested would be exempt from the Inquisition and to organise purchases of ships, guns and stores. However, the prevailing attitude among the Dutch Sephardim, as well as the Dutch public more generally, was now much more hostile to Portugal than it had been before 1645, so that Vieira faced a thoroughly uphill task. His mission was further hampered by the arrest for 'judaising', in December 1647, of the Lisbon New Christian businessman, Duarte da Silva—a strong supporter of the Portuguese Restoration and of the restored monarchy who later reverted to normative Judaism in London and who had issued the letters of credit with which Vieira was to purchase warships, guns and munitions.[60] The arrest caused widespread surprise because da Silva was well connected with the court and had all along been one of the chief procurers of naval stores and gunpowder from Holland and Hamburg;[61] but the Inquisition had no intention of collaborating in steps to reduce its own power and authority and timed his arrest, with the seizure of his capital and possessions, with the deliberate intention of disrupting Vieira's plans as much as possible. The result was that Vieira found himself in Holland with letters of credit that the Inquisition had rendered entirely worthless.

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[57] *Instruções inéditas de D. Luis da Cunha*, pp. 75–6; Valladares, *Rebelión de Portugal*, 75–9.

[58] Ibid., 79; BL MS Add. 20951, fo. 136; Boxer, 'Padre Antonio Vieira', 482, 484–5; Smith, 'Old Christian Merchants', 237–8.

[59] Kellenbenz, 'Phasen', 98–9; Swetschinksi, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 118–19.

In the circumstances it was scarcely surprising that neither Lopo Ramirez, who remained the Amsterdam correspondent of the Lisbon New Christian bankers down to 1648[62] but whose zeal for the Portuguese cause had conspicuously waned since the mid 1640s, nor the richest Portuguese Jew in Holland at the time, Bento (David) Osorio, would come to the rescue by advancing the necessary funds. Jeronimo, moreover, as yet lacked the means to do so. But when Vieira, Sousa Coutinho and Jeronimo all then wrote to Hamburg beseeching Duarte to come to their aid, he did so with alacrity.[63] Within weeks, Duarte had purchased two large vessels, of 220 and 180 lasts respectively and was fitting them out with guns and stores, while negotiating in Hamburg and through his Lübeck agent, Hendrik Bremmer, also there and in Stockholm, with a view to acquiring more. All this he undertook using his own funds.[64] By mid April,

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[60] Gonçalves Salvador, *Os cristãos-novos*, 214, 216–17; Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos Cristãos Novos*, 424–5.

[61] Ibid., 265, 424.

[62] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* ii, 62, 216 and iii, 6, 354.

[63] Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia de Antonio Vieira*, 135–6.

[64] AHL (Lübeck) Nachlass Hagedorn vi. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Lübeck Senate, Hamburg, 24 may 1648; *Cartas do Padre Antonio Vieira* i, 161–8; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 151.

Duarte had bought, and was fitting out, a third vessel while Jeronimo, back in Amsterdam, negotiated the purchase of a swift twenty-eight gun frigate.[65]

The preparations for the *Companhia Geral* were now too far advanced to escape the notice of Europe's vigilant diplomats. Spain's chief plenipotentiary to the Westphalian peace congress, the Conde de Peñaranda, one of whose tasks was to block Portuguese initiatives however and wherever he could, discovered what was afoot from Spain's Jewish agent in Hamburg, the writer-physician Manoel Bocarro Francês (Jacob Rosales) who was originally from Portugal. 'In Lisbon', he assured Peñaranda, 'the merchants have formed a company for Brazil which is intended to operate thirty-six well-armed warships sailing in two convoys yearly for the protection of their merchant ships. The ships and supplies they must procure in these parts for they have no other recourse; and already Duarte Nunes da Costa, Agent of Portugal, has purchased three good vessels and searches for another three, and will seek more; and has purchased large amounts of munitions'.[66]

Meanwhile, in Lisbon, the king having promised to remit the necessary funds without delay found this, as usual, easier said than done. By mid April, Duarte's expenditure on ships, guns and stores approached 100,000 *cruzados* which meant that he was risking his entire worldly fortune, and his family's standing, for the sake of Portugal's interests in Brazil. Father Vieira who was following all this closely, at The Hague, became genuinely concerned for his sake. Writing to Niza in Paris, he expressed both anxiety and keen regard for 'Duarte Nunes [da Costa] who is courting disaster; I reproach myself for urging him to do this'.[67] Of course, had Duarte been left stranded, this would also have utterly disrupted Vieira's schemes. But just a few days later two ships out from Lisbon arrived in Hamburg, bearing bales of pepper and letters of exchange consigned to 'Duarte Nunes da Costa' worth together 100,000 *cruzados*.

Having replenished his assets, Duarte acquired an imposing new residence on the Hamburg Krayenkamp. Since Jews were not permitted to own real estate in Hamburg, he leased the premises from a Christian. But this did not detract from the splendour of the place, the house being reckoned one of the finest in the city. Here it was that Duarte hosted Guimarães, in 1650, and spent his declining years. After his death, in 1664, his second son, Manoel Nunes da Costa lived there briefly, but moved out in 1666, at the time of the Shabbatean frenzy, very likely intending, in the intoxication of the moment, to emigrate with his family to the Holy Land. The house was then rented out to Queen Christina who had now long since abdicated the Swedish throne and was on one of her numerous visits to the city. In 1668, the house was sold to the Queen, for 17,000 *thaler*.[68]

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[65] Rau, 'O Padre Antonio Vieira', 94, 99–100.

[66] AGR (Brussels) MS SEG 604, fos. 179–179v. intelligence from Hamburg.

[67] *Cartas do Padre Antonio Vieira* I, 183; see also BPE (Evora) MS VI/2–11, fo. 229. Niza to Duarte Nunes da Costa, Paris, 28 March 1648.

Portugal gained little at the Westphalian peace congress—disagreement over Portugal being one of the reasons for the collapse of the Franco-Spanish peace negotiations at Münster—so that after 1648 the struggle with Spain and (outside Europe) with the Dutch continued just as before. The Portuguese monarchy and empire remained more than a little precarious. Meanwhile, significant figures among the New Christian community in Lisbon and among the Portuguese Jewish diaspora in northern Europe continued to lend valuable support to the Portuguese cause. In 1650, acting under instructions from Lisbon, Duarte recruited and dispatched to Portugal of a force of 2,500 German mercenaries who had been discharged at the end of the German conflict and were willing to fight in Portugal against Spain.[69] Like his son in Amsterdam, Duarte in his now dual capacity as agent of the Portuguese crown and of the Brazil Company, had political and probably also religious as well as commercial reasons for taking a global view of the maritime and colonial world of his day. In Hamburg and Amsterdam, it was far easier than in Lisbon, Madrid, Paris or London to keep a wary eye on the colonial ambitions of all the different European states so that the two agents were not just observers of the general maritime scene but a faithful watchdog of the wider Portuguese interest.

In fact they possessed a unique vantage point from which to observe the maritime shifts of the age. They handled intelligence and state secrets, enjoying a degree of access to courts and councils of state which put them in a quite different position from most other merchants. When in 1650, for instance, Duke Jacob of Courland, an eager mercantilist and patron of commerce, applied to the Brazil Company for permission to invest and participate in its trade, and this was approved in Lisbon, it was as a matter of course that working out the details was left to Duarte Nunes da Costa in Hamburg.[70] In February 1652, Duarte, having discovered details of Swedish plans to establish forts on the Guinea Coast, passed these on to ministers in Lisbon; the matter was discussed in the Portuguese council of state and a diplomatic protest, strongly asserting Portuguese rights in Guinea, lodged in Stockholm.

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[68] Valentin, *Judarnas historia i Sverige*, 51; Kellenbenz, 'Königin Christine', 190.
[69] 'Relações diplomáticas entre Portugal e a Suecia', ii, 33.

Jeronimo meanwhile became a seasoned observer of the Dutch companies and regularly sent reports on colonial matters to the *Conselho Ultramarino* in Lisbon. By this time he himself was a principal investor in the Dutch West India Company and a leading figure on the Amsterdam exchange so he had plenty of inside information to dispense, including the details of the number, tonnage and cargoes of both outgoing and incoming Dutch East India fleets.[71] In June 1655, during a time of great tension between Portuguese and Dutch in Ceylon, Jeronimo sent urgent warnings with details of the reinforcements which the Dutch Company was sending out to Ceylon, prompting the *Conselho Ultramarino* to ask the king to dispatch additional troops to southern India and Ceylon without delay.[72] This did not, however, prevent the fall of Colombo, after a seven-month siege, in 1655–6, after which it was only a matter of time before the Dutch, taking revenge for their setbacks in Brazil, completed their conquest of coastal Ceylon driving the Portuguese out of both the island and the cinnamon trade.[73]

As the struggle for control of Brazil, Ceylon and soon the southern tip of India intensified, Jeronimo was saddled with much the more difficult of the two agencies. The maritime and colonial conflict between Portugal and the Dutch exerted a constant pressure on him personally. He repeatedly advanced funds to repatriate the large number of Portuguese seamen and soldiers captured by the Dutch in the East Indies, Africa and the Atlantic and shipped to Holland, feeding them until shipping space became available and then paying their passage back to Portugal.[74] He was famous for his discretion and adroit good sense. But in this highly fraught situation he constantly required all his skills to juggle his increasingly triangular loyalties—Jewish, Portuguese and (at any rate after 1660) also Dutch. A rather amusing example of the scrapes from which he had to extricate himself concerns the time when he acted as Father Vieira's host in Amsterdam. Naturally, he escorted him to the great Portuguese synagogue on the occasion of a sabbath service as he did many another visiting diplomat and dignitary. But on this occasion, the Jesuit father took such exception to remarks made by the rabbi in his sermon that he angrily interjected, disrupting the proceedings. It was an ugly moment requiring all Jeronimo's renowned *savoir faire.* He dragged the yelling Jesuit out of the synagogue 'not without some violence' and then rapidly calmed him down, saying that 'a man as eminent as yourself will either persuade or be persuaded; if you convince us, it will be a bad day for the synagogue, and should you be convinced, for the King of Portugal, so I consider it best that we agree to avoid the issue'.[75]

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[70] Mattiesen, *Kolonial- und Überseepolitik der kurländische Herzoge*, 97–100.

[71] See the Filomoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, Lisbon, 'Livro das Monçoes 22B, fo. 354. dispatches of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, Amsterdam, 10 Aug. and 22 Sept. 1651.

[72] AHU (Lisbon) India ex. 23, doc. 63: res. *Conselho Ultramarino*, Lisbon, 9 June 1655.

[73] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 248.

During the early 1650s with the Spaniards fully engaged in reconquering Catalonia and the Dutch embroiled in the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–4), Portugal found herself temporarily free from major external pressure and well placed to advance her position especially in Brazil. After the Peace of Westminster, of 1654, ended the Anglo-Dutch conflict however, the Dutch States General turned their attention once more to the problems of Portugal and Brazil. In the summer of 1654, João IV's ministers instructed their envoy to Sweden, Antonio da Silva de Sousa, then visiting Hamburg where he doubtless stayed and conferred with Duarte, 'to proceed directly to Amsterdam to speak with Jeronimo Nunes about the prospects for an accommodation with the Dutch'.[76] The Portuguese monarch wished to know if the Dutch 'will forget what has happened in Brazil', negotiate a final settlement, 'and, in particular, you will discover whether they will now receive an ambassador from me'.[77] The answer was a menacing no. Indeed, the next nine years from 1654 to 1663 were probably the most fraught and difficult of the entire history of relations between Portugal and the United Provinces, and since no higher level Portuguese envoy could be sent to the Republic, it was left to Jeronimo to speak for Portugal in negotiations with leading regents of the States of Holland and the city governments. 'Lorsque les ambassadeurs de Portugal se retirèrent de la Haye à cause des différens qui survinrent entre les deux puissances', observed the early eighteenth-century Portuguese writer, Francisco Xavier de Oliveira, 'ce juif y resta seul chargé des plus grandes négociations de cette couronne.'[78] This gave him the capacity to exert a certain subtle influence on the final outcome of the Dutch-Portuguese struggle, a role in which, predictably, he again found himself at odds with the main thrust of Dutch Sephardi Jewish opinion which was now even more bitterly anti-Portuguese than previously following the surrender of Recife and all Dutch Brazil to the Portuguese, in January 1654, and exodus of what remained of the Brazilian Sephardi community, often without most of their property, back to Holland or other parts of the New World.

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[74] There are various instances of this in Sousa Coutinho's dispatches, see also 'Carta da padrão', *Anais*, 2nd ser, VIII, 121.

[75] *Mémorias inéditas de fr. João de S. Joseph*, 160–1.

[76] King to Silva de Sousa, Lisbon, 17 July 1654 printed in *Um diplomata português da Restauração*, p. 24.

For the time being the States General would neither receive a Portuguese ambassador nor discuss peace. Instead, they demanded full restitution of the Netherlands Brazil with the boundaries applying under the Truce of 1641. At the same time, as we have seen, the VOC resumed its military offensive against the Portuguese in Ceylon and southern India. All this constituted a huge political and strategic problem for Portugal and one complicated by the intricate political divisions among the Dutch provinces, and in Holland between the Orangists and the more republican faction led by Johan de Witt.[79] For information about the tense Dutch internal situation, the Lisbon *Conselho de Estado* (Council of State) was almost wholly dependent on Jeronimo's reports. On 20 April 1655, for instance, the *Conselho* discussed a dispatch from Jeronimo, in Amsterdam, dated 30 March, advising that the Dutch stance was in reality less hostile and obdurate than it appeared. Despite the fierce rhetoric emanating from

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[77] Ibid.
[78] Oliveira, *Discours pathétique*, 67.
[79] Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 723–8.

Zeeland and some other provinces, the Dutch Republic, he urged, would not go to war for the moment; moreover, the leading faction in the States General, that headed by De Witt, were in fact 'inclined towards peace'.[80]

Three days later the *Conselho* discussed further dispatches from Jeronimo. He had been engaged in talks with the 'Conde de Nassau'—meaning either the former Dutch governor-general of Brazil, Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen or more probably De Witt's foremost political opponent, the Frisian Stadholder, Willem Frederik—who had 'promised him to work vigorously on our behalf and find out for certain whether the States General will now receive an ambassador from Portugal'.[81] Advising the king to send Sousa de Macedo and write thanking the 'Conde de Nassau' for his help, Jeronimo again affirmed that the Dutch could be reconciled to the loss of Brazil and that negotiation was now feasible. On 16 December 1655, the *Conselho* again discussed Jeronimo's analysis of the splits between the Dutch provinces.[82] But as yet no further move was made.

This impasse was set to continue for three years. The insufficiency of the conciliatory overtures emanating from Portugal strengthened the hawks and finally, in 1657, the war party, including the Amsterdam Sephardi community among them, had their way. In September, ten months after the death of João IV, a powerful Dutch war fleet, under the Baron van Obdam, sailed to Lisbon bearing an ultimatum for the new Portuguese Queen-regent, Dona Luisa and her ministers which demanded the immediate restitution of Dutch Brazil under threat of war. The ultimatum was rejected (much to the gratification of the Spanish court) and the Dutch naval blockade of Lisbon began. With the outbreak of war, De Witt had 'Hijeronijmo Nunes da Costa' whom Holland's Pensionary described as being 'in charge of the affairs of the Queen of Portugal here' placed under surveillance and his correspondence intercepted.[83] By decree of 31 December 1657 the export to Portugal of naval stores and munitions of any sort was banned.[84] Under a second edict, of 14 February 1658, the

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[80] Biblioteca dos Duques de Cadaval (Muge) MSk-viii–6b, 'Memorias do Conselho de estado', fo. 86v.

[81] Ibid., fo. 91v.

[82] Ibid., fo. 260v. res. *Conselho de Estado*, Lisbon, 16 dec. 1655.

[83] ARH SG 2648. DeWitt to Obdam, The Hague, 16 Nov. 1657; Rowen, *John de Witt*, 292.

[84] Aitzema, *Historie of Verhael* ix, 186.

States General forbade the importing of Portuguese products, fruit and salt into the United Provinces,[85] a blow to the Portuguese Jewish merchant community for whom the Portugal trade remained of fundamental importance. Much regretted in such smaller Dutch ports such as Enkhuizen, Hoorn and Schiedam was the suspension of supplies of Portuguese marine salt which was needed in quantity for the herring fishery.

However, a possible joint land and sea attack on Portugal by Spain and the Dutch together failed to materialise,[86] and in Holland at least, it was not long before the ardour for war cooled. Moreover, the essentially maritime and colonial struggle which now began rapidly acquired a desultory character outside the East Indies where the VOC, having ejected the Portuguese from Ceylon, went on to capture Cochin, Cranganore, Tuticorin, Negapatnam and the other strongholds around the southern tip of India. In the Atlantic, the Dutch war effort was largely confined to a privateering campaign, albeit one on a considerable scale. As in the late 1640s, several privateering frigates were built and fitted out by Jewish merchants, one of them owned by Joseph Pereira of Amsterdam, was mistakenly captured by the Spaniards and brought into a Galician port in the autumn of 1658.[87] The depredations of the privateers, probably had a more drastic effect on Dutch trade with Portugal (and via Portugal with Brazil) than the ban on imports, causing heavy losses through interruption and suspension of trade not least to the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community, including Jeronimo himself.

Nevertheless, Portuguese Jewish merchants at Amsterdam, more noticeably than other Dutch merchants, continued to supply munitions to Portugal, seemingly on a considerable scale On 1 August 1658, a vehement protest from the Spanish king, Philip IV about this traffic, and the infringement of the States General's own policy, was discussed in the States of Holland.[88] Later, in January 1661, the Spanish ambassador complained that four ships loaded with munitions for Portugal, consigned by Amsterdam Jews were preparing to sail and that it was the Jews specifically who were flouting the ban on exports of arms and munitions to Portugal.[89] He warned that Philip IV was not only likely to feel obliged to intercept Dutch vessels off the Portuguese coast but would consider revoking 'l'ordre qu'elle avoit donné de ce que l'on auroit à traitter les juifs domiciliés en ces provinces comme aux autres sujets [of the United Provinces] puisque ce sont eux qui envoyent les dites munitions de guerre'.[90] Thus Spain would punish the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam in particular. Soon after, in spring of 1661, a States warship off the Portuguese coast intercepted a Dutch vessel packed with munitions consigned to the Portuguese crown. The Spanish ambassador at The Hague was outraged to learn that the cargo had been shipped under false papers and bills of lading for Cadiz by three Portuguese Jews—Fernando Martines, Gonzalo de Azevedo and Jacob del Monte. The ambassador complained bitterly about the Jews and about the lax searches conducted in the ports by the admiralty authorities, again warning that the king of Spain was apt to revoke the order he had given 'en faveur du commerce des juifs de ces provinces, puisque ce sont eux qui commettent incessement ces fraudes et contraventions'.[91]

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[85] ARH SG 7011/ii, res. SG, The Hague, 14 Feb. 1658 Res. Holl. 20 Sept. 1658.

[86] Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 408–9.

[87] Res. Holl. 18 Nov. 1658.

[88] Res. Holl. 1 August 1658.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1658, the States General began debating whether or not to negotiate with Portugal and receive a Portuguese envoy. Four provinces—Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland and Groningen—flatly refused to negotiate, insisting there could be no retreat from the demand for prior restitution of Brazil while Holland remained divided and Friesland and Overijssel urged negotiation. Yet only Zeeland wholeheartedly favoured continuing the war, the rest engaging to some extent in posturing while most Holland regents inclined towards peace. The intricacies of the debate and voting drew Jeronimo Nunes da Costa right into the thick of Dutch politics as well as of Dutch Sephardi politics. He continually went back and forth between Amsterdam and The Hague, as he reported to Lisbon, and also travelled to other Dutch cities in an effort to sway regent and other opinion.[92] At The Hague, his chief supporter was the French ambassador, who was under instructions from Mazarin to assist Portugal as a way of weakening Spain.

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[89] ARH SG 7055/i. Gamarra to SG, The Hague, 8 Jan. 1661.

[90] Ibid.

[91] ARH SG 7055/i. Gamarra to SG, The Hague, 11 April 1661; Herrero Sánchez, *Acercamiento hispano-neerlandés*, 134.

[92] 'Carta de Padrão, *Anais* 2nd ser. VIII, p. 121; Oliveira, *Discours pathétique*, 67–8.

When finally the States General voted to admit a Portuguese ambassador, over the objections of three provinces, the Queen-regent's ministers in Lisbon made a disastrous choice. For this exceptionally delicate and important mission, they selected a high nobleman, Fernando Telles de Faro, who unbeknown to them nurtured clandestine pro-Spanish sympathies. Once settled in at The Hague, Telles de Faro (who was under orders to show his secret instructions to Jeronimo), utterly baffled the latter by showing no inclination to get on with the negotiations.[93] In fact, he was in secret contact with the Spanish ambassador, Don Esteban de Gamarra, and deliberately dragging his feet in the interests of Spain. Eventually, the French became suspicious and warned Jeronimo together with Luis Alvares Ribeiro, the embassy secretary. Even so, both men were stupefied when, on the pretext of visiting Amsterdam for 'some amorous diversion', Telles de Faro fled with the embassy papers and cash and placed himself under Gamarra's protection.[94] Aside from the setback to peace prospects, this was a financial blow to Jeronimo personally, since he had lent the new ambassador 8,000 guilders for various purposes, around half for purchasing a diamond necklace. Inevitably, the affair caused a sensation in court circles throughout Europe. Tried *in absentia*, in Lisbon, the culprit was swiftly sentenced to public execution by strangulation and the loss of all his possessions; he was publicly burnt in effigy and his several Portuguese residences demolished, the ground on which they stood being sown with salt.

This bizarre episode occurred at a critical moment, giving Jeronimo the opportunity to play a political role of an importance almost unique for a practising Jew in seventeenth-century Europe. With French support, Jeronimo together with Alvares Ribeiro, on 7 June 1659, submitted a joint request to the States General asking to be accredited as official plenipotentiaries on behalf of Portugal, in place of Telles de Faro, even though they had no authorisation from Lisbon to do any such thing.[95] De Witt with his usual dexterity steered this through the States General, despite its being opposed by several provinces, and ten days later the 'Agent d'Acosta', as the Dutch called him, and the embassy secretary were accredited as joint representatives of Portugal in the peace negotiations.

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[93] ANTT MS Misc. de Graça 2 L, Correspondencia de Luis Alvares Ribeiro, fo. 14. Jeronimo Nunes da Costa to Queen-Regent, Amsterdam, 3 June 1659.

[94] Aitzema, *Historie of Verhael* ix, 660–3, 667; Molsbergen, *Frankrijk en de Republiek*, 183–4; Van de Haar, *Diplomatieke betrekkingen*, 163; Schedel de Castello Branco, *Vida*, 314–16.

[95] ANTT Misc. da Graça 2L, Correspondencia de Luis Alvares Ribeiro, fo. 14.

In fact, for both Portugal and De Witt speed was now of the essence. For the war between France and Spain was drawing to a close and the Peace of the Pyrenees ending the long struggle, eventually concluded in November 1659, had already largely taken shape. Should the negotiations between Portugal and the Dutch fall through, as the Spanish court desired, and the Dutch war-party have their way, there was every possibility that Portugal would soon find herself, without French support, simultaneously at war with Spain and the Dutch, and under combined attack by land and sea. Spain was promising the States General, should the Dutch assist with reconquering Portugal and Brazil, restitution of the whole of the former Dutch Brazil to the West India Company, a promise especially attractive to Zeeland and the Sephardi community.

During these months Jeronimo was almost constantly in The Hague, conferring with the French and English envoys as well as with senior regents, especially Pieter de Groot, son of Grotius, one of De Witt's closest associates and a leading member of the States' committee for Portuguese affairs. De Groot soon entered into detailed talks with Jeronimo.[96] A draft Dutch-Portuguese peace treaty in twenty-five articles was worked out which De Witt presented to the States of Holland on 19 October. The key points were that Portugal would restitute neither northern Brazil nor Angola but would compensate the West India Company for its losses in Brazil and Africa with an indemnity of four million *cruzados* to be paid over a long period in the form of salt shipments from Setúbal. Salt being the greatest deprivation resulting from the war for the Dutch, their public at this juncture were well attuned to its value. The other main concession, that the Portuguese king would grant the Dutch the same advantageous trade privileges as were conceded to the English, in 1654, predictably provoked great jealousy and displeasure in London.

The envoy chosen to replace Telles de Faro, the Conde de Miranda, arrived in The Hague only after the draft peace terms had been drawn up, late in November 1659. But a draft is not a peace and with four provinces still opposing the cessation of hostilities, and many regents taking the view that the outline peace made insufficient amends, the outcome remained very much in doubt for a long time afterwards. Some of the Dutch negotiating team pressed for even more favourable terms of trade with regard to the parts of Brazil and Africa which the Portuguese had recovered from the Dutch, especially the right to sail direct to northern Brazil, Angola and São Thomé by-passing the royal customs in Lisbon and Oporto. Miranda and Nunes da Costa who acted as his interpreter and chief adviser countered this by claiming that direct navigation would totally subvert the sovereign rights of the Portuguese crown over trade with its own colonies as well as breach the Brazil Company's monopoly of exports of wine, olive oil, flour and cod to the whole of Brazil.[97]

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[96] Ibid., fo. 55. Alvares Ribeiro to Mello Torres, The Hague, 22 August 1659.

But the real struggle now was less over the precise terms than to get a draft peace without restitution of any territory in Brazil through the Dutch civic and provincial assemblies. The Portuguese were offering attractive trade terms and a four million *cruzado* indemnity equivalent to some eight million guilders, though the exact mechanism of the indemnity and notional price to be placed on the salt was yet to be fixed. In the summer of 1660 Jeronimo again travelled back and forth to various Dutch cities, assuring magistrates and merchants of the advantages of the treaty and trying to win over the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community. Many Jews in Holland, Miranda reported to Lisbon, in March, especially those forced to leave Netherlands Brazil in 1654, actively supported Zeeland and the West India Company in opposing the draft peace.[98] The collapse of Dutch Brazil had been a disaster for the Sephardim on both sides of the Atlantic and one can scarcely doubt that Jeronimo was at this time involved in endless debate, recrimination and soul-searching.

Presumably, he was never enthusiastic about Portugal's reconquest of northern Brazil and must surely have infinitely preferred João IV's pre-1645 stated policy of accepting the partition of Brazil and formal recognition of the borders of the Dutch zone. Since the king himself had (however hypercritically) disowned the rebel planters who rose against the Dutch and Dutch Jews in northern Brazil, in 1645, and, disclaiming responsibility, pretended to adhere to the terms of the 1641 truce also after 1645,[99] there was no reason why Jeronimo Nunes da Costa should not have repudiated the planters' rebellion even more emphatically, in discussions with fellow Sephardim in Amsterdam, for as long as possible, until around 1650. But in the context of 1660–1 this was all water under the bridge. Jeronimo's tactic now was to urge fellow Jews that there was no realistic hope of retrieving what was lost in Brazil and that their interests, including those of them who had been driven from Brazil, would best be served by re-establishing a secure and prosperous commerce with Portugal and, via Portugal, with Brazil and the other Portuguese colonies.

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[97] ANTT Misc. da Graça 3L, fo. 43, 38–46. Miranda to Mello Torres, The Hague, 27 Feb. and 4 March 1660.

[98] Ibid. fo. 46. Miranda to Mello Torres, The Hague, 4 March 1660.

Jewish participation in the Dutch internal debate over the Portuguese peace was apparently far from marginal. Gamarra, who was still seeking to block the peace, noted acidly, in January 1661, that while Miranda's secretary was endeavouring to bribe the burgomasters of Flushing, 'Geronimo Nunez da Costa, Agent of the Tyrant [of Portugal], has been negotiating hard in the city of Utrecht and here [in Holland] has won over two Jews, one called Abraham de Azevedo who came here as a deputy from Brazil before it was lost, to seek support, a man much interested in the [West India] Company, and the other Abraham Balverde who was also a delegate [from the Jewish community of Recife] and though both men did all they could in past years to persuade government leaders here, and the directors of the Company, to refuse any settlement without restitution of the territories, now they go urging one and all that they should accept the offers of the Tyrant, for otherwise they will lose everything.'[100] Abraham de Azevedo who subsequently claimed to have lost the largest fortune—amounting to 234,737 florins—of any lost by Jews in Brazil, had indeed been one of the elders of the Zur Israel congregation of Recife in the late 1640s, and in 1651–2, and had been a member of the delegation sent across, in 1653, to drum up support for Netherlands Brazil in Amsterdam and confer as to how to safeguard the Jews and their rights should the Dutch in Brazil finally be compelled to capitulate.[101] Abraham Valverde, son of another of the elders of the Recife congregation, Jacob Valverde, also lost a good deal in Brazil and apparently later emigrated from Amsterdam to Barbados.[102]

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[99] Verissimo Serrão, *Historia de Portugal* v, 112–13, 122.

[100] AGS Libros de la Haya vol. 43, fo. 4. Gamarra to Philip IV, The Hague, 10 jan. 1661.

[101] Wolff and Wolff, *A Odisséia dos judeus de Recife*, 189–90; Böhm, *Sefardíes en los dominios holandeses*, 62–3, 100–1.

At this juncture, shortly after the Restoration in England, the Portuguese court came under strong English pressure not to agree to the proposed commercial concessions to the Dutch. 'I can say no more of the business of Portugal', declared the new English secretary of state, Lord Clarendon, 'than that the king our master must never endure that the Hollanders should enjoy equal privileges with him in point of trade'.[103] The Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1654 and the special trade privileges granted to the English then, were confirmed, updated and expanded, in June 1661, in conjunction with the marriage treaty whereby Charles II took as his queen the new king's sister, Catharine of Braganza, receiving as her dowry cash, Bombay, and the valuable North African stronghold of Tangiers, situated at a commanding position in the Straits of Gibraltar. The personage entrusted with carrying out the financial side of the bargain, on behalf of the Portuguese crown, was none other than Duarte da Silva, the suspected New Christian judaizer whose experiences at the hands of the Inquisition had not dampened his zeal for the restored Portuguese monarchy and who now accompanied the princess on her voyage to England where he afterwards joined the Sephardi community.[104]

Confident of their new ascendancy in Lisbon, the English pushed hard to prevent the Dutch securing commercial concessions equal to those enjoyed by their merchants.[105] At this point, Miranda having received instructions to prevaricate as long as possible before finally acceding to the terms regarding commerce, Jeronimo effected possibly the most decisive political intervention of his career. If the Portuguese court, in the last analysis, had to defer more to a major political and military ally such as England rather than to a bitter maritime rival such as the United Provinces, Jeronimo's personal perspective was entirely different. Not only did he have no reason to prefer the English, he had every reason to consider the Dutch-Portuguese peace vital not just for himself but for the Amsterdam

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[102] Wolff and Wolff, *A Odisseia dos judeus de Recife*, pp. 229–31.

[103] Van de Haar, *Diplomatieke betrekkingen*, 177; Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 252–3.

[104] Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos Cristãos Novos*, 281–2.

[105] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 234–5; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 125.

Sephardi community. A repudiated draft peace, or a diluted agreement which failed to provide Amsterdam with trade terms equivalent to those enjoyed by England would have been of little use to his community. It would indeed have been an unmitigated disaster for the Dutch Sephardim. Consequently, he had a much stronger incentive than did Miranda to seek to check the overweening and chauvinistic new English envoy at The Hague, Sir George Downing.

Interpreting Portugal's interests at this juncture rather differently from Miranda and Downing, Jeronimo conferred secretly with Pieter de Groot and other members of the States of Holland's committee for Portuguese affairs, and also with De Witt himself. He explained the contradictory pressures to which his master, King Affonso, was being subjected and advised the Dutch leadership not only as to how to ward off Downing but how to deal with his own superior, Miranda. De Groot, the latter reported to De Witt, was told by Jeronimo that it would be useless to adopt a conciliatory tone with Affonso in the present conjuncture, since the Portuguese king was resolved on his pro-English policy. The only effective strategy for De Witt was to take a tough line, taking advantage of the fact that Spain was now disengaged from France and girding herself up for a major offensive against Portugal, and issue an immediate ultimatum threatening to renew the war unless the Portuguese signed the draft terms.[106] This was remarkable advice for the Agent of Portugal to be giving the Dutch leadership. But it is clear Jeronimo was directly implicated in the secret decision which resulted in the States General's ultimatum of 31 July 1661, requiring that the draft peace, embodying commercial privileges equivalent to those enjoyed by the English, must be signed within ten days, or Miranda would have to leave the Republic and the war would resume.[107] The gamble paid off. To Downing's fury, Miranda panicked and signed the treaty on 6 August.

Yet in the fraught circumstances, ratification would clearly be far from automatic and unless ratified the peace was a dead letter. On taking his leave of the States General, on returning to present the terms to the king, Miranda received a golden chain worth 6,000 guilders while his Jewish assistant, the 'Agent d'Acosta', received a modest replica worth 800, both over the protests of Zeeland and Gelderland, provinces not yet ready for peace.[108] Miranda left Jeronimo who had reportedly shown great 'dilligence et zèlle [. . .] specialement en tout ce qui dependoit à la conclusion de la paix entre sa Majesté et Mrs. Les États' in charge of the embassy, stipulating that during his absence Nunes da Costa alone was authorised to represent his master in official transactions connected with the peace.[109]

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[106] De Groot to de Witt, 9 July 1661 in *Brieven aan Johan de* Witt, pp. 42–4; Herrero Sánchez, *Acercamiento hispano-neerlandés*, 356.

[107] *Brieven geschreven ende gewisselt* I, 410, 413–14; Wicquefort, *Histoire des Provinces-Unies* iii, 70–1; Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 253, Van de Haar, *Diplomatieke betrekkingen*, 178; Israel, 'Diplomatic Career', 186.

During Miranda's absence, Jeronimo spent much time in The Hague, conferring with De Groot and other regents, explaining the intricacies of the split at the Portuguese court between the pro-English and the pro-Dutch factions, the former headed by Mello Torres 'who had been in England' and the latter by the Conde de Soure.[110] Once again, it seems that Jeronimo, at this crucial juncture, was to a considerable extent following his own policy, or at least one particular strand of Portuguese policy which for the time being by no means fully coincided with the prevailing mood at court in Lisbon. Whether or not this policy was in the best interests of Portugal, it certainly accorded with the interest of the States of Holland and Amsterdam as interpreted by the leading regents—and of Dutch Sephardi Jewry as well as of Jeronimo personally.

Miranda failed in his mission, returning to Holland in December 1661 with the peace still unratified. King Affonso was more anxious to please the English than the Dutch. The Dutch response was again to threaten a resumption of hostilities which at this point was no empty threat since the East India Company had substantial forces in place in southern India and used the opportunity to renew its offensive against the Portuguese strongholds in the area. When the news reached Europe that the Dutch governor-general Van Goens had launched a new offensive against the Portuguese along the Malabar coast and that the fortresses of Crananore and Cochin were under threat, Downing at The Hague, and Charles ministers in London became seriously alarmed. While England was obstructing the Dutch-Portuguese peace in Europe, warned Downing, the 'Dutch East Indye Company are still making a vast progress in the East

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[108] Aitzema, *Historie ofte verhael* x, 109–10.

[109] ARH SG 7011/ii. Miranda to the States General, The Hague, 23 and 26 August 1661.

[110] *Brieven aan Johan de Witt*, 46.

Indies'.[111] Suddenly, it seemed in London that their policy was not so adroit after all. Charles II hastily changed tack and withdrew his objections to the proposed Dutch-Portuguese peace. The Portuguese promptly ratified, in May 1662, but now it was the turn of the States General to prevaricate.

This further delay was more than just a device to enable Van Goens to complete the conquest of Cochin and Crananore, For there were still substantial difficulties within the Republic. Not only were Zeeland and Gelderland adamently refusing to sign, but Groningen now withdrew its earlier assent and rejoined the rejectionist camp. But this did little to mitigate the fury of the Portuguese court, and the English, on seeing that Affonso's signature had failed to halt the advance of the VOC in India. The Malabar campaign only ended with the surrender of Cochin to the Dutch in January 1663. The embattled Dutch-Portuguese peace of 1661 then finally came into effect being published, and celebrated, in both Lisbon and The Hague in March 1663. King Affonso formally thanked Jeronimo for his services in helping conclude the peace, granting him a royal pension of 700 *cruzados* yearly.[112] Presumably, it was also at this time, or soon after, that Francisco de Medina, the father of the future army contractor Sir Solomon Medina of London, a substantial merchant who resided at Middelburg was designated 'Agent vande Coninck van Portugael' in Zeeland, authorized to negotiate on behalf of Portugal with the admiralty college there about maritime matters concerning Portuguese interests.[113]

But the Dutch-Portuguese peace was not yet finalised. Portuguese insistence on the restitution of Cochin, combined with Dutch complaints over the drastic reduction in the pace of indemnity payments resulting from the much reduced number of Dutch vessels able to reach Setúbal, to load salt, during the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–67),[114] as well as English efforts to mobilise Portugal against the Dutch at that time, led to a fresh deterioration in relations in the years 1664–7 just as Spain embarked on her final effort to liquidate Portuguese independence. By 1667 with the Dutch emerging successful from their war with England there was even talk in the Republic of embarking on a new war with Portugal. The Portuguese court was anxious to avoid this and, to sort out the remaining difficulties, a leading minister, Francisco de Mello Manuel da Camara was sent to The Hague as ambassador extrordinary.[115] During the years of his embassy, 1667–9, Nunes da Costa acted as his assistant and interpreter much as he had for Miranda.

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[111] Lister, *Life and Administration* iii, 153; Meilink-Roelofsz, *De Vestiging*, 54–62; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 248–9.

[112] 'Carta de padrão', *Anais* 2nd ser. VIII, p. 121.

[113] ARH SG 5581/i. Zeeland admiralty college to States General, Middelburg, 23 Jan. 1664.

[114] Rau, *Estudos*, 287.

The outcome was the supplementary agreement of July 1669 by which the Portuguese reconciled themselves to the loss of Cochin, and a new schedule of salt consignments from Setúbal was established. Jeronimo had long been one of the leading Dutch importers of Portuguese salt and it was natural that during these negotiations he should be the one to speak for Portugal on the details of the salt traffic though no-one can have been entirely unaware that there was a distinct conflict of interest in his playing this role. Under the final settlement, it was agreed, that 85,000 *moyos* of tax-free salt would be shipped from Portugal to the Republic each year for twenty years, a rate of shipment that would require 130 ships a year, though in fact, during 1668, only 108 shiploads amounting to 60,800 *moyos* had been achieved.[116] Subsequently, the rate of shipment often fell lower still. In 1678, for example, no more than 43,283 *moyos* were shipped and in 1680 a mere 45,476 *moyos*.[117]

The supplementary Dutch-Portuguese peace of 1669, coming soon after Spain's acceptance of Portugal's independence, in 1668, was a true landmark in history, ending the formative period of restoration of the new Portuguese monarchy, and the reconstitution of her maritime empire. It also ended the long history of Dutch-Portuguese conflict in Africa, America and Asia. After 1669, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa's activities as Agent of the Crown of Portugal in the United Provinces, like the Curiel agency for Portugal in Hamburg, became a minor fixture of tradition, ceremonial and routine rather than one of high politics as during the critical quarter of a century of the Portuguese struggle for independence.

But there remains the question of the implications and significance of the Jewish and New Christian role in the struggle for Portuguese independence and for consolidation of the empire. Where Duarte and Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, like their ally Father Vieira, had undeniably failed was in their attempt to engineer a fundamental and far-reaching change in the relationship between Portugal and the Portuguese Jewish and crypto-Jewish diasporas overseas. For all his promises and good intentions, João IV in the end had been powerless to prevent the Inquisition seizing Duarte de Silva and other Portuguese New Christians whose contribution to the struggle against Spain had been of great significance. Worse still, Affonso VI's brother, Dom Pedro, who took over the reins of government in Portugal as a result of a *golpe de estado*, in 1667, under the title of Prince-regent, decided, now that Portugal was secure from both Spain and the Dutch, that it made sense from his point of view to seek the approval of the clergy and the common people by reverting to a much more harshly anti-New Christian and pro-Inquisition stance than was feasible previously.[118] The Inquisition, curbed in some measure, if only very imperfectly, by João IV, was for all practical purposes entirely restored to its former power and status. No sooner was the new Portugal secure than—from the end of the 1660s—preparations were made for a major new round of repression of Portuguese crypto-Judaism.

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[115] Rau, *Os holandeses*, 10; Prestage, *Diplomatic Relations*, 235–7.
[116] Rau, *Estudos*, 287.
[117] ARH SG 7015/i. Wolfson to States General, Lisbon, 31 July 1685.

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[118] Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos Cristãos Novos*, 289–95.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

DUTCH SEPHARDI JEWRY, MILLENARIAN POLITICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BRAZIL (1645–1654)

The assumption that the Jews were a wholly marginal isolated group which took little on no part in the great political and military conflicts and rivalries of early modern times is so ingrained in modern historiography that even the bare facts of the Jewish involvement in the struggle for Brazil between 1645 and 1654 seem at first sight rather disconcerting. For the evidence leaves no doubt that western Sephardi Jewry (and the Portuguese New Christians living in Portugal) played a key role in the vast triangular, trans-Atlantic conflict between Portugal, Spain and the Dutch, in the years from the Portuguese Secession from Spain, in 1640, until Spain's acceptance of Portuguese independence, in 1668, a political and economic role the dimensions of which have not thus far been fully appreciated.

The Portuguese Revolt against the Spanish crown in December 1640, stemming from a conspiracy of the Portuguese nobility with the duke of Braganza—now proclaimed King João IV of Portugal—at their head, was one of the most dramatic events of the mid-seventeenth century and one of the most far-reaching in consequence and implications. Its impact, with Portuguese (southern) Brazil, the Portuguese East Indies, or *Estado da India*, and (in 1643) Tangiers following metropolitan Portugal into rebellion against the Spanish crown, was indeed global in scope. A key market in early modern times, and hub of a far-flung seaborne empire, Portugal strove to secede from a monarchy which in 1640 was still the most powerful of the world empires, initiating a struggle which dragged on for over a quarter of a century.[1] Its eventual success was in no small degree due to the support the reborn Portuguese monarchy received from the French, Swedes, English in whose interest it was to help weaken Spain and the Habsburgs.

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[1] Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 100–4; Elliott, *Count-Duke of Olivares*, 597–615; it was in 1668, that the Spanish crown finally acknowledged the fact of Portuguese independence.


F.D. 2002
Amazon
NEW HOLLAND
Island of Fernando de Noronha
Paraíba
Olinda
Itamaracá
Recife (Pernambuco)
Fort Maurits
São Francisco River
PORTUGUESE BRAZIL
Bahia de Todos os Santos
Rio de Janeiro

Map 8. Dutch Brazil around 1640

Yet if the Lisbon *coup d'état*, of December 1640, heralding the rebirth of Portugal after sixty years of subjection to the Spanish Habsburgs, was warmly welcomed and assisted by the French, Swedes and later by Cromwell, it also posed a difficult and painful dilemma for the United Provinces of the Netherlands. For during the sixty years (1580–1640) of Portugal's linkage to the Spanish crown, the Portuguese, as subjects of the Spanish crown, and the Dutch, as rebels in the eyes of Spain, had been locked in bitter rivalry for possession of the East Indies, West Africa and—since the West India Company's attack on Bahia in 1624—also Brazil. Of course, the Portuguese Revolt offered an obvious opportunity—desperately needed by the Portuguese—to negotiate an end to the Dutch-Portuguese conflict beyond Europe, to reconstitute and consolidate their maritime empire, and concentrate all available resources on the prolonged defensive fight against Spain. Assuredly the Dutch, like the French and Swedes, saw in the rebirth of Portugal an unrivalled opportunity to weaken Spain and make further gains in all quarters at Spanish expense and, in particular, seize more towns and fortresses in Flanders and additional footholds in the Caribbean. As a first step in this direction, a Dutch war fleet was sent in the summer of 1641 to clear Spanish warships from the Portuguese coast and encourage the Portuguese (as well as vainly try to intercept the returning Spanish American silver fleet).[2] At the same time, however, halting the war against the Portuguese in the Indies, the inevitable result of helping them against Spain, entailed serious disadvantages for both the great colonial companies.[3] Abandoning the drive against the Portuguese possessions in Asia, Africa and America seemingly meant giving up long-cherished plans to extend the Dutch zones of occupation and influence in Brazil, West Africa, Ceylon and southern India, all of which were crucial to the Dutch overseas trading system. Not surprisingly, the directors of the East and West India Companies soon began trying to influence the Dutch public against entering into any sort of final peace or formal alliance with the new Portugal.

To begin with, in the years 1640–45, the Portuguese Secession posed much less of a problem for the Amsterdam Sephardi merchant elite than it did for the regents and colonial companies. In

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[2] Israel, *Dutch Republic and Hispanic World*, 324–5.

[3] Aitzema, *Historie of Verhael* iv, 197–9; Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 103–4; Israel, *Dutch Republic and Hispanic World*, 313–14, 330.

1640, the Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam were not yet major shareholders in the colonial companies and since their principal business, the trade with Portugal had been seriously disrupted by the Spanish embargoes against Dutch shipping and goods in force since April 1621 (in Portugal, Spanish Italy and the southern Netherlands as well as Spain) they were bound to view with enthusiasm anything that would end the embargoes and revive Dutch maritime trade with metropolitan Portugal.[4] Hence the Portuguese Secession promised the unimpeded return of Dutch ships and cargoes to Portuguese ports after a highly damaging interruption lasting two decades. This, in turn, could be expected to revive the economic vitality of the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community, ending the prolonged period of relative stagnation following an initial steep slump in the years 1621–5 which had held the community in its grip ever since April 1621.[5]

This expectation, moreover, fully materialised. João IV readmitted Dutch vessels and goods to the ports of Portugal on favourable terms, and without obstruction, by decree of 21 January 1641.[6] The long recession in Dutch Sephardic business activity, already slowly ending in the late 1630s, turned rapidly into a vigorous boom. The number of Portuguese Jewish depositors with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank having fallen from 114, in 1620, to only 76 in 1625, in the worst period of the slump was still at only 89 in 1641 but had risen sharply to 126 by 1646.[7] A still more telling proof of the damage caused by the Spanish embargoes and the impressive speed of the post-1640 recovery are the figures for the Amsterdam Sephardic community's *imposta* tax on trade turnover.[8] Commerce having fallen very sharply in 1621–2 to a recorded trade volume of two million florins in 1623—the low-point of the slump—only rose above the three million level in one single year during the whole of the period 1622–1636, a dramatic confirmation of just how deep the Spanish embargoes had bitten and how sluggish the post-1621 commercial performance of the Amsterdam Sephardim really was. It is true that there was some discernible recovery in the late 1630s, assessed trade for the *imposta* attaining and holding steady at the three and half million florin level in the years 1637–39 before rising to 4,372,000 florins in 1640. But there can be little doubt that this appreciable improvement was largely due to the boom in trade with Dutch Brazil. Remove that factor and Dutch Sephardic European commerce must have been nearly as stagnant in 1639 as in the early 1620s. If the assessed value of Dutch Sephardi trade rocketed from 4.37 million florins worth in 1640 to over 10 million florins worth by 1650, no scholar with any awareness of the realities of western European maritime commerce at this time can be in any doubt that this was owing to the lifting of the Spanish embargoes—first in Portugal, in 1641 and then in the summer of 1647 in Spain and the Spanish Netherlands. From 1641, Dutch vessels, frequently bearing cargo for Portuguese Jewish merchants at Amsterdam, entered Portuguese ports in large numbers. Indeed, in the three years 1643–5, Dutch vessels accounted for more than half the total number of non-Portuguese vessels, thus considerably outnumbering the English, French and Hanseatics, anchoring at Lisbon.[9]

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[4] Ibid., 45–6, 93–4, 138–9, 210–12; Rau, *Estudos*, 179–90; Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', 29–31; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 203–12.

[5] Ibid., 421–32; Israel, *European Jewry*, 88–9; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 128–40.

[6] Prestage, *A Embaixada de Tristão de Mendonça Furtado*, 14.

[7] Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 14; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 422.

[8] For the figures (the historical significance of which, however, is incorrectly interpreted) see, Vlessing, 'Portuguese-Jewish Merchant Community', 228; Vlessing, 'Economic Influence of the Portuguese Jews', 309.

All this helps explain why the Portuguese rebellion against Spain was quite enthusiastically supported by the Sephardim of north-west Europe as well as most of the Portuguese New Christians. Those of the latter living in France, at Rouen, Nantes, Bordeaux, and Bayonne, under the protection of Cardinal Richelieu (provided they discreetly veiled their crypto-Judaism), could now re-establish their ruptured links with Portugal, broken off since France's entry into the Thirty Years' War against the Habsburgs, in 1635 while at the same time be seen to be promoting the Cardinal's policy of assisting Portugal to achieve independence as a means of whittling down Spain, a policy with which Richelieu's New Christian agent, Alphonse Lopez, was particularly associated.[10] It is true that at Lisbon several factors of the Portuguese New Christian bankers based in Madrid, having thrown in their lot with the Spanish cause, participated in the conspiracy of 1641 intended to overthrow the Braganza, and reverse the coup of December 1640.[11] But it seems that Olivares' policy of favouring a small clique of Portuguese New Christians who moved to Madrid and were granted special privileges, had tended to alienate those who remained in Portugal and found themselves excluded from those opportunities.[12] Most New Christians remaining in Portugal had no particular ties with the Madrid *asentistas* and, once it began to succeed, every reason to favour rather than oppose the rebellion. For the restoration of the Portuguese monarchy, and reconstitution of the maritime empire, inevitably required the forming of an entire new financial and fiscal apparatus centred on Lisbon and it was natural that New Christian businessmen free of ties with the Madrid bankers, such as Manoel Garcia Franco, Balthasar Rodrigues de Mattos and Duarte da Silva, should throw in their lot with the new political order. For this simultaneously enabled them to display loyalty to their 'patria' while securing a leading position in finance and trade.

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[9] Rau, 'Subsidios', 241.

[10] Revah, *Le Cardinal Richelieu et la restauration*, 10–16.

[11] In particular Pedro de Baeza de Silveira, brother of Jorge de Paz one of the leading Madrid bankers, see Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers*, 125–6.

In 1641, then, the interests of Dutch and other north-west European Sephardim converged with those of their New Christian relatives in France and Portugal. Jews and New Christians alike had a strong interest in supporting the Portuguese rebellion and furthering the negotiations which soon began a few months later to suspend the Dutch-Portuguese conflict beyond Europe and align the Portuguese empire with France and the Dutch against Spain.This support, furthermore, mattered; for during the first few years of the struggle for Portuguese independence, the new monarchy found itself in an highly precarious strategic and financial position and it is very likely, had Olivares and his fellow ministers in Madrid at that time not felt they needed to concentrate their main military effort against Catalonia, and in Flanders, that the new Portugal would have quickly disintegrated under the combined weight of inadequate resources and Castilian military pressure.[13]

In any case, during the years 1640–43, João IV lacked the wherewithal to maintain more than a token army and fledgling war fleet; and most of this was required to defend Portugal itself. Maritime communications with the empire in Brazil, Africa and the East Indies, accordingly, on which the monarchy's survival and prosperity depended, seemed entirely at the mercy of the Dutch. Consequently, one of the new king's first and most urgent priorities in the midst of the desperate struggle on which he now embarked, was with all possible haste to seek an end to hostilities in the Indies east and west and secure Dutch political and military assistance as well as an assured flow of grain, naval stores, weapons and munitions from the Amsterdam exchange. The first Portuguese ambassador to the United Provinces, Dom Tristão de Mendonça Furtado, left Lisbon in January 1641 a mere few days after the Lisbon *coup d'état*, with urgent instructions to negotiate as best he could a ten-year truce to apply in Brazil, Africa and Asia, and letters of credit, including one for 100,000 *cruzados* issued by the Lisbon New Christian banker Manoel Garcia Franco, for the purchase of arms, naval stores, siege equipment and munitions.[14]

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[12] Ibid.; Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 122.

[13] Elliott, *Count-Duke of Olivares*, 608–10, 612; Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, 110–33.

The conferences between Dom Tristão and the States General's committee for Portugal were the chief topic of conversation in The Hague and Amsterdam during the early months of 1641, not only among the regents, diplomats and East and West India Company directors but also among the Portuguese Jewish community. Having tried unsuccessfully to derail the talks, the directors of the colonial companies watched with growing alarm as the value of VOC and WIC shares on the Amsterdam exchange began to slide, the stock market surmising that a truce agreement would be reached and that this would curtail the opportunities and profits of both companies.[15] Within weeks, over 10% was wiped off the value of their shares. Meanwhile, the Jews, the sources reveal, participated in an important way in these deliberations as well as the bargaining over arms purchases. Garcia Franco's credit note for 100,000 *cruzados* was drawn on Francisco Ramires Pina (Isaac Naar), an Amsterdam merchant who had long traded with Lisbon, was a specialist dealer in pearls (especially pearls from Portuguese India and the Persian Gulf) and who was in good standing with the New Christian financiers backing the rebellion in Lisbon.[16] He was also at this time one of the *parnasim* of the Amsterdam synagogue and thus in a position to support the Portuguese cause on the community's board of elders, though he died soon after Dom Tristão's arrival, and the servicing of the arms contract had to be re-assigned to his cousin Lopo Ramirez (David Curiel) who, for the moment was also a supporter of the new Portugal.

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[14] Rau, 'A Embaixada', 102.
[15] Aitzema, *Historie of Verhael* iv, 198–9.
[16] Rau, 'A Embaixada', 102, 107, 111.

Given the extensive commercial opportunities arising from the Portuguese revolt, and the vital importance of Netherlands Brazil to Dutch Sephardi Jewry, the diplomatic negotiations, and the details of the truce terms themselves, concerned the Jews in several important respects. It is true that the Jews are nowhere explicitly mentioned in the published text of the Dutch-Portuguese truce treaty of 1641. But they are *de facto* referred to in several parts of the text using curious circumlocutions which had to be adopted at the insistence of the Portuguese who felt that it would intolerably compromise their king's reputation and prestige, at home and abroad, to be seen to be discussing, much less making concessions, to 'Jews'. However, it was later expressly acknowledged by both sides that the truce agreement, using circumlocutions, specifically refers to the Jews in three of its clauses.[17]

The most vital issues for them were that they should be legally permitted to trade from Holland and Dutch Brazil with Portugal—and through metropolitan Portugal with all parts of the Portuguese colonial empire—and that their cargoes and assets in the hands of their factors and agents in Portugal and the empire, should be declared exempt from confiscation by the Inquisition whenever their correspondents (who were usually *conversos*) were arrested on suspicion of judaizing. In theory the truce terms conceded not only these points but yet more. For a key clause, article XXV, seemingly also guaranteed protection for their persons during visits to lands subject to Portugal, a guarantee of freedom of movement which the States General had unsuccessfully tried to obtain for its Jewish subjects, from the Spanish crown, during the abortive peace talks of 1632–3.[18] The *Consejo de estado*, in Madrid, had refused even to discuss such a suggestion. But being, as they were, in a rather weak position, in

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[17] The griffier of the States General, Cornelis Musch, insisted in discussion with the next Portuguese amabassador, Sousa Coutinho, in July 1647, that Clause XXV of the treaty 'meterão expreçamente so pelo judeus, porque os não quizerão nomear'; see *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Countinho* ii, 146–7; Sousa Countinho agreed and, in February 1648, advised the king that the Dutch were correct in maintining that clause XXV refers to the Jews 'e que sem os nomear se faça delles expreça menção naquella particular que diz os subditos desas provincias nascidos nellas ou em qualquer outra parte: e não ha duvida, Senhor, que por isso o fizerão naquella forma e que pois o primeiro embaxador de Vostra Magestade o accordou assym', ibid., ii, 313–14.

[18] De Boer, *Friedensunterhandlungen*, 67, 89–90; Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', 27.

June 1641, the Portuguese negotiators had had little choice but to give way conceding this notable clause:

> It will be freely allowed to the subjects of either side, of whatever nation, condition, quality or religion without any exception—whether they are born under the jurisdiction of either side, or have their residence in either—to visit, come in ships, and trade in whatever kind of goods in the kingdoms, provinces, territories and islands of the other in Europe and in whatever other parts situated this side of the Line.[19]

Nor was it permitted for either state to impose on those engaged in importing or exporting goods to and from their territory who were subjects of the other, higher taxes, imposts or other burdens than they imposed on their own subjects.

A further concern of the Amsterdam Sephardi community was that their brethren in Dutch Brazil should possess similar rights and privileges under the Truce terms, as they themselves were to enjoy as subjects of the United Provinces. Without this their correspondents in Brazil would have no security of trade with Portugal or the Portuguese zone of Brazil. This desideratum was satisfied under Article IX which stipulated that the same protection and recognition as was to be enjoyed by residents of the Republic should apply also to residents of territories and conquests of the West India Company 'cujuscunque nationis, conditionis aut religionis sint'.[20]

The Portuguese court for their part strove to curtail as much as possible the concessions made to the Jews. This was deemed necessary for reasons of reputation and especially because the restoration of the monarchy had unleashed not just an upsurge of emotional patriotism among large sections of the Portuguese populace but also a fierce back-lash visible in many quarters, not least the Cortes, against the New Christian minority which was regarded by many, with the encouragement of the clergy, as being not only crypto-Jewish in inclination and Hebrew by origin but also the source of many of the country's recent afflictions.[21] Hence, where the Dutch began by demanding full liberty of conscience for all their subjects residing in

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[19] Du Mont, *Corps universel diplomatique* vi, part I, p. 217; Sousa de Tavares, *Relação do tratado de 1641*, 10, Prestage, *A Embaixada de Tristão de Mendonça*, 80.

[20] Du Mont, *Corps Universel diplomatique* vi, part I, 217.

[21] Valladares, *Rebelión de Portugal*, 72–3; Schaub, *Portugal au tems du Comte-Duc*, 76–9, 288–9.

Portugal without distinction of religion,[22] in the final version of the relevant article (Clause XXVI) the right of private practice in houses (and full freedom of exercise of religion on ships anchored in Portuguese harbours) was granted to subjects of the United Provinces on Portuguese territory solely with regard to Protestants with explicit exclusion of non-Christians, [i.e. Jews]: 'subditi ac incolae harum provinciarum qui Christiani sunt [. . .]utentur et fruentur libertate conscientiae in domibus suis privatis ac intranaves libero religionis exercitio'.[23] In theory then, the persons and property of Dutch Jews on Portuguese territory were guaranteed protection while Jewish observance was forbidden anywhere under Portuguese jurisdiction even in the privacy of the home. The Amsterdam Sephardim consulted by the States General's delegates during the negotiations which led to the signing of these terms must certainly have included members of the *Mahamad* together with relevant ex-members, and merchants prominent in the Portugal trade, such as Lopo Ramirez, Bento Osorio, Duarte Ramires Pina, Francisco Lopes de Azevedo, and Diogo Martines.

Furthermore, the advantages accruing to western Sephardi Jewry and the Portuguese New Christians of France from the Portuguese Revolt against Spain, as well as the cessation of hostilities between Portugal and the Dutch, potentially extended well beyond the economic sphere. A Portugal emancipated from Spanish control seemed initially to afford a dazzling range of opportunities. As João IV urgently needed financial assistance, and the Jews and New Christians could offer this, it seemed not unreasonable to expect—despite the vehemently antisemitic tone of much of the anti-Spanish war propaganda emanating from Lisbon and the demands of the Portuguese clergy and Cortes for a tightening up of the discriminatory code excluding New Christians from the civic magistracies and office-holding—that in exchange for their help it might be possible to coax João IV into curbing the Inquisition, diluting the discriminatory code which reduced them legally to a separate and subordinate caste, and generally improving the lot of the New Christians in Portugal and southern Brazil.[24]

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[22] Sousa de Tavares, *Relação do tratado de 1641*, 16.

[23] Du Mont, *Corps universel diplomatique* vi, part I, 217.

[24] Valladares, *Rebelión de Portugal*, 73, 76; see also Lúcio de Azevedo, *Historia dos cristãos novos*, 238–9.

But this was not all. Amid the initial euphoria, the Jewish leaders in north-west Europe, presumably including Duarte Nunes da Costa, since early 1641 'Agent of the Portuguese crown' at Hamburg, seem to have suggested that the king should consider allowing the establishment of two public synagogues in Portugal, one in Lisbon and another, presumably in Oporto. Antonio de Sousa de Macedo, a leading propagandist of the Portuguese Secession, subsequently proudly recorded that 'regem (habemus) ita catholicum, ut in necessitatibus principii regni sui non admiserit propositiones hebraeorum petentes duas synagogas in Lusitania pro quibus offerebant ingentes pecunias [we have a King so Catholic that during the difficult times at the beginning of his reign, he would not accept the propositions of the Jews petitioning for two synagogues in Portugal for which they offered huge sums of money].[25] Assuredly, amid the rabidly judeophobic atmosphere prevailing in Portugal at the time this was hardly practical politics. But what was within the bounds of possibility, was to curtail the powers of the Inquisition, ease the pressure on the New Christians and, as a first step, seek a general amnesty from the Pope for past religious offences. Olivares had tried with mixed success to do something of the sort in Spain; and this is what the great Jesuit orator and writer, Antonio Vieira, now urged King João IV to do in Portugal.[26] A key proposal which Vieira was to espouse with enthusiasm was the idea of exempting from confiscation by the Inquisition all New Christian capital invested in commerce; another was that the king should rescind the ban on New Christians holding public office or entering the military orders.[27]

It seems clear that the Sephardim of north-west Europe, and Portuguese New Christians in France, saw in the Portuguese rebellion against Spain a chance to renew and improve their ties with Portugal, and her overseas empire, building on links which were social and religious as well as commercial. They responded fervently to the summons to create a new monarchy and forge a new beginning, seeing in the mystical Sebastianist speculations which surrounded the political restoration of Portugal, and which culminated in Vieira's strange vision of a purefied Portugal which would lead and redeem all mankind, a promise of a new harmony in which they would be accommodated. Remarking on the enthusiasm of the Portuguese Jews in Holland for the Portuguese cause, in May 1644, the then Portuguese ambassador at The Hague, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, who was no friend of the Jews, urged the king to entrust the funds for the entire Portuguse diplomatic service to the Jewish bankers at Amsterdam: 'e advirto a V. Magestade que por mais judeos que sejão os portuguezes que ali há, emfim lá tem huma afeição a Portugal que fas desejarem mais servir a V. Magestade do que os flamengos, e não o digo sem cauza' [and I advise Your Majesty that although most of the Portuguese that are there are Jews, nevertheless they have an affection for Portugal that makes them wish to serve Your Majesty more than they do the Dutch and this I do not say without reason].

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[25] Ibid., 238.

[26] Vieira, *Obras Escolhidas* iv, 48–9.

[27] See the text 'O que querem os homensda nação' in Vieira, *Obras Escolhidas* iv, 42–4.

Vieira urged the king to make maximum use of this Jewish Lusophilia tailoring his policy so as to enlist their help and secure their allegiance ultimately not only to safeguard Portugal's independence but to liquidate Portuguese crypto-Judaism itself. Such a strategy, he believed, would prove a far superior instrument for accomplishing that goal than the relentless rigour of the Inquisition. So great was the 'love' of the Portuguese Jews of north-west Europe for their former *patria*, Viera assured the king, in 1643, that 'todos estes, pelo amor que tem a Portugal, como patria sua, a Vossa Magestade, como seu rei natural, estão desejosos de poderem tornar par o reino e servirem a Vossa Majestade com suas fazendas, como fazem aos reis estranhos' [all these men, because of their love of Portugal as their homeland and of Your Majesty as their natural monarch, are desirous to return to the kingdom and serve Your Majesty with their capital, as they do foreign kings].[28] While Duarte Nunes da Costa and other Jewish sponsors of the Portuguese cause in the north hoped that bridling the Inquisition, and tightening links between Jews in the north and New Christians in Portugal, would revitalise and nurture crypto-Judaism in Portugal and southern Brazil, Vieira believed such a renewal of ties would generate a veritable counter-exodus from the synagogues of the north, undermining Judaism, destroying Portuguese crypto-Judaism and finally bringing the 'men of the nation' to Christ.[29]

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[28] Viera, *Obras Escolhidas* iv, 11; Valladores, *Rebelión de Portugal* 74–6.
[29] Ibid., iv, 52–4; Saraiva, 'Antonio Vieira, Menasseh ben Israel', 35.

In any case, initially there was abundant Sephardi support for the Portuguese Revolt and it proved a valuable asset for Portugal, even if Duarte Nunes da Costa exaggerated somewhat when he assured the Portuguese ambassador in Paris, in June 1643, that he was unable to send his son, Jeronimo, to Portugal because 'we who are exiled from our homeland are prevented from going there' but were it not for that defect 'not yet having been put right', so fired with zeal to serve the king, and Portugal, were most Portuguese Jews in the north 'irem a China por terra' [they would go overland to China].[30] Even the rabbinate was not immune to the fervour. On completing the second part of his *Conciliador*, in 1641, Menasseh ben Israel dedicated the work to the West India Company directors, remarked that his dedication had become all the more appropriate since Portugal was now free of Spain, the conflict between Portugal and the Dutch at an end, and the truce treaty between Portugal and the United Provinces about to be signed. The pending truce between Portugal and the Republic, he remarked, 'siendo yo Lusitano con animo Bataveo, me sera gratissima' [I being a Portuguese with a Dutch heart will be most pleasing to me].[31] It was a sentiment with which the WIC directors can in no way have sympathized.

Meanwhile, in Dutch Brazil, the Dutch-Portuguese Truce of 1641 seemed a highly satisfactory basis for consolidating and further expanding Jewish life, activity and religion. It was during the relatively short period of peace which now ensued (1641–4) that the Jewish population of Dutch Brazil reached its peak, of approximately 1,450.[32] The peaceful conditions of those years encouraged investment and the spread of sugar cultivation and persuaded more Jews to acquire plantations and settle further away from the garrison, fortifications and main community at Recife. There are indications that small congregations formed in places such as Paraíba and Itamaracá. This process of diffusion and the establishment of peaceful relations between the two parts of Brazil inevitably encouraged, however tentatively at first, more social and economic contact between New Christians in the south and professed Jews in the north.

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[30] ANTT Miscellanea da Graça, Cela 0, caixa 17, tomo 4B, fo. 549v. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Vidigueira, Hamburg, 7/27 June 1643.

[31] Menasseh ben Israel, *Segunda Parte del Conciliador*, epistola dedicatoria; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 233.

[32] Wiznitzer, *Jews of Colonial Brazil*, 120–38; Wiznitzer, 'Jewish Soldiers in Dutch Brazil', 43; Emmanuel, 'Seventeenth-Century Brazilian Jewry', 32–68.

To some among the Jews the cessation of hostilities, was bound to appear as a heaven-sent opportunity, and almost a divine command, to begin to proselytise among the New Christians, activate latent crypto-Judaism, and draw distant relatives back to Judaism from Christianity.[33] The best known such proslytizer was undoubtedly Isaac de Castro Tartas, a native of Tartas in south-west France who, at the age of sixteen, emigrated from Holland to Recife, in 1641 and then, at the age of nineteen, in October 1644, crossed the border between the two Brazils to Bahia in the Portuguese zone for the express purpose of spreading his spiritual message among the New Christians of Rio de Janeiro.[34] Before long, he was denounced, arrested and sent for trial by the Inquisition in Lisbon where, however, all efforts by the theologians there to convince him of his errors, and induce him to be 'reconciled' to Christ failed. He was burned alive at the age of twenty-four, defiant to the end, a martyr to his faith. The story of his life and death was subsequently propagated throughout the Sephardi world. In Holland and also Italy, he was eulogized for his 'glorious' martyrdom, at Amsterdam, a special sermon being preached in his memory, by Saul Levi Morteira.[35]

Needless say, the euphoric hopes and seductive vision of reconciliation and restored harmony which so enticed the Hamburg and Amsterdam Sephardi communities, in 1641, were soon to be rudely shattered. Already in 1644, there was unrest among the Portuguese Catholics in Maranhão in the north while a further decline in the value of WIC shares betrayed a growing undercurrent of anxiety for the Company's—and the colony's—future.[36] Having eased back in the year from June 1641 and June 1642 from 117 to 102, and from June 1642 to June 1643, to 92, the slide in the share price at Amsterdam began to accelerate, receding by March 1644 to only 68 guilders.[37] But this was as nothing compared to the devastating impact of the insurrection of the Catholic planters in the hinterland of Recife, in June 1645. Heavy indebtedness to the Jews and to the WIC was undoubtedly one of the factors which induced many Catholic

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[33] Novinsky, *Cristãos Novos na Bahia*, 135–6.

[34] Wiznitzer, 'Isaac de Castro', 65–7.

[35] Ibid.; Yerushalmi, *From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto*, 397–8.

[36] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* i, 128, 139, 162, 181; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 167–8.

[37] Van Dillen, 'Effectenkoersen', 9–10; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 163, 167–8.

Portuguese living under WIC rule to join in a conspiracy which involved burning their own plantations and crops as well as those of the Dutch and Jews. 'The Heavenly Court had decreed', wrote Haham Isaac Aboab da Fonseca, rabbi of Recife in the years 1642–54, that the marauding band should spread out and invade forest and field. Some of them looked for plunder, others hunted human beings; for the enemy came with the intention to destroy everything'.[38] The Dutch military garrison in Brazil, pared down to a minimum since the truce, was too weak to react. The insurgents swept across the entire expanse of the Dutch zone beyond the fortifications of Recife, Mauricia, Paraíba, Itamaracá, and a few other forts, putting everything to the sack as they went. Within a terrifying three months, practically everything outside half a dozen fortified bases was conquered or devastated. The sugar economy of Netherlands Brazil was entirely destroyed. With the disintegration of the economy, and of all confidence, some of the Jews began to leave, returning across the Atlantic to Holland and Zeeland, others stayed put, awaiting the arrival of Dutch reinforcements. From late 1645, Recife itself came under siege, and while a few individual ships came in during the ensuing months, supplies almost ran out and the garrison and citizenry, including the Jews, suffered severely from hunger and deprivation until the arrival of a substantial relief fleet in July and August 1646.[39]

The revolt was a tremendous blow not just to Brazilian Sephardi Jewry but also to the Sephardic community in Holland, many of whom soon learnt that they had lost goods, sugar consignments, investments, loans and whole plantations in the devastation. It was a blow not just to their commerce and assets but to their entire social, political and religious world. For the rebels who made no secret of their Judeophobia and who executed several Jews whom they captured in cold blood, not only claimed to be acting in the name of João IV but clearly received their arms, munitions and reinforcements from Bahia. The fact that for the rest of the 1640s, the Portuguese king sought to avoid outright war with the Dutch by continually insisting that the insurgency had nothing to do with him, and that he wished to abide scrupulously by the truce of 1641,[40] deceived no-one. It was, on the contrary, entirely obvious that the rebellion was directed and supplied from southern Brazil and that the Portuguese court, and Portugal's diplomats, were doing their best to subvert Netherlands Brazil while pretending not to be doing so.

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[38] Quoted in Wiznitzer, 'Jewish Soldiers in Dutch Brazil', 48.

[39] Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 142; Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 180–1.

[40] Ibid., 177–8.

The change in the previously euphoric mood of Dutch Sephardi Jewry was immediate and dramatic. As the magnitude of the disaster, and scale of the losses, sank in, most of the community rapidly repudiated their earlier sympathy for the Portuguese cause and turned their resentment against João IV's ambassador and his associates at The Hague. Vehement condemnation of the Portuguese resounded on all sides. In the late summer of 1645, Sousa Coutinho, reported to his colleague, the Conde de Vidigueira, at Paris, in a state of some anxiety, describing the anger and frustration of the Amsterdam Sephardim. 'The Jews would condemn me to be stoned', he wrote, adding bitterly 'and here that could easily happen, and what is worse those who we imagine are our friends are the worst' [O povo de Amsterdam fes bravuras, os judeos me condenarão a pedradas e aqui he muito facil a execução, e o que peor he que os que cuidamos sã amigos são os peores].[41] This latter remark was a reference to those such as Lopo Ramirez and Jeronimo Nunes da Costa who had been materially assisting the Portuguese cause.

This emotional reaction among the Amsterdam Sephardim reached such a point that there were warnings about unacceptable and unseemly behaviour from the burgomasters to the community elders and on 22 Elul 5405, the *Mahamad* issued a ruling forbidding members of the congregation from publicly uttering insults 'contra o senhor embaixador de Portugal' [against the ambassador of Portugal] or making allegations apt to incite scandal and uproar whether verbally, or in writing, when discussing Brazilian affairs.[42] For Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, recently appointed Agent of the Portuguese crown at Amsterdam, the situation was one of extreme difficulty, delicacy and embarrassment. He too was shocked by the disaster in Brazil but was also furious at being made the but of communal recrimination. Yes, he was, he declared, in one outburst, 'a good Portuguese and faithful servant of His Majesty', loudly threatening retribution against 'liars' and defamers who thought he ought to be ashamed of his new position and title.[43]

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[41] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* i, 308.

[42] GAA PJG xix (Hascamoth), p. 281, res. Mahamad, 22 Elul 5405 (13 Sept. 1645).

The indignation of the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community quickly boiled over into bombastic threats of an imminent and massive counter-offensive which would rescue Dutch Brazil and teach the Portuguese their lesson.[44] But the numerous New Christians in Portugal who had supported the Restoration in the early 1640s, and still supported it in 1645, had no reason to view matters in such a light. Indeed, during the late 1640s, they continued to lend strong support to the new regime and back its initiatives in Brazil and West Africa, Thus, the Catholic planters' insurrection in Dutch Brazil can be seen to have marked a crucial, and perhaps even the definitive, parting of the ways, politically and to a degree also commercially and financially, between the Sephardim of north-west Europe and the New Christian merchant elite of Lisbon and Oporto. The finance for the major Portuguese expedition dispatched to Brazil in 1647 to thwart the Dutch attempt to invest Bahia using an expedition sent from Recife (which occupied part of the island of Itaparica, in the Bay of All Saints, posing a serious threat to the capital of Portuguese Brazil) was arranged by Duarte da Silva and other leading Lisbon New Christians through the mediation of Antonio Vieira.[45] Duarte da Silva was later also instrumental in arranging the finance for the expedition of Salvador de Sá, in 1648, which recovered Angola from the Dutch.[46] Ironically, one of the most active of the Lisbon New Christian consortium in supporting the Portuguese cause in Brazil, especially in supplying arms and munitions to Bahia, was Jeronimo Gomes Pessoa who later had occasion to flee from the Inquisition, taking refuge first in France (where he probably already lived as a crypto-Jew), and then, in the mid 1650s, Amsterdam where, however his business prospered far less well than it had in Portugal.[47]

The Portuguese Jewish community in the United Provinces, meanwhile, aroused by the need to care for hundreds of often homeless, dispossessed and ruined relatives returning from Brazil, not only in

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[43] Swetschinski, 'Amsterdam Jewish Merchant-Diplomat', 15.

[44] *Correspondencia diplomatica de Francisco de Sousa Coutinhoa* iii, 314.

[45] Boxer, *Salvador de Sá*, 245; Boxer, *The Dutch In Brazil*, 189.

[46] Smith, 'Mercantile Class of Portugal', 78–80.

[47] He adopted the Jewish name Abraham Israel Pessoa, see ibid., pp. 201–2; Cabral de Mello, *Olinda restaurada*, 103; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 141–2.

Amsterdam but also in considerable numbers in Middelburg, vigorously supported those sections of the Dutch regent elite who were pressing for the despatch of a large-scale expedition to crush the rebellion in the Dutch zone. This placed the Sephardi community in an extremely curious position within the intricate mosaic of Dutch provincial and urban politics. For the Amsterdam city government, as indeed most of the States of Holland, absorbed as they were in the complex peace negotiations with Spain, and unwilling to lose their newly restored commerce with Portugal, showed considerable reluctance to be drawn into a major conflict in Brazil.[48] Besides the West India directors (whose prestige and stock alike were now much reduced, and whose financial position was even worse than their military predicament), only a few Holland towns, such as Leiden and Haarlem, together with the States of Zeeland—and those of Utrecht and Groningen, provinces which, like Zeeland, had proportionately a larger stake in the WIC than Holland—pressed for a really major expedition, organized by the States General, to save 'New Holland'.[49] The Jews consequently at this point aligned themselves in Dutch domestic politics behind a vocal but not particularly potent coalition, led by the Zeelanders and at odds with the regent leadership of Amsterdam, their own city. Finally, however, Amsterdam conceded that something substantial had be done to rescue the WIC in Brazil and somewhat belatedly, late in 1647, a powerful naval and military force, originally intended to comprise fifty vessels and over 7,000 troops, was prepared for an ambitious counter-offensive.

During the months before this States' armada departed Dutch shores, as also after its departure, the Jews of Amsterdam did all in their power to maximize the psychological pressure on João IV, discredit his regime, and heighten the outcry against Portugal in the United Provinces. In particular, they stressed the weakness of the Portuguese crown, on both sea and land, in the hope of enhancing Dutch belligerency and discrediting the domestic opposition to escalating the war. In July 1647, Sousa Coutinho complained to his counter-part in Paris that the Jews were maliciously spreading rumours in the Netherlands to the effect that the Castilians were gaining ground in the fighting around Ciudad Rodrigo, on the Portuguese border, and had captured a key frontier fortress, that discontent and unrest were rife in Portugal, and that the king had arbitrarily commandeered foreign ships in his ports to take part in his *armada* for Bahia; and when all this failed were even going so far as to assert that João IV had been arrested by the nobility.[50]

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[48] Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 186–8; Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 357–72.

[49] Ibid., 366–7; *Correspondencia diplomatica de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* ii, 237 370–2.

For its part, the Portuguese court was acutely aware that it was still highly vulnerable, that the contest in Brazil might go either way, and that there was a growing risk that Spain and the States, now on the verge of making peace with each other, might soon join forces against Portugal. Likewise they knew France lacked sea power and was in any case absorbed in her struggle with Spain in Flanders, Catalonia and Italy; and that Portugal did not possess the resources to fight off a serious Spanish offensive if combined with a Dutch maritime blockade. Should the Dutch launch a sustained assault on Portugal's shipping and colonies, while the Spaniards attacked by land, there was every prospect that the Portuguese empire would simply collapse. Should Portugal revert to Spanish sovereignty, Brazil and West Africa would then be partitioned between Spain and the Dutch, the Spaniards having already signalled at the Münster peace congress that they accepted and recognised Dutch Brazil defined by its maximum boundaries, as of 1641.[51] João IV and his diplomats could only strive to counter the threat by continuing to reiterate their acceptance of the terms of the 1641, and publicly disowning the rebellion in Dutch Brazil.

As the preparations for the Dutch armada continued, Sousa Countinho did his best to win over Dutch opinion outside Zeeland, urging a compromise solution without armed conflict—that is plied the very opposite strategy to the Jews. After repeated delays, in December 1647, a considerable Dutch war fleet, with a large military force aboard, finally set sail under the command of one of the finest Dutch admirals, the republican-minded but irascible Withe de Witt (known to the English as 'Double Wit').[52] The entire Dutch Sephardi community, including even the Agent of the Portuguese Crown in the United Provinces, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, clearly pinned high hopes on the success of this expedition. His uncle, Lopo Ramirez, having conspicuously switched his allegiance from Portugal and become an agent of Spain, in the autumn of 1645,[53] Jeronimo by this time was probably virtually alone among the Amsterdam Sephardim in remaining officially loyal to the Portuguese cause. Even so, it would seem that his notion of Portuguese interests differed perceptibly from that of the king and his diplomats, let alone the insurgents encircling Recife, in his mind centering on their compatibility with the interests of Sephardi Jewry. For it seems clear that during the months before the fleet left, in the autumn of 1647, a vital juncture in the unfolding drama in Brazil, Jeronimo deliberately exaggerated Dutch strength in his reports to Lisbon, contriving to create the impression that it would be much the best solution for the king to acquiesce in the restitution of Netherlands Brazil.[54] After informing his colleague, the marquês de Niza, in Paris, early in December, that the Dutch admiralty colleges were still experiencing serious difficulties in getting their ships, supplies and troops ready, Sousa Coutinho warned that should Jeronimo Nunes da Costa assure him otherwise 'he porque não sabe se não dar roins novas contra nos' [it is because he only knows how to spread damaging reports against us]. Niza was, he supposed, already aware what a scoundrel his uncle, Lopo Ramirez, was 'e como', he added, 'estes cães não andão mais que a dar-nos pezar [and how these dogs do nothing but cause us grief]; but now he was sending compromising letters—which, he said, he might also send the king—'pera que acabem de conhecer em Portugal que nã ha nestos nem fe nem lealdade' [so that they should finally be aware in Portugal that there is in these men neither good faith nor loyalty].[55]

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[50] Ibid., ii, 154. Sousa Coutinho to Niza, The Hague, 22 July 1647.

[51] Israel, *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 369.

[52] Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 187, 191–2, 194.

A week later, Sousa Coutinho again accused Jeronimo of deliberately overstating Dutch strength in order to unnerve the Portuguese; and while agreeing with his colleague that the king's forces in Brazil needed adequate warnings, recommended that Jeronimo's appraisals of the situation should not be transmitted as these would serve only to demoralize the troops and spread the impression 'que va contra elles o poder do mundo' [that the power of the entire world goes against them].[56] When the fleet was finally ready to depart but then detained in port by contrary winds, and was stricken by an outbreak of smallpox, Sousa Coutinho accused Jeronimo of deliberately concealing the truth from the Portuguese authorities. He said nothing about this, remarked Sousa Coutinho, just as he had failed to inform Niza of the previous loss of two Dutch warships whereas,'se fora em nosso odio e dano que elle a avizara por vias duplicadas' [if it were something discreditable or damaging to us, he would report it in duplicate].[57]

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[53] Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, 204–6.

[54] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* ii, 270–1, 276–7.

[55] Ibid., ii, 265–66. Sousa Coutinho to Niza, The Hague, 9 Dec. 1647; Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, 160, 169.

[56] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* ii, 271. Sousa Coutinho to Niza, The Hague, 16 Dec. 1647.

In the end the Withe de With expedition entirely failed to fulfil the high hopes which the Dutch Sephardim had invested in it. Most of the ships and men arrived safely at Recife but the ensuing battle of Guararapes, in April 1648, outside Recife, resulted in a heavy defeat for the Dutch. Withe de With's expedition thus scarcely improved the position at all. Indeed, on the contrary it depressed the morale of the garrison and citizenry in Recife, including the Jews, by eliminating their main hope of rescue. Meanwhile, outraged by the catastrophe which had struck them, and their relatives in Brazil, the Amsterdam community was especially incensed by the barbaric treatment meted out to Jews captured in the fighting. For news was received that several had been executed on capture. In the Netherlands, this issue remained significant throughout the struggle for Brazil; for, besides arousing the strongest emotions among the Jews, it provided the *Mahamad* with their best legal basis for making repeated political representations to the States of Holland and States General about the situation in Brazil. In particular, it enabled the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community to reinforce their status as Dutch subjects, tighten the links between their community and the Dutch state, and represent the Portuguese crown as a faithless violator of its obligations under the treaty of 1641. At the same time, reports that the Portuguese were summarily executing captured Jews, or handing them over to the Inquisition, served to stiffen the resolve of the 300 or so Sephardim who fought with the Dutch. As one of the German employees of the WIC in Brazil later noted, 'the Jews, more than anyone else, were in a desperate situation and therefore, preferred to die sword in hand than face their fate under the Portuguese yoke: the flames'.[58]

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[57] Ibid., ii, 276–7. Sousa Coutinho to Niza, The Hague, 30 Dec. 1647.

[58] Quoted in Wiznitzer, 'Jewish Soldiers in Dutch Brazil', 46.

The treatment of Jewish captives in Brazil thus became a political question of an importance out of all proportion to the comparatively small number of victims involved. Besides Isaac de Castro Tartas, arrested in Bahia, in December 1644 and transferred to the dungeons of the Inquisition in Lisbon, early in 1645, a number of Jews, including a Moseh Mendes, were caught by the rebels in the hills around Recife, in the summer of 1645, and hanged or otherwise executed on the spot, while several more, including some Ashkenazim, were captured near Fort Mauricia, at the estuary of the São Francisco river which marked the boundary between Dutch and Portuguese Brazil and sent, via Bahia, to Portugal.[59] Of the latter, four Ashkenazim—Samuel Israel, David Michael de Alemagna, Jacob Polaco, and Salamon bar Jacob—and three Sephardim born in Holland (and never baptised) were eventually released; but the rest, those born and baptised in Catholic lands, were handed over for trial by the Inquisition.[60]

According to a submission by the *parnasim*, of 27 November 1645, thirteen Jewish captives had thus far been executed in cold blood. On that occasion, the *Mahamad* asked that the States General direct the WIC authorities in Brazil that henceforth in any agreements with the enemy it should be stipulated that the 'Jewish nation' should be treated on the same basis as other Dutch subjects. In making this request, the *parnasim* stressed that the Jews in Brazil had been entirely loyal and were participating fully in the efforts to repel the rebels.[61] In their petition to the States General of October 1646, and again in June 1647 and January 1648, the *parnasim* complained that Jewish captives had been handed over to the Inquisition in blatant violation of Clause XXV of the Truce, asking this to be taken up with the Portuguese court.[62] The States General did indeed subsequently write to João IV, protesting and demanding the immediate release of those Jews transferred to the Inquisition.[63]

But what more than any other incident enabled the *Mahamad* to elicit sympathy for the Jewish cause among the Dutch public and unite Jewish opinion, in Holland and more widely, behind the drive to save Dutch Brazil, was the emotional impact of the news of the *Auto-da-fe* held in Lisbon in December 1647 centring around the martyrdom of Isaac de Castro Tartas. The young man's death at the hands of the Inquisition, at the age of twenty-two, in full view of thousands of onlookers, was perhaps the single most publicized and sensational instance of Jewish martyrdom of the whole seventeenth century and aroused considerable revulsion amongst the Dutch public and elsewhere. Even Christians totally prejudiced Judaism such as a French eye-witness of the *Auto-de-fe* who, in his Catholic zeal insisted on the need for uncompromising measures against 'cette peste du Judaisme' was nevertheless deeply troubled at the spectacle of a young man 'bruslé vif, publiant et professant la Loy de Moyse qui possedoit et parloit toutes sortes de langues' and, moreover, who 'persista tousjours en sa malheureuse créance jusques au dernier soupir criant à haute voix Ely, Adonay, Sabatot; jamais l'on n'a veu une telle resolution et constance'.[64]

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[59] Wiznitzer, *Jews in Colonial Brazil*, 108.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Wiznitzer, 'Jewish Soldiers in Dutch Brazil', 46.
[62] ARH SG 7011/I, Petition 'uyt den naem ende van wegen de gemeene Joodsche Natie residerende binnen Amsterdam met voorschryvens vande heeren burgemeesteren ende regeeerders deselver stede', May and June 1647.
[63] ARH SG 7011/i. States General to João IV, The Hague, 10 Oct. 1646.

It was in fact precisely at this juncture that the Amsterdam *Mahamad* dropped its hitherto traditional terminology when addressing the Dutch authorities and instead of referring to themselves as the 'Portuguese nation' as always in the past now switched to calling themselves the elders of the 'gemeene Joodsche natie' [general Jewish nation]. It is a change that seems to be directly linked to the outburst of emotion in Amsterdam on the news of the Lisbon *Auto-da-fe* at which not only was de Castro Tartas burnt alive but three of the Sephardim captured at the São Francisco river estuary, Abraham (Gabriel) Mendes, Samuel (João Nunes) Velho, and Abraham Bueno (Diogo Henriques) all former New Christians having kissed the crucifix were publicly 'reconciled' and sentenced to epic penance and imprisonment in Inquisition dungeons.

Sousa Coutinho was much perturbed apparently by the reaction. Unless one was in Holland and witnessed the scene in person, he informed the king, one would not believe the degree of disgust news of the Inquisition's treatment of these Jews aroused. A delegate from the *parnasim* had been sent to confer with the States of Holland and States General, in The Hague, and the whole business, and especially the burning of the 'Jewish prisoner from Bahia', was affording the Jews what he considered entirely spurious and pernicious influence on the proceedings.[65] As a consequence of this furore, he reported, a States General delegation had come, on 30 January 1648, to reprimand him, reminding him that the United Provinces had now made peace with Spain and had their hands free to defend their Jewish subjects regarding whom 'o direito dos gentes' [the law of the peoples] had been doubly violated, firstly in that the Jews who had surrendered with others at the fortress of São Francisco were sent to Portugal, and transferred to the Inquisition, and secondly, the clear violation of Article XXV of the Truce treaty, regarding the status of Jewish subjects of the States General.[66] The ambassador was sufficiently unnerved by this to ask the king whether he was really prepared to risk full-scale war with the United Provinces in order to keep three Jews in the cells of the Inquisition.

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[64] Quoted in Wiznitzer, 'Isaac de Castro', 74.

Sousa Coutinho was instructed to inform the States General that the Inquisition trials of the Jews was a matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and authority with which the king had no power to interfere. But this excuse began to wear excessively thin when word arrived that, in similar circumstances, the king of Spain had acceded to States General pressure and ordered the release of four Dutch Sephardi Jews captured by the Spaniards before 1648 who had been handed over to the Inquisition. If *raison d'état* could work in Spain to oblige the Inquisition to disgorge Jews from its dungeons, it was hard to see, urged Sousa Coutinho, why this should be impossible in Portugal.[67]

The Portuguese ambassador at The Hague thus found himself caught up in a war of propaganda, symbols and emotion in which the Jews of Amsterdam had some success in blackening the image of the new Portugal among the Dutch public and in regent circles. But during the later 1640s and early 1650s, Dutch Sephardi Jewry did more than merely wage a war of propaganda against Portugal. There is a sense in which the Dutch Sephardim, or at least some of them, actually went to war with Portugal. Even though the United Provinces and Portugal were still nominally at peace, the Withe de

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[65] *Correspondencia diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* ii, 306. Sousa Coutinho to João IV, The Hague, 10 Feb. 1648.

[66] Ibid., ii, 313–14. Sousa Coutinho to João IV, The Hague, 24 Feb. 1648.

[67] Ibid., ii, 296.

With expedition was no means the only armed initiative against the Portuguese in Brazil sponsored at this time by the States General. Prompted by Zeeland, the States had earlier decided to reactivate the pre-1640 privateering war on Portuguese shipping plying the Atlantic. This form of belligerency had, since the end of the sixteenth century, developed into a highly skilled art in Zeeland and been one of the most effective methods of attacking the Portuguese until the truce of 1641. Between 1623 and 1638, Zeeland privateers are estimated to have captured 547 Portuguese vessels, on average, some thirty seven vessels per year.[68] But this time the plan was to strike harder still, by fitting out more privateers than ever before, in the hope of paralysing Portuguese navigation to Brazil.

It was a plausible threat. Yet how precisely was it to be organized and funded? There seemed to be no existing body capable of doing so. The essence of privateering was to yoke private capital to public war aims through government licensed piracy against enemy shipping. But the West India Company had now been so greatly weakened at sea, and financially, by its failures in Brazil and the slide in the value of its shares, that it was no longer capable of a large-scale raiding campaign,[69] while the admiralty colleges were struggling as it was to find funds enough for the regular navy. There was no lack, in Zeeland, particularly of veteran captains and seamen eager to serve on privateering frigates; but without an organizing agent to co-ordinate investment, recruitment, and supply there was no way to put this resource to work. Consequently, the States General, in December 1646, set up the so-called 'Brasilse directie tot Middelburg'.[70] It was this organisation which channelled investment in the new privateering war.

The overriding need was for high-risk investment capital with which to recruit men, fit out ships and purchase guns and stores. Local resources were insufficient and, in the main, the Christian merchants of Amsterdam and other Holland towns were not in the least attracted by this venture. It was no doubt because of their special relationship to Brazil and emotionally charged reaction to the events of 1645–6 that the Sephardic Jews of Amsterdam willingly stepped into the gap, forming what might almost be termed a privateering alliance with Zeeland against Portugal.[71]

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[68] Ferlini, 'Resistência e acomodação', 235.

[69] Hoboken, 'West-Indische Compagnie en de Vrede', 361–2.

[70] Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 201; Binder, 'Zeeländische Kaperfahrt', 41, 77.

Portuguese Jews, noted Sousa Coutinho, had been negotiating with the Zeelanders about the financing of a large-scale privateering campaign, even before this initiative was authorized by the States General. By the spring of 1647, the Middelburg directorate was canvassing hard in Amsterdam to raise funds but, according to Sousa Coutinho, not a single Dutch [Christian] merchant desired to participate. However, numerous Hebrews were eager to do so, 'ou seja pelo amor que nos tem' [either through the love they have for us], he remarked sarcastically, 'ou porque são os mais empenhados em Pernambuco' [or because they have the most at stake in Pernambuco].[72] With the furore over Isaac de Castro Tartas and the other Jews who were paraded in the Lisbon *Auto-da-fe* of December 1647 at its height, in February 1648, the ambassador informed Lisbon that the Jews were conferring with the Zeelanders 'para que por conta de huns e outros se armen fragatas para irem infestar os mares e costas desse reino, para o que ja pedem licença aos Estados, e se ainda a não tem a virão a ter, se Vossa Magestade não for servido de lhes mandar responder a sua satisfação' [in order together to fit out frigates with which to infest the seas and coasts of that kingdom for which they already ask permission from the States General and, if they do not have it yet, they will have it if your Majesty does not reply to their satisfaction].[73]

In the years 1647–8, this privateering onslaught, supervised by the *Brasilse directie* and based in part at Recife, became increasingly effective and had a devastating effect. The privateers, financed in large part by Amsterdam Sephardi capital, systematically hunted Portuguese vessels in the South Atlantic, off Bahia and along the coast of Portuguese Brazil, effectively blockading Rio de Janiero for many months.[74] In the two years 1647–8, the Zeelanders captured approximately 220 Portuguese vessels sailing to and from Brazil, apparently a majority of the vessels which attempted the crossing.[75] In 1648 alone, the Dutch captured 132 Portuguese ships, seventy-nine of which had been en route to Bahia.[76] By the summer of 1648 it had in fact become clear that unescorted navigation to Brazil, from Portugal, was no longer viable.

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[71] *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* ii, 53, 314.
[72] Ibid., ii, 53. Sousa Coutinho to João IV, The Hague, 6 March 1647.
[73] Ibid., ii, 314. Sousa Coutinho to João IV, The Hague, 24 Feb. 1648.
[74] Van den Bogaaert, *Expansión holandesa*, 151.
[75] Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 201–2, 208–11; Binder, 'Zeeländische Kaperfahrt', 41, 77; Van den Bogaart, *Expansión holandesa*, 151.

What rescued Portugal's Brazil trade at this critical juncture was the setting up of the joint-stock *Companhia Geral de Comercio do Brasil*, or 'Brazil Company' as it is termed in the English-language secondary literature. This monopolistic organization partly based on the model of the Dutch colonial companies enjoyed exclusive rights to export flour, wine, olive oil and salted cod to Brazil, and to export Brazilwood from the colony, and possessed the means to organize heavily armed convoys including heavy galleons impregnable to attack by the swift, sleek but comparatively small privateer fregates. Designed to overtake and board, the privateers indeed soon proved useless against the *Companhia*'s heavily-manned galleons. The company was the brainchild of the Antonio Vieira who collaborated with the New Christian merchant elite at Lisbon in setting it up. Vieira's aim was to harness additional New Christian capital to the Portuguese cause in Brazil by persuading the king to go further than he had hitherto in the way of concessions to the *conversos* and expressly exempt New Christian funds invested in the Company from confiscation by the Inquisition. This proved the key to success.

João IV in setting up the *Companhia Geral* took his one really substantial step towards curbing the power of the Inquisition and improving the lot of the New Christians.[77] Vieira who was anxious to drum up support for the company among the Sephardim in the north, and the New Christians of Rouen, as well as those of Lisbon and Bahia, knowing that the project could not succeed without a steady stream of naval stores and munitions from northern Europe, and that, initially at least, fighting ships would need to be purchased and fitted out there, did his best to win over the New Christians in France and some among the Dutch Sephardi leadership to the project. But not a single one of the latter was willing to participate, Bento Osorio and Lopo Ramirez refusing outright and Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, though willing, lacking the means to assist the purchase of more than one vessel, the 28-gun frigate *A Fortuna* which was bought by Vieira, in Amsterdam, in March 1648 for 34,000 guilders, two-thirds paid in advance and the remainder on arrival in Lisbon.[78] It was Duarte Nunes da Costa, at Hamburg who stepped into the breach and organized the purchase of the first batch of warships.[79]

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[76] Cabral de Mello, *Olinda Restaurada*, 83–4, 92.

[77] BL MS 20951, fo. 136 'Institucam da Companhia Geral par o Estado do Brasil'; Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil*, 212.

With the advent of the Brazil Company, Portuguese shipping losses to the Zeeland privateers were cut to a fraction of what they had previously been and the Portuguese, were able to reinforce their forces in both Bahia and around Recife and consolidate their gains.[80] It was indeed in the years 1649–52 that Dutch Sephardi Jewry's hopes of seeing a reversal of the tide in Brazil were finally dashed. The last real attempt to break out, defeat the besiegers and regain the upper hand, was launched in February 1649 and culminated in the second battle of Guararapes. This proved an even more ignominious defeat marked by still heavier losses than the first. With this, and the failure of the privateering campaign, Sephardi hopes inevitably faded. In these circumstances, the best chance of saving Dutch Brazil, it was widely argued in the United Provinces, not least by the Jews lay in an all-out war against Portugal. But plans for this, or at least a rigorous naval blockade of Lisbon, foundered on Amsterdam's opposition to any such proposals. In fact, no strategy had been agreed on by 1651 when the growing threat of war with England made all further talk of sending forces to Brazil or Portugal useless for the interim. With this the fate of Netherlands Brazil was sealed. During the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–4), it proved difficult to send even a modicum of reinforcements and supplies to Brazil. Finally, in 1654, the garrison at Recife capitulated, including in their surrender all the remaining Dutch forts in the country.

The end of Netherlands Brazil was a crushing blow to Dutch and all western Sephardi Jewry. It was a blow economically, socially and spiritually—and in the end for the Portuguese New Christians no less than Sephardi Jewry. For once the crown's goal was accomplished, the new Portuguese king, Dom Affonso, in February 1657, saw no further use for the concession made to the New Christians and, in 1657, under ecclesiastical and popular pressure, published a decree cancelling the resented exemption from seizure by the Inquisition of capital invested in the company by 'os homens da nação' [men of the nation].[81] The Dutch-Portuguese truce of 1641 which had raised so many hopes, and which seemed to guarantee a secure and prosperous future for the Sephardim in Ibero-America, in the end undermined and shattered all such expectations, among other consequences driving a wedge between western Sephardi Jewry and the Portuguese New Christians, a parting of ways in terms of political identity and strategy and possibly even contributing to a further widening of the gap in religious outlook.

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[78] Rau, 'O Padre Antonio Vieira', 92–4, 99–100.

[79] Vieira, *Obras Escolhidas* i, 100–105; *Cartas do Padre Antonio Vieira* i, 161–8; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 151; Kellenbenz, *As Relações econômicas*, 25–6; Israel, *Empires and Enrepots*, 347–8.

[80] Cabral de Mello, *Olinda Restaurada*, 83–4, 88, 92.

For the Sephardim, Brazil had truly been a land of opportunity and promise, a place on which future prospects for the both the western Sephardi and Portuguese New Christian diasporas in no small measure rested. For only in Brazil, or so it seemed in the 1640s, was there room for Jewish settlement on a large, even unlimited, scale underpinned by rights and guarantees, issued by the WIC and confirmed by the States General, more liberal and extensive than anything comparable to be seen in the Old World at that time. The economic and legal status of the Jews in Brazil already exceptional before 1645, became more so in the aftermath of the Catholic planters' rebellion, the States General, prodded by the Amsterdam *Mahamad*, directing the WIC to reward the efforts and loyalty of the Jews by removing several remaining discriminatory regulations.[82] All that was left was their formal exclusion from a few professions, and from holding magistracies and civic offices. Owing to the severe crisis which began in 1645—but only owing to that crisis—Jews in Brazil came as close to equality with Christians as they were ever to attain in the western world before the French Revolution.

One consequence of the debacle was a fundamental shift in the political outlook, and sense of identity, of Dutch Sephardi Jewry. Henceforth, to proclaim enthusiastic loyalty to Portugal as well as the United Provinces as Menasseh ben Israel did, in 1641, was inconceivable. The community at Amsterdam no longer wished to be designated the 'Portuguese nation' preferring to be referred to from now on as the 'Jewish nation' of Amsterdam. Nor was this shift in Dutch Sephardi allegiance, simply a matter of opportunism and a tightening political alignment with the Dutch Republic. The idea of a political restoration of Israel so closely linked to the messianic mystical aspirations of the era and so vividly aroused in Sephardi minds through the stirring events of the 1640s, could not perhaps, once whetted, simply be stuffed away again and discarded along with the shattered of expectations of Brazil. It is conceivable at least that, for some, so intoxicating a notion should still be nurtured even if, for the moment in exclusively theological and messianic terms.

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[81] BL MS Add, 20951, fos. 136–7 Portuguese royal *alvara*, Lisbon, 2 Feb. 1657

[82] Wiznitzer, *Jews in Colonial Brazil*, 100.

Is it mere coincidence, for example, that the year of the second battle of Guararapes which effectively aborted the Dutch counter-offensive in Brazil was also that in which Menasseh ben Israel wrote his *Esperança de Israel*? The message of Menasseh's *Esperança* clearly was that the political and spiritual redemption of Israel was, after all, despite appearances close at hand, indeed deeply implicit in the stirring, as well as deeply disappointing, events his generation had beheld in the New World. The book is a retreat from active hopes based on current political reality to political expectations of a mystical Millenarian character based on signs and symbols which, he believed, pointed to the fulfilment of a long-germinating spiritual process. One of the most compelling of these signs, he claimed, were the several recent Jewish martyrdoms in Brazil and Portugal, above all the casting into the flames of Isaac de Castro Tartas in Lisbon.[83] The *Auto-da-fe* in which the young man was consumed by fire became a symbol of the destruction of Jewish hopes in Portugal's Restoration. But Menasseh urged his contemporaries to discern also in that terrible event consolation and a token of divine promise. Isaac de Castro Tartas' heroism at the stake, according to the Amsterdam rabbi, was a God-given sign that 'our Redemption' was now very near.

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[83] Menasseh ben Israel, *Mikveh Israel. Est es, Esperança de Israel*, 99–100; Wiznitzer, 'Isaac de Castro', 71–2.

CHAPTER TWELVE

MENASSEH BEN ISRAEL AND THE DUTCH SEPHARDI COLONIZATION MOVEMENT OF THE MID-17TH CENTURY*

Gershom Scholem attributed a fundamental role in the shaping of Jewish mysticism and spirituality to the psychological and cultural impact of political and social upheavals affecting the Jews. In particular, he identified the Expulsion from Spain, in 1492, as the impelling force behind the new forms of mystical messianism which swept almost the entire Jewish world from the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth century.[1] 'After the Expulsion from Spain', held Scholem, 'the Kaballah sought to provide an answer to questions which arose from an event which had uprooted one of the principal branches of Judaism'. He did not mean that developments in Jewish messianic expectation were nothing more than sublimated responses to the experience of socially disruptive events. But he did contend that a complex internal interaction developed between exceptional upheaval in the everyday world and Jewish messianic preoccupation which assumed an enduring and powerful dynamic of its own; and this, it may be suggested, has important implications for efforts to interpret Menasseh ben Israel's sense of mission, his perception of, and response to, the dismaying political and economic setbacks, and spiritual turmoil, which troubled both the Sephardi Jewish and the Ibero-American New Christian diasporas in his day.

Expulsion from Spain, holds Scholem, first generated a wave of immediate expectation infused with traditional messianic notions and when these failed to materialize, ebbing into disillusionment and frustration embittered by new calamities, a further phase of spiritual development during the mid sixteenth century, in which final redemption came to be viewed as the more distant outcome of an elaborate and, in part, clandestine programme of preparatory spiritual processes. What he saw as the creative phase of this new mystical messianism, evolved at Safed, in the Holy Land, during the decades between 1540 and 1580. In the decades after 1580, this intensified mystical messianism of Isaac Luria (1534–72), and related kabbalistic impulses, spread first through the Jewish communities of the Ottoman Near East, then Italy and eventually permeated most of the rest of the Jewish world. Finally, in the middle decades of the seventeenth century, ending in the years 1665–6 with the great movement of Shabbatai Zevi, occurred an explosive culmination, a powerful acceleration and intensification of earlier trends, resulting in a popular messianic outburst which exerted a widespread and in many ways damaging impact.

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* This piece is a revised version of the essay published under the same time in Yosef Kaplan, Henry Méchoulan and Richard H. Popkin (eds.) *Menasseh ben Israel and his World* (Leiden, 1989), pp. 139–63; I would like to thank David Katz and Edgar Samuel for their assistance with several points relating to the Readmission to England.

[1] Scholem, *Sabbatai Sevi*, introduction; Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, 244–50.

But what precisely determined the onset and timing of this upsurge of more acute messianic expectation specifically in the 1640s and 1650s? According to Scholem the spectacular outburst of the mid seventeenth century, though distantly grounded in outward experience, resulted from an internalised cultural dynamic requiring some three generations after the Lurianic movement first became dominant at Safed to permeate the wider Jewish world and then a further generation, in which the Jewish culture of the time completely absorbed these more acute messianic expectations, creating a situation in which a 'Messiah who seemed to fit these ideas could find a wide-ranging echo'.[2] Scholem in other words explains the mystical messianic eruption of the mid-seventeenth century essentially in terms of inner spiritual dialectic stemming from Lurianic Kabbalism itself. He does not connect any new external event, or set of worldly circumstances, to this further and spectacularly dynamic stage in the evolution of Jewish mysticism.

Yet, Scholem's overall interpretative scheme, linking Expulsion with the evolution of Jewish Kabbalism, might arguably actually be strengthened should a mid-seventeenth century link between outward upheaval and intensified messianism be convincingly demonstrated. It would, after all, render the whole general phenomenon of upsurges in mass messianic expectation more readily explicable if these can be shown to be anchored psychologically in experience of severe dislocation in communities' and groups' immediate circumstances.

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[2] Scholem, *Messianic Idea in Judaism*, 59.

Among the most striking Jewish messianic speculations of the mid-seventeenth century were those engaged in by the celebrated Dutch rabbi Menasseh ben Israel (1604–1657)—whose family came from Beja in Portugal and whose Portuguese New Christian name was Manoel Dias Soeiro—in his *Spes Israelis* (1650) and several subsequent writings, and these do in fact suggest a possible close connection between heightened mystical messianic impulse and acute new pressures in external circumstances at least in the experience of an important section of Sephardi Jewry and the *converso* diaspora. In a letter to the Scottish-Dutch dissident Protestant theologian, John Dury (1596–1680), of December 1649, penned whilst he was writing his *Spes Israelis*—or *Mikveh Israel*, to give the title of the Spanish version of the tract—Menasseh explains that his aim was to show that the 'day of the promised Messiah unto us doth draw neer' by elucidating a number of key contemporary events and phenomena which he interprets as signs of pending Redemption.[3] He tells Dury that he wanted to bring out the deeper meaning of the cruelties perpetrated by the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal and the universal significance of the Jewish perseverance in the face of such relentless persecution and oppression, as well, on the other side, as the meaning of the 'great honours' conferred on prominent Jews in recent years by various Christian princes. These are themes which Menasseh does indeed take up in his *Mikveh Israel*, where he seeks to interpret both the oppression and the conferring of titles as proof of the imminence of Salvation, the in-gathering of the Jews, and the inception of a universal peace among mankind.

In addition, he identifies what he sees as another and an especially eloquent sign of pending Redemption. It seems to him a matter of surpassing significance that the age-old dispersion of the Jews had recently been virtually completed in a way it had never been in the past previous to the extension of Dutch control over northern Brazil after 1630. The Dispersion of the Jews, he wrote 'se ha agora cumplido, despues que en America se an instruhido synagogas' [has now been completed since in the Americas synagogues were established].[4] Through his own close personal and business connections with the Portuguese Jewish community of Recife, and relatives and associates on both sides of the Atlantic, Menasseh felt directly involved in the spread of organised Jewish life in the New World, seeing the founding of synagogues in America as a sure token of divine intent. In his *Mikveh Israel*, he expressly balances the continuance of age-old Jewish suffering, vividly exemplified by recent cases of heroic martyrdom at the hands of Catholic Inquisitors, against the joyful news of fresh charters, opportunities and concessions for Jewish settlement obtained from a variety of European rulers. The mixed strains of sombre gravity and optimism which permeate his tract weld good and bad into a single system of messianic dialectics, the driving principle of which is that 'nuestra perseverancia entre tantos malos' [our perseverance among so many calamities] is an infallible sign 'que para grandes bienes nos tiene el Señor guardado' [that the Lord has preserved us for great benefits].[5]

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[3] Roth, *Life of Menasseh ben Israel*, pp. 185–6; Méchoulan, 'Menasseh ben Israel', 328–9.

It seems implicit in Menasseh's conception, furthermore, that key features of the situation—spiritual perseverance in the face of persecution, heroic martyrdom, securing charters from princes, and completing the Dispersion in the New World—not only signal but also facilitate and accelerate the onset of universal Redemption. Thus when recalling, in his *Vindicae Judaeorum* (1656), his efforts to secure the Readmission of the Jews into England, he stresses that 'for seven years on this behalf I have endeavoured and sollicited it, by letters and other means, without any intervall. For I conceived that our universall dispersion was a necessary circumstance, to be fulfilled, before all that shall be accomplished which the Lord hath promised to the people of the Iewes, concerning their restauration, and their returning again into their own land, according to those words *Dan.* 12.7, 'when He shall have accomplished to scatter the power of the holy people, all these things shall be finished'.[6]

The charters and concessions lately granted by princes had indeed, as Menasseh claims, in the *Mikveh Israel*, brought about appreciable changes in the position of the Jews in the world. Through his business and personal correspondence with Venice and elsewhere in Italy, a country where he sold part of the ouput of his printing press,[7] Menasseh had acquired a fairly detailed knowledge of the Jewish policies of contemporary Italian princes, and states in his *The Humble Addresses* that he himself owned copies of several of the recent Italian charters of settlement, including those promulgated by the Grand Dukes of Tuscany which were the most liberal of all.[8] Besides the Tuscan edicts, Menasseh refers several times in his publications to the privileges granted to the Jews in recent years by the dukes of Savoy and Modena,[9] the Venetian Republic, and Danish king in his port of Glückstadt on the Elbe.[10] Furthermore, while it would have been inadvisable, given the then sour state of relations between England and Holland, expressly to praise the policies of the Dutch Republic in tracts pleading for Readmission to England, in others of his writings not addressed to Cromwell and his ministers, Menasseh does stress the 'clemencia' with which the Jews were treated in the United Provinces and the 'amor, afición y fidelidad' of the Dutch Jews towards the Republic.[11]

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[4] Menasseh ben Israel, *Mikveh Israel*, p. 111.

[5] Ibid., p. 102; Méchoulan and Nahon, 'Introduction', 68.

[6] Menasseh ben Israel, *Vindicae Judaeorum*, 37; Menasseh also refers to Daniel chap. 12 on p. 111 of *Mikveh Israel*.

But what of the wider Jewish significance of Menasseh's writing? In the context of the tumultuous two decades from 1645 to the Shabbatean frenzy of 1665–6, Menasseh's characteristic approach to Israel's and the wider world's pending Redemption, his dialectical intertwining of pressures of persecution with impulses towards resettlement and readmission, arguably corresponded on several levels, to the actual complex and bewildering interaction of serious disruption offset by new opportunities visible in the life of contemporary Sephardi Jewry and their New Christian relatives on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, Menasseh ben Israel, however untypical in other respects (and perhaps especially his willingness to engage in dialogue with

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[7] In the late 1640s, Menasseh regularly exported parcels of books, presumably mostly those he himself had printed, to Venice, see ARH Levantse handel vol. 264, fos. 13v, 90v.

[8] Menasseh ben Israel, *Mikveh Israel*, 107–8; *The Humble Addresses* pp. 4–5 in Wolf, *Menasseh ben Israel's Mission*; Menaseh ben Israel, *Piedra gloriosa*, 247–8; Israel, *European Jewry*, 40–1.

[9] For the text of the Modena charter of 1652, see Leone Leoni, *Nazione ebrea*, 241–5.

[10] Menasseh ben Israel, *Mikveh Israel*, 107–8; Cassuto, 'Portugiesischen Juden in Glückstadt', 111; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 61–4; Ravid, "How Profitable", 164–5; Israel, *European Jewry*, 129–30.

[11] Menasseh ben Israel, *Piedra gloriosa*, 248; Menasseh ben Israel, *Um Discurso* [. . .] *recitatdo em Amsterdão en 1642*.

Christian theologians) was a profoundly representative figure as regards the profound impulse in his writings to infuse contemporary events with messianic mystical significance and fervour.

For Sephardi Jewry the two decades from the mid 1640s down to the mid 1660s were unquestionably an era of exceptional turmoil, of major disaster unparalleled since the Expulsion from Spain, combined with a roughly equal dose of improvement, fresh opportunity, and economic expansion. Together these conflicting trends created, as events were to prove, an exceptionally dynamic, adaptable and creative diaspora context, especially in the sense that these two decades proved a uniquely formative period in the communal and institutional history of the Jews in many places on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, and what was perhaps the most distinctive feature of this crucially formative mid seventeenth-century epoch, it was precisely the most powerful response to the social crisis and upheaval, the movement to establish new Jewish colonies in places where Jews had not lived before, or had not dwelt for several centuries, which created most of the positive new opportunities. Hence, of all the political and intellectual manifestations of the exceptional ferment characteristic of the western Sephardi world during these decades, none was more important or typical than the flurry of proposals and schemes for Jewish colonisation and resettlement in continental Europe, the New World, England, and the Holy Land.

Three major calamities struck Sephardi Jewry in the late 1640s and 1650s, all of which had profoundly unsettling consequences. In all three cases, however, the negative, disruptive effects of these disasters in the end also had some paradoxically beneficial results which, for all the distress and dislocation, ultimately reinforced and nourished Jewish life in both the Old and New worlds. The most sudden, and probably the most disastrous, of these setbacks was, as we have seen, the paralysing of the Sephardi economy in Dutch Brazil with the rising of the Portuguese Catholic planters against the Dutch (and Jews) during the summer of 1645. The rebels burnt most of the sugar plantations around Recife and Olinda bringing the economy of Netherlands Brazil—and with it the commerce and financial activities of the Jews of Recife (Pernambuco)—to a complete standstill. Without an economic base, it was of course impossible to sustain the relatively large Sephardi population that had settled there under the Dutch. From its peak of around 1,500, in 1645, the Jewish population of Netherlands Brazil appears to have fallen as low as

650, by 1650, following the defeats of the Dutch forces in the two battles of Guararapes.[12] With the final collapse of Dutch Brazil, in 1654, the remainder of the Brazilian Jewish community had to be shipped back to the Netherlands. Numerous fortunes were lost. Hundreds of Sephardi refugees streamed back in waves to the Netherlands. And all this in turn put a heavy strain on the mother communities of Amsterdam and Middelburg. Menasseh ben Israel, whose brother Ephraim Soeiro had emigrated to Brazil, was one of the many Dutch Jews who had invested in the Brazil trade in the 1630s and early 1640s and who now not only lost their money but had to cope economically and psychologically with a large influx of often destitute and homeless refugees, frequently relatives and associates, who had been stripped of all their assets. Spinoza's father was another who lost money in Brazil and one of Spinoza's last donations before he left the synagogue, in 1656, was to a collection to help the fugitives from Brazil.

Thus, the exodus of Jewish refugees from Netherlands Brazil, the only part of the New World where organised Jewish life then existed, beginning in 1645 and ending in 1654, all but demolished Menasseh's fond notion that the Dispersion of the Jews was nearing completion. The two other major calamities adding considerably to the scale and intensity of the upheaval caused by the collapse of Netherlands Brazil, were firstly the outbreak of the long war of 1645–69 between Venice and the Ottoman sultan over Crete, a war of restricted scope militarily but which had the effect of paralysing for a quarter of a century the entire Venetian Levant trade, including all the connections linking the Sephardim of Salonika, Istanbul and Smyrna with Venice. Where earlier in the seventeenth century, Venetian Jews, sending goods via Split, Valona and Corfu, virtually dominated the export of fine cloth, camlets spices and other goods from Venice to the Greek lands and the Ottoman capital,[13] after 1645 for some two and a half decades what had become the chief component of the Venetian Jewish economy wilted almost to a standstill. It was a blow from which Venetian Jewry and its daughter communities in the Adriatic were never fully to recover.[14] The consequence was a double flow of migration, with one sizeable stream of mostly poor Jews coming to Venice from the Adriatic, Bosnia and the Greek lands while another and often more affluent stream at the same time left the ghettos of Venice moving to Livorno, Amsterdam, and eventually the New World.

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[12] Wiznitzer, 'Number of Jews in Dutch Brazil', 107–14.
[13] Paci, *La 'Scala' di Spalato*, 111–12.
[14] Israel, *European Jewry*, 93.

The third great rupture of these years followed the resolution of the Spanish crown, in 1647, to suspend its international payments, cancelling existing contracts with its bankers in part with the deliberate intention of reducing the role of the Portuguese New Christians in the Spanish royal finances, a development which not only precipitated a severe financial crash in Madrid and Antwerp but was soon followed by a marked resurgence of Inquisition persecution of the *conversos* especially in Madrid and Andalusia which continued through the 1650s and 1660s. This double setback in Spain not only produced a fresh exodus of Portuguese New Christians fleeing from the Spanish Inquisition but seriously disrupted the nexus linking the Portuguese New Christian banking community in Madrid with their counterparts in Antwerp.[15] Over the next fifteen to twenty years, several thousand New Christian refugees emigrated from Spain and also from Antwerp, including several of the richest financiers in the Spanish empire, among them Thomas Rodríguez (Abraham) Pereyra, Salvador Váez Martínez, Diogo Teixeira (Abraham Senior), Gil Lopes (Abraham) de Pinto, Fernando de Montesinos, and several members of the Pasarinho family. Also among the post-1647 emigrants from Spain were many of the most intellectually dynamic figures of the western Sephardi world of the later seventeenth century, including Isaac Orobio de Castro (1620–87), Juan de Prado (c. 1615–c. 1670)), the brothers Fernando (Isaac) and Abraham Cardoso who left Spain together, settling in Venice, in 1648,[16] Miguel (Daniel Levi) de Barrios (1635–1701), and Joseph Penso de la Vega (1650–93). By the 1650s, appreciable numbers of these mid-century exiles from Spain were to be found in every major western Sephardi community.

The disasters set in motion a triple migration from Brazil, Spain and the Venetian empire which dramatically boosted the population of the Sephardi diaspora in north-west Europe and Livorno. There was much upheaval, loss and distress but the situation had many positive as well as negative effects since it also greatly expanded the Sephardi diaspora's capital resources and trade connections, especially with Spain and Spanish America, while at the same time enhancing its colonizing capability. In addition, such a simultaneous convergence of streams of migration from diverse quarters, fusing the whole into a single complex yet integral phenomenon would naturally have intensified the quest for answers to the riddle of Jewish exile and suffering, imparting fresh impetus to kabbalistic speculation and study groups particularly in Holland and Italy, as well as the founding of new synagogues, *yeshivoth* and charitable institutions in those places and in the Holy Land. Abraham Pereyra (d. 1699) who arrived in Amsterdam from Madrid, via Venice, in the late 1640s, bringing with him a sizeable fortune, described by Menasseh ben Israel as 'huma tão consideravel riqueza' and valuable commercial contacts; also brought religious zeal; for immersing himself in penitential and mystical contemplation, he promptly donated large sums for 'bons usos', establishing two *yeshivoth* in Amsterdam, over one of which he made Menasseh head, and remitting sizeable sums to the Holy Land for charitable distribution.[17] In 1659, he set up the *yeshivah Hesed-le-Avraham*, at Hebron; subsequently, in 1665–6, he threw himself headlong into the Shabbatean frenzy.

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[15] Novoa, *Historia de Felipe IV*, 365; Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', 46–9; Israel, 'Sephardi Contribution to Economic Life', 385–8; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 77–8.

[16] Yerushalmi, *From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto*, 192–3.

Doubtless there was an appreciable store of capacity in the existing Sephardi communities of north-west Europe and Italy for absorbing the waves of immigration emanating from Brazil, Spain and the Adriatic. While Hamburg was hampered and the smaller community of Glückstadt severely damaged by the Swedish-Danish war of 1643–5,[18] the 1640s and 1650s were a time of rapid growth for the Sephardi communities of Livorno—where the Jewish population is estimated to have risen from 1,250 (nearly 10% of the total population of 12, 900), in 1645, to around 2,000 or around 11% of the total) by 1675[19]—and Amsterdam, as well as a few smaller centres such as Middelburg, Rotterdam, and Bordeaux, which all also grew noticeably at this time. But it seems equally clear that much of the newly arrived immigrant population could not be readily absorbed.

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[17] Menasseh ben Israel, *Thesouro dos Dinim*, dedication of final section to Abraham Pereyra; Van der Wall, 'Petrus Serrarius and Menasseh ben Israel', 173.

[18] Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 65–7.

[19] Toaff, *Nazione Ebrea*, 120–1; in the earlier version of this essay I gave the higher figures for Livorno in Toaff, 'Cenni storici', 361, 368.

For possibilities for successful absorption within existing communities were everywhere limited by a number of powerful constraints. In the first place, Christian city governments and to an extent also the elders of the Jewish congregations, were far from keen to admit any sizeable number of the poor and needy who would place additional strain on existing welfare arrangements. Then, secondly, there was much opposition, even in Amsterdam, from established Christian guilds to allowing Jews to engage in retailing or craft and industrial activities such as sugar-refining, silk-weaving, or preparing medicines, drugs and spices. At Hamburg, the rules imposed by the city government excluded Jews from practically every form of economic activity other than overseas trade, including sugar-refining despite their having special expertise in this field and their being allowed to engage in that industry in Glückstadt.[20]

Consequently, from 1645 down to the late 1660s, there was a chronic problem of how and where to find sufficient employment for poorer Jews in the established centres. Apart from menial tasks for other Jews, community service and the mainly Jewish processing industries of tobacco-blending and diamond cutting found chiefly at Amsterdam, and coral working—a speciality at Livorno, there was scarcely anything available other than to win one's bread in the flourishing overseas trade sectors in which the Sephardi elite specialised. If one lacked a sizeable starting capital, though, the only way to do so was by commencing as a factor, commissary or travelling agent of an existing merchant and this inevitably meant going overseas searching for profitable openings. Whether one scoured the Italian principalities several of which had recently granted charters for Jewish settlement, the Caribbean, England or Morocco, or nearer at hand explored the outer rim of the United Provinces, the only way to find a commercial or other niche for those without much capital was to leave the existing main centres. Of course, this could be done on an individual basis in some places. But where a new Jewish presence could only be established with the agreement of a foreign prince or parliament, or, as in the Caribbean area, under the auspices of a government or organisation strong enough to offer adequate military and naval protection, the only way was to formulate ambitious and elaborate colonising and resettlement schemes, braving all the political and logistical complications such plans entailed, and try to persuade governments it was in their interest to adopt or underwrite them. Moreover, even at Amsterdam where there was a certain scope for further increasing employment in a few specialised industries where guild restrictions did not exclude Jews, and in particular tobacco, chocolate, and diamond-processing, these industries without exception involved processing products imports of which depended on the continuing prosperity and growth of long-distance trade, especially with the New World and India. Hence, even those activities which did potentially allow some room for Jewish newcomers with small means could only continue to offer new employment opportunities, if Sephardic involvement in overseas commerce itself continued to expand.

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[20] SAH Jüdische gemeinden 993/I, p. 88 res. Mahamad, 16 Adar 5417; Feilchenfeld, 'Altäste Geschichte', 326–7.

There are strong grounds, then, for seeing the Jewish colonisation movement which burgeoned so dramatically between 1645 and the 1660s as essentially a response to the problem of surplus Sephardi and New Christian immigrant population which could not be absorbed within the context of the existing Jewish community structure of western Europe. At the same time it should be viewed as part of a conscious effort to broaden and restructure an incipient Sephardi Atlantic economic system which had been shorn of what hitherto had been its main branch—the Brazil sugar trade. For it was obvious from the outset that were the Sephardi communities of Holland and Italy to rely just on the traditional Portugal trade and trade with North Africa and the Mediterranean, the whole system would simply be too narrowly confined and structured to sustain the community network that was beginning to take shape. If Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry, then the political and economic driving force of the western Jewish world, was to succeed in prising open—for its own benefit but also that of the wider Sephardi and New Christian diasporas—new structural opportunities in long-distance maritime commerce such as were afforded by the Dutch-Spanish peace, the rise of the Caribbean sugar plantations, widening loop-holes into the lucrative Spanish American market, the emergence of England as a leading maritime and colonial power, and French mercantilist ambitions, then the only way to do so on a durable basis was to resettle sizeable numbers of Jews in a network of new communities in the Caribbean, North America, England, and wherever else—notably northern Italy—where there were indications this could be a practical proposition.

In particular, for reasons connected with the English Navigation Act of 1651, and the growth of English naval power, it suddenly became a matter of special urgency, in the years around 1650, to establish an offshoot of the western Sephardi diaspora in London.[21] This was in the first place because England had lately acquired the naval power to ensure, under the Navigation Act, that goods shipped from Spain, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Islands (Canaries, Azores and Madeira) were not reshipped from the Dutch entrepot to England, and to compel her colonists in the Caribbean to import and export only from and to England, and in English ships. Secondly, England controlled Barbados which, since 1646–7, had become the most flourishing of the new substitute sugar-producing colonies outside Brazil. Thirdly, it became clear, in the years 1650–1, as more and more cargoes belonging to Dutch Jews—including several belonging to Spinoza's father—were confiscated by the English on the high seas under the Navigation Act, Amsterdam's Portuguese Jewish merchants was constantly needing to engage in legal proceedings in London, often before the High Court of the Admiralty, through proxies and representatives, presenting documents, establishing their credentials, and (where fortunate) freeing their ships and retrieving their captured goods.

Historians in the past often supposed that the Sephardi community on Barbados was established only after the final collapse of Dutch Brazil, in 1654, when a sizeable group of Sephardim is known to have arrived there direct from Recife among them Luis Diaz (Joseph Jesurun Mendes), founder of the *Nidhe Israel* synagogue at Bridgetown. But it is now clear that Sephardi trade with Barbados began considerably earlier, in the mid 1640s, directly after the planters' rebellion in Brazil. Thus, for example, in a petition to the Council of State, in London, of May 1653, Simon de Casseres describes himself as 'having inhabited in the Barbados above seaven yeares tradeing from thence to Hamburg', exporting ginger and tobacco as well as sugar;[22] in another document he is described as a 'merchant of Hamburg'.[23] What de Casseres and others were importing to Barbados from the Lower Elbe is revealed by the Hamburg archives. Thus, for instance, in July1651, Duarte Esteves de Pina, Gaspar Gomes, Manoel de Pina and Manoel Rodrigues, all of Hamburg, are all listed in the *Admiralitätskollegium* records as shipping linens, French wine and brandy, olive oil and whale oil to Barbados.[24] Amsterdam Sephardi Jews were also dealing in Barbadian products well before 1650 as is shown, for example, by the case of Judah Toro, who is recorded in 1648 as shipping 25 rolls of 'Barbados tobacco' from Amsterdam to Genoa.[25] Yet even before archival evidence documenting Jewish activity on Barbados in the late 1640s and early 1650s was found, it already seemed obvious from the fact that the introduction of sugar cane cultivation by the Dutch on Barbados, input of Dutch capital, equipment and goods, and the initial vigorous upsurge of sugar and tobacco exports, filling the gap left by the slump in the Brazil trade since 1645, all occurred in the years 1646–7,[26] given the dominance of Sephardi Jews in the Dutch Brazilian sugar trade, that the latter were almost certainly deeply involved in Barbados well before 1654.

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[21] Kaplan, 'Sephardim in north-western Europe', 260; Böhm, 'Simon de Casseres', 125.

[22] PRO HCA 30/872. Petition of Simon de Cacerez, London, 31 May 1653.

[23] Ibid., John Thurloe, at the Counsell of State at Whitehall, Saturday, 4 June 1653.

In any case, the Brothers Simon Enrique and Benjamin de Casseres, described, interestingly as coming from Glückstadt, were mentioned by the governor of Barbados, in October 1653, as being 'inhabitants of this island of Barbados' and as having 'a plantation' and also a 'storehouse' at Bridgetown, information which seems to confirm that the seven to eight years they had been on the island had placed them in a prosperous condition.[27] Sephardi settlement on Barbados after 1654, moreover, continued at a brisk pace. In May 1665, an English merchant complained bitterly that the Island's governor, Lord Willoughby had continually 'countenanced Jews, who have become very numerous and engrossed the greatest part of the trade of the island, to the great discouragement of English merchants, their dealings being principally with those of their own tribe in Holland'.[28] By 1681, the governor estimated that there were 260 Jews living on the island. Meanwhile, down to the sending out of a large Parliamentary force to the Caribbean, under Venables, in 1655, the Navigation Act which expressly prohibited trade by foreigners to the English colonies, was almost completely ignored on Barbados, the colonists preferring to trade 'with strangers', as one Commonwealth man admitted, 'our English merchants traffiquing to those parts being generally great extortioners'.[29] But once implemented the Navigation Act engineered important changes. Ruthlessly aimed at promoting commerce in English bottoms by eradicating foreigners and especially the Dutch wherever possible, in no respect was it more stiflingly restrictive than in its regulation of colonial trade.[30] The Jews, as denizens, could, however, find ways to circumvent the legalities and despite constant complaints from Christian merchants in both Barbados and London, doggedly continued to act as agents for Dutch commerce.[31]

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[24] Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Admiralitätskollegium F4/15, fo. 94.

[25] ARH Levantse handel 264, fo. 252; see also Kellenbenz, *Sephardim,* 162.

[26] Harlow, *History of Barbados*, 37–8, 42.

[27] Samuel, 'Review of the Jewish Colonists', 18.

[28] *Cal. State Papers. Colonial. America and West Indies 1661–1668*, p. 296. Petition of Thomas Newton, 15 May 1665.

As the Dutch-Portuguese conflict in Brazil dragged on, fighting between the Dutch and Portuguese in India and Ceylon resumed, and relations between the United Provinces and Portugal progressively deteriorated until the two countries drifted into open warfare in the years 1657–61. Inevitably it was England, Holland's enemy and Portugal's closest ally—and under the Anglo-Portuguese marriage treaty of 1661 heir to Portuguese Tangiers and Bombay—which profited most from this both in terms of global politics and in maritime commerce. Indeed, the mid 1650s, and still more after 1660, London was in a position of near hegemony over the Portugal trade, a sector still of vital significance, and which continued to be for some time, to Dutch and other western Sephardi Jewry.[32] Yet the business of establishing an offshoot community in London was for several reasons a prickly one, fraught with difficulties. Quite apart from the traditional xenophobia of London's merchants and populace, and opposition of many preachers, relations between England and Holland, open rivals in this period for the maritime trade of the world, constantly oscillated between barely concealed hostility and open war. The slightest move on the part of the elders of the Amsterdam Jews towards setting up a daughter congregation in England was bound to be regarded with the great suspicion, if not outright condemnation as betrayal, by the Amsterdam city government and States of Holland. Of course, there were other Sephardi communities, notably Hamburg and Livorno, which shared in the colonising initiatives of the 1650s, but neither of these was politically or economically strong or populous enough to take the lead; only Amsterdam could do that.

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[29] Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers* ii, 142.
[30] Harper, *The English Navigation Laws*, 41.
[31] Harlow, *History of Barbados*, 262–4.
[32] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 123, 328–9.

It is clear therefore that while Dutch Sephardi Jewry—not only Amsterdam but also Middelburg and Rotterdam—was always and everywhere the main engine behind the Sephardi Atlantic colonisation movement of the decades 1645–65, including the Readmission of the Jews into England, the central role of the Dutch Jewish leadership in founding the new communities in London and elsewhere in the burgeoning English maritime empire, needed to be discreetly veiled and de-emphasised. At the same time, the attitude of the French crown to Jewish colonization in Martinique and Guadeloupe long remained vacillating and ambiguous,[33] while the political status of other regions of interest to the Dutch Sephardi leadership, such as Cayenne and New Amsterdam (New York) was disputed and unresolved. It was inevitable therefore, that the Atlantic colonising push of Sephardic Jewry in the mid seventeenth century was always highly problematic and continually jostled and hedged around by harsh and unpredictable political and economic pressures.

The Dutch colonies themselves provided some scope for settlement. But in the difficult circumstances of the 1650s not much and not nearly enough. The Dutch East India Company did not permit settlement by Europeans who did not belong to the Dutch Reformed Church in its new colony in South Africa,[34] or anywhere in its Asian territories, and there was little scope for colonising the West India Company's footholds in Guinea. Meanwhile, the small group of Sephardi refugees from Brazil who reached New Amsterdam in 1654 met with a distinctly unenthusiastic reception from the Calvinist burghers and the then governor, Pieter Stuyvesant, and while they eventually had their right to settle and trade both there and at Fort Orange (Albany) confirmed by the West India Company directors, in Amsterdam, under rules drawn up in January 1657 they remained excluded from most crafts and retailing precisely as in Amsterdam itself until well after the English captured the colony from the Dutch in 1664.[35]

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[33] Arbell, 'Jewish Settlements in the French Colonies', 289–92.

[34] Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 1059.

The possibilities for settlement within the Dutch maritime empire which most interested leading advocates of Sephardi and *converso* colonizing initiatives were decidedly those in Curaçao and the Guyanas. Several key individuals can be identified, all deeply marked, spiritually and materially, by the post-1645 debacle in Brazil who displayed not just an ardent enthusiasm for colonizing ventures but often appear to have shared—somewhat along the lines of Menasseh himself—in a sense of participating in a communal rather than a purely personal programme and who also, at least in some cases, evinced a form of messianic, mystical zeal albeit invariably fused with a keen desire to establish lucrative new trade connections and re-establish production of sugar cane and other tropical cash crops. All these men probably in some degree adhered to a religious ideology which ultimately, and even perhaps integrally, linked their colonizing schemes with what eventually approached being an early form of proto-Zionism. One of them, João de Yllão (or Yllan), in 1651, secured the first charter for Jewish settlement on Curaçao from the West India Company helped by his influential father-in-law, Dr Jacob Bueno, but later, in 1665–6 became a fervent follower of Shabbatai Zevi. Remarkably, in the midst of the second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–67), he petitioned the English king, Charles II, since 'God in his mercy has begun to gather in his scattered people', for a safe-conduct to enable him to ship fifty Jewish families to the Holy Land.[36] Another of the architects of the Sephardi colonizing movement, Abraham Drago had had to abandon substantial property in Brazil and later showed a keen interest in the facilities Curaçao and Aruba afforded for trade with Río de la Hacha, Santo Domingo and other parts of the Spanish West Indies.[37] But the most important, a business partner of Drago, was David Nassy (Joseph Nunes da Fonseca) another refugee from Brazil who during the later 1650s and 1660s obtained a whole series of charters from the WIC and other bodies authorising Jewish settlement in different parts of the Dutch West Indies.

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[35] Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 166–8; Smith, *Religion and Trade*, 216; Israel, 'Jews of Dutch America', 345.

[36] Emmanuel, *Jews of the Netherlands Antilles* I, 40–42.

[37] GAA NA 2890A, p. 493. Amsterdam, 24 Aug. 1661 (P. Padthuysen) describes a voyage in which Drago was a main investor via Curaçao to Coro and Río de la Hacha; see also Zwarts, 'Episode', 520, 526; Wolff, *A Odisseía*, 30.

Initially, Yllan, Drago and Nassy were chiefly interested *faut de mieux*, in establishing a community on Curaçao. But being an essentially barren island, unfit for agriculture, and as yet lacking a regular transit trade to the neighbouring Spanish American mainland, little progress was made there before the early 1660s when the transit traffic began to gain more momentum.[38] In the autumn of 1657, David Nassy and a group of Brazilian exiles temporarily resident in Middelburg, negotiated a highly favourable contract for settlement with the committee of the States of Zeeland which then supervised the colony of Nova Zeelandia (Essequibo), in western Guyana.[39] Among other measures to promote this project and attract sufficient colonists, printed copies of the terms were posted to the *parnasim* at Livorno. The emigrants were duly shipped across and an initially thriving colony based on sugar cane cultivation was established at Essequibo and along the Pomaroon river.[40] This remained the most flourishing of the Sephardi colonies in the Dutch maritime empire between 1658 and 1665 during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, when an English force sent from Barbados temporarily occupied and ravaged both Essequibo and Pomaroon (though not nearby Berbice), destroying the plantations and crushing mills and driving off many of the Jews, at least some of whom they transported to the (then English) colony of Surinam, in central Guyana.[41]

In September 1659, David Nassy, as the leader of the colonisers in Amsterdam, negotiated an advantageous contract for Jewish colonists to settle under his direction on the island of Cayenne, off what later became French Guyana, a region at the time possessed by the Dutch West India Company.[42] On this occasion, not only Livorno but also other Italian Sephardic communities were contacted and urged to participate. Actually, most of the fairly numerous Jewish colonists who settled in Remire as the main port of Cayenne was called, seem to have come from Italy, particularly Livorno, albeit were shipped out from Amsterdam; according to the Sephardi poet and chronicler Daniel Levi de Barrios, in the year 1660 no less than 152 Jewish emigrants reached Cayenne from Livorno.[43] The Italian connection was crucial, then, though guidance and supervision of the colony remained firmly in the hands of Nassy and his colleagues. In June 1663, four businessmen—David Nassy, Abraham Drago, Manoel Aboab and Samuel Nassy—drew up a contract in Amsterdam, agreeing to share in the cost of purchasing and fitting out a Dutch vessel, the skipper of which was Joris Govertsen, which they needed to transport cattle from the Portuguese Cape Verde Islands 'para la colonia de Cayana' and to remain in the Caribbean for a period in order to transport other cargoes back and forth in the service of the colony. Under the agreement, Drago was stated to be in charge in Amsterdam whilst Nassy was away in Cayenne but before leaving, it was to be Nassy's task to obtain the necessary license to purchase the cattle from the Portuguese Brazil Company, that is from the latter's representative in Holland, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa).[44]

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[38] Israel, 'Economic Contribution', 527–8.

[39] Cohen, 'Egerton Manuscript', 339–40.

[40] Oppenheim, 'Early Jewish Colony', 95–106; Arbell, 'Jewish Settlement in Pomeroon', 343–61.

[41] Ibid.; Williamson, *English Colonies in Guiana*, 178.

[42] Hartsinck, *Beschryving van Guyana* (1770), 940; Wolbers, *Geschiedenis van Suriname*, 36; Zwarts, 'Een Episode', 520; Arbell, 'Jewish Settlements', 296.

Shortly afterwards, Nassy appeared before the same notary to record that he was about to leave for Cayenne, had finalized a batch of supplementary agreements with the WIC, and that under the terms of one of these, he would be receiving a batch of black slaves to be supplied by the Company for his colonists in Cayenne.[45] No doubt this was connected with his efforts to promote sugar cane cultivation in Cayenne for in the same week, Manoel Aboab drew up a contract in Amsterdam with a skilled craftsman Jan Izendrot, who undertook to go out to Cayenne at the organizers' expense for four years and there, on their behalf, to construct and service 'ingenious ofte suyckermolens' [i.e. sugar mills] for the use of the colony.[46] After a time, Sephardi Cayenne began to thrive but in 1664 the French king, Louis XIV, sent out a fleet to the Guyanas to retake the territory (which was claimed by France) from the West India Company. The French ejected the Dutch but the Jews there mostly seem to have stayed initially; however, when the English arrived not long afterwards during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, with orders to burn and pillage the settlement (France being in formal alliance with the Dutch), the colony was destroyed and the Jews there transferred to the (then still English) colony of Surinam where they remained.[47] In

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[43] Wolbers, *Geschiedenis van Suriname*, 36; Loker, 'Cayenne', 106–117.

[44] GAA NA 2892, pp. 857–8. Amsterdam, 13 June 1663 (Peter Padthuysen).

[45] Ibid., p. 921. Amsterdam, 27 June 1663 (P. Padthuysen).

[46] Ibid., p. 899. Amsterdam, 22 June 1663 (P. Padthuysen).

[47] Zwarts, 'Episode', 529; Arbell, 'Jewish Settlements', 300.

1667, finally, a Dutch force under Abraham Crijnssen captured Paramaribo, and the rest of Surinam, from the English. The settlers had now come full circle and found themselves once again under Dutch rule except that their plantations had now moved from eastern to central Guyana.

Meanwhile, Barbados continued to far outstrip all the other sugar-producing colonies in the Caribbean. Most of the Jews who settled there had come from Netherlands Brazil, of else from Holland or the Lower Elbe, so that their ties were, and remained, predominantly Dutch rather than English. It is important, moreover, to stress that they formed part of a Sephardi Atlantic network which focused not on London but Amsterdam, for traditional Anglo-Jewish historiography has often tended to play down or omit this part of the Barbados story.[48] Indeed, during the Second Anglo-Dutch War Barbadian Jewry was, with ample justification, repeatedly accused by London merchants of being pro-Dutch in sympathy and passing to the Dutch intelligence about the movements of English warships.[49] But while the connections were principally Dutch, it was essential after the Cromwellian regime took control of the island from the English royalists, in 1651, to devise viable methods of circumventing the Navigation Act. In this regard, especially after the Anglo-Dutch peace of 1654, it became indispensable that there should be an offshoot Sephardi community in London. For only in this way could the Barbados-Amsterdam circuit to be camouflaged and dressed up to look like trade between England and Barbados. Officially, the Barbados Sephardim, after 1654, had to appear to be agents of merchants, native or denizened, residing in London and this was facilitated by the post-1656 Readmission. In reality, the Navigation Acts were observed by Barbados Jews neither in the letter nor spirit, since they continued to import large amounts of Dutch, Westphalian and Silesian linens, spices, and manufactures, from Amsterdam, and to export sugar and tobacco to Holland.[50] But the presence of a community in London made it easier for them to pretend not to be subverting the Navigation Act.

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[48] See, for instance, Newman, 'Sephardim of the Caribbean', 447–50.

[49] *Cal. State papers. Colonial. America and West Indies, 1661–1668*, p. 530; Fortune, *Merchants and Jews*, 109–12.

[50] Harlow, *History of Barbados*, 2.62–4; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 239–40.

The intricacy of the methods involved, and sometimes baffling complexity of the accompanying documentation, is vividly illustrated by the story of the *The Pearl*, a supposedly English vessel brought in to San Sebastián by an Irish privateer in Spanish service, in 1657, at a time when England was at war with Spain. The ship was found to have on board twenty-seven Jewish colonists on their way to Barbados bringing with them a large and costly stock of merchandise which was to be sold in Barbados and which eventually turned out to belong to Portuguese Jews at Amsterdam but which was covered by a confusing mixture of papers and passes in both English and Dutch. Clearly, during their crossing, the skipper and merchants were supposed to show one set of papers to the English and another to their enemies. Spain being then at war with England, the San Sebastián admiralty authorities, wielding the English passes, with great satisfaction confiscated the valuable cargo as 'English', but soon found to their dismay that the Amsterdam city government and States General (with whom the Spanish crown was anxious to remain on good terms), prompted by the Amsterdam Sephardi *Mahamad*, lobbied so hard in Madrid that, English papers notwithstanding, there was no way of avoiding full restitution of the goods as being indisputably 'Dutch'. Since the Spaniards had questioned whether these Jews were really Dutch subjects, it was also this incident that led the *Mahamad* to request the regents to issue the resounding States General resolution of 17 July 1657 asserting that 'those of the Jewish nation who live in these provinces are true subjects and inhabitants of these provinces and must enjoy the conditions, rights and privileges stipulated in the treaties of peace and commerce [with Spain].'[51]

Meanwhile, the settlement of Brazilian refugees on the French islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe appeared to bode well. Several vessels arrived at Guadaloupe early in 1654, one ship, with many Jews, bringing the inhabitants of Tamarica, two vessels bringing the inhabitants of Paraíba, and another the garrison of Tamarica and Paraíba.[52] Under the stimulus of Dutch and Dutch Jewish activity, the cultivation of sugar cane and general commerce advanced rapidly between 1654 and the early 1660s at first chiefly on Guadaloupe; but from the 1660s onwards especially Martinique. The best known and most influential of the Jewish settlers on Martinique was Benjamin d'Acosta de Andrade, a former New Christian from Portugal who had settled in Dutch Brazil and came to the French islands in 1654. He owned two of Martinique's largest sugar mills and invested in cacao-processing as well as sugar.[53] Here too, until the late 1660s when Colbert's mercantilist measures began to have some effect in the French islands, and interloping Dutch merchants, cargoes and ships began to be seized, the main contacts were with Holland. A constant stream of Dutch vessels visited Martinique,[54] so that the bulk of the French West Indian sugar and tobacco output was at that time sold to the Dutch and shipped for refining and spinning to Amsterdam.[55]

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[51] Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', 38.

[52] Du Tertre, *Histoire générale des Antilles*, i, 463–4; Arbell, 'Jewish Settlements', 289–90.

Meanwhile, Sephardi emigrants from Holland and Hamburg, joining others from Venice and Livorno, responded to the several new charters for settlement issued at this time in Italy. Impressed by the success of the Grand Duke of Tuscany's free port, at Livorno, other Italian princes began to emulate his liberal policy towards the Jews, in particular desiring to attract Sephardi merchants involved in long-distance trade and new industries. At Nice (Nizza), in Savoy, Duke Carlo Emmanuele II declared a free port, open to Jews and other foreigners, in 1648, and issued explicit invitations to settle to the Sephardi communities through his court Jew, Isaac Avigdor. Several of those arriving to set up businesses at Nice in the 1650s came from the Netherlands and from Dutch Brazil.[56] The Este duke of Modena, not to be outdone, issued three charters during 1652–3, the years immediately preceding Menasseh ben Israel's mission to London. These proclamations which styled the Sephardim 'wealthy people and very apt to introduce traffic and commerce', succeeded in drawing a substantial immigration to Modena and still more to Regio—a community Menasseh mentions in his *Humble Addresses*. A register which survives lists sixty Sephardic families which settled in that Italian duchy in the five years between 1652 and 1657, showing that while most originated in Venice, Livorno, or Salonika, or were Portuguese New Christians fleeing the Spanish Inquisition, no less than nine families migrated there from Amsterdam, Hamburg or Dutch Brazil.[57]

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[53] Ibid.

[54] GAA NA 2898, pp. 57–60, 169, 185, 197, Amsterdam, deeds 11 July, 3 Aug., 4 Aug. 1668 (P. Padthuysen); Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy*, 195–6; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 288–9.

[55] Emmanuel, 'Les Juifs de la Martinique', 511–16.

[56] Foà, *Politica economica de la casa savoia*, 52–5; Leone Leoni, *Nazione ebraica*, 41–7.

[57] Balletti, *Ebrei e gli estensi*, 223–4; Leone Leoni, *Nazione ebrea*, 245–7.

At the same time that these developments were in progress, the Sephardic congregations at Middelburg and Rotterdam entered the fastest-growing and liveliest phase of their existence,[58] and a remarkable attempt was made by Lopo Ramirez (David Curiel) to obtain permission from the governor-general of the Spanish Netherlands to be allowed to establish a Jewish congregation in the Antwerp suburb of Borgerhout. Late in 1653—two years before the Whitehall Conference, in London—Lopo Ramirez, a leading Jewish merchant of Amsterdam, and former supplier to the Spanish army of Flanders, who was then in bitter dispute with the Amsterdam *Mahamad* over his attempt to appropriate a large inheritance, in their eyes wrongfully, endeavoured to take advantage of his Brussels connections and the fact that the Philip IV's governor-general, the Archduke Leopold Wilhelm who was supposed to be fighting the French was chronically short of cash, by offering money in return for permission to practice Judaism, and trade, in Antwerp.[59] The Archduke responded by convening a committee to consider the question composed of senior officials and ecclesiastics, among them Jacobus Boonen, Archbishop of Mechelen and primate of the Flemish Catholic Church. This commission found there was no fundamental obstacle to what was proposed in the laws of Brabant, or those of the Church, provided when authorizing the re-admittance of the Jews to Antwerp, the Archduke stipulated that they must live segregated from Christians in a formal ghetto as in Italy and Catholic Germany.[60]

The matter had thus proceeded quite far when the papal internuncio in Brussels, Andrea Mangelli, caught wind of it and taking alarm, alerted the Papacy to what was proposed. The papal nuncio in Madrid was at once instructed to intervene. The Spanish king was told that His Holiness having heard about the proposal that 'una sinagoga de hebreos' be established at 'Burgero' [Borgerhout], requested Philip to forbid this absolutely, urging that this was no less than he would expect of the king's rectitude and 'Christian zeal'.[61]

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[58] Van 't Hoff, 'De vroegere Portugeesch-Joodsche gemeente . . . te Middelburg', 16–21; Reijnders, *Van 'Joodsche Natien'*, 139–40, 157; Hausdorff, *Jizkor. Platenatlas*, 13–17.

[59] AGS Estado 2185. Consulta of the Consejo de Estado, Madrid, 7 Feb. 1654; Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, 211–16.

[60] Ullmann, *Studien*, 38–40; Pohl, *Portugiesen in Antwerpen*, 342–3; Dequeker, 'Heropleving', 155.

[61] AGS Estado 2185, *consulta, Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 7 Feb. 1654; Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 213.

Taken aback, the authorities in Madrid asked the Archduke to explain himself, making it clear that there was to be no charter or concession of any sort to the Jews.[62] Yet while the main proposal was thus aborted by the Papacy, Lopo Ramirez and his nephew, Isaac Aboab (1631–1707), nevertheless received from the archduke an informal permission for them and their immediate households to live as observant Jews in Antwerp and they did indeed do so for several years,[63] until Lopo returned to Amsterdam in 1666 and was reconciled to the *Mahamad* (after paying a 1,000 guilder fine for distribution to the poor of the community) apparently in response in the Shabbatean excitement of the time.[64]

However, much the best known and ultimately the most important of the all the initiatives, and that with which Menasseh himself was most directly involved, was of course the drive to persuade the Cromwellian regime to readmit the Jews to England. It is true that beginning with Lucien Wolf, Anglo-Jewish historians have consistently played down the Dutch and continental roots of the founding event in modern Anglo-Jewish history, interpreting the Readmission as something to be grasped in terms of English conditions and circumstances—including the dawning greatness of the British Empire of which Cromwell was, in many ways, the first architect. But though often repeated this is not a view which makes much sense.[65] For, on the contrary, the essence of the Readmission is that it was primarily a Dutch and Dutch Brazilian initiative, and one moreover undertaken in the interests of Sephardi Jewry generally, but one where—given that the key impetus, that emanating from Holland, had to be concealed for political reasons—the enterprise had to be made to appear more particular and insular in character than it actually was. In terms of publicity and political strategy, the main emphasis was always on English interests and circumstances. For this was a time of spiralling commercial and colonial hostility between England and the Dutch.

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[62] AGR SEG 257, fo. 133. Archduke Leopold Wilhelm to Philip IV, Brussels, 17 April 1654.

[63] GAA NA 2242A, fo. 14, Amsterdam, 4 July 1673; Ouverleaux, 'Notes et documents', 29, 38–41; Schmidt, *L'histoire des Juifs*, 45.

[64] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 240.

[65] As indeed Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi pointed out, see Yerushalmi, 'Between Amsterdam and New Amsterdam', 180.

In fact a good deal had to be veiled from the eyes of both the English and the Dutch governments.[66] Until the death of the pro-Stuart Stadholder, William II (1647–50), in November 1650, the States General refused to recognise the legitimacy of the regicide parliamentary regime in London altogether. While there was a short-lived improvement in relations in early 1651 and an English delegation arrived in The Hague to negotiate an alliance, the improvement did not last long and the atmosphere remained extremely fraught. During their visit the English envoys took the opportunity to visit the Portuguese Jewish synagogue in Amsterdam and apparently received an elaborate welcome, at which a public blessing was pronounced upon the Commonwealth of England, something which could only be decided on after elaborate consultation among the *parnasim* (elders). Subsequently, John Thurloe, after Cromwell himself the key figure in managing England's foreign affairs under the Commonwealth, had several discussions with Menasseh ben Israel in part about the possibility of the Readmission of the Jews into England. Menasseh was sufficiently encouraged and enthusiastic after his encounter with Thurloe to submit a petition to the English Parliament calling for a charter of Readmission. As the Council of State, in London, began to consider the matter, however, Anglo-Dutch relations were again deteriorating rapidly, following the collapse of The Hague negotiations and the passing, in October of the rigidly mercantilist Navigation Act.

The Council of State eventually issued a safe-conduct for Menasseh to come to London, in November 1652, after the onset of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–4). But this was obviously in large part merely a hostile ploy aimed at weakening or distracting the Dutch and it was in any case impossible for a senior figure of the Amsterdam community to be seen drawing up plans with the English at the time. Another attempt was made to bring Menasseh to London, and another safe-conduct issued, in the autumn of 1653, and Menasseh may well have been eagre to go. But considerable pressure was exerted on him not to as he himself states in his *Vindiae Judaeorum*: 'my kindred and friends, considering the chequered and interwoven vicissitudes, and terms of things here below, embracing me, with pressing importunity, earnestly requested me not to part from them.'[67]

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[66] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 197–213.

[67] Quoted in Roth, *Life of Menasseh ben Israel*, 211–12.

The next stage in the campaign to secure Readmission to England centred less around Menasseh than an influential Sephardi merchant and former *parnas* of the Amsterdam community, Manuel Martínez (David Abrabanel) Dormido.[68] A few months after the end of the Anglo-Dutch War, Martínez Dormido (who may have been a relative of Menasseh's wife, Rachel Abrabanel)[69] arrived in London, together with Menasseh's son, Samuel Soeiro, partly in the hope of restoring his personal circumstances but also with wider colonizing considerations in mind. These he must have discussed with Menasseh and his son and also, as we shall see, with David Nassy. Martínez Dormido in effect paved the way for Menasseh and was the first to petition Lord Protector Cromwell (where the real power lay)—as distinct from Parliament—for the Readmission into England. Later one of the most active founders of the London Sephardi synagogue, and one of its first two *parnasim*,[70] Martínez Dormido was clearly the second most important architect of the Readmission after Menasseh himself.

His own life abundantly reflected the wider crisis of Atlantic Sephardi Jewry. Although it seems he had never set foot in the New World, his career was intimately bound up with Brazil; moreover, he himself had crossed the boundary from New Christian to normative Judaism. Brought up among a family of Portuguese *conversos* in Andalusia where he became a minor financier, after spending a period in Inquisition dungeons, he escaped from Spain in 1632 and settled in south-west in France. In April 1640, after several years as an active crypto-Jewish proselytiser, in Bordeaux, he moved to Amsterdam reverting to open Judaism. Remarkably it took him only two or three years to establish himself as a leading figure in the community. In 1641, with Dutch Jewish trade with Brazil thriving, he sent his two sons to Recife with 'great cargazons of goods', as the English translation of one of his memorials to the Council of

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[68] 'David Abrabanel Dormido' is listed as a *parnas* for 1645 and had served the previous year on the governing board of the *Yeshivah Ets Haim*; see GAA PJG 1323 'Registro dos parnassim', anno 5405; Meijer, *Encyclopaedia Sefardica Neerlandica*, 103; further on Martínez Dormido, see Diamond, 'Community of the Resettlement', 135–6; Kaplan, 'Sephardim in north-western Europe', 260.

[69] Roth points out, however, that there is no evidence to support Lucien Wolf's assertion that he was Menasseh's brother-in-law or a relative at all, Roth, *Life of Menasseh ben Israel*, 337.

[70] *Libro de los Acuerdos*, pp. 2, 14–17.

State, in London, later expressed it, 'of which proseedes I did looke for above 500 chests of suggars which they had to send to me in the yeare 1646'. However, he was one of the many Sephardi creditors who were still awaiting payment in sugar when the indebted planters rose against the Dutch and Jews in the year 1645. 'It happened that the Portugalls and dwellers in the country of Pernambuco [i.e. Recife] did rize, amongst whom were my debtors and the possessors of my estate.'[71] Through the rising he was wiped out commercially.

Martínez Dormido later claimed to have lost over 150,000 guilders of goods and investment in Brazil, being owed 80,000 guilders by just three Portuguese planters of the Recife area alone. A proud Spaniard, he did his best to keep up appearances in Amsterdam, despite 'an extremity of miseries and necessities' which he concealed as best he could 'as I owe to my quality and to that honour wherewith I was borne and bred and ever did observe'. Feeling no particular loyalty to the Dutch state, however, he seems to have passed intelligence from Amsterdam to London during the Anglo-Dutch War and it is this which enabled him to transfer to London as an openly proclaimed Jew as soon as the conflict was over and ask Cromwell's help in petitioning the king of Portugal to compensate him for the fortune he had lost through the planters' rebellion in Brazil. In his petition to Cromwell of November 1654, he styled himself 'of the Hebrew nation' and likewise, a 'loyall subiect of Your Highnesse [ie Cromwell] and this most noble Commonwealth'.[72] Expelled from Brazil and without prospects in Holland, his sons, Selomoh and Aaron Abrabanel Dormido also left Holland for London soon after the end of the war well before the arrival of Menasseh ben Israel in the autumn of 1655.[73]

But besides petitioning Cromwell on his own account, Martínez Dormido also appealed to the Lord Protector on behalf of the Jews generally. He asked that they be re-admitted to England 'granting them liberties to come with their families and estates, to be dwellers here with the same eaquellnesse and conveniences which your inland subjects doe enjoy'.[74] Cromwell referred both papers to the Council of State which received the first favourably and subsequently sent a vigorous letter to the court at Lisbon lending support to Martínez Dormido's demand,[75] but was distinctly lukewarm about the general petition, observing that the Readmission of the Jews would be 'against the establish'd law'.[76] Martínez Dormido, however, undeterred by this, pressed on with his campaign, searching for additional support.

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[71] Quoted in Wolf, 'American Elements in the Re-Settlement', 91.

[72] Ibid., p. 92; see also PRO SP 84/160, fo. 92.

[73] Their names appear in the father's 1661 petition for denization where it is stated that they had resided in London for seven years, *Cal. State papers. Domestic 1661–1662*, p. 214; see also Wolff, *A Odisseía*, 166.

[74] The two petitions, submitted together on 3 November 1654, were referred by

Remarkably, his chief confidant in Amsterdam at this juncture, was none other than David Nassy who not only expressed his own enthusiasm for the project of Jewish resettlement in England but undertook to act as the link between Martínez Dormido in London, and the *parnasim* in Amsterdam. Thus it was that the foremost figure among the Jewish colonizers in the New World of the mid seventeenth century also took part in the Jewish resettlement in England. Doubtless his awareness of England's relevance to his concerns at this time was strongly coloured by the experience of the recent war which had all but paralysed Dutch Jewish trade and navigation for the interim and also, apparently, aborted his planned colonising expedition to Curaçao in 1652.[77] Though he was still some way off from obtaining his charters for Jewish settlement in Essequibo and Cayenne, no-one can have been more aware than he of the need for the Western Sephardim to gain footholds in London and the English West Indies.

Responding to his ally's appeal for support, Nassy duly conferred with the Amsterdam *parnasim*. He wrote from Amsterdam, on 20 November 1654, explaining that while he had already spoken with Abraham Farar, one of the *parnasim*, he had not yet had a chance to speak to the man who, in his view, had the most influence in such a matter, 'because Jacob del Monte is not in the country now'.[78] Farar had however discussed the matter with the presiding *parnas*, Selomoh Salom, and both men 'acknowledging your great zeale, as well as your quality and worth' considered the project of obtaining permission for Jewish settlement in England an important one. In fact, Nassy assured Martínez Dormido, the Amsterdam *parnasim*

Cromwell to the Council 'to report' on 8 November, see *Cal. State Papers. Domestic 1654*, p. 393.

[75] Wolf, 'American Elements in the re-Settlement', 92.

[76] PRO SP 84/160, fo. 92.

[77] Emmanuel, *History of the Jews of the Netherlands Antilles* i, 43–4.

[78] PRO SP 84/160, fo. 90. David Nassy to Martínez Dormido, Amsterdam, 20 Nov. 1654 (English translation).

'exceedingly desire the common good and that [the Sephardic Jewish nation] may have more enlargement, acknowledging that to plant themselves in that realme another congregacon' would greatly benefit Sephardi well-being and commerce generally. They also considered that the resulting close commercial collaboration of the Jews of Amsterdam and London would produce 'no small profit arising to these provinces [i.e. the United Provinces] and that realme'.

Nassy, like Farar and Salom, was, of course, chiefly concerned with the commercial and maritime aspects of the Resettlement and its consequences for Dutch Sephardi Jewry. But their colonizing ideology was not just a matter of economics and finding employment for uprooted relatives and dependents. Nassy and the *parnasim* were also highly conscious of the need to encourage and safeguard the stream of Portuguese New Christian emigration from Spain and Portugal and the need to publicise new colonising and settlement projects among the Sephardi diaspora more generally. Nassy expressed his confidence that success in England would help stimulate the emigration of the falsely and forcibly baptised from 'France, Spaine and Portugall': 'and if they were certaine of the benevolence wherewith they shall be there admitted', he urged, 'who can doubt that they will foresake regions wherein by constraint they doe reside, and seeke refuge procuring by their business to inrich the countries where best entertainment shall be given them?'.[79]

The *parnasim* then agreed with the project, and could see its advantages from their perspective, while Nassy was extremely enthusiastic. But at the same time they were acutely conscious of Martínez Dormido's status as a client of Cromwell and what this implied for Dutch Jewry. In fact, there was no prospect that the *Mahamad* of the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community would openly support or approve, or even be seen to be associated with Martínez Dormido or his campaign for Resettlement in England. Accordingly, he was told that in no circumstances would the *parnasim* undertake, as Martínez Dormido wished them to do, that 'they should write unto his Highnesse'. This was out of the question, in view of how much the States General and burgomasters of Amsterdam had

> honoured and favourred them, making no difference in the estimation and privileges (which can be given) betweene us and the natives, and

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[79] Ibid.

> lately most gratiously they have granted them to be citizens of the city with affections and words of such good reputacon that they oblige, more than the benefit itselfe, the gratitude which we profess and the loyalty of our proceedings.[80]

The allusion to their being 'granted . . . to be citizens' refers to the resolution of the Amsterdam city government of 23 October 1654, taken in response to an urgent plea from the Portuguese Jewish community, following extensive interference with their merchandise in Spain, to be recognized as *poorters* (citizens) of Amsterdam. In reality the concession was not as generous as the English rendering of Nassy's letter implies, as it conferred only minor citizenship status and expressly upheld the ban on Jews engaging in retailing and most crafts.[81]

A few days after Nassy sent his letter of 20 November to London, Jacob del Monte (1612–1670),[82] patriarch over a numerous and wealthy family, returned to Amsterdam. He was the member of the *Mahamad* who at that moment was regarded as most authoritative in matters of high state-craft and he chose to write directly to Martínez Dormido. He made it clear that he too was enthusiastic about the resettlement of the Jews in England, and believed that great effort should be devoted to that purpose. Nevertheless, he was even more concerned to stress that the Amsterdam Sephardi community could in no way be publicly associated with the venture: 'it is a thing impossible to be done', he declared, insisting that 'it doth impugne our constancy, for, being subjects of the States who have allwaies protected us with the laws which you know, and (in this citty) as their citizens, how can you desire that our nation should write to cause gelousy in another Potentate or Republic?'[83] Of course, it went without saying, that 'if it were a thing feasible and not hurtfull (because you are a subject so meritorious)', the *parnasim* would not hesitate and 'would do it'.

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[80] Ibid.

[81] Bloom, *Economic Activities* 155; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 22.

[82] Born and raised into a judaizing New Christian family in Rouen, Del Monte was listed as the seventh richest Jew in Amsterdam in the 1674 tax register and is known to have been a large investor in the West India Company,; he himself traded, however, chiefly with Spain; see Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 252–3.

[83] PRO SP 84/160, fo, 90. Jacob del Monte to Martínez Dormido, Amsterdam, 26 Nov. 1654.

A third letter sent from Amsterdam and addressed to Martínez Dormido at about the same time was sent by the presiding *parnas*, Selomoh Salom, and the synagogue treasurer, Jacob Bueno de Mezquita. It repeated the same points, emphasizing the political 'inconveniences' which prevented the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community from publicly having anything to do with the efforts to secure Readmission to England.[84] The message was clear enough but perhaps the Amsterdam *parnasim* had not reckoned on the possibility that Martínez Dormido would have their letters translated into English and use them as propaganda with the London Council of State. For while the letters showed that the Amsterdam *parnasim* refused to lend their name to the appeal, they also showed that the Jews were loyal citizens, and plied such an important commerce, that the Dutch regents considered their presence and allegiance to be an invaluable asset.

The new petition which Martínez Dormido submitted to the Lord Protector together with the English translations of the three letters from Amsterdam, at the end of November 1654, reveal how closely Matínez Dormido's concept of Readmission was linked to the vision and project of Menasseh ben Israel. Like Menasseh, he lays the main emphasis on the commercial advantages likely to accrue to England through allowing the Jews—by which he means, the Sephardim, as for the most part, did Menasseh—to 'come and dwell with their families and estates in these countries and the Dominions thereof'. Twice he urges that the Lord Protector ought adopt this course out of 'political reason of state'. Also like Menasseh, he does not mention the problems of Dutch Jewry, or the collapse of Netherlands Brazil, but instead stresses the predicament of the New Christians fleeing the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal and their urgent need of a new homeland which they, in turn, will handsomely repay by bringing to their new place of residence their considerable wealth. He urges that this 'most noble Commonwealth may enjoy the same and participate of the full blessings wherewith [the Lord] doth enrich the countries wherein His Chosen People have their habitation'.

Again like Menasseh, he does point out, however, the liberal treatment and accommodating attitude the Jews had met with in those parts where they had, of late, been permitted to settle, his objective being to secure not just the right to resettle but commercial privileges at least as generous, if not more so, than those already granted to the Jews in Holland. The following year, in his *Humble Addresses*, Menasseh would plead that 'our Hebrew nation be received and admitted into this mighty republic under the protection and care of Your Highness like the citizens themselves [. . .]and that it be allowed to us to trade freely in all sorts of merchandise just like every one else'.[85] Furthermore, he contrives to show, without saying so, that the Jews in Holland and Hamburg *were* eager to establish a daughter community in England. For those Jews, he assures Cromwell, alluding to the three letters, 'protected in other Republics sought not to make themselves odious where they are used as their natives, enjoying equall benefits'.[86] Rather they wanted to proceed 'without adventuring that favour and peaceable possession wherein they are keeping their estates, as the good consideracion and naturall discourse of that my nation doth give to understand.' Nevertheless, he insisted, 'I am very certaine, and yet they have assured me, if they had bin able, without giving occasion to gelousie, they had supplicated Your Highnesse (by the notice I communicated unto them of my intents) to favour me in them'.[87]

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[84] PRO SP 84/160, fo. 90.

The Council of State remained distinctly unimpressed;[88] though this did little to dampen Martínez Dormido's ardour for soliciting privileges for his himself, his family and his people. In March 1655, he applied unsuccessfully for permission to export 1, 200 silver Spanish pieces of eight to correspondents of his 'at Goa in the East Indies, from whom I hope to receive valuable effects by English ships trading to Surat.'[89] He continued to recommend the establishment of Sephardi communities both in England and her colonial 'dominions' and continued to collaborate with David Nassy who, within days of Menasseh's arrival in England sent Martínez Dormido secret intelligence, he had obtained from Saint Malo, concerning the movements of the main Spanish war fleet which was now at sea, off Andalusia, consisting of twenty-eight vessels carrying 11,000 men and mounting 1,100 guns. England was now at war with Spain and by passing on such intelligence to Cromwell, Nassy and Martínez Dormido obviously hoped to demonstrate the usefulness of New Christian sources of information to a state at war with that country. 'God grant', exclaimed Nassy, 'that they never enjoy their expectations, those wicked Papists; and that His Highnesse may remain in his arms victorious and enjoy great success for the good of his people'.[90]

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[85] Wolf, *Menasseh ben Israel's Mission*, pp. lxxxii–lxxxiv; Ravid, "How Profitable", 168.

[86] PRO SP 84/160, fo. 92. Petition of Manuel Martínez Dormido.

[87] Ibid.

[88] *Cal. State papers. Domestic, 1654*, p. 407.

[89] *Cal. State Papers. Domestic, 1655*, 28 March.

Without doubt many Jews took a fervent interest in Menasseh's mission to London in 1655. Indeed, in eager expectation of an imminent great change, a considerable number seem actually to have crossed the Channel and gravitated to London. Doubtless most of those who did so, or watched excitedly from Amsterdam and Hamburg, from David Nassy down, were, refugees from Brazil, Spain or the Venetian empire, men searching for new openings in both Europe and the Caribbean. This lends added significance to the reports of those various observers of the London scene in 1655 who saw the mission less as that of Menasseh ben Israel than of a substantial, vocal and impatient group of Jews crossing over from Holland. The Tuscan ambassador in London for example, says nothing about Menasseh or English debates, but noted rather that 'diversi ebrei venuti di Amsterdam hanno suplicato il signore Protettore di havere in Londra una loro sinagoga' [various Jews from Amsterdam have petitioned the Protector to have a synagogue in London].[91] 'The information you have touching the Jewes application to England', wrote an English royalist to a colleague, 'may have ground upon the going over of many of them; and among the rest Menasseh ben Israel, a learned Rabbi among them at Amsterdam is gone over, but he pretended only a short stay.'[92] The number of Sephardi visitors in London, most just arrived, by early December 1655 was such that Martínez Dormido who regarded himself as Menasseh's chief associate in the enterprise of England and their secular leader, even petitioned Cromwell to be granted the 'nomination and title of Consull of my nation'.[93]

Further light on the wider context in which Jewish Readmission into England was pressed for in 1654–5, is to be found in the text of the Open Letter which Menasseh sent to several 'Holy Synagogues of Italy and Holstein' [i.e. Hamburg and Glückstadt] on the eve of his departure from Amsterdam, for England, on 2 September 1655. For it seems from the only known copy of the text (which Cecil Roth discovered in Venice) that Menasseh published his summons to join in the Resettlement not in Hebrew but only in Portuguese. Roth thought it 'somewhat puzzling' that he should not have done so in Hebrew as would have befitted a communication to the Jewish world as a whole;[94] but while Menasseh was neither ignorant of, nor indifferent to, the suffering of the Ashkenazim in Poland and the Ukraine, or the influx of Ashkenazic refugees to Amsterdam and Hamburg, his mission, and the efforts of men such as Martínez Dormido or Nassy, were specifically concerned with the Sephardi refugees from Brazil, Spain and the Adriatic. Hence it was perfectly logical that Menasseh should circulate his text not in Hebrew but in Portuguese.

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[90] Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers* iii, 750.

[91] Roth, 'New Light', 138.

[92] Wilensky, 'The Royalist Position concerning the Readmission', 402.

[93] PRO SP 84/161. Fo. 48. Petition of Martínez Dormido to the Lord Protector, London, 4 Dec. 1655.

Furthermore, Menasseh clearly intimates that his summons was issued despite the disapproval with which his mission was viewed by some wealthy Jews 'protegidos de clementissimos principes e magistrados' in which, though he does not say so, he obviously includes the Amsterdam *parnasim*.[95] He knew that he could not conceal from the elders of other Sephardi and Ashkenazi communities the fact that the Amsterdam *Mahamad* had refused to approve his mission. But, as against this, he stressed that his mission *was* greeted with applause and rejoicing among the mass of the Sephardi community—by which, since the news had not yet reached Italy, he could only mean those in Holland. When the Dutch ambassador in London came to speak with him, late in December, Menasseh hastened to reassure him 'that he doth not desire any thing for the Jews in Holland, but only for such as sit in the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal'.[96]

In England itself, meanwhile, the general climate of opinion, with a few notable exceptions, was decidedly hostile. 'Den Joodschen rabbi Menasseh ben Israel', reported the Dutch ambassador from London, on 17 December 1655, 'is over eenige maanden alhier gecomen, ende heeft seer grote instantien by den Heere Protector gedaen om vrijdom voor de joden alhier te becomen, hebbende tot dien eijnde een grote deductie gedruckt en doen distribuereeren aenden Raedt ende andere aensienlijke personen' [The Jewish rabbi Menasseh ben Israel arrived here some months ago and has made very great efforts with the Protector to obtain freedom for the Jews here, having for this purpose printed a long *deductie* and distributed it to the Council and other prominent persons]. But the Protector, continued the ambassador, had not wished to decide without first hearing the views of various famous preachers and others.[97] The ensuing Whitehall Conference, however, refused to authorize or approve what was proposed: 'vande propositie ende heele versouck gedaen door Menasseh ben Israel van wegen de joden', reported the Dutch ambassador, in mid January 1656, 'werd nu niet meer gesprocken; men meene dat den heere Protector bemerckende dat het tegens de borst is vande voornaemste predicanten ende vande gequalificeerde regenten van London het sal laten berusten, alhowel geseidt wordt dat van wegen de joden groote vordeelen ende profijten werden aangeboden'.[98] [of Menasseh ben Israel's proposal and whole request on behalf of the Jews nothing more is said; it is thought that the Lord Protector, seeing that it is against the wishes of the leading preachers and aldermen of London will let it lie, even though it is said that on the part of the Jews great advantages and profits are being offered]. A week later the ambassador added that various prominent personages around Cromwell had assured him 'dat den Heere protector genoeghsaam heeft te kennen gegeven dat hij niet is genegen die saake verder te pousseren, hebbende bespeurt hoe seer het tegens de borst is van alle soorten van luyden, ende oock voornamentlijck dat de regenten van de stadt London met soo grooten wenst sigh daertegens formaliseerden' [that the Protector had sufficiently indicated that he did not wish to push the matter any further, having seen how much it went against the grain with all kinds of people and also especially that the chief men of London had expressed so great a sentiment against it].[99] This assessment was fully confirmed by the Tuscan envoy who stressed the 'grande oppositione, massime di questi predicanti, mercanti, e dal popolo'.[100]

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[94] Roth, 'New Light', 116.
[95] Ibid., p. 136.
[96] Thurloe, *A Collection of State papers* iv, 333.

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[97] ARH SG 5901. Nieuwpoort to SG, Westminster, 17 Dec. 1655.

[98] Ibid. Nieuwpoort to SG, Westminster, 14 Jan. 1656.

[99] Ibid, Nieuwpoort to SG, Westminster, 21 Jan. 1656.

[100] Roth, 'New Light', 138.

Cromwell and some others may have sympathised with the Jewish cause. But if so the Lord Protector found it prudent not to declare his own opinion.[101] Among the Jews, the sense of disillusionment and disappointment was palpable. Over the next months, Menasseh and Martínez Dormido doggedly persisted in their efforts to salvage something but 'those few Iewes that were here', as Menasseh put it, 'despairing of our expected success departed hence. And others who desired to come hither, have quitted their hopes, and betaken themselves to Italy, some to Geneva [i.e. Genova], where that Commonwealth hath at this time, most freely granted many, and great privileges'.[102]

Thus, in the end, few of the emigrant Sephardim and *conversos* of Brazil, Spain and the Adriatic found a haven in London, at any rate for the time being. What was significant at the time was not that a few Jews stayed but that most of those who came in the autumn of 1655 left again, deeply disillusioned. Without a formal proclamation and a charter of privileges, there was indeed no secure or defined basis for an immediate influx of refugees with their families and capital. Thus very few settled in London during these years despite Cromwell's behind-the-scenes assurances, in response to the final minimalist proposal which Menasseh and Martínez Dormido together with other leaders of the London crypto-Jewish fraternity—Antonio Fernández (Abraham Israel) Carvajal, Domingo Váez (Abraham Israel) de Brito, Isaac Lopes Chillón and Simon (Jacob) de Casseres—submitted in March 1656, asking permission in writing for those remaining in London, to gather undisturbed, even if not allowed the public exercise of their religion, for private prayer gatherings, as well as a cemetery for the dead.[103] The private practice of Judaism continued to be tolerated on the same basis as in the early 1650s and, in this sense even though nothing had been added and there were no guarantees or rights, Menasseh's and Martínez Dormido's campaign of 1655 can perhaps be said to mark the beginning of modern Anglo-Jewish history. Yet in terms of what had been sought, and the hopes that had been raised, as well as what the Sephardi diaspora needed and expected, the exercise was nothing but a resounding and grandiose failure. Bitterly disappointed, Menasseh himself left and returned to the United Provinces, albeit to Middelburg rather than Amsterdam which he had left, amid scenes of euphoria, two years before.

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[101] ARH SG 5901. Nieuwpoort to SG, Westminster, 31 Dec. 1655.

[102] Menasseh ben Israel, *Vindiciae Judaeorum* in Wolf, *Menasseh ben Israel's Mission*, pp. 144–5; Menasseh plainly did not mean Geneva where there were then no Jews, but, as Roth surmized, Genova where new articles of toleration for the Jews were granted in the 1658, see Urbani, 'Gli eccellentissimi Protettori', 197–9; Schreiber, ' Juden in Madrid', 480–1.

[103] Roth, *Life of Menasseh ben Israel*, 258–9; Böhm, 'Simon de Casseres', 126–8.

There is no positive indication that Menasseh's choice of Middelburg was influenced in any way by the enthusiasm for colonial schemes evinced by Francisco de Medina and other Sephardic merchants active there in the 1650s. But Middelburg at that moment was as apt a microcosm of the wider crisis facing the western Sephardic world as any. A large body of refugees from Brazil, more numerous than could be absorbed by the limited commercial possibilities of Sephardi trade in Zeeland, were being temporarily accommodated in the city. The month of Menasseh's arrival, October, was also the very same in which David Nassy and other Portuguese Jewish colonisers from Amsterdam met for a conference at Middelburg with the States of Zeeland's committee governing the colony of Nova Zeelandia. Their purpose was to finalise the charter of Jewish rights in the colony. The plan was to recruit colonists not only in Zeeland but also Amsterdam, Hamburg and Livorno. Aptly enough, the house used as the synagogue in Middelburg belonged to a prominent exile from Netherlands Brazil, Paulo Jacome de Pinto, a man at the centre of the efforts to promote Jewish settlement in Nova Zeelandia.[104] Menasseh died on 20 November 1657, five weeks after his arrival in Zeeland but fittingly his last weeks were intimately entwined with a project which was to prove an integral and memorable step towards the permanent establishment of Jewish life in the New World.

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[104] Van 't Hoff, loc. cit., 21; Harris, 'A Dutch Burial-Ground', 117.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

TANGIERS, SEPHARDI JEWRY AND ENGLISH IMPERIAL AMBITIONS IN THE MAGHREB (1661–84)

'His Majesty in the match with Portugall', remarked an English contemporary, 'having chiefly lookt att the benefit of commerce and trade which might accrue to his subjects sheweth he hath made no ill use of his time of banishment but hitt the naile on the head, and stands the right course to make his subjects rich and happy'.[1] Charles II of England's procuring Tangiers and Bombay under the terms of the Portuguese marriage treaty of 1661—and the euphoria which in London accompanied this sensational diplomatic success—indeed marked a new stage in the evolution of English imperial ambitions, exciting the most sanguine expectations of hegemony and profit and being viewed with profound resentment and dismay by the Spanish crown (under which Tangiers and Portuguese India had resided between 1580 and 1643) and also the Dutch who were then the chief rivals of the English for dominance of world trade.[2] Indeed, a consensus rapidly emerged in Britain that Tangiers, even more than Bombay, afforded unparalleled opportunities for wresting power and wealth from others and concentrating it in English hands. Indeed, it was confidently assumed in court and mercantile circles that appropriating Tangiers augured a much vaster British ascendancy in North Africa, and beyond, than had ever been seen hitherto, so that in the feverish mercantilist atmosphere which in the early 1660s permeated both Charles' court and the city of London all manner of ways and means to exploit to the full the advantages afforded by so invaluable a foothold were carefully pondered.

Tangiers was perceived above all as a potentially great maritime and trade depot. To draw traffic from all sides, it was promptly declared 'a free port for all ships of what nation soever' exempt from ordinary customs duties. Enthusiasts for English maritime and commercial hegemony deemed the port not just a strategic strong point, commanding the Straits of Gibraltar but the key to naval and commercial mastery of virtually the entire Mediterranean. Pivotal strategically and commercially, Tangiers was considered fully secure against the designs of the Moors, Spaniards and Dutch being well protected on the seaside and 'to the landward very well fortifyed with castles'. Once the projected great mole (about which the king was especially eagre) was built, England would possess 'a secure harbour for all sorts of vessells to a very considerable burden' and the ideal staple where merchants, English and 'stranger', could 'land all sorts of goods as broad-cloths, tinne, lead, iron, East India goods as alsoe all such Levant or Turkie goods whereof the kingdoms of Fez and Morocco may have need, and being made a generall magazine where all sorts of goods may be found att all times' a place where merchandise stored by the king's subjects 'will be secure from all such manner of wrongs and violences to which all men were subject att Algier, Tetuan, Saley, etc.'[3]

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[1] BL MS Harl. 1595, fo. 22. 'Sundry Particulars Relating to the Towne and Roade of Tanger'.

[2] Valladares, *Rebelión de Portugal*, 173–6; Israel, 'Emerging Empire: the Continental perspective', 428–9.

By exploiting Tangiers' enviable location, the English could, it was assumed, provided they devised the right combination of naval, military, commercial and political strategies, swiftly gain the preeminence many Englishmen in the later seventeenth century deemed their natural right and due not only over the 'barbarous' Moors and detested Dutch but also the French, Spanish and indeed all other nations. Among these ways and means to universal supremacy, moreover, the Jews, or rather such Jews as wished to reside in, or travel back and forth to, Tangiers, were assigned quite a prominent role:'there is no question', exclaimed one advocate, 'but the Jewes and others who negotiate the arabick of these three provinces or kingdoms of Algier, Fez and Morocco will repaire all there [i.e. to Tangiers] to furnish themselves with what they from time to time may want, and bring in unto us their superfluities of corne, wax, hydes, oastridge feathers, dates which wee usually take from them to send in Spaine, Italy and England besides store of good Barbary gold and Spanish pieces of eight for what wee sell above the vallue of their native commodities, which is yearly very considerable, and so soon as there will be a factory settled the trade may be drawne from Algiers, Tetuan and Salley all to Tanger'.[4]

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[3] BL MS Harl. 1595, fo. 20v.

England's merchants by themselves could not dominate the inland trade routes of the Maghreb, or easily negotiate with Muslim princes and officials. But the web of trade-routes which extended across the Maghreb and the Sahara being to a considerable extent in Jewish hands, it was thought that the entire North African trade network could be rendered subordinate to, and made to depend on, Tangiers and the English interest simply by drawing the Jews there and assigning them trade privileges By drawing to Tangiers the traffic controlled by the Jews of Morocco and Algeria, England would significantly enhance her unrivalled position. At the same time, it was expected that Tangiers under the English would rapidly undermine the system current since the end of the Dutch-Spanish peace of 1648 whereby the Dutch—including many Amsterdam Sephardic Jewish merchants—siphoned off much of the profit of the Spanish America trade through the 'great quantity of Holland shipps which found an employment by being ware houses' in the bay of Cadiz and bartered textiles, East India goods, and other commodities across the bay often for unregistered silver.[5] English advocates of the Tangiers project believed Cadiz itself would be subordinated by the new 'free port' of Tangiers where 'the French, Italians and the very Hollander himself shall land their goods' so as to have them at hand for when the Spanish silver fleets were made ready to sail in, or returned to, the Bay of Cadiz. Thus, with Tangiers in their possession, the English could be expected to wrest from Amsterdam not just the whole trade of North Africa and the Levant but also 'the Spanish plate without which their East India trade is worth little', so that besides that of the Mediterranean the English would capture the trade and shipping of the East Indies too.[6]

English supremacy, or 'perfecting of the work of making our nation masters, when not of all, yet of the greatest part of the commerce of the world', as one commentator expressed it, would be vastly advanced, it was supposed, simply by imposing a sizeable English presence at the northern tip of Morocco. This proud and excessive

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 230–4.

[6] BL MS Harl. 1595, fo. 22v.

English confidence so typical of the early 1660s pervaded even the king's instructions for his first governor of Tangiers, the Earl of Peterborough: 'our mane designe in putting ourself to this great charge for making this addition to our dominions', affirmed Charles, on making Tangiers a 'free port' in the first instance for five years, is 'to gaine to our subjects the trade of Barbary and to enlarge our dominions in that sea, and advance thereby the honour of our crowne and the general commerce and weale of our subjects.'[7] Peterborough was to take over more Moroccan territory if he was able to and 'with all convenient speed to consider and advise of the best waies and meanes for encouragement and invitation of our subjects and strangers to reside and trade, and as that which we judge absolutely necessary to those ends, [. . .] speedily to consider of the making of a mould for a sure station of shipping'.[8]

The force sent out, under Peterborough, to take possession was considerable, comprising several frigates, some 3,000 infantry and a substantial artillery train. Arriving in Tangiers Bay on 29 January 1662, the earl disembarked and marched in the next day, at the head of his troops, to receive the town keys from the departing Portuguese governor. Work on the harbour mole and upgrading the fortifications began at once. But wider Moroccan realities soon began to impinge on the heady imperial dream. The chief Muslim potentate in neighbourhood at this time—Cidi Ahmad al-Khadir bin 'Ali Ghaylan, styled in Spanish 'Principe de Arzila, Alcázar [al-Kebir], Salé, Tetuán y sus contornos', and in the English 'Prince of West-Barbary' or, alternatively, just plain 'Gayland, king of the Moorres near Tangier'—aspired to rule all northern Morocco, an ambition he brought furthest in May 1664, when he added to his possessions Saleh and Rabat.[9] Ahmad al-Khadir resented the new masters of Tangiers who, being stronger and better equipped than their Portuguese predecessors, obviously posed a bigger threat to his plans. 'Gayland (chief governour of the adjacent country)', records Lancelot Addison, Anglican chaplain in Tangiers during the 1660s, 'though at first he entertain'd the earl with overtures of peace, yet he took occasions to try the English metal' and several times surprised and overwhelmed

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[7] Ibid., fo. 11. Earl of Peterborough's commission; Routh, 'English Occupation of Tangier', 62; see also Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 63.

[8] BL MS Harl. 1595, fo. 11–11v.

[9] Weiner, 'Anglo-Morrocan relations', 63; de Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, pp. 41–4.

English patrols and work teams outside the walls 'which gave no less discouragement to ours, than heart to his own souldiers.'[10]

Peterborough's successor, the most dashing of the English governors of Tangiers, formerly Lord Rutherford, now Earl of Teviot, a brisk military man who held no high opinion of Moors or Jews, arrived with 400 fresh recruits to take up his post, in May 1663. He accelerated the work on the fortifications and mole while continuing the somewhat desultory negotiations with which Peterborough had sought to resolve the incipient conflict with the Moors which was destined to mar—and finally blight—the whole history of the English presence in the Maghreb. Somewhat to Teviot's distaste, Ahmed ibn Khadir, like most Morroccan princes in early modern times, negotiated with Christian commanders and representatives via Jews and, in particular, through Isaac Pallache, a Jewish merchant-diplomat, based at Arzila belonging to the famous Pallache lineage of Marrakesh and hence a relative of the well-known figure of Samuel Pallache.[11]

According to this Isaac Pallache, Teviot was lamentably unaware of how to negotiate with a Muslim ruler. While Gayland told Pallache he would conclude peace on terms relatively favourable to the English, requiring only that Teviot undertake not to assist Gayland's opponents in central and southern Morocco, and at Saleh, and for this purpose dispatched Pallache to Tangiers to confer, nothing came of this since, as Pallache himself later explained, 'el conde Tiveot no tuvo pasencia hasta que yo bolbiesse [from Arzila] con la respuesta', and failing to grasp the Moorish disposition 'que quando les conseden algo quieren mucho mas' [when you concede something to them they then want much more], he had sought to dispense with Pallache and offered more at the outset than was advisable.[12] A brief truce ensued. But when Teviot constructed five more redoubts around Tangiers, taking more ground within the English perimeter, Gayland, felt affronted and announced the resumption of hostilities. A half-built fort was nearly stormed in June but was 'so bravely defended with hand-granadoes, that the Moors were soon forced to forsake their attempts'.[13]

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[10] Addison, *A Discourse of Tangier*, 3.
[11] García-Arenal and Wiegers, *Entre el Islam y Occidente*, 166–7.
[12] PRO CO 279/3 fo. 1. 'Representation of Isaac Pallache'.
[13] Addison, *A Discourse of Tangier*, p. 8.

Tortuous negotiations punctuated with sporadic fighting resumed. Teviot did negotiate through Pallache in part but at the same time was suspicious of him as he was, Addison relates, of all the Jews. He was under instructions to allow Jews to settle in Tangiers and encourage their trade as well as to permit 'a synagogue for the Jewes in case they desire it, and that they can be content to exercise their religion without offence or scandal to the government'.[14] But he felt that he needed to guard against them, the Jews in his view being a continual security risk, agents of Galyand's wily methods, instruments of what Addison called his 'amicable hostility'. Though Addison speaks of the 'Earl's singular carefulness to carry an equal hand in all controversies that happened betwixt the Christians and those Jews that were residing upon the place', he also remarks that the earl 'was no stranger to the ill nature of the latter, and how it was in their interest to favour the concerns of the Moors: as being (the most of them) born amongst them, and greatly sympathized in their customs. Besides, many of them were only come to Tangiers to trade, having left their wives and children in the Moors dominions'.[15]

Full-scale hostilities erupted early in 1664 after Gayland warned Teviot 'Mohammedan Law forbad them to suffer the Christian to erect fortifications in their country; and that if the earl would not desist from that work, he was not to expect any longer continuance of the peace. To which message the Earl made no other reply, but that the sword should decide whether Mahumeds Law or his Masters orders were more powerful. And so the war was declared by beat of the drum in the streets'.[16] At this critical juncture, 'the Earl of Tiviot was resolved to have turned the Jewes outt of this cittye', he halted all trade with the interior, and 'seized all the goods of [. . .] merchant men Moores [and Jewes] and put the same into Your Majesty's Magazine'.[17] Thus Teviot expelled at least the 'Barbary Jews'—it is not known whether any European Jews had yet settled there—from the city.[18] According to a French report, the English garrison and civilians in Tangiers were indeed greatly reassured 'qu'on avoit chassé de la ville tous les juifs qui pouroyent favoriser le dessein de nos ennemis'.[19]

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[14] PRO CO 279/2, fos. 63, 64v, 67, 'Instructions to the Earle of Teveott'.

[15] Addison, *A Discourse of Tangier*, p. 20.

[16] Ibid., p. 23.

[17] PRO CO 279/3, fo. 325; PRO CO 279/17. 'Copia del testimonio de Jacob Cohen y Bunan', Tangier, 29 Nov. 1675.

[18] Ibid.

Several fierce attacks were beaten off during the ensuing months. It was seemingly only because the Earl wished to display English prowess outside no less than within the redoubts, that he was caught in 'that fatal action of May the 4th 1664', a Moorish ambush, ironically at the Wad-al-Yahud or 'Jew's River' (Río de los Judíos) in which he and 470 of his troops were trapped and, fighting to the last, were cut down where they stood. 'And if we may divine by what he did in so short a space, what he would have done had he lived', sighed Addison, 'we may safely conclude, he would have made Tanger as famous an English colony as it was once a Roman. But all this was crusht in his unfortunate death'.[20] Brave he might have been, but he left Tangiers in a dismal state, trade with the interior suspended and morale low: 'more than one third of the town is ruined', reported one witness, and incapable of being inhabited; and the gardens, orange-trees and other plantations are destroyed which were the principal sustenance of the Portugall citizens'.[21]

The disaster naturally caused consternation in London. It was at this juncture that Pallache, setting out from Arzila presumably having suggested this scheme to Ahmad al Khadir, travelled to London to report to the English court on what had happened as well as discuss ways and means to assist the English advance their trade in the Maghreb. 'There is a Jew lately come into the city of London', it was recorded at court in Whitehall, late in 1664, 'borne in Africa . . . whose father [i.e. Samuel Pallache?][22] was imployed as ambassador into Holland and there dyed'. His mission was partly concerned with how to end the fighting with Gayland and partly with advancing England's share of North African commerce. 'This Jew hath letters from Gayland the king of the Moores neere Tangier and hath great interest in Gayland and in all the courtes and port townes of all the kings of Africa neere Tangier'.[23] 'He proposeth', continued this memorandum, 'a perfect way of drawing all the trade of Affrica to Tangier and undertakes to keepe a boate and a constant goode correspondence between the natives of Affrica and all the king of England's subjects'.[24]

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[19] De Castries, *Sources inédites* 2nd ser. i, p. 80. 'extraict de la Gazette de France, 27 June 1664.

[20] Addison, *A Discourse of Tangier*, p. 26.

[21] PRO CO 279/3. Fo. 245.

[22] A reference presumably to the famous Samuel Pallache (d.1615) whose labarinthine negociations in Spain, England and Holland have attracted the attention of several scholars, see *infra* pp. 159–60.

[23] Ibid.

Ahmad al Khadir assured Charles that it was Teviot who had violated the peace by venturing to construct new forts outside the original fortifications. Pallache told Charles' ministers that only by enlisting his services and working through him, could they, after Teviot's disastrous folly, salvage a workable peace between England and Gayland. But he insisted he would only explain in detail how he proposed to achieve this if granted an audience with the king himself: 'agora es menester governarse con Guilan por otro modo el qual no puedo significar a vuestra real Magestad por escrito solo dandome media ora de audiencia paraque totalmente yo signifique y enforme a vuestra real Magestad my disineo que es bueno para el servicio de vuestra real Magestad' [now it is necessary to conduct policy with Gayland quite differently but how I cannot convey to your Majesty in writing but only if I am given half an hour's audience in which thoroughly to explain and inform your Majesty concerning my design which is good for your Majesty's service].[25] It is unknown whether Pallache's wish that 'he may be hearde in what he hath to say' by the king was granted or whether any of his proposals were taken up.[26]

Following Teviot's death, Tangiers remained for nearly a year under the command of his deputy-governor, Colonel John Fitzgerald. During this time, commerce and the mood of the merchants, as well as the garrison, continued to languish. With the connivance of the Spanish crown, the Dutch were gathering a substantial squadron in the Bay of Cadiz with the obvious intention, the experience of the First Anglo-Dutch War suggested, of patrolling the Straits and preventing English shipping from passing through. Besides this, the mole remained unfinished. A further factor contributing to the 'greate prejudice and incovenience decreasing the trade of this city', according to the twenty or so English merchants resident in Tangiers, was the fact that the garrison of English and Irish troops were paid 'in English money whereby wee shall be disinabled to manage any trafficke with the adjoining nations [. . .] for that wee have as yett noe merchandise to sell them in returne of what goods they have'.[27] In their view it was imperative the garrison be paid in Spanish pieces of eight, the financial *lingua franca* as it were, of the Maghreb.

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[24] PRO CO 279/3, fo. 126, 135, 137. 'Gayland' to Charles II, Arzila, 11 June and 1 July 1665.

[25] PRO CO 279/3, fo. 1 'Representation of Isaac Pallache'.

[26] PRO CO 279/3, fo. 2.

The new governor John Lord Bellasyse, governor of Hull and Lieutenant of the East Riding of Yorkshire, arrived early in 1665, bearing the grandiloquent title 'captain-general of His Majesty's Forces in Africa, Governor of his Majesty's cittie of Tanger and Lord Vice-Admirall of the Seas adjoyning'. His instructions focused chiefly on military concerns linked to the outbreak of the Dutch war; but the issue of the Jews was not forgotten. Nor indeed could it have been since a major channel of intelligence by land in and out of Tangiers was via the Jews, especially the network controlled by the former royal interpreter, Solomon Pariente, and by prominent Jews around Gayland at Arzila and Tetuán, including Isaac Pallache. Thus the Jews were simultaneously an indispensable asset and a danger, being regarded as vital to Tangiers' future prospects, and to English commerce in North Africa, but at the same time willing instruments of Gayland and other Moorish princes. Like Teviot, Bellasyse was instructed to 'connive at the Roman Caholic worship for the satisfaction of those that shall be of that profession, and also at 'a synagogue for the Jews'.[28]

During much of 1665 Tangiers bay was blockaded by a Dutch naval squadron supplied from Cadiz while the city was besieged from the landward by Gayland. This joint Morroccan-Dutch siege by land and sea began on 10 May when 'a fleet of 12 sayle Holland men off warr', as Belassyse reported to Lord Arlington', 'set out from Cadiz where they have been these four months preparing themselves, and came into our bay all together and att the same time Gayland's forces appeared before the hills adjoining our out lines.'[29] The Hollanders used their fleet 'to bloke up our bay and all passages into the Streyghts from Cadiz to Gibraltar which hath forced severall merchants to take refuge under protection and defence of our gunns where they expect howerly to be attaqued'.[30]

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[27] 'Humble Petition of the Merchants, and other Inhabitants of the said City of Tanger', PRO SP 279/3, fo. 64.

[28] 'Instructions for Lord Bellasyse Capt. Generall and Commander in Chiefe of our forces in Africa'. PRO CO 279/6, fo. 4.

[29] PRO CO 279/3, fo. 112. Bellasys to Arlington, Tangiers, 20/30 May 1665.

[30] Ibid., fo. 113.

The Dutch entered the bay twice, firing salvoes, but were driven back by the barrages from the artillery batteries which Bellasyse had positioned on the mole. Bellasyse meanwhile tried to break the siege by negotiating with Gayland. Indeed, he was convinced he might well have secured a new peace 'iff the Spanyard and Hollander who are both earnest solicitors did not prevaile with him to the contrary'.[31] In July, he sent Arlington a copy of a letter of intelligence sent from Tetuán, reporting that there had 'arrived here a Flemish Jew from Sally whose name is Jacob West [Vaez?] who I am informed by Amatantes, merchant, that he hath agreed with Sidi Hamet de Mudan in 20,000 pieces of eight he is to give Gayland on condition that he doth not make peace with the English nor suffer them to trade here, nor at Sally, and he shall also be obliged himself to furnish this towne and Sally with all sortes of English goods and saith that the Hollanders will put forty sayle of frigatts in the bay and thereabouts to hinder you from provisions to be brought unto you by sea, so that if Gayland doth not make peace with you whereby you may have provissions from him, that you will then be forced to deliver up Tanger to Gayland on condition to have the liberties, for that you will never surrender it to the Hollander and this you will be forced to do within these six to eight months'.[32]

The English survived the siege albeit not unscathed, their sharpest setback occurring on 22 October when the long awaited relief fleet, the 'victuallers', with their naval escort, sailing from Plymouth together with the outward bound Smyrna convoy, twenty-one sail of English ships appeared in the Straits but came off worst in the ensuing fight. Those that escaped sailed 'this day into our bay', as Bellasyse described the scene, 'shattered and pursued by the Hollanders', most of the 'victuallers' having been taken. For Tangiers the disaster meant the 'arrival of not above one months provisions in this single vessel which hath escaped'.[33]

The possibility that Tangiers might fall to the combined efforts of the Moroccans and Dutch vanished, however, with the crumbling of Gayland's sway in the hinterland. For by now he was at war with the Alawite prince, Mawlay al-Rashid bin al-Sharif al-ʿAlawi, commander of a growing army of Arabs and Berber nomads, originally from the Tafilalt, an oasis far to the south, on the edge of the Sahara, who in 1664–5 successfully relocated the focus of his power northwards, seizing the town of Taza.[34] From there he rapidly extended his growing authority and austere politico-religious Islamic revivalism. At Taza, furthermore, he had established close ties with Jewish merchants who presided over the import and export trade across the whole plain east of Fez, a region with an active commerce with the Christian enclaves. Through them he began to receive sizeable stocks of European weapons, gunpowder and other munitions.[35] Mulay-al-Rashid's chief adviser in financial and commercial matters was the Jew Aaron Carsinet.

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[31] Ibid.
[32] 'Intelligence from Tetuán, 6 July 1665'. PRO CO 279/3, fo. 131.
[33] PRO CO 279/3, fo. 187. Bellasyse to Arlington, Tangiers, 12/22 Oct. 1665.

Not only did they provide the young ʿAlawite prince with the financial support he had hitherto lacked, but according to the former French captive, Germain Mouette, the Jews of Taza assured their co-religionists in Fez, that Mulay al-Rashid had promised much more favourable treatment than they were receiving from Abu ʿAbd Allah al-Duraydi, Gayland's corrupt and reputedly cruel governor of the fortified new town of Fez—Faz al-Jadid. The struggle for Fez proved long and bitter. 'Gayland hath been out of Alcázar above a month', reported the English agent from Tetuán, on 4 November, 'to wait on the king of Tafalett who is come down the second time upon him and hath fired and destroyed all the stately gardens and vineyards about Fez, taking diver castles'.[36] As Gayland's support waned, he ceased fighting the English and broke with his former friends, the Spaniards. Articles of peace between Gayland and Charles II were signed in April 1666.[37]

The Dutch finally lifted their maritime blockade of Tangiers, and patrol of the Straits, in February 1666, on the approach of a strong English squadron under Sir Jeremy Smith. From then through the rest of the Dutch War, until the summer of 1667, Tangiers was free of any threat, though the—for the English—inglorious end of that struggle certainly affected the English presence in the Maghreb psychologically while the English also began to grow anxious about the intentions of the up-and-coming Morrocan sultan, Mawlay al-Rashid.

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[34] Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib*, 230.

[35] De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 39–40.

[36] Correspondence of Sir Richard Fanshaw in the Historical Manuscripts Commission *J.M. Heathcote Manuscripts (Conington Castle, Hunts)* (Norwich, 1899), p. 212; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan relations', 69; Abun-Nasr, *History of the Maghrib*, 230.

[37] PRO CO 279/6, fo. 49. Bellasyse to Arlington, Tangiers, 4/14 April 1666.

In May 1666, the English garrison in Tangiers received intelligence from Tetuán that Mulay al-Rashid was extending his sway on all sides, controlling more and more trade routes, and 'presses up hard uppon our friend Gaylan and is in great correspondence with the French'.[38] The establishing of regular contact between the French and the 'Alawite *sharif* marked by the arrival of the French merchant envoy, Roland Fréjus accompanied by his Moroccan Jewish interpreter, Jacob Pariente—a friend of Aaron Carsinet—in Mulay-al-Rashid's camp, in April, was evidently arranged by Carsinet.[39]

The Alawite ruler scored his greatest success—the decisive step in the building of the Alawite Moroccan empire—the capture of the great city of Fez early in June 1666. He did so, moreover, once again with Jewish help. After only a few days of resumed siege, Mulay al-Rashid and a handful of men were let into Faz al-Jadid through the *judería* where the prince spent the first night in the home of Judah Monsano; with Faz al-Jadid secured, the capitulation of Faz-al-Bali quickly followed.[40] The widely detested al-Duraydi was publicly executed by being hurled upon iron hooks affixed to the walls of the old town. Mawlay-al Rashid was now acknowledged sultan and supreme political authority in Morocco by Fez's elite of Muslim scholars and clergy. The fall of Fez and defection of most North Moroccan Muslims and Jews from Ahmed al-Khadir did not however lead the English to abandon him. 'Gaylan's condition being so low', reported the acting governor, Norwood, to London, 'I am glad of all occasions to assist him in this juncture that the greatest part of his vassals have abandoned him; it is not to be expressed how greatly our appearing for his helpe doth give him courage and reputation'.[41]

Norwood thought little was lost by thus defying the major new power in the Maghreb, the 'king of Taffaletta' whose 'animosity to Christians doth give us small hopes of freindshipp with him, especially since he has declared that he destroyed the king of Baremona for having concluded a peace [with the English]; what then can we hope for from such a conqueror? We are well stock'd with beefe and [. . .] keepe within our lines'. Soon after, Ahmed al-Khadir's army was crushed 'by the king of Taffaletta who came against him with 40,000 men', part of his army having 'revolted from him which was the cause of his defeate'.[42] Gayland fled to Arzila with a few remaining adherents, 'himself being lanced in 5 places two of which wounds are in his face'. Almost immediately, Alcázar al-Kebir, Saleh and Rabat as well as Meknes defected and went over to the Alawite. Tetuán, a key port with an extensive Jewish population as well as a small European Christian community—a town where the Muslims were largely of Andalusian Morisco origin and where a small corsair contingent was based—similarly submitted.[43] This was a setback for English ambitions since Tetuán plied a substantial seaborne commerce by which those who sought to achieve English hegemony in the Mediterranean hoped to 'press goods in Spayne by way of Ceuta the trade of which place with Tetuán is of great concernment'.[44]

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[38] Ibid., fo. 71. Norwood to Arlington, Tangiers, 16/26 May 1666.

[39] De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 40.

[40] Ibid., 40.

[41] PRO CO 279/6, fo. 90. Norwood to Bellasyse, Tangiers, 28 June 1666.

Gayland, now entirely 'blocked up in Arzila' continued to receive support from Tangiers, the acting governor urging that he 'lett all his horse break through unto our lines and under the favour of our artillery [. . .] trouble the enemy with frequent sallyes and surprizals for 'tis certaine that Taffaletta cannot stay long from his more considerable acquisitions in South Barbary which is not yet so settled as to run the hazard of that better for this inconsiderable part of the country'.[45] 'The governours of Ceuta and Larrache', observed Norwood,' doe also foresee the inconvenience of [Mulay al-Rashid's] conquests, and doe afford Gaylan's party all manner of succour'. After yet another defeat by Mulay al-Rashid, in February 1667, Gayland whose forces had dwindled to 3,000 horse and 600 foote, actually offered to sell Arzila to the English, a proposition debated in both Tangiers and London that spring. Norwood urged that 'the place is fortified by an excellent strong wall encircled by a large fossé', that its possession would strengthen the English presence and advance trade, despite having only a small harbour 'exposed to the great violence of the seas'. 'His Majesty can well keepe this and that place', urged Norwood, 'by the charge of this last establishment [i.e. Tangiers] which can well spare 300 souldiers and officers proportionable to Arsila, and leave this garrison in good posture'.[46] Even so, acquiring Arzila was bound to entail additional expense and this was unthinkable after the Great Plague and Fire in London, during the humiliating final stages of the Dutch war, funds and supplies of all kinds being desperately scarce. Thus the opportunity to acquire Arzila was forgone.

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[42] Ibid., fo. 95 Norwood to Arlington, Tangiers, 15 July 1666.

[43] Ibid., fo. 82. Norwood to Arlington, Tangiers, 10 June 1666.

[44] BL MS 1595 'Sundry Particulars relating to the Towne and Roade of Tanger', fo. 25v.

[45] PRO CO 279/6, fo. 99. Norwood to Arlington?, Tangiers, 20 July 1666.

[46] PRO CO 279/8, fo. 46. Norwood to Arlington, Tangiers, 8/18 April 1667.

Mawlay-al-Rashid's troops made several forays into the fields around Tangiers. Apart from Gayland, the only Muslim ally of the English likely to continue opposing Mawlay-al-Rashid's growing power were the Algerian corsairs whose frigates had several times sought refuge in Tangiers from the pursuing Dutch and French; but even they were markedly less deferential to the English following De Ruyter's victory in the Medway, the news of which resounded no less in the North Africa than in Spain and Italy. 'The late ill news of the Dutch enterprise upon his Majesty's shipps at Chatham', reported Norwood, 'hath soe filled the minds of all men [here] with prejudicial reflexions upon our nation that nothing of courtesy is to be expected in these parts particularly those of Algeire are most to be suspected whoe have valued us of late for nothing but the frequent opportunityes they make use of to benefit themselves by Tanger. To provide against the worst I begg wee may be speedily supplyed with fresh stores as wee can not be without, as shots, musquetts, pickaxes, spades, nailes and shovells of which the remaines are little or nothing'.[47]

Gayland's defeat and the conclusion of the Dutch war, did however leave Tangiers more secure than before, at least over the next decade. If it was financial exigency which obliged Whitehall to reduce the English military presence in North Africa considerably, to well under 2,000—in 1676, the garrison still stood at only 1,440 foot and 30 horse paid sixpence *per diem* in meat and threepence in money—there was no pressing danger over the next decade or so.[48] Finished with Gayland—in 1668, the latter evacuated Arzila by sea with English help and fled to Algiers—Mawlay al-Rashid concentrated, in 1668–70, on subjugating Marrakesh and the southern port of Safi, a major centre of both Jewish and North European trade and then, turning to the interior, regaining Tafilalt and added to his burgeoning empire the other desert oases which formed the northern terminals of the trans-Saharan trade.[49]

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[47] Ibid., fo. 110. Norwood to Williamson, Tangiers, 27 July 1667.

[48] *The Present State of Tangier* (1676), p. 40.

[49] See essay no.

In the longer run, however, the outlook for all the Christian enclaves and other coastal towns which had not yet submitted looked increasingly problematic. On 8 April 1672, on the eve of the French invasion of the United Provinces, Mawlay al-Rashid, the greatest of all early modern Moroccan rulers, went riding in the gardens of Marrakesh and, striking his head against a branch of an orange-tree, sustained a fatal injury, dyeing the following night. His successor, his brother, Mulay Ismail (ruled: 1672–1727), who though less great and remarkable, was to reign longer than any other Moroccan sultan, assumed power like his predecessor with the help of Jews. Provided with funds, agents and crucial information by Joseph Maymeran (or Maimoran) (d. 1683), his Jewish adviser, Mulay Ismail, who at the time of his brother's death was serving as *khalifa*, or royal deputy, in Meknès, deftly pre-empted his rivals, having himself immediately proclaimed sultan and, backed by the local Muslim clergy, seizing control of the kingdom. Maymeran's reward was to be made steward of the royal palace in Meknès.

But Mulay Ismail had to fight to consolidate his rule. Another brother led a revolt at Tafilalt and other parts of the south-east while in the north Faz al-Bali rose in rebellion and Gayland seized the opportunity to return from Algiers with Turkish backing, and try to regain his former domain. To repel his enemies, Mulay Ismail first marched north and succeeded in defeating and, killing Gayland in battle, in September 1673; while, in October, after a fourteen-month siege, he reduced Faz al-Bali. It took years of further campaigning, however, and a two-year siege before Marrakesh capitulated, in June 1677, after which he had most of Morocco under his control. The fall of Marrakesh was followed by the proclamation of a new *jihad* against the remaining Christian—that is Spanish, Portuguese, and English—enclaves, an offensive directed initially by Mulay Ismail's *al-qa'id* (*alcaide*) of Alcázar al-Kebir, Cidi Omar ibn Khaddu al-Battu'i, his commander in the north.[50]

With this a wave of fear and insecurity swept all the Christian enclaves, and a new state of emergency gripped Tangiers which was destined to continue off and on over the next five years until the English finally evacuated the city in 1683. Sudden attacks alternated with bouts of uneasy truce. In May 1680, the Moors captured the so-called 'Charles' and 'Henrietta' forts by assault. By October 1681 the size of the English garrison at Tangiers had risen to 3,605 men and its annual cost soared.[51] Commerce, inevitably, was severely disrupted. 'I intend upon the ending of the cessation', wrote Governor Fairbourne to London, during the next lull, in September 1680, 'to forbidd all correspondence with the Moores by sea or land from any inhabitant of this place on penalty of being reputed spies, and to be proseeded against accordingly . . .'[52] It was presumably in connection with this and in the knowledge that the Jews supported the new sultan, that the governor, Sir Palmes Fairborne, resolved to follow Teviot's precedent and expel the Barbary Jews from the city which apparently he did.[53] This in itself was an admission that the whole Tangiers project had failed, something Fairbourne did not hesitate to admit: 'this poor languishing place where neither merritt of service or sufferinge availes in our reliefe', he described in a report to London, in February 1681, as 'a jewell of inestimable value. It has been our misfortune to faile in the polishing it as its intrinsick worth deserves. I am sure the treasure expended thereon would have abundantly suffic'd to the perfecting it to all those uses its best friends have given His Majesty encouragement to expect from it'.[54]

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[50] De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 61–2.

Sir Palmes Fairborne, soon (again like Teviot) to be killed fighting the Moors outside the walls, had every reason to be worried, and not least about money for the troops, 'the garrison being neare 5 quarters in arrears',[55] and 'our walls and parapetts [being] in a very crazy condicion'. In July 1680, 'the enemye having placed their severall batteryes sent in a Jew to signifye to [the governor] that in case he would quit the out forts, [the *alcaide*] would withdraw his armye and his guns'.[56] Although the governor's council of war concluded 'considering the strength of the enemye, their skill in undermining, and their batteryes of guns . . . [that the outer walls] were not tenable above three days', the governor decided to hold what they had and try to negotiate a fresh truce 'for six or 4 months' which was done.[57] In the autumn several attacks were repulsed.

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[51] PRO CO 279/28 fo. 231.
[52] PRO CO 279/26, fo. 64. Fairbourne to Jenkins, Tangiers, 6 Sept, 1680.
[53] Routh, *Tangier. England's Lost Atlantic Outpost*, 276.
[54] PRO CO 279/27, fo. 133. Fairbourne to Jenkins, Tangiers, 20 Feb. 1680/81.
[55] PRO CO 279/25, fo. 269v. Fairbourne to Jenkins, Tangiers, 17 July 1680.
[56] Ibid., fo. 217.
[57] PRO CO 279/25, fo. 217. Kirke to Jenkins?, Tangiers, 21 July 1680.

Morale had now sunk to the point that Fairbourne sought to represent to his 'Majestie the absolute necessitye of either resolving to send such a force of horse and foot as that we may be able to fight them in the field, which according to the expertnes of the enemye cannot be less than 500 horse and 4,000 foot or with all humble submission, I say his Majestie had better resolve to quit and leave both the towne and mole in a ruin'.[58] Three years later that was the very resolution that was reached. But first, in July 1681, it seemed that the blow was about to fall not on Tangiers but Larache. The new governor of Tangiers, Kirke, 'thought the good correspondence between my master and his Catholic Majestie and the interest of both in the preservation of that place, a sufficient motive' to write warning the governor of Gibraltar and other high officials in Spain.[59] If the Spaniards had time to act on the English warnings it can have done them little good. For in fact, the *Alcaide* Omar launched his assault not on Larache but La Mámora which fell to his forces a few days later. 'The Spaniards talk much of retaking it', Kirke informed London, 'pray God they may, for the success of it has made the Moores very insolent and the retaking of it would make them as humble'.[60]

The English presence was then prolonged by means of a new truce one of the terms of which was unrestricted commerce between the two sides, and the unimpeded right of 'Barbary Jews' to enter and stay in Tangiers. When Kirke, learning that plague was raging in neighbouring parts of Morocco felt obliged to take emergency measures to seal off the city to protect it from the epidemic, he at once wrote to the Alcaide Omar, at Alcazar, stressing 'the great care I have had to render this place under my command as free for the communicacion and intercourse of his Majestie Muly Ismael's subiects as they themselves could desire of mee', so that traders, mainly Jews, had been continually going back and forth, now, however, having 'most certain information that Sale, Mamora, Fez, Mequinez and other places of the country are at present infected with the pestilence' he had no choice but break off this regular contact and impose a strict quarantine. The Jews in the town though could remain. It was 'absolutely necessary', he insisted ' that none out of the country be permitted to come into the town, but that all business henceforward be managed by the hands of the Jews who are alreadie here for your Excellency who upon the arrival of such marchandises as shall be brought to our bounds (which upon due inspection shall appear to be of a nature that may be admitted without danger) shall receive them here and dispose of them for the accompt of the owners and that all other goods which are lyable to infection as hides, *alhaiques*, feathers and such kinds to be deposited in a place to be assigned for that purpose at the stockade, with an equal number of guards on either side, from where they may be conveyed to the sea and embarqued without passing through the cittie. Such goods as shall be brought from Tetuan (that place being free from infection) shall be admitted with one Jew and two carriers'.[61]

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[58] Ibid.

[59] PRO CO 279/28, fo. 144. Kirke to Jenkins, Tangiers, 12 July 1681.

[60] PRO CO 279/27, fo. 320. Anonymous letter, Tangiers, 18 May 1681.

This emergency trade regime of July 1681 abundantly reflects once again the unrivalled pre-eminence of the Jews in the commerce and diplomacy of the Maghreb something which had evolved over centuries and in this period was buttressed by numerous social and cultural factors one of the foremost of which—as always in the history of the classic trade diasporas—was that of language.[62] Unlike most Muslims (except for some courtiers and the Moriscos, former inhabitants of Spain, prominent in Saleh and Tetuan), the culturally dominant and much of the middling layers of Jewish society were accustomed to using Spanish, the lingua franca of the Maghreb and a tongue indispensable not just for business dealings with Europeans but also for mediating between local Muslim functionaries and the European enclaves. This applied not just to Spanish enclaves such as Oran, Ceuta, Melilla, Larache and, until its capture, La Mámora but also those under Portugal and now England. It was also this factor in part which afforded the Jews their special position as intermediaries in Moroccan high diplomacy.[63] It is true that successive English governors of Tangiers preferred to dispense with the Jews where possible and developed a good relationship with the Muslim envoy 'Sidi Hadj Lucas', as they called him, an able diplomat who spoke and wrote Spanish and was employed as a diplomatic secretary and negotiator by several Muslim rulers; however he, as one of the English remarked, in 1681, was 'the only man they have that is not a Jew fitt for this purpose'.[64]

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[61] PRO CO 279/28, fos. 108–108v. Kirke to *Alcaide* Omar, Tangiers, 12 July 1681.

[62] Israel, 'The Jews of Spanish North Africa', pp. 71–86; de Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, 11–12.

[63] Israel, loc.cit.; De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, pp. 17–18.

The leading Jewish dynasties in the Maghreb such as the Pariente, Pallache, Cansino and Sasportas are sometimes compared with the Court Jews of Germany in as much as they provided a wide range of financial and other services for princes. Yet there is also an important difference. For they wielded considerably more political influence, were more apt to be involved in political intrigues, and also enjoyed a higher status, being diplomatic as well as financial agents of a kind which simply did not exist, or scarcely existed, in Europe.[65] Jews who mattered in the diplomacy of North Africa were invariably at the same time key merchants, financiers and fiscal agents as well. They traded over long distances. But they regularly also engaged in a range of financial and fiscal roles 'When 'tis said that merchandize is the Jews general profession in Barbary', comments Addison, 'it is not to exclude their darling brokerage and usury, in which they are very serviceable both to Christians and Moors. And indeed the latter do seldom use them for any other purposes, unless in sending them upon hazardous messages, or to collect their maritime imposts, in which they know them to be more exacting than any else they can employ'.[66]

Ironically, the suspicion and open disdain in which the Jews of Tangiers were held by some governors, as well as the English corporation and merchants, and by the Anglo-Irish garrison, was in striking discordance with the prominent role assigned to the Jews both by the Moroccan authorities and by the framers of mercantilist projects at Charles II's court. In Tangiers, the Jews were disparaged not only on religious and the usual antisemitic grounds but also for political reasons, being considered more sympathetic to Islam and the Moors than to the Christians, one of the stories circulating in Tangiers to account for the loss of three outforts to Muslim attackers in November 1679 being that a large part of the garrison's powder supply had been surreptitiously removed and sold to agents of Mulay Ismael by the Jews.[67] Nevertheless, in most respects, as Addison acknowledges, the behaviour of the Jews was 'very regular and agreeable to the laws of a well-civilized conduct: for setting aside the artifices of commerce and collusions of trade, they cannot be charged with any of those debauches which are grown into reputation with whole nations of Christians, to the scandal and contradiction of their name and profession. Fornication, adultery, drunkenness, gluttony, pride of apparel etc. are so far from being in request with them, that they are scandalized at their frequent practice in Christians. And out of a malitious insinuation, are sorry to hear that any of their nation should give a name to, and die for a people of such vices.'[68]

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[64] PRO CO 279/27, fo. 300 Kirke (?) to Jenkins, Tangiers, 4 Nov. 1681.
[65] Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 149; De Bakker, *Slaves, Arms and Holy War*, p. 18.
[66] Addison, *The Present State of the Jews*, 10.
[67] De Castries, *Sources inédites* 2nd ser. I, 504.

In any case their undercutting English merchants, constant involvement in the 'artifices of commerce and collusions of trade', and petty loans to soldiers, did much to exacerbate local Anglo-Irish hostility to them. In seemed unbearable to Christian merchants that the Jews should have more trade, at any rate with the interior, than they. Moreover, they were suspected of continually engaging in dubious or illicit business practices and defrauding the authorities, and in some cases not without reason. In May 1666, the Judge-Advocate of Tangiers found guilty a number of Christians and Jews named as 'John Baptista, John Emmett, Edward Chester, Abraham Corcesio, David Mexias and Judah Bennites all inhabitants of this his Majesty's city of Tangier that they have all bought and received stolen goods from private souldiers', some of this pilfered merchandise apparently being 'cheese stolen out of His Majesty's stores'.[69]

Addison attributed the formidable business skills of the Barbary Jews, in his *The Present State of the Jews more particularly relating to those in Barbary*, in part 'to their continual practice in trade', but even more to their laudable 'frugality in living' with regard to both diet and clothing, as well as to their literacy, numeracy and command of 'a sort of Spanish which enables them for traffick'. Yet there was certainly also a further factor, in his view, namely their peculiar position in Maghrebi society, a mixture of subservience and latitude, the Muslims entertaining 'but a very mean esteem of this people, being taught by tradition which age hath made authentique, that they are an anomalous issue, and not like other men descended from Adam; and that the end of their being is to serve the Musulman'.[70]

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[68] Addison, *Present State of the Jews*, 13.

[69] PRO CO 279/6, fo. 73. 'A Judgement by the Judge-Advocate, Tangiers, 31 May 1666.

[70] Addison, *The Present State of the Jews*, p. 10.

Consequently, it was taken for granted by Muslims and Christians alike that the Jews posed no direct military threat and lacked courage. In Addison's opinion—invariably a curious mixture of objectivity and prejudice—the Jews of Barbary were 'vilely hector'd by the Moors, against whom they dare not move a finger, or wag a tongue in their own defence and vindication; but with a stoical patience support all the injuries and contumelies to which they are dayly exposed. For in the midst of the greatest abuses, you shall never see a Jew with an angry countenance, or appealing concern'd; which cannot be imputed to any heroick temper in this people, but rather to their customary suffering, being born and educated in this kind of slavery'.[71] He noted also that the 'Moors permit not the Jews the possession of any warlike weapons unless in point of trade. And herein they do not so much restrain, as gratifie their disposition; for they seem generally inclined to a great averseness to everything that is military, being as destitute of true courage, as good nature.'[72]

But while the Jews dwelt defenseless in a hostile environment none doubted that they played a key role in political and military affairs. Precisely because they were vulnerable and dependent for protection on town governors and princes, they had more to gain or lose from changes of government than did most Muslims or the Christians of the enclaves. Living as Addison puts it in 'a condition [. . .] which is no other than a better sort of slavery', for them it was vital to scrutinize court politics and military affairs closely: for even in those places where they have permission to inhabit', notes Addison, 'they are not only tributary, but upon every small disgust, in danger of ejectment, insomuch that they cannot promise to themselves either any durable settlement or security. Indeed, their calmest state is sufficiently stormy.'[73] This applied to English Tangiers, as we have seen, no less than Muslim towns or the Spanish enclaves.

Insecure among Muslims as well as Christians, it was largely at their own volition that the Jews dwelt mainly in towns 'and in these they live in a heap, seldom (or not at all, if it be in their power to avoid it) mingling with the Moors. And the apartment of the town where they have permission to inhabit, is from them called the *judería*, or Jewry [in Arabic *mellah*]; which in some places in Barbary is so contrived, that the Moors can lock it up at night.'[74] But if concentration in separate quarters, the *mellah*, based on the earlier *juderías* of Spain, rendered the Jews entirely vulnerable and dependent on the ruler's protection, it also created a fenced off, separate sphere of political consciousness, debate and intrigue, which in times of political instability and transition, as at Fez in 1665–7, could prove a potent factor politically and even militarily.

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[71] Ibid., 8; Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 149.
[72] Addison, *Present State of the Jews*, 8.
[73] Ibid., p. 7.

At Tangiers, as at Oran, Ceuta, Larache, La Mámora, Mazagão and other European enclaves in North Africa, the Jews evidently composed a sizeable proportion of the civilian population.[75] Despite dramatic oscillations caused by the two virtual expulsions and dramatic ups and downs in the commercial fortunes of the city, for most of the history of the English presence there the Jewish community evidently numbered several dozens. 'There are in the city', it was reported in 1676, 'about 200 families beside officers [. . .] and souldiers'. Among these inhabitants of Tangiers, continued this anonymous observer, there were besides English and Irish a considerable mixture of foreigners 'as French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italians and divers Jews both of Barbary and Europe, who are great dealers in trade, and have their several synagogues within the town: I say, several, for although they agree in the common reading and veneration of the Five Books of Moses, their denial of our Saviour Jesus Christ and their hatred of Christians; yet they are not free from their little schisms'.[76]

If the old divide between Sephardim and 'Berber' Jews had receded into the background by this date, with the older Arabic-speaking element being absorbed to a considerable extent by the exiled hispanic culture of the successive waves of post-1391 and post-1492 Sephardic immigrants, at any rate in the main trading cities, a new division had appeared among North African Jewry with the arrival of Dutch and Italian Sephardic Jews in several Moroccan ports during the seventeenth century which was destined to gain greatly in intensity in both Algeria and Morocco during the course of the eighteenth—namely the cultural and psychological gulf between Barbary and European Sephardic Jews. Both types of Sephardim may once have had a common cultural and intellectual background in the Iberian

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[74] Ibid., p. 9; Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 149–50.
[75] Israel, 'Jews of Spanish North Africa', 71–86.
[76] *The Present State of Tangier*, p. 42.

Peninsula but this counted for less by the late seventeenth century than the strikingly disparate circumstances in which the two groups had dwelt in the meantime. There were certainly shades of difference in matters of religious observance. But the real gulf was in secular culture. While the latter wore European costume the former wore traditional North African Jewish dress. Those Jews, observes Addison, 'who have been born and bred up in Barbary, differ little from the Moors. For first, they wear little black brimless caps, as the Moor red; which they seldom move in greeting one another'.[77] Furthermore, while the former were accustomed to read printed books in Spanish and Portuguese, and often also knew French, Italian, Dutch and English as well, the latter knew only Hebrew, Arabic and their somewhat archaic form of Spanish. Moreover, unlike the New Sephardim, the Old Sephardim, or 'Barbary Jews', while they generally spoke adequate Spanish were frequently ignorant of, or had forgotten, the western alphabet and could read and write only in Hebrew characters. Again and again one sees this in the case of documents which they endorsed in the course of business dealings in Tangiers. For example, in July 1679, 'Samuel Assaioll of the Hebrew nation' in Tangiers chartered a small vessel originating in Marseilles to sail to Arzila and convey goods from there to Tangiers signing and authenticating the freight contract drawn up with the French *patron* in Hebrew characters only.[78]

Unsurprisingly, there arose a degree of tension between the two Jewish groups in Tangiers which though essentially cultural, political and economic in character nevertheless, as always in early modern times, also assumed a religious tinge. A bitter quarrel which erupted in the mid 1670s and which came to the attention of the governor at that time, pitted Joseph Artnitel, Samuel Mexias, Joseph Benjami and Moseh Benazaria 'in the name of the Barbary Jews residing in Tangiers' against Abraham Cohen who, his antagonists complained, 'did continually affront, molest and disquiet them, that they could not attend to their callings; whereupon Abraham Cohen, and the European Jews, being summoned, and the matter heard, it appeared that they were on both sides in faction and fire for that the said Abraham Cohen and his fellows did drink wine, and traded in swines-flesh; for which cause the Tangier-Jews had made their complaint to the *sabios* [elders] of Tetuán, who had excommunicated the said Cohen, and the rest.'[79] Abraham Cohen seems in fact to have been an obstreperous type, reluctant to repay debts and who got into disputes with various merchants, Jewish and English.[80]

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[77] Addison, *Present State of the Jews*, 10.
[78] PRO CO 279/24, fos. 188, 233.

The decree actually issued by the *sabios* of Tetuán on 18 Sinan 5435, signed by Jacob Aboab and Isaac Bives, enjoined the 'Holy Congregation of the City of Tangier whom our Lord preserve' to ostracize the European miscreants, threatening to excommunicate 'whatsoever Jew and Jews, who shall joyn in communion with Abraham Cohen to say their prayers' because such drinking of wine as he was found to indulge in, and 'making profit of those things he cannot do according to the Law', were deemed palpable offenses against religion.[81] 'But the governor perceiving knavery in the business', states the published account of 1676, 'and that the inhibiting the European Jews to bring pork into the town, might be out of design to hinder the bringing in of provisions; and that their appeal to the Moorish-Jews at Tetuán and the publishing of an excommunication, was a very great presumption, and an affront to His Majesties Government; commanded the Barbary-Jews within a few days to dissolve the excommunication, and to renounce the authority of Tetuán, or any other power but of the king of England; or else he would turn them and their families out of the town: which took good effect, caused a peace among them, and no more was heard of it.'[82]

European Jews in the Maghreb lacking the familiarity with conditions in the interior of the Moroccan Jews, naturally sought the protection and favour of European rulers, officers and consuls. At Tangiers, moreover, the cultural gulf dividing the two groups was further exacerbated, by royal policy. While Barbary Jews controlled what the English called the 'inland trade' of Morocco, their links with Muslim potentates rendered them suspect in a way that European Jews were not. Hence, under the royal 'Rules, Orders and Instructions for the better Government of our Citty and garrison', of March 1674, while Charles II in principle left the question of whether permission to reside in Tangiers be granted to individual 'Barbary Jews or not, to the Governor and Mayor to doe therein as they shall finde best' implying that individuals or groups deemed undesirable by the governor could be expelled at any time, the king stipulated that 'all encouragement bee given to any Jews that shall remove thither from Europe and bring estates'.[83] Moreover, such European Jews were emphatically to enjoy the same freedom to import and export, and engage in retail activities, as the English merchants. Thus, for example, in January 1678, two affluent Dutch Sephardi Jews, who had recently come to Tangiers, Isaac Bueno de Mezquita and Isaac Henriques (whose wife, Sarah Henriques was a daughter of Benjamin Bueno de Mezquita of Amsterdam)[84]—were admitted by the mayor and corporation of Tangiers to the same freedome of 'buying and selling as well by retaile [. . .] equall with the freemen of this cittie', in accordance with the king's instructions of 1674.[85]

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[79] *The Present State of Tangier*, p. 43.
[80] PRO CO 279/23, fos. 34, 95.
[81] Ibid., p. 46.
[82] *The Present State of Tangier*, p. 45.

Most of the 'Barbary Jews' in Tangiers were not admitted by the Mayor and Corporation as 'freemen' and resided there on the basis of monthly licenses which the governor's staff were not infrequently accused of deriving a corrupt revenue from. In December 1675, replying to queries from London, the then governor, William, Earl of Insigiun, denied all knowledge of his secretary 'taking money for licenses for Jewes'.[86] In August 1680, ministers in London inquired about 'the powers, if any, by which the governour laiss impositions upon the inland trade, or gives lycenses of trade to the Barbarie Jewes and whether such impositions are accounted for to the king'.[87] The licenses authorized visiting, or temporarily residing, Jews from the interior to bring goods in and out of the city. A number of Barbary Jews became permanent residents but few of these could obtain passes as comprehensive as that signed by Insigiun, in June 1675, granting indefinitely 'full siguro and pasporte unto Samuel Mexias of the Hebrew nation and Jacob Mexias his sonne now residing in Tituán to the end that they [may] freely come hither by sea or land and bring with them such goods as they shall thinke fitt and here despose the same and that being donne returne againe with their money or other goods they shall buy, either by sea or land, without any lett, hindrance or molestacion, always provided that they shall not buy or sell any contrabande goods but behave themselves according to the laws of the place, during theire abode here.'[88] Mexias in fact seems to have traded chiefly in hides.

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[83] PRO CO 279/24, fo. 165 'Rules, orders and instructions', 8 March 1674.
[84] PRO CO 279/24, fo. 322, memorandum of 31 Dec. 1679.
[85] PRO CO 279/40 'Proceedings of the Corporation', Tangiers, 14 Jan. 1678.
[86] PRO CO 279/17 unpaginated 'Objections made', Tangier, 1 Dec. 1675.
[87] PRO CO 279/26, fo. 13 'Memorialls of severall matters and papers relating to Tanger', 10 Aug. 1680.

In their trade along the coast, the 'Barbary Jews' in Tangiers frequently employed the sea route, especially in trading with Tetuán and Arzila. This entailed a degree of familiarity with the English seamen plying local sea-routes. But here too tensions developed and on at least one occasion, in 1674–5, there was a spectacular court case which was eventually reviewed in London.[89] The case concerned the chartering by Samuel Mexias, in Tangiers, in 1674 of the sixty-ton *King David*, manned by a crew of nineteen, skipper John Haselgrove, to sail to Tetuán to collect 172 bales and bundles of raw and tanned hides and other goods. Along with the cargo two Barbary Jews, a certain Solomon Bunan and his brother, bound for Tangiers also boarded at Tetuán. According to the skipper, during the return voyage the ship had been forced by strong cross winds to put in at Malaga where the Jews falling into an argument with the mariners 'caused the ship to be embargoed as a Jews ship and goods, which goods of the Jews were condemned by a court admiralty in Malaga but the goods and ship of the English were discharged' and although Haselgrove might have then have sailed off 'yett at the request of the said Jews the complainant [i.e. Haselgrove] remain'd theare with 14 or 15 men and his said ship five months at a great charge which they promised to pay and give other satisfaction towards his damages'. Haselgrove claimed Mexias and the others owed him the very considerable sum of 2,659 Spanish pieces of eight. However, according to Mexias and the two Jewish passengers the ship had not been compelled to sail across to Malaga, the other ships in their company having successfully negotiated the straits, and there had been no dissension on board. Rather Haselgrove's own boatswaine had gone 'ashore and declared to the governor of Malaga that the goods belonged to the Jews' whereupon the ship was seized and searched.

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[88] PRO CO 279/17 unpaginated pass for Samuel Mexias signed by the governor, Tangiers, 26 June 1675.

[89] PRO CO 279/17 'Solomon Bunan of the Hebrew nation in an action of trespass for assault and battery against John Haselgrove', 15 Aug. 1675; and ibid. 'at court at Whitehall, London, 7 Jan. 1674/5.

One of the English later testified that this was indeed so—his testimony being endorsed in Hebrew characters by Bunan—and that 'Bunan and his brother were both aboard and had hid themselves in the bread room, and after strict search made the Spaniards found them and took them ashore and put them in prison' where they remained for five months. Matters came to a head in July 1675 when Haselgrove so lost his temper with Bunan at a 'sittinge of the Court merchant in Tangier' that he assaulted him 'with force and weapons' and both furiously insulted and wounded him.

Lacking the status of 'freemen' of the city, the 'Barbary Jews' unlike those from Europe were supposedly excluded from all retail activities. This was a cause of incessant friction since there was strong pressure from the Christian shopkeepers to whom it seemed intolerable that Barbary Jews should be able to encroach on their livelihood, to enforce the restrictions. Thus, for instance, in May 1678, the Grand Jury of the city arraigned Mexias, Jehonathan Geer, and Samuel Assioll who 'not freemen, yet retail to the prejudice of others'.[90] 'Jehonathan Geer of the city of Tanger Hebrew merchant', like Mexias, had many close ties with Tetuán.[91] In July, the Grand Jury again considered complaints against 'Barbary Jews' 'for selling and retailing contrary to the orders of the court'.[92]

While the Protestant English business and shop-keeping community had innumerable complaints against the soldiery, generally loathed Catholics whether Portuguese, Spanish or Irish, and openly derided the French, their aversion to the 'Barbary Jews' was altogether more virulent. 'The Barbary Jewes continue among us for private ends to destroy, betray and suck upp the blood of the shoppkeepers and other inhabitants', insisted the Mayor, John Bland, writing to Secretary Williamson, in London, in March 1675, 'that by their monthly licenses to be heer, they may in the end devoir us all'.[93] Writing later that same year, Bland while maintaining that it was essential for the future of Tangiers 'that the soulgery have less rule, and the civill authority more' again employed his powers of invective chiefly against the 'Barbary Jewes living here, who doe no good butt mischeiffe to this place, whome, if some were not in favour that gett a monthly revenue by their residence here, long since had been banished, for they will if not hindred by banishment att one time or other ruine this citty. I shall use all my enterest to have them all banished and never more admitted'.[94] Suspicion of, and proposals for expelling, the Arab-speaking Jews of Tangiers were clearly in the air for much of the time throughout the period between Teviot's arrival, in 1663 and the English abandonment of the city. Hence in the entry to his journal for 23 February 1671, John Luke, the governor's secretary, records 'in the morning I caused all letters from Tetuan for the Jews to be read, wherein was no news, onely one of them, directed to Pedro Stelis under his true name, discovered him to be undeniably a Jew'; and on 18 October 1672, Lukes notes 'My Lord resolved on sending out all the African Jews'.[95]

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[90] PRO CO 279/22 fo. 189 'Presentments by the Grand Jurie in Tangier', 3 May 1678.

[91] PRO CO 279/17 unpaginated. Memorandum of the mayor, Morgan Read, Tangiers, 15 Nov. 1675.

[92] PRO CO 279/23, fo. 216, res. 9 July 1678.

[93] PRO CO 279/17 unpaginated. Bland to Williamson, Tangier, 12 March 1675.

But if such prejudice and worries about the security risk alike militated against the presence of the Barbary Jews, in the end it was Charles II's chronic shortage of funds with which to finance his military and naval expenditures that destroyed all prospect of Tangiers developing into a great trade emporium in which Jewish skills would help buttress England's mastery of the Mediterranean. The Alawite sultans would not desist from their attacks, the pressure intensified every year from 1679, and finally, the king of England was compelled to throw in the towel. Thus, the irony was that instead of it being the Jews, as Bland had hoped, it was the English who were turned out 'and never more admitted'. The dream of an entrepot which would preside over the commerce not just of the Mediterranean but also Spain and the Spanish New World had by 1683 collapsed to nothing. During the evacuation, a dismal affair supervised by a commission which included Samuel Pepys, the great mole on which such great effort and resources had been lavished over more than twenty years was deliberately and systematically destroyed so that 'this port of Tangier, a free port for all ships of what nation soever' as Charles II had so earnestly wished it to be whilst it remained in his own hands should, England having been forced to abandon it, be of no service to anyone else.

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[94] Ibid. Bland to Williamson, Tangiers, 28 Sept. 1675.

[95] H.A. Kaufman, Tangier at High Tide. The Journal of John Luke, 1670–1673 (Geneva-Paris, 1958), p. 68, 162.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

JEWS AND THE STOCK EXCHANGE: THE AMSTERDAM FINANCIAL CRASH OF 1688*

During the seventeenth century the Dutch maritime zone served as the hub of world commerce and finance. The geographical spread and complexity of this, the first true world entrepot, was impressive: harbours, warehouses, shipyards, timber yards, rope-making, sail-making, and metal-founding workshops besides sugar, whale blubber, and dyestuff refineries and all manner of other processing plants stretched over much of the coastal area from the Schelde estuary in the south to Groningen in the north, a densely populated area criss-crossed by navigable rivers and canals and dotted with commercial cities, outports, and manufacturing towns. The heart and nerve-centre of this—by the standards of early modern times—vast and vastly complex infrastructure was unquestionably the famed Amsterdam Exchange. This famous bourse was by far the most important anywhere in the world from the end of the sixteenth century when it outstripped Antwerp until the beginning of the eighteenth century when it began to be overtaken by London. Measured in terms of leverage over international trade, shipping and finance, it was perhaps the most influential world transactions and financial exchange that has ever existed. In any case, from around 1590 until the early eighteenth century, Jewish and Christian merchants alike could fairly insist, as one eighteenth-century writer expressed it, that 'la bourse d'Amsterdam est regardée par tous les négociants comme la plus considérable de toutes'.[1] It may have been something of an exaggeration to claim, as a French official put it, in 1700, that Amsterdam was the 'théatre où tout les changes du monde se font';[2] but it would have been utterly inconceivable to say anything of the sort about any other place.

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* This essay is a modified version of the piece entitled 'The Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the English Revolution of 1688' first published in the *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* no. 103 (1990), pp. 412–40 and reprinted in Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, pp. 319–47.

[1] Savary des Bruslons, *Dictionnaire universel* i, 451.

[2] Quoted in Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam*, 78.

The Amsterdam exchange in this broad sense consisted of the 'Exchange' building itself where most of the large-scale commodity dealing went on, besides much of the insurance and shipping brokerage, and a batch of institutions sponsored and supervised by the city government, including the Wisselbank (Exchange Bank), Grain Exchange, Weigh-House, and civic Chamber of Insurance. In addition, there was a crucial but imprecisely defined space frequented by specialist dealers and brokers, meeting some of the time in nearby coffee- and tea-shops, a somewhat mysterious sphere constituting what historians generally call the 'stock exchange', although in fact it had no legally recognised status, procedures or rules of governance, and was basically nothing more than an informal, unregulated market with no permanently fixed location.[3] It met at certain times of the day in the main Exchange Building, or outside on the Dam, in front of the Town Hall, or, more informally still, in the nearby Jewish Quarter.

Like any great business centre, the Amsterdam bourse alternated between periods of relative stability and more volatile phases. While minor or moderate bouts of turbulence regularly alternated with long periods of calm, very occasionally the exchange was gripped by a severe crisis which, as in more recent times, could cause protracted turmoil in the financial markets and widespread economic havoc beyond. The best known of the major crises affecting Amsterdam during the seventeenth century was the disastrous panic which struck in the summer of 1672, during the so-called *rampjaar* (year of disaster) precipitated by Louis XIV's invasion of the United Provinces in alliance with England, Münster and Cologne. But another major crisis, until recently almost completely unknown to historians, occurred in the summer of 1688, preceding the Glorious Revolution in Britain and Ireland, a near catastrophic financial crash which is not only illustrative of the workings of the Amsterdam stock market and exchange more generally, and has a bearing on the English Revolution of that year, but also throws interesting light on the specifically Jewish role in the functioning of the stock exchange and on the inception in Europe of a new strain of economic anti-Semitism rooted in the mystique of the stock market.

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[3] Ehrenberg, 'Amsterdamer Aktienspekulation', 823.

As one would expect, Amsterdam merchants and financiers carefully scrutinised business news from abroad of every type. Like any bourse, Amsterdam was highly sensitive to news of changes overseas of a sort apt to create or ease shortages and stimulate or prevent commodity gluts, indeed anything liable to affect supply and demand. But in an age in which statecraft and war regularly impinged, often with devastating results, on trade routes, shipping and harbours, an age of relentless trade bans, embargoes, tariff-wars, navigation acts, naval-blockades and privateering campaigns, Amsterdam was often even more sensitive to international political and diplomatic news. Indeed, as I have urged elsewhere,[4] by far the most unsettling and dramatic upsets on the Amsterdam Exchange in the seventeenth century were precipitated not by subsistence crises, problems of oversupply, or any specifically economic factors, but by political developments perceived as dangerous to the security and integrity of the Republic and its commerce and shipping.

Contemporaries often remarked on Exchange's hypersensitivity to rumours of conflict between the Republic and powerful maritime rivals such as England, France or Sweden. Sir George Downing, the English envoy at The Hague, remarked in March 1664 that

> the very noise of the conference which I was to have this weeke, and had, concerning the East India Company and the rumours of a warre between England and the United Provinces like to be upon the matters now in difference, have already made the East Indie actions fall this weeke from 498 to 481.[5]

Gregorio Leti, the Italian Protestant historiographer of Amsterdam in the late 1680s and 1690s, who knew several of the leading Sephardic merchants and financiers personally, affirmed that there were two different influences determining price movements in the share market—business news and political news. The main categories of 'actions', or shares, being those of the two great colonial companies, the Dutch East and West India Companies, in their various chambers, the business news which chiefly mattered were the reports from the East Indies and the Caribbean, especially those estimating the size and values of return cargoes about to be shipped back to the Netherlands. Prior to the arrival of convoys from the East or West Indies, share prices rose, if the fleets were held to be richly laden while commodity prices fell for items thought to be plentifully included. Correspondingly, if projected returns were deemed disappointing, this would trigger falls in VOC or WIC share quotations while pushing up affected commodity prices. In the same way news of political developments deemed conducive to peace and untroubled sea-lanes usually boosted share values while, conversely, talk of war or deteriorating international relations would depress them.

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[4] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 86, 255–6.

[5] Quoted in Lister, *Life and Administration* iii, 300.

In the first ever detailed account of a European stock exchange, the *Confusion de Confusiones*, written in Amsterdam in a rather flowery Spanish presumably addressed mainly to other Sephardim, by a notable member of the Sephardic community there, Joseph Penso de la Vega (1650–93), and published in 1688, much the same points are made. Penso who belonged to a former Portuguese *Marrano* family which had left Andalusia to emigrate to Holland in the mid seventeenth century and who seems to have used more aliases than almost any other prominent figure in early modern Sephardic history, being variously known as Joseph Penso de la Vega, Joseph Penso Felix, Alvaro Felix *alias* Philisberto Fortunato *alias* Alvaro Bommelmann,[6] adds to Leti's two main factors a third category of stimuli—namely, the designs and machinations of the stock exchange dealers themselves. 'Know', he wrote, 'that there are three impulses causing shares to rise and three to fall—the state of the Indies, the disposition of Europe, and the scheming of the *accionistas*'.[7] But in terms of scale of impact there was, he notes, a fundamental difference between the more routine types of business reports and dealers' machinations, on the one hand, and news of war and peace, on the other. For where the first two categories usually affected only one set of colonial shares, and not both companies simultaneously, or bonds or other paper securities, talk of war, or major disruption at sea, was liable to unsettle both sets of colonial shares simultaneously and convulse the entire Exchange, undermining confidence, depressing States of Holland and other provincial bonds, precipitating bankruptcies, and disrupting insurance, exchange and bank interest rates as well as the stock market. Political news, in short, was more likely than other kinds of news to precipitate a full-scale financial crash.

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[6] Pieterse, 'Sephardi Jews', 76, 85.

[7] 'sabed que tienen las acciones tres estimulos para subir y otros tres para baxar: el estado de la India, la disposicion de Europa, y el juego de los accionistas', see Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 27.

This indeed became obvious in moments of national emergency, as in 1672 or 1688, when Dutch East and West India Company shares—in all chambers—fluctuated violently more or less *pari passu* with provincial bonds, 'obligations' and general business confidence. But even in less dangerous times, developments in the international arena, and the sometimes rather fanciful constructions put on them by the stock market dealers, could quickly generate concerted upward or downward impulses in shares, bonds, insurance rates, and the money market, all then surging up or down together. In such circumstances, all financial markets functioned symbiotically as dimensions of a single psychological response. Thus, for example, the dissolution of the English Parliament by Charles II, in April 1681, without his securing funds required to meet his costs, was interpreted in Amsterdam to mean that Charles would remain chronically short of cash for the foreseeable future and, consequently, unable to deploy his navy or advance English interests as forcefully as in the past. VOC shares, consequently, rose from 408 to 422 on the news and 'so proportionately' as the English consul observed, 'other obligations upon the land' that is States of Holland and other provincial bonds.[8]

Precisely because foreign news was so vital to the day-to-day conduct of share dealings on the Amsterdam stock market, share dealers could not be content, like most of the business world, merely to await reports passively as they trickled in from overseas. For these men, it was vital to penetrate, as far as possible, what was going on and obtain the swiftest possible information about matters to which the stock market was sensitive. Moreover, by the 1680s, there are clear signs that Amsterdam stock dealers had become adept at exploiting the opportunities afforded by receiving foreign news earlier than others—something of a speciality of trade diasporas such as those of the Sephardim, Huguenots, and Armenians who had co-religionists scattered across a vast area—for levering prices up or down. Since merchants in this period often heard about military movements, deaths of monarchs, palace dramas and treaties before diplomats and governments who indeed often first learnt the outcome of distant battles from particular sections of the mercantile community, late seventeenth century dealers had far more scope for massaging foreign news, or presenting it selectively, to manipulate stock prices up or down, than their successors in an age of high-speed telecommunication where the truth or falsity of their claims can be more quickly ascertained.[9] The amounts at stake moreover were huge, for as Leti later recalled, even unsubstantiated rumours could easily wipe off as much as thirty points in a day.[10]

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[8] BL MS Add. 37981, fo. 34v. Carr to Blathwayt, Amsterdam, 25 April 1681.

It was to this, above all, that the *accionistas*, or stock jobbers, of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, owed their somewhat unsavoury reputation. When to this we add that by the 1670s and 1680s dealing in VOC and WIC shares at Amsterdam had become predominantly a Jewish speciality,[11] it is easy to see how major convulsions in the stock market could generate intense antipathy to the brokers and inflame anti-Semitic phantasies about insidious Jewish conspiracies to swindle and strip great numbers of honest Christians of their money. An anonymous English description of the Amsterdam stock exchange written shortly after the great crash of 1688 and published in 1691 (not 1701, as Violet Barbour states) well illustrates how this particular combination of circumstances helped give rise to the later modern anti-Semitic stereotype of the 'stock exchange Jew'. The writer complained of the

> method used in the transactions of the Jews and others, who make a trade of buying and selling the actions of the Company, the which is a great mystery of iniquity and where it enricheth one man, it ruins a hundred. The Jews are the chief in that trade and are said to negotiate seventeen parts in twenty in the East India Company; these actions are bought and sold four times a day at eight in the morning in the Jewes-street, at eleven on the Dam, at twelve and one o'clock upon the Exchange, and at six in the evening on the Dam, and in the colleges or clubs of the Jewes until midnight, where many times the crafty Jews and others have contrived to coin bad news to make the actions fall, and good news to raise them, the which craft of doing at Amsterdam is not taken notice of [by the authorities], which is much to be wondered at, in such a wise government as Amsterdam is, for it is a certain truth they many times spread scandalous reports touching the affairs of state which pass among the ignorant for truth.[12]

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[9] Israel, 'Een merkwaardig literair werk', 159–61.

[10] Leti, *Teatro Belgico* ii, 243.

[11] Van Dillen, 'Effectenkoersen', 7; Van Dillen, *Van Rijkdom en regenten*, 455–6.

[12] *A Description of Holland, with some necessary directions for such as intend to travel through the Province of Holland* (London, 1691), p. 40; Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam*, 78.

That a considerable amount of stock exchange business was indeed conducted in the Jewish quarter of the city is certain. Several times in the late seventeenth century, the community elders found it necessary to issue *haskamoth* forbidding congregants from plying stock market transactions in the patio and immediate vicinity of the Portuguese Synagogue.[13]

For diplomats, furthermore, it was sometimes pertinent and convenient to blame unwelcome rumours and share movements in the stock market, on the deceit and machinations of the Jews, as we see, for example, from the episode in the summer of 1687 when the Amsterdam Exchange reacted sharply after Louis XIV met and signed a fresh alliance with envoys from the electorate of Cologne which had prominently participated in the invasion in 1672. Tension rose and a jittery Amsterdam was awash with rumour. Some dealers at this point evidently intimated dire consequences, conjecturing English complicity in a supposed new French-led coalition directed against the Dutch, unnerving the stock market in the process. But the particular slant put on all this by the English ambassador, the marquis d'Albeville, is highly revealing about attitudes toward the stock dealers: fabricated news was 'given out by the actionists at Amsterdam', he reported to London in early July, that the 'French king [. . .] gave out letters of marque against [Dutch shipping], that Hanover was entered into alliance with the French as well as Colen. All these news being assured by the Jews and actionists at the same time my Memoriall [to the States General, reaffirming England's peaceful intentions] was given in, caused a consternation for a days tyme at Amsterdam; all was over the next day and the deceit of the Jews and actionists discovered'.[14]

The markets rallied, on learning that there was nothing threatening in James II's communication. Moreover, while some *accionistas* had helped drive them down, others were apparently no less eager to push them up. According to d'Albeville, Jewish brokers intent on engineering a rally, had purposely started a rumour that the English ambassador 'sent 60,000 *livres* to Amsterdam to buy actions two days before he gave in his memorial, a Jew alleging that he had the money in his hands'.[15] No doubt, on this as on other occasions, there was some deliberate coining of bogus news. But d'Albeville made no allowance for the fact that the international situation was genuinely ominous, that there was real anxiety about English intentions (subsequently exploited politically by the Stadholder), and that there was nothing else the dealers, honest or dishonest, could do but try to penetrate the wall of secrecy and feverish speculation surrounding the convoluted but ruthless diplomacy of the time. Nor could anyone or anything prevent investors seeking to profit from the upwards and downwards movements in the share market.

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[13] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 208.

[14] BL MS Add. 41814, fo. 267v. D'Albeville to Middleton, The Hague, 4 July 1687.

[15] Ibid.

The marquis was annoyed by the imputation that he had pulled off a coup on the stock exchange when he had not but could not resist adding that 'he wisheth that were true'. Indeed, not a few foreign diplomats stationed in the Republic entrusted sums to brokers, or entered into corrupt arrangements with them, so as to profit financially from possessing confidential information. Everard, the English consul at Amsterdam in the late 1680s, in February 1686, passed on a proposition to the English resident at The Hague, Skelton, from 'some Actionists in the East India Company who, knowing of the honour I have to be known to your Excellency these many years, doe by me propose a handsome gratification if you think fitt to give them the first and best intelligence of things so far as they may be useful to give an influence to their way of trade'. Taking it for granted that Skelton, like himself, despised the Jewish dealers and 'would not expose the mysteries and main secrets of the state', he was nevertheless 'so bold to thinke that such a correspondency prudently and cunningly managed in this city would be able to doe the King a greate deale of service by making these men to hazard their stocks and ruine themselves, or make it run into better hands, and so would procure the ruin in a greate measure of their proud East India Company which is the only cause of all their insolencies against our traders in those eastern parts of the world: but, besides, I know that all ambassadors of foreign princes have pensions from these Actionists, and, as they have good intelligences, soe they likewise communicate it to those ministers; and why may not such a thing be done with His Majesty's knowledge or connivance and he favour it for wise purposes and not repine at such small profits that may be made by his servants without prejudice to his service, for I would not dare to enter on it without his consent and connivance.'[16]

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[16] BL MS Add. 41818, fo. 235. Everard to Skelton, Amsterdam, 7 Feb. 1686.

Clearly then the 'Actionists' of Amsterdam were a potent group in financial affairs and, in a curious and novel way, also a factor in international diplomacy and intelligence gathering. But they were also regarded with antipathy and intense suspicion much intensified by their Jewishness. The tendency of the brokers to be Sephardic Jews, moreover, became more pronounced, in the years after the crash of 1672 when leading Dutch Sephardic merchants, becoming less active in trade, took to investing much of their fortunes in buying up sizeable blocks of VOC and WIC shares. There were several reasons for this. A good deal of the commerce in which Dutch Sephardic Jewry had traditionally engaged, especially with Brazil via Portugal, had been undermined since the 1650s by the rise of the Caribbean sugar plantations, and the displacement of the Dutch from the Portugal trade by the English. At the same time, the Sephardic population in the United Provinces was still increasing and new business opportunities had to be found,[17] though this was far from easy given the problems of trade and that at Amsterdam and in the other Dutch cities where they were permitted to live, the Jews were mostly excluded from retailing and the crafts as well as some of the new processing industries (such as silk weaving).[18] Furthermore, new Sephardic immigrants had to compete from the mid 1680s onwards with the much larger influx of Huguenot merchants, financiers and manufacturers leaving France for Holland and Zeeland following Louis XIV's Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685). The Huguenots became a major force in many areas of Dutch commerce and finance as well as manufacturing and often had large capital resources at their disposal, a factor which tended to lower the cost of borrowing and depress bank interest rates, which in turn encouraged more investment than in the past in the stock exchange, especially given the (compared to England) increasingly sluggish condition of most of Dutch trade and industry after 1672.

Needing more outlets and opportunities, Dutch Sephardim naturally sought to build on their strengths. They had capital, commercial expertise, and above all relevant business and family connections scattered across the Caribbean, the Iberian Peninsula, India, in London and the Near East as well as France, Italy and North Africa.

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[17] According to latest estimates the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam probably reached its absolute demographic peak of around 4,500 precisely in the mid 1680s, see Nusteling, 'Jews in the Republic', 51–2.

[18] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 20–2, 146–9.

Prominent members of the Sephardic community such as Baron Belmonte, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, and the two Barons Lopes Suasso were diplomatic and financial agents for the courts of Madrid, Lisbon, and Brussels and therefore had access to secret information regarding the Spanish and Portuguese Indies which they might selectively share with others. Disposing of such a far-flung network of contacts surpassing—despite the disintegration of the main crypto-Jewish network in Spanish America—those of every other trading diaspora of the age in range and perhaps cohesion, they found in the stock exchange an arena uniquely suited to their aptitudes, needs and skills, albeit one which, if potentially lucrative, was also notoriously risky. The stock exchange was thus the only major sphere of business activity that Jews, or other outsiders, could easily enter provided only they had substantial capital to risk. Not only was it not fenced around with discriminatory regulations, it was subject to hardly any supervision at all. Thus, while most of the officially licensed 'sworn' brokers in commodities, shipping and insurance, areas subject to rigid guild control, were Protestants; there was no licensing of dealers in VOC and WIC shares and these, in the main, were Sephardim.[19]

The growth in Jewish share-ownership was spectacular. Whereas before 1672, the only large Jewish holders of WIC shares were Antonio Lopes Suasso (1614–85) who in 1674 had 107,667 guilders invested in the company, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (1620–97) with 46,200 guilders, Simão and Luis Rodrigues de Sousa with 30,000 and Jacob Delmonte likewise with 30,000 guilders,[20] numerous others seem to have acquired substantial holdings subsequently while existing shareholders expanded their portfolios. At the same time, Jewish investors began to spread their net more widely among the chambers than before. Hence, for example, where, in 1680 only some 6.5% of the stock in the Zeeland chamber of the VOC was held by Jews, the Jewish-owned portion, divided between thirty-four Sephardi investors, rose to 15%, by 1690, while by 1700, a total of sixty Sephardic investors possessed no less than 34% of the shares, a level at which the Jewish share seems to have levelled off and remained fairly stable through the first half of the eighteenth century.[21]

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[19] Leti, *Teatro Belgico* ii, 243; *Relaes en contradictie*, 7; Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam*, 78; Van Dillen, 'Effectenkoersen', 7.

[20] Schneeloch, *Aktionäre*, 41–2.

Partly because most brokers were Sephardim, but also because the proportion of stock owned by Jews in all chambers grew rapidly in the late seventeenth century, the myth grew up, mainly outside the United Provinces, that most shares in the great Dutch colonial companies were owned by Jews, despite the fact that this was far from being the case and that, in reality most shares in the two great Dutch colonial companies were owned by Protestants whether merchants, regents and professionals. Thus an Italian visitor declared, in 1678, that the Dutch East India Company was a joint stock venture in which Jews were permitted to participate, claiming that 'tre parti di tutti il capitale spetta a loro' [three quarters of all the invested capital belongs to them].[22] The Baron Antonio Lopes Suasso and then his son, Francisco, the largest Jewish shareholders in this period, were later cited in English pamphlets relating to the East Indies, in the 1690s, in a deliberately misleading way, to suggest that Jews now possessed the larger part of all the shares in the Dutch East India Company. 'It is well known and is not to be denied', asserted one English writer, 'that the Jewes have at all times the greatest share of actions in the Dutch East-India Company and that one Jew, Swasso by name, has had at one time more stock in that Company than ever an Englishman had or hath in this [i.e. the English East India Company]'.[23] A second tract asserts that the Jew 'Swasso' at one point had in his possession no less than £75,000, or over three quarters of a million guilders worth, of VOC shares.[24]

Amsterdam Sephardic stock dealers, then, exerted a remarkable hegemony over dealing in a new and highly specialised financial sector which could potentially have a massive positive or negative impact on individual fortunes and the status of elite families in the Dutch urban context. The stock exchange, even when share prices moved up or down only slightly without violent lurches entailing other securities and bonds, affected a great many prominent people both within and without Dutch society in all the more affluent social categories.

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[21] Van der Bijl, *Idee en Interest*, 206–7.

[22] Blom, 'Italiaansche reisbeschrijving', 114.

[23] *Answer to all the material objections against the present East-India Company* (London, 1695?), pp. 2–3.

[24] *Third Collection. . . . Lord Somers*, p. 183.

Penso de la Vega in describing the investor culture which evolved in late seventeenth-century Amsterdam, divided share-holders into three basic categories.[25] The first, which he calls 'the princes', were substantial shareholders who inherited, or bought, shares and retained them for long periods with an eye chiefly on the annual yield from dividends. They often viewed their holdings as part of the family estate and, in the case of regents with shares in the lesser chambers of the VOC also as a political asset, enabling them to become directors in the relevant chamber. Although the pattern varied from town to town, VOC shares frequently made up a large part of the inherited wealth of Holland and Zeeland regent families.[26] 'Princes', like all investors in the stock exchange, were affected by share price movements but were, as a rule, less vulnerable to short-term fluctuations than others and did not need specialist brokers to transact for them.

Penso's second class were 'the traders'. These were occasionally, or moderately, active investors who bought and sold on a medium-term basis, content to profit from the underlying trend without scrutinising every movement or trying to influence or exploit short-term movements. This category were more likely than the first to require the services of Jewish brokers to buy and sell on their behalf, especially if they lived outside Amsterdam. This class comprised Dutch merchants and manufacturers as well as a fringe of foreign diplomats and nobles sometimes of fairly high social status. The foremost client, for example, of the firm of Manuel Levy Duarte and Jacob Athias, diamond dealers who in the 1680s also dealt regularly in the share market, was Olympe Mancini, countess of Soissons, a niece of Cardinal Mazarin, and the mother of Prince Eugene of Savoy, who at this juncture resided in Brussels. This noble lady purchased a parcel of VOC stock, through Levy Duarte and Athias, in 1680, which she later sold, through the same dealers, in 1685, securing a profit of around 7% on the investment.[27] Of course, diamond merchants were more likely to make the acquaintance of high-born clients than most other Jews.

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[25] 'Para mejor inteligencia deste assombro, deveis advertir que tratan en este negocio tres classes de pesonas, unos como principes, otro como mercaderes, y los ultimos como jugadores', Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, p. 4; see also Wilson, *Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance*, p. 82.

[26] Van der Bijl, *Idee en Interest*, 209, 213; Kooijmans, *Onder regenten*, 104.

[27] Samuel, 'Manuel Levy Duarte', 19–20.

His third category Penso terms 'the gamblers' or 'players', a group which included the professional *accionistas* themselves plus other speculators who, for short or long spells, became frenetically involved in the convolutions of the stock market seeking to capitalise on its short-term fluctuations. Some became so absorbed in the mysterious ups and downs of this strange new phenomenon that they seemed to have fallen under some praeternatural spell. With a typical literary flourish, Penso de la Vega declares that the Cretan labyrinth itself was not more convoluted than the fantasies and obsessions of these stock market addicts.[28] The seriously addicted spent their days in the smoke-filled coffee-shops around the Exchange where the principal dealers gathered and share prices were hourly fixed. But one did not need to live in Amsterdam to gamble on short-term oscillations. There were also foreign-based speculators, not infrequently Sephardic or New Christian relatives of Amsterdam dealers, who bought and sold at frequent intervals. Luis Alvares, for instance, a wealthy jeweller who lived in Paris, gambled in the Amsterdam share market through his distant relative, Manuel Levy Duarte, at times frenetically.[29]

Most of the time there were only minor flurries of excitement unlikely to cause anyone undue harm. Indeed, during the thirteen years between the French evacuation of Dutch territory, in 1674, and the autumn of 1687, the Amsterdam Exchange and share market were, on the whole, reassuringly calm and level-headed. Doubtless the devastating crash of 1672–3 when the Republic, stripped of all allies, was attacked and invaded by Louis XIV, together with the English king, Cologne and Munster was still vividly remembered.[30] In a matter of weeks, four whole provinces of the Union—Gelderland, Overijssel, Utrecht and Drenthe—had been overrun and while the advancing French and their allies were halted just in time—a mere few miles from Amsterdam—by the flooding of the so-called 'waterline' a broad strip of low-lying terrain stretching from the Zuyder Zee, at Muyden, down to the great rivers, this was not before the entire country had been plunged in chaos, panic and overwhelming apprehension. There was a furious run on the Exchange Bank, as well as the banks in Rotterdam and Middelburg, with millions of guilders and vast amounts bullion and jewellery being drawn from deposits often for transfer abroad to Hamburg, Antwerp, Frankfurt and Venice. The value of provincial 'obligations', a key element in many regent and other *rentier* fortunes, plummeted with those of the States of Holland dropping at one point to below 30% of face value. WIC shares became almost worthless. The premier share, the actions of the Amsterdam Chamber of the VOC, plunged from a peak, a short time before, of 572%—a level historians once considered the peak for the entire seventeenth century[31]—to 250% of face value which was certainly the low-point for the latter half of the century. The initial collapse, moreover, was followed by a succession of wild swings, raising hopes only to dash them again days, or even hours, later. At one point, morale soared on the basis of optimistic rumours of little substance: VOC shares rose to 340 and States of Holland bonds to 92% before both collapsed again.[32] Meanwhile, public building ceased, land and house rents slumped, and the art market suffered a devastating blow (severely affecting Vermeer among others) from which it took decades to recover. But the staggering loss and disruption of that time, though not forgotten, came to be thought of as something wholly out of the ordinary, the result of an unprecedented catastrophe.[33]

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[28] 'No fue mas intricado el laberintho de Creta que el de sus designios, porque de aquel aun salió un Theseo con el hilo de Ariadne y deste hay muchos que no han podido salir sino con el hilo de la vida', Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 5.

[29] Samuel, 'Manuel Levy Duarte', 19.

[30] Valkenier, *'t Verwerd Europa*, 637; Smith, *Tijd-affaires in effecten*, 64, 69, 71–2; Samuel, *Die Effektenspekulation*, 12, 15; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 293–5; De Vries and Van der Woude, *Nederland 1500–1815*, pp. 508.

In any case, the water-line held. Against all appearance and expectation, the Republic emerged from the disasters of 1672 essentially intact. The great crash of that year shook the Amsterdam Exchange to its foundations; but it took the strain. Particularly after Austria and Spain entered the field, on the Dutch side, in 1673, forcing Louis to evacuate most of the Dutch territory he had overrun—while England, frustrated by the failures of her navy and weary of the massive Dutch counter-offensive against her shipping, withdrew from the conflict, making peace with the Republic in April 1674—confidence began to revive, normal maritime traffic resumed, and expatriated cash and jewellery trickled back. By late 1674, the panic was over. The markets bounced back, the VOC share price in

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[31] Van Dillen, 'Effectenkoersen', 12, 15.
[32] Valkenier, *'t Verwerd Europa*, 637.
[33] Savary des Bruslons, *Dictionaire universel* i, 19–20.

Amsterdam hovering by May 1675, at between 428 and 443.[34] Yet the recovery was incomplete and, for various reasons, lost its initial momentum. In July 1676 the VOC share price had risen no further than 450.[35] During the decade from 1675 to 1684 the Exchange, including the stock market, remained hesitant and, by pre-1672 standards gently but distinctly depressed.[36] Despite the end of the war with France and Louis XIV's agreeing to cancel or modify his more aggressively anti-Dutch mercantilist measures, under the terms of the treaty of Nijmegen (1678), there was a persistent feeling that the peace was fragile and that, despite the partial recovery, Amsterdam, as the English consul, Carr, expressed it, 'decayes in its riches and trade'. In March 1681, Carr reported to London that the 'East India actions which in anno 1670 were 500 and once 550 are now but 406; and never as yet, since the war', he added (slightly inaccurately), 'could be brought up to 450 and so proportionally all other obligations on the land'.[37] The same consul remarked, on 25 March 1681, that VOC shares in Amsterdam stood at 408% with WIC shares languishing at a depressed 54%.[38] With the onset of fresh worries about the peace of Europe, following Louis XIV's annexation of Strasbourg, in September 1681, and ensuing rise in international tension, share prices eased back further, the VOC price receding by November 1681 to 395.5 which may well be the low-point for the whole period between 1674 and 1688, before recovering to 447 the following April and to 462 by September 1682.[39]

A fresh slide began, though, following Louis XIV's border encroachments on the Spanish Netherlands, in September 1682, and the ensuing French occupation of Luxemburg and Dinant. There was no serious panic since the French did not this time advance far. But there was a rise in tension and a corresponding lowering of confidence, causing the VOC share price in Amsterdam to dip initially to 448%.[40] Subsequently, the international situation deteriorated further while a major Dutch domestic political crisis erupted with the Stadholder, William III, quarrelling openly with Amsterdam which refused to agree to his plans to expand the Dutch army by 16,000 men and send military assistance to the Spanish Netherlands. Amsterdam, wanting to avoid war and nurture commerce, saw little point in provoking the French monarch unnecessarily at a time when the Republic was again virtually without allies. The general impression conveyed by this unseemly episode was of Dutch weakness, hesitancy and disunity. Accordingly, during 1683 share prices in Amsterdam fell further, the VOC share price dropping at one stage as low as 397.[41]

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[34] GAA PJG inv. no. 858 (Archives of the Portuguese Jewish Community), fo. 13; I am indebted to Edgar Samuel for brining the business ledgers of Manuel Levy Duarte, a most valuable source, to my attention.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 826.

[37] BL MS Add. 37981, fo. 12v. Carr to Blathwayt, Amsterdam, 25 March 1681.

[38] Ibid., fo. 14. Carr to Blathwayt, Amsterdam, 25 March 1681.

[39] GAA PJG 858, pp. 471–2.

[40] Ibid., p. 340.

The entry into the market of smaller investors with the introduction in 1683 of a new class of partial shares, the so-called *ducaton* shares or one-tenth shares, a refinement devised, apparently, by Portuguese Jewish brokers, initially had little discernible affect on the mood-swings or general volatility of the market. As Penso de la Vega mentions, these *ducaton* shares, the purchase and sale of which was effected immediately, in cash, and not with lengthy delays as with full shares, were an open invitation to the young and less affluent who lacked the means to gamble on costly full shares to risk their money on the stock market far more than before. Where every one point movement up or down entailed gains or losses of over thirty guilders per full share with *ducaton* shares one risked losing only three guilders. In this way, as Penso remarks, a device invented to reduce risk, as well as generate more business for the Jewish brokers, 'in fact made the dangers more widespread' and for this heightened risk and volatility the Jews were subsequently to be blamed.[42] It was in any case probably one of the very few real financial innovations introduced by Jews in the seventeenth century.[43]

The danger of war passed and by late 1684 VOC actions in Amsterdam had recovered to 470%.[44] Amsterdam by steadfastly thwarting the Prince of Orange's efforts to concert a new international coalition against Louis, was reckoned to have played a crucial part in defusing the crisis and preventing war. The conclusion drawn by many diplomats, and the Exchange, was that the Stadholder could not mobilize the Republic for a new conflict, or build an international coalition capable of fighting France, without Amsterdam's consent and that provided Louis kept his undertakings of 1678 regarding tariffs and trade, this would never be forthcoming.[45] But, as later developments were to show, the reassurance drawn by the stock market from Amsterdam's opposition to William III in 1683–4, and the feeling that peace had been strengthened, was not just illusory but directly contributed to the misplaced optimism which prepared the ground for the sudden and catastrophic loss of confidence which precipitated the financial crash of 1688.

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[41] GAA PJG 334, fo. 688; De Vries and Van der Woude, *Nederland 1500–1815* p. 508.

[42] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones* I, 115–16, 123–6; Swetschisnki, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 146.

[43] Ibid., 162.

[44] Leti, *Ceremoniale historico e politico*, v, 470.

With this the scene was set for a more 'bullish' phase in the history of the Amsterdam Exchange and stock market. During the mid 1680s both the VOC and WIC appeared to be vigorous, successful enterprises while the long-distance trade with the Indies and the New World was clearly gaining in importance in relation to the Dutch economy as a whole. In 1684 began that long, steady climb in the value of shares and securities on the Amsterdam Exchange—and the connected steady lowering of interest rates—which was to proceed uninterrupted until the summer of 1688.[46] The cost of borrowing drifted down to unparalleled lows, by early 1688 bank interest rates in Amsterdam standing at a mere 2%.[47] The Exchange was awash with spare cash, some of it Huguenot, and much of it readily available to fuel the heady rise in shares, provincial bonds and 'obligations'. A further factor inflating WIC share quotations was the success of the 'Dutch' faction in Madrid, headed by the Dutch envoy there, Francisco Schonenberg (alias Belmonte), a relative of Baron Manuel de Belmonte, resident of Spain in Amsterdam, in the tussle over the *asiento*, resulting in the Spanish court's decision of February 1685, to transfer the monopoly, or *asiento*, for slave shipments to Spanish America, to the Dutch house of Coymans with which Belmonte was connected and whose factors obtained their slaves from the West India Company via Curaçao.[48] Coymans' triumph not only guaranteed WIC predominance for the next several years in supplying slaves to Spanish America but also the centrality of Curaçao, and its Sephardic merchant community, in the transit trade between north-west Europe and the Spanish colonies.

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[45] Kurtz, *Willem III en Amsterdam*, 102–10, 125; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 830–40.

[46] *Relaes en contradictie*, p. 8; Leti, *Ceremoniale historico e politico* v, 470.

[47] BL MS Add. 41821, fo. 220, 'News from The Hague', 4 August 1688.

[48] Penso de la Vega describes the Coymans *asiento* as the 'mas firme columna desta fabrica, meaning that it was the chief factor behind the sharp rise in WIC share quotations at this time, Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 94, 196; Wright, 'The Coymans Asiento (1685–1689)', pp. 29–30; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 320–2.

From late 1684 until the summer of 1687, the rise of values on the Amsterdam stock exchange was slow but steady, albeit WIC shares, rose more impressively than those of the VOC. Then, in the autumn of 1687, when the VOC share price reached 525%,[49] the speculative atmosphere in Amsterdam suddenly and unaccountably intensified, soon becoming positively feverish. In some respects this was a new investing phenomenon, for on this occasion, and perhaps for the first time, there was no plausible justification for this dramatic upwards spiral. Indeed, it was precisely at this juncture that Louis XIV repudiated the Franco-Dutch tariff agreement of 1678, re-imposing the punitive 1667 tariff list on Dutch imports into France. Hence, quite out of character with its previous tendencies, the stock exchange resurgence intensified and accelerated just as a new *guerre de commerce* between France and the United Provinces was set to begin.[50]

No doubt the introduction of *ducaton* shares had drawn in new investors and increased the volatility of the market. But the steep rise of 1687–8 still has to be explained principally in terms of the wider context. The calculation among the Sephardic brokers must have been that there would be no war and that Louis XIV's resumed *guerre de commerce* against the Republic might harm Dutch commerce in Europe but have little affect on the colonial companies whose continuing prosperity seemed assured by the VOC's seeming invulnerability in the East Indies and by Spain's *asiento* and pro-Dutch policy in the New World. The heightening of international tension, and hostile measures taken by Louis against Dutch trade, were disturbing, but the Amsterdam city government stuck firmly to its policy of seeking to maintain harmonious relations with France. Meanwhile, the seemingly inexorable rise further enhanced the now, for many, irresistible lure of the stock exchange. As the speculative fever gathered momentum over the winter of 1687–8, the stock market's puzzling behaviour which now struck some observers as positively irrational, became one of the main topics of conversation in the city. Penso notes the intervention at this juncture of young inexperienced 'juegadores' (gamblers) with little knowledge of the market, men eager to cash in on the accelerating rise in share quotations who became so intoxicated by their easy success that its amazing oscillations displaced everything else from their minds, even filling, he says, their very dreams.[51]

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[49] *Relaes en contradictie*, 8.

[50] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 1, 60; Cole, *French Mercantilism*, 12–13, 294–97, 307; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 306.

The upward trend in share prices continued month after month but was also punctuated by short, sharp, nerve-wracking retreats precipitated by political anxieties. One such, in April 1688, followed James II of England's attempt—perceived in Holland as distinctly unfriendly—to dissolve the Scots brigades of the States' army. 'The East India actions are considerably fallen this day', reported Daniel Petit, English consul at Amsterdam, on 6 April, 'upon the news they had here of a memorial [from the English king, requesting the return of the troops] which the marquis d'Albeville, His Majesty's envoy at The Hague, had presented yesterday to the States'.[52] But this was quickly forgotten, or discounted, and the upward trend resumed. 'The East India actions', recorded Petit, on 23 April, 'are within these four days risen from 560 to 568', adding four days later that the 'East India actions are still rising'.[53] Writing to James' secretary of state, a few weeks later, Petit explained that the merchants 'pretend to judge of peace and warre by the fall and rising of the actions', remarking that the 'East India actions are risen within this week [17–24 May] from 566 to 576½' which was indeed matter to excite all Amsterdam.[54] The business community, and the Jewish dealers, took the view that the peace would hold. The ebullient 24 May was also the day on which Penso de la Vega completed the first part of his remarkable book on the stock exchange, dedicating it to the young merchant and insurance broker, Duarte Nunes da Costa, son of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (alias Moseh Curiel), the Jewish 'agent' of the crown of Portugal in the United Provinces.[55]

Yet the astounding rise in share values undoubtedly also caused considerable unease. What was the moral basis of the increased wealth of those who bought the shares? A major reason for the public debate which arose in 1687–8 about the character and status of the stock market was certainly the feeling that the share market was not just a new and strange but also a morally unsettling and improper phenomenon, a form of swindling—the 'windhandel' (trade in wind) as it was often called; and that, besides, the rise in values was excessive and unjustified.[56] Meanwhile, the long 'bullish' run, as always, attracted new investors, diplomats and foreign nobles among them, mesmerising some and reinforcing the belief of many that prospects for peace and the two colonial companies remained excellent. WIC shares having languished at 54% in 1681, rose 'con la esperança', as Penso explains, 'de que los retornos de Guiné y Curaçao serían floridos' [with the expectation that the returns from Guinea and Curacao would be excellent], to a peak of 110% in the spring of 1688.[57] When the VOC share price edged up to 580, the highest thus far ever witnessed, many investors predicted a continuing rise, being assured by the dealers that the forthcoming East India return fleet was richly laden, that a large dividend could be expected, and that they could rely, as Penso puts it, on 'la paz de la Europa' (the peace of Europe).[58]

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[51] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones* I, 60; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 146.
[52] BL MS Add. 41815, fo. 205. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 6 April 1688.
[53] Ibid., fos. 237, 247. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 23 and 27 April 1688.
[54] Ibid., fo. 258. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 24 May 1688.
[55] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, p. xviii.

Amid the excitement, remarks Penso, enthusiasts began assuming the VOC share price in Amsterdam was about to reach, and breach, the magical figure of 600%. At the same time, share quotations for the outlying VOC and WIC chambers also rose impressively, even if these were less susceptible to speculative pressures than the premier shares and consequently lagged somewhat behind, causing a widening gap in values. In November 1681, shares in the Zeeland Chamber of the VOC had stood at 95½ points less than those in the Amsterdam Chamber.[59] At the time of his writing, records Penso, the gap in share values between those of the Amsterdam chamber and those of Zeeland and the other lesser chambers had widened appreciably, 'valiendo ordinariamente las de Zelanda 150 por ciento menos que las nuestras, 80 las de Incusa, 75 las de Orne, 30 las de Roterdam y 70 las de Delef' [those of Zeeland ordinarily being worth 150 per cent less than ours [of Amsterdam], those of Enkhuizen eighty less, those of Hoorn seventy-five less, those of Rotterdam thirty less and those of Deft seventy below].[60] The fact that shares in the Amsterdam chambers of the VOC and WIC were undeniably transacted in most by the share dealers, was convincing and reassuring evidence, he claimed, with which to defend the stock exchange and—by implication—its Jewish brokers. For if the share price in the Amsterdam chambers always and increasingly outstripped those in the outlying chambers where speculative activity was less, this could only mean that speculation and share-dealing generated new wealth for the benefit of the share-holders and employees of the companies.

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[56] Ibid., pp. 74–5, 94.
[57] Ibid., p. 94; Ehrenberg, 'Amsterdamer Aktienspekulation', 817.
[58] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 17.
[59] GAA JG MS 334, fo. 13.

During the early summer of 1688 the long upward run persisted albeit interrupted, as before by sharp flurries caused by political worries. The dismay felt by many opponents of Stuart absolutism in Britain on the birth of a son and heir to James II, raising the prospect for the first time of a Catholic succession there, was shared to an extent also in Holland. A Catholic succession moreover, seemed to increase the likelihood of England aligning with Louis and, therefore, of renewed antagonism between England and the Dutch. 'The news of the birth of this prince', noted Petit, on 29 June, 'was no sooner known here but the East India actions fell from 572 to 567'.[61] The consul's decision to mark the birth with an impressive banquet, fire-work display, and other appropriate signs of public festivity were so out of harmony with the prevailing mood that a hostile crowd gathered outside his house, not only uttering scurrilous insults against the King and Queen of England, and their heir, but hurling stones through his windows, loss and indignity for which James subsequently declined to compensate him.[62]

Over the next fortnight the share market, distinctly disquieted, first rallied and then eased back again, owing mainly to anxiety about the returning East India fleet upon which the most extravagant expectations of profit were riding. On 13 July 1688, VOC shares were quoted in Amsterdam at 569%.[63] 'It is generally believed that they will fall more', commented Petit, 'because of the fear which the Dutch have that their Smyrna or East India fleet will be attacked by the English or French'.[64] Throughout July the share market remained broadly stable but nervous owing to the perceived threat to the returning East India convoy. On 29 July VOC actions at Amsterdam stood at 566%.[65] Meanwhile, amid the tightest secrecy, the Stadholder William III had already revealed his bold and far-reaching plans for armed intervention in Britain against James II to three (of the four) Amsterdam burgomasters.[66] In years past the reaction of the latter would almost certainly have been negative and resistant. But, as William well knew, the situation had changed dramatically. Louis had violated his undertakings on trade under the 1678 treaty; Dutch textile and fish exports to France had slumped badly, and back in May, the States of Holland had agreed that every diplomatic channel was now exhausted and that there was no alternative but to resort to more concrete measures to induce Louis to retract his aggressive new measures.[67] Thus, the Stadholder, amid the utmost secrecy, gained the co-operation of the Amsterdam burgomasters and could proceed with preparing his expedition to England. For if war between the United Provinces and France in the estimation of the Dutch leadership was now unavoidable, the best way, seemingly, to turn the tables on Louis would be to exploit the growing opposition to Stuart absolutism in Britain, intervene there militarily to break his protogé King James and then turn England's resources, army and navy round against France.

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[60] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, pp. 109–10.

[61] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 83. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 29 June 1688.

[62] BL MS Add. 41821, fo. 213; Wagenaar, *Amsterdam in zyne opkomst* i, 696.

[63] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 101. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 13 July 1688.

None of this could yet be disclosed to the States of Holland. Only William's close advisers, a handful of the most important regents, and a few key officials such as Job de Wildt, secretary of the Amsterdam admiralty college, knew of the plans and what the raising of extra seamen, preparing of warships and munitions, and other preparations now underway, were for. The necessary funds were made available not by formal resolution of the States but by informal arrangements, with the help of Lopes Suasso and other Sephardic financiers, in secret. When, later, in September, the plans were revealed to the full States of Holland and it had to be explained why so much had already been done without the States knowing anything about it, one of the key justifications offered was precisely that the 'interessen van die geene die sterk in Actien van de Oost- en West-Indische Compagnien waren handelende, de geinteresseerdens obligeerden, om soo ver doenlijk te penetreren in de secreten van den staat, ende soo veel in haar was de deliberatien en resolutien na die haare interessen te doen formeren ende uytvallen' [the interests of those who traded intensively in East and West India Company shares, obliged those involved to penetrate the secrets of the state as far as possible, and in as far as they could to make the deliberations and resolutions accord and fall in with their interests].[68] In short, so essential was it to prevent the Sephardic brokers finding out what was happening that it had been impossible to deliberate the most crucial resolutions of the state in the assembly of the Holland regents.

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[64] Ibid.

[65] BL MS Add. 41821, fo. 210, 'News from The Hague', 29 July 1688.

[66] Gebhard, *Leven van Mr Nicolaas Cornelisz. Witsen*, 316, 320.

[67] Israel, *Anglo-Dutch Moment*, 115–17.

Over many months, moreover, the secrets of the state were well kept. Few knew of the plans and those who did kept silent. Through June, July and the first three weeks of August, a great deal was going on but there was yet nothing obvious pointing to the fact that the Republic was preparing to invade Britain which was bound to mean war with both England and France. Although extensive military and naval preparations were underway, such activity was not in itself unusual in the Dutch ports, and much remained hidden; and what could not be hidden was explained away on various pretexts. Until early September, the preparations were not yet on a large enough scale to attract much attention so that officially inspired rumour indicating that the warships were destined for yet another expedition against the Algerian corsairs, seemed plausible enough. Meanwhile, Amsterdam blocked the full package of retaliatory measures against France drawn up in the States of Holland, giving the impression that the city remained as determined as ever to reach an accommodation with France.[69] Indeed, Amsterdam's regents still hoped that war could be avoided and Louis induced to compromise

During the first three weeks of August, in any case, the stock market seemed less concerned about the quarrel with France than the more immediate question of the returning East India fleet.[70] 'East

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[68] *Secreete resolutien van de Ed. Groot Mog. Heeren Staten van Hollandt* iv, p. 227. Secret res. 18 September 1688.

[69] GAA vroedschapsresoluties MS 38, pp. 139–42. Res. 21 and 24 September 1688; D'Avaux, *Négociations* vi, 190, 200.

[70] BL MS Add. 41821, fo. 210. 'News from The Hague', 29 July 1688; see also

India actions here are falling', explained Petit, on 6 August, 'because of the uncertainty they are in here with what success their East India ships will come home'.[71] But the very next day it was announced that the VOC directors had word that the return fleet had left the Cape of Good Hope in good order two weeks before and was now well up the African coast. In fact, the fleet was expected in the Channel shortly and more richly laden than previously forecast.[72] Sudden jubilation swept the stock market, the VOC share price jumping fifteen points on the news: 'auff diese gutter Zeitung', echoed the Hamburg press, 'sind die Actiones auff 575½ gestiegen';[73] and for several days more they continued rising amid mounting excitement. 'The spirit of Ahab and demons of Job set to work with renewed vigour inspired by news so favourable for *la liefhebrería*', comments Penso de la Vega, in characteristically florid style, using the curious term current among the Jewish brokers (mixing Dutch and Spanish) for designating bullish tendencies in the market. It was thus not in early 1672 as J.G. van Dillen supposed—when VOC shares reached 572%—that the Amsterdam stock exchange reached its highest peak for the seventeenth century,[74] but rather in the ten days or so after 7 August 1688. In late May, before the onset of worries over the return fleet, the VOC share price had already touched 576 before receding.[75] Now, in mid-August, the Amsterdam stock exchange, unperturbed by developments in Europe, not only regained the level of late May but soared higher into uncharted territory. By 13 August, the dealers and investors were in triumphant mood buoyed by the rousing news that the naval force sent out under Admiral Evertsen to meet the Indies return fleet now nearing the end of its long voyage from Batavia, had successfully effected their *rendezvous* at the

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the Hamburg newspaper *Relations-Coerier* 121 (1688) issue 7 (for this and the following references to German press reports of the summer of 1688, I am indebted to Dr Johannes Weber of the *Deutsche Presse Forschung* project of the Bremen University Library).

[71] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 138. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 6 August 1688.

[72] *Relations-Coerier* (Hamburg) no. 121 (1688) issue 7; *Sonntagischer Postilion* (Berlin) no. 32 (1688) issue 4; Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 174.

[73] *Relations-Coerier* (Hamburg) no. 121 (1688), issue 7; *Sonntagischer Postilion* (Berlin) no. 32 (1688) issue 4.

[74] Van Dillem, 'Effectenkoersen', 12, 15.

[75] See BL MS Add. 41815, fo. 258. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 24 may 1688; Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 138–9; indeed several sources give 576 as the highest point reached in 1688, see Leti, *Theatro Belgico* ii, 243; Pringsheim, *Don Joseph de la Vega*, p. xiv; Israel, *Anglo-Dutch Moment*, 420–1.

mouth of the Channel, and, flags flying and guns at the ready, were bringing them in: VOC actions soared further to 582.[76]

But no sooner were the markets assured that the fleet was safe than VOC shares eased to 580 and then began to retreat. The mood changed, explained Penso, because word was sent ahead on fast yachts, reporting the cargo to be less splendid than had been surmised, being valued at 3,400,000 guilders 'which was entirely beneath predictions, since the returns had been expected to be much larger'.[77] 'Divulgandose que la cargaçón no importava mas de 34 toneles, haviendo traido el año antecedente 50, començaron a desmayar los orgullos, a ofuscarse los corages, a rendirese los bríos' [Word being spread that the cargo was not worth more than 34 tons, having the year before amounted to fifty, the confident were dismayed, courage began to fail, spirits became dejected] and, consequently, shares values began to slide.[78] But the slide that began on the 17 August was nothing out of the ordinary, a mere minor flurry typical of the exchange. A few days later, the bulls or 'liefhebbers' as they were called, again took charge, share prices rising on reports that fresh calculations showed the cargo to be, after all, more considerable than latterly estimated.[79]

It was not until a full eight days after the minor dip of 17 August that the great crash of 1688 began and it is certain that what triggered it had nothing to do with appraisals of the value of the East India returns.[80] While modern scholars had noticed that in the fourth of the four dialogues of the *Confusion de confusiones*, Penso de la Vega speaks of some great crisis which hit the stock exchange in 1688,[81] until recently nothing definite was known about this financial crash owing to the fact that Penso generalizes his remarks, dressing them up in an obscure, florid style, providing hardly any dates. The specificity of his comments about a crisis only becomes clear when set beside additional evidence such as is to be found in the unpublished reports of Daniel Petit to London. Just as the stock market recovered its poise, reversing the short retreat of 17 August, the entire situation was suddenly transformed: the 'liefhebbers', reports Penso, were all at once overwhelmed. This resulted from highly disturbing reports spread by certain *accionistas* who convinced the 'cabals', or dealers' informal gatherings, that they had 'penetrated' the deepest secrets of the state and knew for certain that war, involving the Republic, was immanent.

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[76] BL MS Add. 41821, fo. 236v. 'News from The Hague', 13 August 1688; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 848; De Vries and van der Woude, *Nederland,* 520.

[77] 'Die Ladung ist so reich nicht', reported the Relations-Coerier, 'als man sich eingebildet, sintemahl der Einkauff sich nur auff 34 Tonnen Goldes und 40,000 Gulden belaufft, welches ganz ausserhalb Vermuthen ist, zumahl man die Retour viel grösser zu sein gemeynet hat', *Relations-Coerier* 127 (1688), issue 7.

[78] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 174.

[79] Ibid., pp. 173–5.

[80] Ibid., p. 174.

[81] Pringsheim, *Don Joseph de la Vega*, p. xiv; Kellenbenz,' Introduction', pp. xiv, xvii, xx.

What these *accionistas* revealed was that war would break out soon and that 'haviendola, deluviassen las imposiciones, se atropellasen los tributos y ardiesse la Europa con miserias, con horrores, con estragos' [having it, there was be a flood of new impositions, crushing taxes, and Europe would burn with misery, horrors and destruction].[82] Before this, affirms Penso, there had been no such suspicion, a claim corroborated by the despatches of diplomats from The Hague. Thus, it was not until 24 August that the French ambassador at The Hague, the astute comte d'Avaux, learnt that the preparations underway in Holland were not for a punitive expedition against Algiers but designed for a full-scale invasion of England.[83] Another vigilant diplomat, the Polish resident, Moreau, heard only on the same day as the French ambassador that in The Hague there were now persons who held that large-scale naval and military preparations were underway 'et que la flotte est destinée contre l'Angleterre', though he himself, initially, was disinclined to believe this, so improbable did it seem.[84]

'They are at work night and day to get their ships ready' reported Petit to London, from Amsterdam, also on 24 August. But as yet it was far from clear to him what they were for, given Dutch resentment at Louis's economic measures and the international tension generated by his efforts to secure the electorate of Cologne, against the wishes of the Emperor and Pope, for his client Cardinal Fürstenberg. 'But against whom', Petit assured the earl of Middleton, 'is diversely spoken of, some guess it to be to oppose France in case that crown does by force undertake something in favour of the Cardinal Fürstenberg, others say that the equipping of this fleet is to prevent any design the two fleets of England and France may form to their prejudice'.[85]

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[82] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 174–5.

[83] D'Avaux, *Négociations* vi, 203.

[84] BL MS Add. 38495, fo. 9. Moreau to King of Poland, The Hague, 24 August 1688.

Hence, the prevailing mood on 24 and 25 August among the diplomatic community was still one of complete uncertainty. Yet the revelations of a few *accionistas* to the cabals of the Amsterdam stock exchange sufficed to destroy business confidence throughout the exchange. All at once, quite suddenly, the share market collapsed and in the most devastating fashion, dragging the other financial markets in its wake. Experienced hands at the Exchange evidently concluded that the *accionistas* claiming to have 'penetrated' the deepest secrets of the state knew what they were talking about. On 25 August commenced what was soon to be Amsterdam's second most catastrophic financial crash of the century. Evidently, the abruptness of the change took most stock market investors, and most of the business community, by surprise. According to Penso de la Vega, on the first day of the drama, the VOC share price at Amsterdam fell thirty points.[86] If so, the slide, and the psychological turmoil accompanying it, gathered additional momentum over the next couple of days. For in total, during the first four days of the panic, the VOC share price at Amsterdam dropped 210% from 580 to 370, indeed a staggering and (except for 1672) unprecedented fall. A full third, meanwhile, was wiped off the value of WIC shares.[87]

The blow fell so suddenly that investors were not just distraught at the scale of their losses but stupefied, utterly bewildered. Other than a handful of discerning dealers, no-one yet had the remotest notion of what had brought it about. What on earth could have caused 'tan lamentable precipio', such a ruinous fall? 'Good God, what a disaster!' exclaims 'the merchant' in Penso's fourth dialogue. 'Almighty, what a catastrophe!' exclaims 'the philosopher' who has recently acquired some VOC shares and, as a result, lost his equanimity: 'What a collapse! What a thunderbolt!' 'Blessed Heaven!', he adds, 'What a gruesome Day of Judgement! Merciful Lord preserve my senses!'[88] The furious selling of the four opening days of the crash was followed by a stunned lull: 'East India actions have been much at a stand these three days, reported Petit on 31 August, 'the uncertain issue of the conjunctures are the occasion of it'.[89] At this juncture, Petit, d'Albeville, and most other diplomats in the Netherlands still had no definite notion as to what the Dutch military preparations were for, only D'Avaux by this time knowing for certain that the object was to invade England. By 7 September Petit could agree that the Dutch were indeed preparing a major expedition but still reported that 'the discourses and reasons for this equipage are very various, one day they say they will demand reason of France [over commerce and Cologne], another day that they will goe and cause a rebellion in England'.[90] It was not until 14 September that Moreau granted that 'le peuple ne fait plus de difficulté de dire que [la flotte] est pour l'Angleterre', but still remained somewhat sceptical, remarking a week later that 'si cela est le dessein c'est bien conduit et le secret bien gardé'.[91]

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[85] BL MS Add. 41816, fos. 157–8. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 24 August 1688.

[86] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 180; another contemporary report apparently states eighty points, see Carswell, *The Descent on England*, p. 160 where, however, the source of theinformation is not cited.

[87] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 136, 173.

Yet during these fraught weeks the Amsterdam stock market entertained no such doubts. It was an astounding situation. No doubt the stock exchange had fallen further and faster in June 1672 but that was in the midst of full-scale French invasion. By contrast, in late August 1688, nothing at all had actually happened; nor even was anything known for certain by the diplomats or anyone else. Nothing more than rumours, claims to have penetrated secrets unknown to everyone else, had sufficed to wipe over 200 points off the VOC share price in a few days. The slide went furthest, moreover, during the very period of uncertainty in which the diplomatic community was struggling to determine what was really happening and before anything was known for certain, the stock market crash bottoming out in the first week of September. Penso de la Vega, referring to the beginning of September, says that the low-point in the VOC share price was reached at 365%, a full 216 points below the zenith reached in mid-August and this is confirmed by Petit.[92] On

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[88] Ibid., pp. 227–9.

[89] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 16. Petit to Middleton, Amstedam, 31 August 1688.

[90] Ibid., fo. 167. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 7 Sept. 1688.

[91] Ibid. MS Add. 38495, fos. 14v, 19. Moreau to Polish king, The Hague, 14 and 21 September 1688.

[92] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 138, 173; Pringsheim, *Don Joseph de la Vega*, p. xiv.

5 September 1688, reported the latter, main chamber VOC actions were selling in Amsterdam at 366.[93] The lower figure given by Amsterdam's official historiographer, Gregorio Leti, should not therefore be accepted. 'I have seen the actions stand at a value of 550 and fall to a mere 300', he wrote some time after the event, without giving dates; presumably, the latter figure is either due to faulty memory, or a printing error for 360.[94]

The collapse of the VOC share price by over 220 points inevitably affected the entire Exchange. Yet, quite remarkably, as Penso de la Vega asserts, it was precisely when the uncertainty ended and it became known for certain that the Republic was indeed about to invade Britain, and that France would declare war on the Republic, that the stock market recovered its nerve and stemmed the collapse. What transpired next was indeed rather astounding and was greeted by the investing public, as well as the characters in Penso's dialogue, with utter incredulity. But as Penso explains, if rational considerations about return fleets from the Indies and the political conjuncture were what chiefly drove movements in the stock market, the ways in which *accionistas* responded to pressures and stimuli were neither predictable nor altogether rational. Sentiment and psychological impulses—fear, hope, and patriotism—drove the actionists first this way and then that, often decisively affecting the extent to which reports were believed and the way facts were assessed.[95] For precisely when the danger confronting the Republic was revealed in all its stark reality, and the full extent of the risks to which the Dutch state and its shipping were exposed became evident, the 'liefhebbers' regained the upper hand in the stock market, and reversed the slide, engineering an amazing rally. Having disastrously collapsed 'through fear of war', recounts Penso, VOC shares abruptly 'bolbieron a subir 100 despues de saberse ya con evidencia que hay la guerra' [rose again by 100 points when it was known for certain that there would be war].[96] 'The East India actions', wrote a stupefied and still confused Daniel Petit, on 8 September, 'are risen from 366 to 430 since Tuesday the fifth the last'.[97]

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[93] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 173v. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 8 September 1688.

[94] Leti, *Teatro Belgico* ii, 243.

[95] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 2, 60.

[96] Ibid., p. 184.

[97] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 173v. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 8 September 1688.

The recovery began on the day d'Albeville submitted a conciliatory memorial to the States on behalf of James II which may have persuaded some dealers there might not be a general conflict in Europe after all. This first tentative rally was then powerfully reversed, on 9 September, when the French ambassador, d'Avaux, appeared in person to inform the States General that his master was aware that 'cet armement reguarde l'Angeleterre' and delivered a severe warning: should the Dutch move to overthrow His Britannic Majesty, Louis would at once support his fellow monarch and declare war on the Dutch.[98] Share values again began to slide. Yet d'Avaux's intervention which sent shock waves through the courts of Vienna, Madrid, Rome, Turin, and Berlin, and much improved the mood in pro-government circles in London, had only the briefest negative impact on the Amsterdam Exchange which in any case was quickly reversed.

In the immediate wake of d'Avaux's admonition the VOC share price in Amsterdam again shed fifteen or twenty points. But then the amazing and unaccountable rally of early September resumed, VOC shares climbing from 414 to 424, on 14 September, and to no less than 433 two days later.[99] Shares then eased back slightly but throughout the tense weeks that followed, as the invasion fleet made ready to sail and the necessary east winds were eagerly awaited, war with England and France now being as certain as anything could be, the VOC share price remained comparatively buoyant at around 420.[100] Admittedly, some hard-headed strategic considerations helped to buttress the share market. The quarrel between Louis XIV and the Emperor, and the French invasion of the Palatinate, and siege of Philippsburg, on the Rhine, during September, convinced the dealers that there would be no immediate French invasion. Some apparently believed that by the spring the struggle in Britain would be settled in favour of William and his supporters. 'Le siège de Philippsburg', observed d'Avaux later, 'fit augmenter les actions [à Amsterdam] de 10 pour cent et rendit les Etats Généraux fort insolens par la certitude que le Roi ne les attaqueroit pas, ni les Pays-Bas espagnols'.[101]

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[98] Israel, *Anglo-Dutch Moment*, 109.

[99] BL MS Add. 41821, fos. 254v and 257v. 'News from The Hague', 14 and 16 September 1688.

[100] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 236v. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 15 October 1688.

[101] D'Avaux, *Négociations* vi, 273.

Yet general commercial confidence in Amsterdam sagged further. Trade sharply contracted, shipping slackened, and the wider retreat on the Exchange triggered by the stock market crash was not halted. Many investors had by now lost colossal sums in the stock market. Given that each VOC share had a face value of 500 pounds Flemish, or 3,000 guilders, on the eve of the crash, in mid August, at 580% each VOC share was valued at over 17,000 guilders.[102] During the initial collapse, or *precipio*, in late August, Penso's 'philosopher' exclaims disconsolately: 'mas yo pierdo ya de 552¾ a 370 que son 5,430 en la partida!', meaning that he had lost 5,430 guilders on every share.[103] Losses on WIC actions, and other bonds and securities were also spectacular. Shares in the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC, recounts Penso, fell during the first days of the crash, from 110 to 75%, on a face value of 1,000 pounds Flemish. This means the value of each share in four days dropped from 6,600 to 4,500 guilders.[104] Nor did WIC actions recover to the same extent as those of the VOC, owing to the dispiriting news from Madrid that the house of Coymans was now to lose the *asiento* for slave deliveries to the Spanish Indies and that Curaçao's role was hence likely to be reduced.[105] 'West India actions', reported Petit on 5 October, 'are so inconsiderable that nobody will buy them'.[106] Lopes Suasso and Belmonte must have lost immense amounts on this front.

'Obligations upon the countrey' [i.e. States of Holland bonds], Petit further reported, 'begin also to fall extreamly'.[107] In fact, they had already dropped precipitately since late August and there had been a further punishing further slide following d'Avaux's admonition to the States. But it was noticeable, here again, that 'obligations sur la province d'Hollande' had been slow to rally alongside VOC shares after 9 September, though by 16 September they had risen from their nadir by 3%.[108] At the same time, the money market tightened, interest rates having been at spectacularly low levels for years suddenly doubled within days. 'They say', reported d'Albeville, on 7 September, referring to the Huguenots, that the 'refugiés have four per cent interests'.[109] Where, only two months before, one could raise money in Amsterdam without difficulty at only 2%, suddenly in the wake of the crash, 'on n'en peut avoir à moins de 4 pour cent d'interest en donnant de bonnes assurances'.[110] But perhaps the most damaging aspect of the crash for the Amsterdam business community was less the drop in share and bond values, devastating though this undoubtedly was for personal and family fortunes, than the financial and commercial dislocation resulting from the panic selling of late August. Brokers and investors simply sold faster than correspondents and buyers could settle their bills. Thus huge sums owed were withheld while, amid the panic, creditors called in debts at the worst possible moment. The upshot was a disastrous confusion and further loss of confidence, producing finally a chain reaction of merchant bankruptcies, particularly in late September and early October.[111]

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[102] Kellenbenz, 'Introduction', p. xv.

[103] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 138.

[104] Ibid., p. 136: 'sabed que las acciones del Oost se largan por 370 y las del West por 75'; Ehrenberg, 'Amsterdamer Aktienspekulation', 817.

[105] Wright, 'The Coymans Asiento', 55–8.

[106] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 214v. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 28 September/8 October 1688.

[107] Ibid.

[108] BL MS Add. 41821, fo. 257v. 'News from The Hague', 16 September 1688.

'The East India actions', explained Petit, on 28 September, 'which are of late so very much fallen and by which Monsieur Van Beuningen loses already some tons of gold [i.e. several hundred thousand guilders] have ruined a great many merchants; one worth above 150,000 pounds sterling is upon breaking'.[112] 'The great fall of the East India actions', he added a week later, 'has already ruined several of our greatest merchants here and many more must and will undoubtedly follow'.[113] The best known victim of the crash was indeed the famous ex-burgomaster of Amsterdam, Coenraaad van Beuningen (1622–93), who as a former director of the VOC, had vowed to improve share values by cutting back corruption and improving dividends. He had been showing signs of mental instability for some time. But only now, under the impact of his staggering losses, did his mind snap. 'Van Beuningen is turned mad for his losses by the actions', wrote D'Albeville to London, on 19 October, 'this is the end of his philosophie and great witt'.[114] 'Monsieur Van Beuningen has lost his senses within these ten days past', confirmed Petit shortly afterwards, 'it proceeded from the very great losses which he and his relations suffer by the East India actions in which they were great traders'.[115]

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[109] Ibid., fo. 170v. D'Albeville to Middleton, The Hague, 7 September 1688.

[110] BL MS Add. 41821, fo. 254v. 'News from The Hague', 14 September 1688.

[111] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 274–6.

[112] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 199v. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 5 October 1688.

[113] Ibid., fo. 214v. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 5 October 1688.

[114] Ibid., fo. 24o. D'Albeville to Middleton, The Hague, 15 October 1688; De Vries and Van der Woude, *Nederland*, 520.

As October wore on and William III's armada remained at Hellevoetsluis awaiting favourable winds to carry it to England, the Republic was dangerously poised on the brink of war with both England and France. Few felt inclined to initiate fresh overseas commercial transactions within Europe. Consequently, there is nothing surprising about the fact that the recession deepened and marine insurance rates rose steeply. On 15 October, Petit observed that 'trade begins to be slender'.[116] Four days later he reported that 'trade and navigation lye almost dead, bankrupts are dayly made among the great merchants here'.[117] Yet the stock market, having precipitated the wider crash in the first place, seemed now altogether released from the downward pressures gripping the rest of the Exchange. All hint of the frenzied earlier panic had vanished. 'East India actions', remarked Petit on 15 October, 'are at a stand viz about 420'.[118]

Penso de la Vega, like so many others, was considerably perplexed by the powerful rally on the Amsterdam stock exchange in the aftermath of d'Avaux's dire warning to the States of 9 September. Given the frenzy afflicting the market in late August, this sudden steadiness of nerve and robustness of the VOC share price, in the face of heightened and more certain danger, seemed both perverse and paradoxical. The English ambassador judged the Dutch mood completely irrational: 'the people generally', he reported to London, 'are everywhere mad for warre both against England and France, those of Amsterdam more than any, and beyond all reason and imagination'.[119] But mad or not the stock market was unquestionably being buoyed up by a degree of confidence among certain *accionistas* which the diplomats at The Hague found hard to account for.[120] 'Nous voyons aujourd'huy', commented Moreau, 'que ces mesmes gens qui ne peuvent faire valoir leur commerce et leur navigation que par la paix souhaitent la guerre avec fureur, et que sur la nouvelle du siège de Philippsbourg et l'entrée des troupes en Allemagne, le capital des biens a commencé à renchérir considérablement'.[121] But however one explained it, the Jewish brokers as well as the Dutch common man seemed suddenly convinced that the vast fleet being prepared for the invasion of England would be as successful in that exceedingly risky and difficult enterprise as the *armada* of Philip II, of 1588, had been unsuccessful.

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[115] BL MS Add. 41816, fos. 245–6. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 19 October 1688.

[116] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 236v. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 15 October 1688.

[117] Ibid., fo. 245. Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, 19 October 1688.

[118] Ibid., fo. 236v.

[119] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 170v. D'Albeville to Middleton, The Hague, 7 Sept. 1688.

[120] BL MS Add. 38495, fo. 28v. Moreau to the king of Poland, The Hague, 12 Oct. 1688; D'Avaux, *Négociations* vi, 288.

Obviously this mysterious confidence emanated from select circles in The Hague and Amsterdam. The Prince of Orange's own coolness under pressure, and quiet confidence in himself, were well known but hardly sufficed to generate so astounding a rally in the stock market. Moreover, while the invasion plans and high strategy, as well as the pending propaganda campaign, were concocted by the Stadholder and his entourage in The Hague, most of the actual financing, organization and provisioning of the invasion fleet went on not in The Hague but in Amsterdam where some 60% of the transports and accompanying war fleet were being made ready, under the direction of the secretary of the local Admiralty College, Job de Wildt.[122] As commerce and finance slackened and the general slump took hold, sectors of the city became caught up in a crescendo of activity orchestrated by de Wildt and the contractors who supported the Stadholder. Vessels were hired by the dozen and fitted out. Manufacture of weapons, boots, saddles and uniforms surged. 'The people that are employed here by the Admiralty', reported Petit in mid October, 'are night and day att work, Sundays not excepted; they are about 1,800 in number'.[123]

Furthermore, it became clear that many of those most closely involved in financing and provisioning the invasion fleet, and the war effort more generally, were among the foremost financiers and stock exchange dealers. 'One Pereira, a Jew is [the fleet's] commissioner for victuals', reported d'Albeville to London, referring to the army contractor Jacob Pereira who did indeed handle the bulk of the provisioning of the Amsterdam contingent of the invasion armada.[124] Meanwhile, Antonio (Moseh) Alvares Machado who signed a contract with the States General, on 25 October 1688, for provisioning the garrisons of the Republic protecting the eastern frontier from the French, took charge of the provisioning of the army.[125] Jeronimo Nunes da Costa advanced the marching costs of the Württemberg contingent sent to reinforce the Dutch land frontiers while, in November, the Baron Lopes Suasso signed a contract with the receiver-general of the States General to advance 188,000 guilders within ten days to the governor of Swedish Pomerania to cover the marching costs of the 6,000 Swedish troops likewise hired by the States to stiffen the Dutch frontier garrisons.[126] Reports reaching the French ambassador d'Avaux, that the Whig opposition to James in England were subsidising the expedition, and had remitted large sums from England to Holland, noted that 'une partie avoit été envoyée par lettres de change, dont Suasso en avoit payé quelques-unes'.[127]

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[121] BL MS Add. 38495, fos. 28v–9. Moreau to king of Poland, The Hague, 12 Oct. 1688.

[122] ARH SG 5625/ii. *Gecommitteerden raden* of the Admiralty to SG, The Hague, 4 Nov. 1688; De Jonge, *Geschiedenis* iii, 44, 721–2.

[123] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 234.

It is perhaps not surprising that those who gambled on William's success by advancing large sums in this way, had an vested interest also in backing his enterprise by buying up cheap shares on the stock exchange. The Sephardi financiers were doubtless acting out of calculated self interest. They had much to lose if shares failed to recover, or fell further. But there is also a sense, reflected in Penso de la Vega who urges his (presumably mainly Sephardic readers—since his text is in Spanish), to support the fatherland by buying shares in the East and West India Companies, in which they prided themselves in displaying their loyalty and supporting the state at an ominous and critical juncture. Buying shares at this point was a huge gamble. But it was also a form of political intervention, a way of expressing confidence in the Republic and its armed forces at a vital moment. The risks they were taking no doubt lent added fervour to the prayers recited at the special service held on the eve of the Stadholder's departure for England in the Portuguese synagogue in Amsterdam 'to implore God to ensure the triumph of the Prince and his armada'.[128] As we see from the text of the special prayer recited in that service and subsequently rendered into Dutch and published, the congregation prayed, in Portuguese, for the success of their sovereign 'the States of Holland', and of the States General and the Prince of Orange in their great undertaking in England.[129]

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[124] BL MS Add. 41816, fo. 229. D'Albeville to Middleton, The Hague, 9 Oct. 1688; Childs, *British Army of William III*, 250; 'Den Boer and Israel.' 'William III and the Glorious Revolution', 440.

[125] ARH SG *Raad van State* 109, fo. 520v. res. 25 Oct. 1688; BL MS Add. 38695, fos. 72–3.

[126] ARH SG 3318, fo. 488v. res. 30 Nov. 1688.

[127] D'Avaux, *Négociations* vi, 230.

This 'patriotic' reaction on the stock exchange began tentatively on 5 September. It is striking that in his description of the stock brokers' cabals in which groups met to fix prices at given times, Penso de la Vega portrays their gatherings in smoke-filled coffee-shops, as contests, even 'battles' between 'underminers', or 'bears', on the one hand, motivated solely by selfish self-interest and 'bulls', or 'patriotic' actionists, on the other, eager for profit for themselves but also anxious for the well-being and reputation of the republic, and the colonial companies, and who endeavour to drive up the value of their shares. No doubt he deliberately stressed this aspect of what he calls *liefhebrería*, in order to help defend the reputation of the Dutch Sephardim in response to the current of bitter complaints that the Jews, out to profit at the expense of others, had not only attracted excessive and unstable cash flows to the stock market, but actually engineered the crash, by manipulating the news and driving the 'price of actions down, belittling the Dutch state and the companies'.[130] A clique of Sephardic dealers one of whom, a hostile critic named as 'Mezquita',[131] had indeed worked to depress share prices, and for this purpose exploited adverse and frightening rumours. Nevertheless, as Penso insists, and with obvious justification, despite the extreme precariousness of the Republic's situation, the 'contraminores', or bears, were solidly defeated in the actionists' cabals during the long autumn months of 1688. Indeed, Penso de la Vega contributed in his own way to the rally, through his book, urging his fellow Sephardim to avoid the practices of 'undermining' like the plague and to strive always to be patriotic in their stock exchange dealings that is responsible 'liefhebbers' who, without taking undue risks with their families' capital, support the shares and show themselves thereby 'amantes de la patria, del estado y de la Compania

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[128] Franco Mendes, *Memorias*, 98.

[129] *Gebedt gedaen op Woensdag, sijnde den 27 Oktober 1688, door de Portugeese joden in hare kerck, ofte synagoge, binnen Amsterdam* (Knuttel, 12784a) (Amsterdam, 1688).

[130] *Relaes en contradictie*, 1–3.

[131] Ibid., p. 9.

[de las Indias Orientales]'.[132] Patriotic investors in the stock exchange, he asserts, 'continuamente dessean que las acciones suban y que vengan nuebas tan felices que en un punto caminen, corran, batan las plumas, y remontan las alas' [continually desire that the actions go up and that such good news comes that in one moment there is a flurry of pens and spirits rise. The 'liefhebbers' take considerable risks with their money, but they are not afraid; and by their boldness they strengthen and assist the state: 'los liefhebberen son como la Zorafa que de nada se espanta' [the liefhebbers are like the Zorafa which is afraid of nothing].

From mid September 1688 onwards the Amsterdam stock exchange did indeed surprise onlookers by exuding, and helping to build, an unfathomable confidence. But the 'liefhebbers' were vindicated by William III's success in England and, after that, even the formidable difficulties still facing the Stadholder and his army in Scotland and Ireland and the setbacks suffered by the new combined Anglo-Dutch army in Flanders failed seriously to depress the stock market. The quarrel between William III and the Amsterdam city government early in 1690 over the Prince's rights in the annual selection of Amsterdam's magistrates, revealing divisions at the heart of the government in the midst of a war, briefly unnerved the market. But at the first hint that the row was about to be patched up the stock exchange registered vigorous approval by rallying strongly. On 10 March 1690, the English resident at The Hague noted that the 'actions at Amsterdam are risen prodigiously uppon hopes of an agreement'.[133] Indeed, even a major defeat in the transformed strategic context after the Stadholder's successful dethroning of his father-in-law, and acquisition of the thrones of England, Scotland and Ireland, seemed incapable of causing the stock exchange more than a minor fit of nerves. This was vividly illustrated during the difficult and potentially grave situation which developed during June 1690 before the Battle of the Boyne. There was great uncertainty about the situation in Ireland and for the moment the French were victorious at sea, raising the possibility of a pro-Stuart counter-landing in England; and when, on top of this the Anglo-Dutch army operating in the southern Netherlands, under Waldeck, was seriously defeated at the battle of Fleurus, the news of which reached Amsterdam several days before that of the victory at the Boyne, the stock market remained almost wilfully undeterred. At Fleurus, the French slaughtered 4,600 Dutch troops, wounded many more and captured a further 4,000 besides most of the Dutch field artillery and large quantities of stores. Yet, to the surprise of the diplomats, the Amsterdam *accionistas*, were not greatly perturbed: 'there has been a big battle lost', observed the English resident at The Hague, 'but there is not much consternation in Holland, the actions at Amsterdam are fallen onely from 496 to 487 and in another time they would have fallen fifty per cent'.[134]

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[132] Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones*, 36; Wills, *1688. A Global History*, 216.
[133] PRO SP 84/221, fo. 51. Aglionby to Warre, The Hague, 10 March 1690.

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[134] Ibid., fo. 157v. Aglionby to Warre, The Hague, 7 July 1690.

Appendix 1: Movements of the VOC Share Price (Amsterdam Chamber) on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 1671–90*

Date	*Conjuncture*	*Share Prices/movements*
Autumn 1671	–	572
June 1672	French invasion	250/340
May 1675	peace with England	428/443
13 July 1676	successes against France	450
April 1681	French seizure of Strasbourg	395½
23 Jan. 1682		410
April 1682		441/447
Sept. 1682		461/462
Nov. 1682	French capture Luxembourg	448
May 1683	further French advances	427/402
June 1683	William III quarrels with Amsterdam	401/408
Aug. 1683	continuing Dutch political crisis	395/403
Autumn 1684	resolution of Dutch crisis	470
5 Feb. 1685		479
late 1687		525
April 1688		560/568
17/24 May 1688		566/576
June 1688	deteriorating relations with France	572/567
13/29 July 1688	fears for returning VOC fleet	569/566
7 Aug. 1688	VOC fleet returns safely	560/575½
13 Aug. 1688	Favourable VOC returns	582/580
25 Aug. 1688	The great Crash of 1688 begins	580/500
26/29 Aug. 1688	Stock exchange panic	500/370
1/5 Sept. 1688	The crash bottoms out	370/365
5/8 Sept. 1688	strong rally begins	366/430
9/14 Sept. 1688	Louis XIV threatens war	430/414
14/16 Sept. 1688	rally resumes	414/433
15 Oct. 1688	Invasion of England delayed	420
Dec. 1688	rising confidence	(over 450?)
July 1690	Dutch defeat at Fleurus	496/487

* The references for most of these share prices are given in the text; the remainder are from GAA PJG 334.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE DUTCH SEPHARDI ÉLITE AT THE END OF THE 17TH CENTURY: THE OBSERVATIONS OF GREGORIO LETI (1631–1701)*

It is remarkable that Gregorio Leti's discussion of the Amsterdam Sephardi élite at the close of the seventeenth century has been very little utilised or referred to by historians of the Jews in early modern times. Leti's quite extensive observations of this select group of families undoubtedly represents a major, and rare type of, source which not only provides a certain amount of detail not found, or not found in the same form, elsewhere but also opens up fresh and striking perspectives in a way that scarcely any other source does. It is not hard to see, though, why Leti has been widely neglected as a observer of the Dutch Jewish scene: the relevant sections of text have simply gone unnoticed being liberally scattered in inconspicuous places in his extremely prolific literary output, buried in volumes which appear to be unconnected with matters of Jewish interest.

The illegitimate son of a Milanese nobleman, Gregorio Leti (1631–1701) was a literary adventurer who led a colourful and somewhat unconventional life. After forsaking his native Italy, filled with angry resentment against ecclesiastical authority and petty despotism, he settled in Geneva where he married and converted from Catholicism to the Reformed faith. He was as far from being a pious Calvinist, however, as he was from being a good Catholic, and in 1679, following a public enquiry into his alleged inclination towards the maxims of Machiavelli and other aspects of his writings, especially his historical passages concerning the Reformation, he was ejected from Geneva as an undesirable influence on youth and on public morality.[1] After this, in many ways, the pivotal experience of his life, he moved on, first to the Paris of Louis XIV and then to the London of Charles II, but failed to establish himself in either capital, despite his growing reputation as a writer of fashionable works on the history of Italy, Spain, France, Germany and other lands. This was due to his scantily veiled anti-Catholicism and doubtless partly also to the politically indiscreet character of some of his historical writing.

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[1] Fassò, *Aventuriere della penna del seicento*, 71, 88, 100.

On quitting England, in 1683, he decided to sample the Dutch Republic and, finding Amsterdam much to his taste, remained there for the remaining eighteen years of his life. Both the unparalleled bulk and frequently hack nature of his writings can be largely explained by his being an early instance of a professional writer living mainly by his pen. Although he knew no Dutch on arriving in Holland, his standing as a historical writer was by now such that he rapidly moved to the forefront of the expatriate literary *monde* of Amsterdam.[2] In October 1685, he was appointed civic historiographer by the Amsterdam city government at a yearly salary of four hundred guilders. Besides historical research, his duties included giving seminars on history, in French, for the sons of the regent oligarchy. His appointment was renewed in 1689 when his remuneration was raised to six hundred guilders. At the same time, his writing assumed a strongly pro-Dutch hue and he developed into a leading anti-Louis XIV propagandist, not least in the monumental heroic poem which he wrote and published in Italian, celebrating William III's expedition to England in 1688.

Though often facile, dull and filled with tiresome flattery, the works Leti penned during his Dutch period do also have a serious side which, still today, deserves a measure of attention. Though necessarily discreet in his remarks about the Dutch, he was always a tireless champion of religious and intellectual toleration and a scathing critic of bigotry whether Catholic, Lutheran or (Swiss) Calvinist.[3] Furthermore, he went further than probably any other early Enlightenment writer in elevating the Dutch Republic to the status of a universal model of abiding significance for all humanity, comparing the United Provinces favourably with the (in his view) corrupt and decayed republics of Venice, Genoa and Geneva.[4] What he esteemed most about the Dutch Republic was the unique combination he found there of an unparalleled political, religious and intellectual freedom—and of freedom to come and go (including for foreigners like himself)[5]—with good order, security, relative freedom from crime, and benevolent government.[6]

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[2] Ibid., 219–20.

[3] Cameroni, *Uno scrittore avventuriero*, 162–4.

[4] See, for instance, Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici i*, *raguaglio* 3, pp. 262–5 *et seq.*

Leti's observations on the Jews in the United Provinces have to be placed in this specific early Enlightenment republican context and linked especially, perhaps, to his defence of freedom for women.[7] It is difficult for us today, in our more liberal age, to appreciate fully the extent to which Dutch society generated unease and an unflattering image in late seventeenth-century Europe.[8] But it is a fact that contemporary comment on the part of foreign visitors, and above all visiting ecclesiastics, reveals a strong current of aversion and disdain for a society marked by a weak sense of social hierarchy which accorded a previously unheard of degree of freedom to women and Jews. It required an unconventional spirit such as that of this indefatigable Milanese token Calvinist, and some courage, expressly to champion freedom of women and Jews in print. According to Leti, contemporaries were needlessly afraid of female emancipation for the experience of the Dutch Republic proved that where women are allowed independence and freedom they do not become brazen, disorderly in life-style or promiscuous but, on the contrary, cultivate virtue to a greater degree, and dress more demurely—covering up more of the bosom—than in Italy or France where they are constantly chaperoned and tyrannised over by men. Similarly, critics were wrong, he insisted, to believe that the Jews were allowed too much freedom in Amsterdam. For when they are given freedom and independence they repay the society which thus accords them their dignity by making useful and valued contributions to the state and by cultivating the arts, refinement, and virtue.

Like most champions of toleration and freedom of thought in the early Enlightenment, Leti was decidedly no defender of Judaism, Jewishness or Jewish learning as such. If he boldly asserts the right of Jews to a place in general society, and their potential worth to the state and cultural life, he contemptuously dismisses their cult, rites and religious culture as worthless, or at least unworthy of anyone else's attention. We meet this disdain, among other places, in his two-volume account of England where he describes the Sephardi synagogue in London. Services there, asserts Leti, were unsightly, discordant to the ear, and characterised by 'gesti ridicolosissimi'.[9] Nor in his later *Teatro Belgico* (2 vols. Amsterdam, 1690) was he any kinder regarding services in the Portuguese synagogue at Amsterdam. Christians often come there to witness the proceedings, he observes, but these 'per dire il vere son di poca edificatione: gridano, cantano salmi con voci senza tuono, e senza concerto, con il soliti veli sul cappello, ma no veggo gran ifferenza della maniera con la quale negotiano nella Borsa, e quella con la quale si tengono nella sinagoga' [to tell the truth are scarcely edifying: they screech, sing psalms with voices without tone or harmony, with the usual prayer shawls on their heads; but I see no great difference between the manner in which they haggle at the Exchange and that with which they conduct themselves in synagogue'].[10]

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[5] 'Ma a proposito di forstieri', insisted Leti, 'diro che questi hanno grandissima libertà, poiche entrano e escono a loro piacere, senza esser tropo ricercati ne esaminati come se fa in italia, o in Francia, o[. . .]in Germania', Leti, *Teatro Belgico* ii, 406.

[6] Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* i, raguaglio 3, pp. 408–10.

[7] See Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 734.

[8] Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 1–2.

But if he is distinctly unimpressed with Jewish liturgy and music, and believes the Jews have nothing to teach Christians here,[11] in contrast to most contemporary observers, he also takes comparatively little interest in the economic activities of the Jews. While he does suggest that tolerating, and accommodating, at any rate the better-off Jews brings society tangible economic benefits and does not doubt that where Spain ruined herself by expelling the 'Jews, Marranos and Moors', more enlightened polities such as Venice, Tuscany, and Hamburg had enriched themselves by permitting and encouraging Jewish immigration,[12] this is not a prominent theme in his writing on the subject. Moreover, he is acutely aware of the economic and what he sees as the cultural poverty of the mass of Ashkenazic Jewry and tends to dismiss this group as being of little potential value to society. His main point with regard to the Ashkenazim is that those who fear the effects of tolerating Jews, allowing them more freedom and dignity, and better opportunities for residence, are wrong to imagine that such a policy would precipitate a massive, uncontrollable and degrading influx of poor German Jews.[13]

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[9] Leti, *Del teatro Brittanico* I, 251–2, 549–50.
[10] Leti, *Teatro belgico* ii, 337; Kaplan, 'Gente política', 26.
[11] Leti, *Teatro belgico*, ii, 337.
[12] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 731–2.
[13] Ibid., p. 724.

Indeed, he tries to prove with a not particularly convincing display of statistical knowledge that the number of (mainly destitute) German Jewish families in the Dutch Republic was in fact minute or at least far less significant the number of Sephardim. His statistics for the latter are not far from the mark. He states that in 1690 there were around 450 Portuguese Jewish families in Amsterdam, implying a total of nearly 3,000 since he habitually multiplies numbers of families by six to reach total figures.[14] The Jewish community, Sephardic and Ashkenazic, of Rotterdam, he says, (gliding over the fact that most were Ashkenazim) amounted to eighty families or some 480 souls.[15] But then, in a wild underestimate, he assures readers that at Amsterdam 'in quanto al numero de Guidei tedeschi non arrivano a cento famiglie che vuol dire, sei cento persone in circa'.[16] But however incorrect, this assertion was consistent with his earlier claim in *Il Ceremoniale historico e politico* (6 vols. Amsterdam, 1685) that the total number of Jewish families, Sephardic and Ashkenazic, in Amsterdam, stood at only around 570, or some 3,420 souls in all, or in any case 'non arrivano a quatro mila' [they do not amount to 4,000].[17] To round off his misleading statistical picture, he states, further on in the *Teatro belgico*, that the total number of Jews in the Dutch Republic amounted to no more than 1,400 families, yielding a grand total of 8,400 individuals which, according to the estimates of modern historians, was considerably below the true figure.[18]

Leti's central thesis when discussion g the Jews, however, is that the Dutch Republic, by granting them freedom to trade, citizenship and public honours—if not access to public office, or economic equality with non-Jews—thereby according them higher status than they possessed elsewhere in Europe, only benefited by doing so. For the Jews so dignified demonstrate a love for, and loyalty to, the state which, in turn, render it stronger and more prosperous than it would be otherwise. Consequently, he focuses his attention mainly on the standing, achievements, life-style and attitudes of a group who were virtually unique in Europe—Amsterdam's Sephardic Jewish aristocracy—an élite cultivated, wealthy and held in high public regard who performed financial, diplomatic and other services for the state, pursued all the arts of refinement, and resided in 'palazzi e case nobilissime'. Leti cannot exclude wealthy Ashkenazic Court Jews in principle if he is to be in any way consistent with his own doctrine that dignified treatment towards the Jews, or any generally despised group of humanity, will yield a dignified result and, indeed, when discussing the Jews of Berlin, in a work published in 1687, Leti had singled out a Court Jew, 'il signor Joost Libman [i.e. Jost Liebmann (c. 1640–1702)]', for many years the presiding figure among the Berlin community who, he says, had the privilege 'd'esser gioielliere de queste serenissimi Altezze' [of being jeweller to these serene highnesses] the electors of Brandenburg, as being a man 'che in fatti serve con puntualità e con fedeltà' [that serves in fact punctually and faithfully] and who accordingly was looked on with high regard by the elector and all the courtiers, 'più di quello che permette quell'uso ordinario de' Christiani verso i Giudei; perche in fatti dico e buona persona e honorevole' [more than the usual Christian treatment of the Jews would permit; for indeed I say he is a fine person and an honourable one].[19] But in the Dutch context it is the Sephardic aristocracy alone which interests him.

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[14] Leti, *Teatro belgico* ii, 336; the conventional figure accepted by modern historians has been around 3,000, see, for instance, Vaz Dias, 'Over de vermogenstoestand', 169; Israel, *European Jewry*, 198; however, Nusteling, in his recent study on this topic, has proposed a new estimate of around 4,500, see Nusteling, 'Jews in the Republic', 51–3, 56–7.

[15] Leti, *Teatro belgico* ii, 132; the main synagogue of Rotterdam, inaugurated in 1725, seatd around 100 families, see Reijnders, *Van "Joodsche Natien"*, 154.

[16] Leti, *Tearo belgico* ii, 336; Bloom claimed there were around 5,000 Ashkenazim in Amsterdam in 1674, a figure which Kaplan first accepted and then revised downwards, to at most around 3,000 (including about 500 Polish Jews), see Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 31, Kaplan, *Alternative Path*, 106; Nusteling, in his recent study, has revised this figure further downwards to around 2,000 Ashkenazim, see Nusteling, 'Jews in the Republic', 53.

[17] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 725.

[18] However, it was not as much below the probable real figure as it seemed to historians until recently; according to Nusteling, the most authoritative recent voice on this topic, at a slightly later date, in 1700, there was a total of about 8,000 Jews in Amsterdam and another 3,500 or so outside, yielding a grand total for the Jewish population of the United Provinces of around 11,500, see Nusteling, 'Jews in the Republic', 55–6.

Up to a point, Leti praises the entire Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community for its social graces and general air of refinement: 'la sinagoga de' Portoghesi sembra un seggio di Nobili, gente ben fatta, quasi tutta civile, ben vestita, ricca e che fa gran figura' [the synagogue of the Portuguese seems like the seat of nobles, cultivated people, almost all well-mannered, well-dressed, rich and who look impressive].[20] Many of these families, says, Leti possess great wealth, two or three having estates of over a million guilders, and more than six over half a million: 'in somma tra queste 450 famiglie si fa il conto che vi siano più di venti milioni di facoltà, la maggior parte in gemme, in contanti, in buone lettere' [in sum among these 450 families it is estimated that there are more than twenty million guilders worth of wealth, the greater part in gems, cash and securities].[21] In one place he even provides a partial list of men belonging to the upper strata of the community which reads as follows:

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[19] Leti, *Rittrati historici, politici, chronologici e genealogici* i, 334.

[20] Leti, *Il ceremoniale* v, 728; Kaplan, 'Gente política', 25.

> il Barone Antonio Lopez Suasso, David Emmanuel de Pinto, Giacob Perera, Giacomo del Prado, Giacomo de Pinto, Giacomo Aboaf Ozorio, Francisco Emanuel Dias Jorge, Moise Perera, Henrique Mendes de Silva, Abramo del Soto, Emanuel de Pinto, Giosepe e Abramo Felix, Giacomo e David Bueno de Meschita, Abramo Telles, Antonio Alvare [Machado], Simone e Luigi Rodrigues de Souze, Emanuel de Vega, il proveditore di Mascado, Emanuel Gomes de Silva, e altrui.[22]

But as soon as he begins to elaborate further, Leti loses interest in the wider group and focuses almost entirely on the handful of leading figures those who performed notable services for the state and who, at the same time, presided over the Sephardic Jewish community. These were the men who best illustrated his argument and are the ones that readers and educated citizens of Amsterdam would want to know about. It would also appear, from certain of his remarks, as we shall see, that these were the men with whom Leti himself had come into personal contact. As a recent immigrant himself from southern Europe who knew little Dutch, to begin with, Leti evidently spent much of his time not only with other Italians and Huguenots (his wife was a daughter of Jean le Clerc) but also with these polished cosmopolitans who generally spoke Portuguese or Spanish among themselves. He clearly visited and enjoyed hospitality at several of their houses and knew at least several of those whom he describes personally.

In one case, that of Baron Manuel de Belmonte, Resident or as Leti calls him 'Agent-General' of the Spanish crown at Amsterdam, we know that he came into personal contact right at the start of his career in the city whilst finalising the manuscript of his *Il Ceremoniale.* At that moment, rumours reached the diplomatic community in The Hague, that the new civic historiographer had a great deal to say in his new book about the leading European powers, especially France and Spain and that, the first volume being dedicated to Louis XIV, it contained much that was flattering to France. At this point, Belmonte came to see Leti, at the instigation of the Spanish ambassador at The Hague, and allegedly offered a large sum if he would delete such passages as were unflattering to Spain. The author refused, however, proudly asserting subsequently that he would not compromise his integrity as a searcher after historical truth,[23]

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[21] Leti, *Teatro belgico* ii, 336.

[22] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, p. 725; 'Giacomo del Prado' was the alias of the Isaac del Prado; Henrique (alias Isaac) Mendes da Silva and Abraham del Sotto, were both *parnasim* in 1689, as had been Abraham Telles, in 1685, and Jacob Bueno de Mezquita, in 1687, GAA PJG 334/1323 'Registro dos parnasim', p. 14.

The Sephardic personality about whom Leti has most to say is Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (Moseh Curiel) (1620–1697) who had held the title of 'Agent of the Crown of Portugal in the United Provinces' since May 1645 and been raised the following year by King João IV of Portugal to the noble status of 'cavaleiro fidalgo da casa real'.[24] Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, records Leti, had performed many significant services for Portugal and during long periods when there had been no resident Portuguese ambassador at The Hague had in effect acted as Portugal's minister in the Dutch Republic. Leti further remarks in his *Raguagli historici*, first published the year after Jeronimo's death, in 1698, but then reissued in 1700, that the Portuguese Council of State, in Lisbon was so pleased with his services that no sooner had the news of his demise reached Portugal than patents were issued appointing his eldest surviving son, Alexandre Nunes da Costa with the same honours and privileges as his father 'e con lettere obligantissime'.[25] Alexandre Nunes da Costa (Selomoh Curiel) (1655–1712) was destined to be much less active than his father had been both as 'Agent of Portugal' and as a community leader, though he was named Portuguese *chargé d'affaires* in the Republic, in 1698 during the absence of the ambassador, Francisco de Sousa Pacheco.[26] In

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[23] Fassò, *Avventuriere della penna*, 230.

[24] On Nunes da Costa, see, Swetschinski, 'An Amsterdam Jewish Merchant-Diplomat', 3–30; Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, 171–95.

[25] Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio I, p. 123; Jeronimo had four married sons, the eldest of whom, Duarte Nunes da Costa (Aaron Curiel (1650–95)—who served as *gabay* in 1689 and to whom Joseph Penso de la Vega dedicated his *Confusion de Confusiones*, in 1688—died two years before his father; a third son, Francisco Nunes da Costa (Jacob Curiel) died only five years after his father, so that of the four, only Alvaro lived to witness the Peace of Utrecht (1713).

[26] See ARH SG 7104. Sousa Pacheco to SG, The Hague, 11 Feb. 1698.

1700, he was elected to serve as *parnas* of the Amsterdam community but, for whatever reason, declined the honour and was not subsequently re-elected.[27]

But having acknowledged Jeronimo's services for Portugal, Leti at once goes on to assert that this pre-eminent Sephardi aristocrat had also performed many signal services for the Dutch Republic. He was regarded indeed as citizen of such rare merit that in recognition of his tireless 'zeal for the republic', the States General had presented him with 'una bellisima catena d'oro, e misteriosissimo medaglia' and with the greatly prized and rare privilege of exemption from taxation, an honour enjoyed by scarcely ten other men aside from accredited ambassadors, in the whole of the United Provinces.[28] Several small details which Leti provides would seem to indicate some familiarity with the Nunes da Costa household. Thus he mentions the exact date of Jeronimo's death (16 January 1697) and says that Alexandre continued to preside over the family firm, together with his youngest brother, Alvaro, but that out of veneration for their father, the brothers continued to trade under the name 'Geronimo Nunes da Costa e figli'.

A second pre-eminent figure to whom Leti devotes considerable space is the Baron Manuel de Belmonte, first 'Agent', then 'Agent-General' and finally, from 1679—during the summer of which he was the only Spanish representative in the Republic—'Resident' of Spain in the United Provinces.[29] Leti stresses, once again, that in several politically crucial moments when there had been no Spanish ambassador at The Hague, Belmonte who he says was always extraordinarily well stocked with foreign news, had served as Spain's representative to the States General. This had often involved him in statecraft at the highest level, as, for instance, in 1675 when he had helped negotiate the arrangements under which a Dutch naval force, under de Ruyter, was sent to the Mediterranean, partly at Spanish expense, to help Spain defend the island against the French.

Such service was fulsomely acknowledged in the royal patent ennobling Belmonte, issued by King Carlos II of Spain at Madrid, on 11 June 1693, and bestowed in a ceremony conducted by the Spanish ambassador at The Hague, on 20 August 1693, where it is stated that through his energetic efforts at The Hague, in the years 1677–8, 'il auroit traversé les deligeances de l'ambassadeur de France, pour attirer les Hollandois [i.e. the States of Holland] à son parti et fait connoître aux États Généraux leur véritable interest, d'où sauroit conçu l'Alliance avec l'Angleterre la quelle auroit détenu les vastes desseins du Roy très Chrestien'.[30] Furthermore, stated the patent of ennoblement, in the name of Carlos II 'dès qu'il se seroit dedié à notre service, il sauroit continuellement appliqué non seulement à disposer les principaux membres des États et particulièrement eux de la régence de l'Amsterdam à tout ce qui pouvoit être de notre plus grand service comme il l'auroit obtenu avec le success qui est notoire, mais aussi à entretenir des correspondences dans toutes les cours et endroits de l'Europe pour acquérir les nouvelles de tout ce qui s'y passoit et nous en avertir'.[31]

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[27] GAA PJG334/1323, 'Registro dos parnasim', 5460.

[28] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 182–3, 186–7, 728; Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio i, 128; Israel, *Conflicts of Empires*, 187, 192.

[29] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 728; see also Res. SH. 25 April 1679; Gottheil, *The Belmont-Belmonte Family*, 93–4.

After the death of Carlos II, in 1700 and the Bourbon Succession, the new king of Spain, Philip V saw no reason to retain Belmonte as his resident especially as he, like the rest of the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish merchant élite, had supported, and still did, the claims of the Austrian candidate, the Pretender 'Carlos III'. Whilst the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13) continued, however, and as long as the States General recognized the Austrian Archduke rather than Philip V as rightful king of Spain, Belmonte and then after his death, his heir, still continued to be recognized by the States as 'resident' of Spain. In his letter to the States General, of 30 May 1704, sent from his then headquarters at Lisbon, 'Carlos III' asked the States, his 'très chers et grands amis', 'having been informed 'du zèle avec lequel le Baron de Belmonte a servi le Roy Charles IIème, nôtre oncle et prédecesseur, aux royaumes d'Espagne, dans les affaires qui lui furent comises auprès de vous en qualité de son ministre résident, nous avons bien lui voulu donner ce même caractère, esperant que sa personne vous en sera d'autant plus agréable', as well as respond to 'tout ce qu'il vous proposera de notre part.'[32]

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[30] Ibid., p. 94; this refers to the period when there was a sharp split between William III and Amsterdam over policy towards France with the latter briefly tending towards a pro-French stance, see Israel, *Dutch Republic*. 824–5.

[31] 'Patent of Nobility' of 11 June 1693 quoted in Gottheil, *Belmont-Belmonte Family*, 94.

[32] ARH SG 7099/i. Archduke Charles to States General, Lisbon, 30 May 1704.

Leti, however, was less interested in Belmonte's accomplishments on behalf of Spain than service that helped or benefited the United Provinces. So highly was Belmonte's contribution esteemed by the States General, assets Leti, that he too was granted the coveted privilege of formal tax exemption. That the exemptions conferred on Jeronimo Nunes da Costa and Manuel de Belmonte were indeed something highly exceptional is born out by discussions on the subject of consular exemptions in the States of Holland and States General. In Jeronimo's case it was only after a somewhat sceptical special committee of the States of Holland had examined the matter several times during 1673 that he was finally accorded the honour.[33] The States were initially reluctant also in the case of Belmonte and it is not hard to see why. As early as July 1680, the French ambassador complained that the French consul in Amsterdam was not exempt from Dutch imposts and taxes while Belmonte was.[34] In March 1681, the Pensionary of Holland, Gaspar Fagel, reported to the States that the French ambassador, d'Avaux, was insisting with all seriouness that Pierre Chalert, French consul in Amsterdam should enjoy immunity from Holland's taxes 'dewyle Manuel Belmonte, Agent van syne Ko. Majsteit van Spaigne ende Jeronimo Nunes d'Acosta, Agent van syne ko. Hoogheydt den Heere Prince regent van Portuael, die voorseyde immuniteyten waren genietende', that is since Belmonte and Nunes da Costa, the Agents of Spain and Portugal were enjoying such immunity. The States response was that no resident or consul residing outside The Hague could normally enjoy such immunity and that Belmonte and Nunes da Costa were special cases. The States General finally confirmed in writing, in August 1683, that Belmonte and Nunes da Costa were being specially excepted from the rule because of their valuable services to the Republic.

A third figure to whom Leti ascribes a notable political role was the Baron Francisco Lopes Suasso (1658–1710), the second baron d'Avernas de Gras. He assures us that this personage too was held in high esteem by the States General, and all Dutch ministers, as well as by the diplomatic community at The Hague where he resided and by the Stadholder-king, William III. In particular, Leti refers to Lopes Suasso's major role in buttressing the finances of the Spanish regime in Brussels, and the payments to the Spanish army of Flanders during the 1690s, remarking that during the 'last war' (i.e. the Nine Years' War (1688–97), Lopes Suasso had performed 'rilevanti serviggi alla causa commun de' collegati' that is on behalf of the forces of the allied coalition ranged against Louis XIV.[35] He might have added that he had played a notable part in the financing of William III's expedition to England in 1688, not least by forwarding the marching costs of the 6,000 Swedish auxiliary troops hired by the States General to reinforce the eastern frontier of the Republic against possible French attack whilst the bulk of the Dutch army sailed for England.[36]

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[33] ARH SG 7013/ii. Jeronimo Nunes da Costa to SG, The Hague, 15 May 1673; *Resolutien SH* 12 Aug, 26 Sept, and 26 Oct. 1673.

[34] Res. SH 12, 18 and 19 July 1680.

Awareness of their signal merits and public services, holds Leti, is the reason the Portuguese Jewish élite had not just come to be accepted as an integral part of Dutch society but esteemed in the most select circles. Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, he says, was visited and honoured by everyone of any consequence.[37] Besides innumerable lesser personages who had visited his elegant town house on the 'Jewish' Herengracht in Amsterdam,[38] and supped at his table, Leti mentions the Electress Sophia of Hanover (1639–1714), (mother of the future George I of England) and the French envoy the marquis de Croissy, the 'other Colbert'. None could match Jeronimo, asserts Leti, 'nella destra condotta, e accorta prudenze di sapersi manneggiare con tutti'. Leti mentions also that Jeronimo's deceased wife, Ribca Abaz (1634–86)—whose family, as New Christians, had been ennobled by the Holy Roman Emperor in the early seventeenth century—was reportedly just as courteous and adroit in entertaining ladies of high rank as was her husband in receiving diplomats and noblemen.[39]

After Jeronimo's death in 1697, his sons, Alexandre and Alvaro, according to Leti, maintained the high social rank which their parents had attained and continued to receive the esteem of all. This is doubtless something of an exaggeration though it is true that both Alexandre and, on his death, in 1712, Alvaro succeeded to the title of 'Agent of the crown of Portugal', Alvaro Nunes da Costa (alias Nathan Curiel) (1666–1737) remaining in this function down to his own death when, Leti might well have been horrified to learn, ministers in Lisbon, upon reflection, decided not to nominate his heir to the post on the grounds that he was a Jew! Moreover, in his capacity as agent, Alvaro is known to have had frequent dealings, and been on friendly terms, with several key Portuguese diplomats, mostly notably Dom Luis da Cunha and the conde de Tarouca who were in the Netherlands for many months to participate in the peace congress at Utrecht which ended the War of the Spanish Succession, in 1713. Among other tasks, Alexandre remitted money for the food and upkeep at Bayonne of the Portuguese soldiers captured after the allied defeat at the Battle of Almanza, in 1708, a loan afterwards not easily recovered,[40] and, in 1712, arranged the accommodation of the Portuguese delegation to the European peace congress at Utrecht.[41] According to the Protestant Portuguese writer, Francisco Xavier, the Chevalier de Oliveira, who was friendly with Alvaro Nunes da Costa in the 1730s, and would have heard about the matter from him, at the time of the Utrecht Peace Congress, 'Alvaro étoit sans cesse visité de toute la noblesse du pais, et de presque tous les ministres étrangers qui passoient à Amsterdam pour se rendre à la Haye. Deux grands ministres du Portugal, le comte de Tarouca, et Dom Luis da Cunha, avoient pour lui la plus parfaite considération'.[42]

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[35] AGS Estado 3890. Consulta of the *Consejo de Estado* on the Baron Lopes Suasso, Madrid, 2 July, 1696; Israel, *European Jewry*, 110; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 17–8.

[36] ARH SG Raad van State 109, fo. 520v. res. 25 Oct. 1688; Israel, *Anglo-Dutch Moment*, 440; see also Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 137–8.

[37] Actually both the future Electress and elector, Ernst August, stayed in Jeronimo's house in Amsterdam on that occasion, the latter being sick at the time; Jeronimo summoned the scholar—physician, Isaac Orobio de Castro to tend him, Bodemann, *Briefwechsel der Herzogin Sophie von Hannover*, 369.

[38] Gans, *Memorboek*, 118.

[39] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 728; Ribca Abaz was born into the Portuguese New Christian Dias Jorge family ennobled by Rudolph II under patents of 1610 and 1614, see Schnee, *Hoffinanz* iv, 315; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 194n.

Indeed, it seems probable that Dom Luis' comparatively enlightened views on the subject of the Jews, tendency to attribute the economic decadence of significant parts of Portugal to the flight of the New Christians, and severely critical attitude towards the Inquisition,[43] as expressed in his then unpublished *Instruções inéditas*, derived from his period in the United Provinces and if this is the case then it would seem likely that his attitudes on these topics were at least in some degree influenced by his relationship to Alvaro Nunes da Costa.[44] Luis da Cunha's reformist approach to the issue of the New Christians in Portugal, like that of Leti himself, was in any case a vindication of the social strategy pioneered by Jeronimo, and continued by Alvaro, of seeking through the aura they projected, and assiduously cultivating the traveling dipomatic *monde* of their time, to raise the image of Jews and Judaism in the eyes of educated non-Jews.

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[40] Heinsius, *Briefwisseling*, vol. p. 327. Sousa Pacheco to Heinsius, The Hague, 21 June 1708.

[41] In April 1712, Alexandre pledged 13, 000 guilders as surety for payment in order to hire, for Dom Luis da Cunha, a large house in Utrecht belonging to the nobleman, the Heer Van Deijl, see GAA NA 7958/ii, p. 88. Amsterdam, 25 April 1712.

[42] Oliveira, *Discours Pathétique*, 41.

[43] Lipiner, 'O Cristão-Novo', 135–6.

No less accomplished than the Nunes da Costa in entertaining the most select were several others. The Baron Francisco Lopes Suasso, according to Leti, was similarly much esteemed by 'rappresentanti publici e nobiltà straniera', and since it is known that he was welcome in the presence of William III and had important dealings with the Stadholder-king,[45] this is indeed not surprising.[46] As for the Baron Belmonte, Leti informs us that Spain's ambassadors when arriving in, or leaving the United Provinces, or on visits to Amsterdam from The Hague, were accustomed to lodge at his house.[47] It may well be that one reason, if not the main one, the baron chose to reside some distance away from the Jewish quarter, unlike Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, was a need to spare envoys of the crown which had expelled the Jews of Spain, in 1492, the embarrassment of lodging in close vicinity to thousands of descendants of those whom Ferdinand and Isabella had dispossessed. Another imposing figure well-known to the courts of Europe was Don Isaac Senior (alias Manoel) Teixeira (d. 1705) who settled in Amsterdam at the age of fifty, according to Leti in September 1698,[48] after deciding to leave his native Hamburg on account of the growing intolerance of that city republic.[49] During his residence in Hamburg he had been constantly visited, says Leti, by distinguished personages, including Queen Christina of Sweden, who apparently lodged at his house on numerous occasions after she abdicated the Swedish throne, and also the Elector and Electress of Brandenburg who lodged with him in 1682.[50]

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[44] See Luis da Cunha, *Instruções Inéditas*, 75–6, 87, 95–7; Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 115.

[45] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 138.

[46] Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio i, pp. 127–8.

[47] Leti *Teatro belgico* ii, 406.

[48] The exact date we have exclusively from Leti, Henriques de Castro noting only that Teixeira's arrival in Amsterdam must have occurred shortly before his election as *parnas* in 1699; such a speedy election so soon after arrival, would appear to have been unprecedented, Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio I, 126; Henriques de Castro, *Keur van grafsteenen* I, 106.

[49] Whaley, *Religious Toleration*, 80.

After their activity in support of the Dutch Republic and its allies, seigneurial life-style, and skill at winning acceptance in high society, what chiefly impressed Leti about the Amsterdam Sephardic élite was their enthusiasm for literature (and literary men such as himself) and for cultivating other aspects of high culture. This is a theme which recurs in several of his descriptions of leading Dutch Sephardic personalities and opens up a new dimension to historians' perceptions of this group who are usually thought of as aristocratic businessmen who also supported Jewish learning and charities but are not thought of as patrons of non-Jewish high culture. Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, states Leti, not only won the admiration of all who knew him but was positively zealous to 'protoggere, accarezzare e beneficiare letterati'.[51] Similarly, the eldest son of Isaac Teixeira Senior, Don Diogo Teixeira de Mattos, a leading figure of the Amsterdam community at the outset of the new century, emulated his father 'nel favorire e accarezzare i letterati.[52] Oddly enough, Leti does not however mention the Baron Belmonte in this connection, though other evidence suggests that Belmonte was the most eager of all the Sephardi patricians to encourage the cultivation of at any rate Spanish profane literature.[53] It was Belmonte who presided over the setting up of the two literary academies of late seventeenth-century Amsterdam Sephardic Jewry, the Academia de los Sitibundos (1676) and the Academia de los Floridos (1685), societies modeled on the Spanish literary fraternities of the day.[54] It was also to the Baron Belmonte that Isabel Correa, dedicated her Spanish rendering of Guarini's immensely popular *Il Pastor Fido* at Antwerp, in November 1693.[55]

The support for literature which Leti mainly seems to have in mind when showering compliments on the literary inclinations of the Dutch Sephardi élite was the liberal hospitality regularly showered by them on Amsterdam's resident colony of foreign writers. Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, asserts Leti, liked nothing more than extending hospitality to visitors from abroad and habitually received 'con nobilissimo accoglio gli stranieri in sua casa'. Similarly, the Baron Lopes Suasso, though he normally resided at The Hague 'con la sua famiglia', with his liveried servants, and carriage drawn by six horses, in his palatial mansion on the Nieuwe Voorhout, regarded in the early eighteenth century as one of the finest residences of The Hague,[56] liked to offer 'speso tavola ad amici e stranieri'.[57]

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[50] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 557–8; Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio I, pp. 126–7; Kellenbenz, 'Königin Christine und ihre Beziehungen', 188–9.

[51] Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio i, 124.

[52] Ibid. raguaglio i, p. 127.

[53] Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 299–302.

[54] Ibid., 299–300; Swetschinski, 'The Portuguese Jews', 71–3.

[55] She dedicated her poem to 'Don Manuel de Belmonte, Baron de Belmonte, Conde Palatino y regente de su Magestad Catholica', see Correa, *El Pastor Fido*, dedication.

In his account of the Holy Roman Empire published a decade before Isaac Teixeira's move to Amsterdam, Leti notes that Hamburg was celebrated everywhere as a centre of hospitality and refinement in Central Europe but that no-one was more celebrated among traveling diplomats and tourists of quality than Don Isaac who, in this respect, did great honour to the city. Leti describes him as 'signore cortese, e civile, e inclinato con molta generosa gentilezza a far servitio ad ogni uno, onde comunemente viene amato da tutti'.[58] He treated both foreign visitors and citizens with great prudence and good sense and with such style 'che la sua casa splendidissma in ogni cosa sembra un teatro, e un albergo, della gentilezza' [that his splendid house seems in every respect a theatre, and hostel of refinement].[59] This may sound vague as well as excessively rhetorical but it has to be born in mind that Queen Christina of Sweden was widely admired as a standard-bearer of learning and high culture, and in particular loved French and Italian refinement, so that while her fondness for Teixeira doubtless rested on his competent management of her financial interests, it would indeed have been highly relevant for him to present himself as propagator of aristocratic high culture in Hamburg.[60]

Foreign *literati* were invited to the homes of these Jewish patricians, in the company of diplomats and noblemen especially, in order to enhance the atmosphere of refinement and elegant wit which was essential if high-ranking guests were to be successfully and regularly entertained in such a milieu. For it needed more than magnificent town mansions, fine cuisine, large carriages and liveried servants to impress the sophisticated veterans of Europe's courtly diplomatic circuit. A highly refined cultural context was required comprising not just rarities and curiosities from the Indies which rich merchants in Amsterdam were better placed than most to acquire, libraries and town gardens crammed with unusual and costly plants but also the right sort of conversation, particularly in French, Italian and Iberian languages, a context in which Leti himself would have been eminently useful.

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[56] Henriquez Pimentel, *Geschiedkundige aanteekeningen*, 35.
[57] Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio I, 127.
[58] Leti, *Ritratti historici* ii, 375.
[59] Ibid., ii, 378.
[60] Whaley, *Religious Toleration*, 77.

Leti emphasizes the Sephardi patricians' skill with languages and interest in cultivating elegant conversation, not least about literary topics. Don Isaac (Manuel) Senior Teixeira (d. 1705), records Leti, 'parla molte lingue con gran franchezza e tra le altre cose ama molto la compagnia de' letterati che accoglie in la sua casa con grand' affetto'.[61] His son, Don Diogo (Abraham Senior) Teixeira de Mattos (d. 1701), according to Leti, was a still more polished conversationalist, a man who could speak about everything, discuss everything and understand perfectly whatever is relevant to the life of 'un galanthuomo', in high society, being particularly well read in the works 'de' più celebrati scrittori, essendo in oltre la gentilezza istessa'.[62] This can only mean that Teixeira de Mattos regularly talked about the books of famous writers whilst in elegant society. Similarly, the Baron Lopes Suasso who in 1682 married Jeudit Teixeira, daughter of Don Manuel Teixeira, was reputedly a man of considerable finesse. The baron, states Leti, in a revealing flight of hyperbole, may have been the richest Jew imaginable 'stimato ricco di più d'un milione di scudi romani, ma maggiori sono i suoi tesori dell' animo, con li quali rende sempre più accreditata la sua nattione, e è certo che non vi è Christiano che non ammiri, e forse che non invidii le sue nobilissime attioni'[estimated to be worth more than a million Roman *scudi*; but his riches of mind are still greater; with these he raises the standing of his nation more and more; and it is certain that there is no Christian who does not admire, and does not envy, his noble actions].[63] He describes the baron as 'generoso, civile, honorevole, affabile, cortese, destro nella sua condotta, savio, prudente, nemico di far male a chi si sia, e inclinato a far piacere ad ogni uno',[64] which indicates at the very least that Leti was much taken with him.

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[61] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 558.
[62] Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio i, 127.
[63] Ibid.

The fine residences of the Sephardi patriciate at Amsterdam and The Hague were more then than just luxurious homes: they also served as the prime forum for a highly intricate and richly cosmopolitan cultural process which included a subtle form of social propaganda. These houses were not just magnificent they were also cultural show-cases designed to impress, to convince courtiers that the Jewish patricians themselves were their equals in elegance and refinement, and even in a certain sense to realign the relationship between general culture and traditional Judaism. The residences of the Nunes da Costa, Belmonte, Lopes Suasso and De Pinto, in particular, were major tourist attractions and were to be long remembered. Leti decribes Baron Belmonte's house as a 'casa nobilissima', one of its appurtenances being a 'carrozza bellissima con le armi di Spagna'. On the famous Romeyn de Hooghe engraving of the house, these arms are also to be seen above the front entrance and carved on the back of the baron's handsome canal barge. Even more impressive, seemingly, was the home of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa which Leti describes as 'la più commoda, esplendida casa della città', with a town garden so impressive that it would be hard to find its equal.[65] The façade was embellished with the arms of Portugal and again, there was both a handsome carriage and barge both likewise embossed with Portuguese royal coat of arms. Inside, says Leti, the atmosphere was almost like that of a princely court, such was the throng of foreign visitors. After 1700, Alexandre Nunes da Costa, and then Alvaro, kept the 'Armes de Portugal arboré sur le grand porteil de la maison' and there they were still to be seen in the year 1734.[66]

A trace of that famous town garden survives on Romeyn de Hooghe's engraving of the house on which the front entrance is open, permitting just a glimpse through to the garden.[67] A taste for fine gardens being very much in vogue among the friends of the Stadholder-king William III, and generally in European courtly society at the time, it is not surprising that gardens should have become one of the favourite vehicles of the Jewish patricians' self-projection.

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[64] Ibid., pp. 127–8.
[65] Leti, *Teatro belgico* ii, 406; Silva Rosa, 'Een drietal prenten', 42–3.
[66] Oliveira, *Discours pathétique*, 40.
[67] Gans, *Memorboek*, 118; Kaplan, 'Gente política', 24.

Vast care and expense was lavished on a number of both town gardens and gardens attached to the country villas several of the Jewish patricians acquired, particularly after the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1736, a visitor described the garden of David de Pinto (d. 1751), father of the celebrated economist and writer, Isaac de Pinto (1717–87), at his *buitenplaats* or country residence, Tulpenburg, a league from Amsterdam, as 'le plus beau jardin de toute la Hollande'.[68] In the early eighteenth century it was much visited by members of Dutch high society.

Rare books, paintings, fine jewels, curiosities of all sorts abounded. When the de Pinto house in Amsterdam was pillaged during the rioting of 1696, one of the display cases dragged out into the street was crammed with old coins and medallions.[69] The rarities on display in these homes had to be choice, costly and impressive but they need not for that reason exclude traditional Jewish culture. Among the items on show in the Nunes da Costa household, was a medieval Hebrew Pentateuch of exceptional beauty which Jeronimo's father, Duarte Nunes da Costa, had purchased from a Spanish Jew, from North Africa, whilst doing business in Pisa, in 1618, a Bible deemed the most ancient and venerable in the possession of Dutch Jewry in the late seventeenth century. Duarte himself inscribed, on the inside cover, that he had purchased it for its beauty and rarity with a view to passing it on to his heirs.[70] Prized items also displayed when appropriate were the various patents of nobility, and letters of appointment, different members of these families had received from the kings of Spain and Portugal and diverse other princes.

A bizarre feature of Jewish patrician culture, to which Leti draws attention, is their making a show of giving alms to destitute Christians. The Sephardic community operated an elaborate welfare system for its own poor which was centrally and meticulously regulated by the *Mahamad* through the communal treasurer, or *gabay*. There was plenty of scope also for handsome individual donations to the communal Jewish poor chest. But none of this was much noticed by the rest of Amsterdam's citizenry, especially as Jewish communal poor relief, as Leti remarks, was designed to keep the Jewish destitute off the streets and preclude begging from Christians,[71] and, yet, Jewish patricians desired to be associated in Christian eyes, as well as those of their own people, with charitable purposes. This was a matter of prestige and civic standing.

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[68] Wijler, *Isaac de Pinto*, 14.

[69] Craffurd, 'Generaal en kort verhaal', 74.

[70] *Catalogue de vente de la succession de feu N.D. Henriques de Castro* (Amsterdam) pp. 44–5.

All the patricians donated to an extent to general civic charities but it was especially the Baron Belmonte who liked to be known as a 'grande amico de' poveri', and was so generous in showering coins on the Christian needy, according to Leti, that there was usually a great throng of destitute huddled around the entrance to his house, a feature, interestingly enough, replicated in Romeyn de Hooghe's engraving which depicts a dignified well-dressed, figure emerging from the house, and giving alms, who is doubtless Belmonte himself. That this was part of a conscious and widely noted strategy emerges also from the couplet by the Amsterdam Sephardi poet, Daniel Levi de Barrios, in which he describes Belmonte as 'Residente leal del rey hispano/piadoso al pobre, atento al cortesano'.[72] 'Alcuni l'accusano di fare egli questo' notes Leti, 'per ostentatione, per vanità' [some accuse him of doing this out of ostentation and vanity]; but surely this hardly mattered, he added, since it was the poor who profited.[73]

How far this enhanced Belmonte's image in the minds of Amsterdam's Christian poor remains unknown. But it is striking that his alms-giving did nothing to protect his residence during the rioting of 1696. While the De Pinto house, whose owners were away at The Hague was the only one belonging to the Sephardic elite which was actually pillaged, the mob smashing most of the large quantity of fine and 'very costly' porcelain they found inside,[74] the residence of the 'Palsgraaf Belmonte' as he was (perhaps ironically) known in the city was also 'seriously menaced'. According to one account, the mob only withdrew, leaving the building intact, because the Baron and his men had formidably barricaded themselves inside. Jeronimo Nunes da Costa's house was also threatened and there too the windows were barricaded, the doors reinforced with beams, and armed men placed in every room which looked out onto the street, or garden.[75]

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[71] Leti, *Il Ceremoniale* v, 726.

[72] Levi de Barrios, *Estrella de Jacob*, 65; Gans, *Memorboek*, 116.

[73] Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici* ii, raguaglio i, 128.

[74] Gans, *Memorboek*, 113.

[75] Crafford, 'Generaal en kort verhaal', 73.

The Jews had never been fully accepted or secure in Christian society and still were not, even in Amsterdam. Theology may have played its part but, according to Leti, it was chiefly the pride and arrogance of the Jews which, over the centuries had brought so many calamities on their heads.[76] Few Jews had more cause to be proud than the Sephardic patricians of Amsterdam. Yet whatever undercurrents of popular resentment may have lingered, Leti with his buoyant republican optimism remained confident that the Jewish patricians' newly devised cultural strategy, nurturing courtesy, finesse and tact, and their policy of unstinting service to state and municipality provided the answer and would surely bring their due reward. Through noble actions on behalf of state and society and support of general culture, Jews could prove themselves the equals of others and, by doing so, would finally be accepted as equals: 'nella società civile gli huomini son tutti uguali, di modo che basta una buona condotta per acquistar gran merito. E come *apud Deum non est acceptio personarum*, lo stesso deve seguire della società civile, ond' è che in Holanda si da indifferentemente la cittadinanza'.[77]

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[76] Leti, *Raguagli historici e politici ii, raguaglio* I, 134–5.

[77] Ibid ii, raguaglio I, 128.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE JEWS OF CURAÇAO, NEW AMSTERDAM AND THE GUYANAS: A CARIBBEAN AND TRANS-ATLANTIC NETWORK, (1648–1740)

The success and vigour of Jewish society in Netherlands Brazil had been short-lived, lasting barely a decade and a half from 1630 to 1645, the year of the revolt of the Portuguese Catholic planters against the Dutch, the West-India Company—and against the Jews. Yet that briefly flourishing Jewish community, based on Recife and its environs, was nevertheless a crucially important phenomenon in Jewish history, particularly as regards the place of the Jews in western Europe's Atlantic maritime and colonial system. For in Netherlands Brazil, the Sephardim acquired a measure of legal, economic and religious freedom, and a level of participation in the general life of a New World society, which went considerably beyond what was then conceivable in Amsterdam, or elsewhere in the Dutch Republic, and hence further than anything thus far witnessed in Europe itself. A new kind of Jewish society had been created in the Americas quite different in some respects from any previous Jewish society in the Old World being geared towards (tropical) agriculture as well as trade, shipping and finance and being rooted in the wider society's rural as well as urban life. The Jews in Recife were also to an unprecedented extent the chief intermediaries between the Dutch colonizers and a particular New World society. The special combination of skills and rights which the Jews assembled and benefited from in Dutch Brazil in turn created the likelihood that Sephardi Jews—and Portuguese New Christians connected with the Sephardi diaspora—would replicate and resume that unprecedented role as intermediaries between western Europe and Ibero-America also in a wider, more general context.

But why did the Sephardi network in the New World function as an intermediary essentially between the Dutch and Ibero-America rather than between the English or French and Hispanic America? It would surely be unconvincing to suggest that during the crucially formative period, the middle decades of the seventeenth century, the

Dutch American colonies needed or solicited the skills, capital and expertise of the Jews to a greater extent than did the English or French dependencies. By the time the remnants of Netherlands Brazil capitulated to the Portuguese, in 1654, the island of Barbados already had a Sephardi community and, under English rule, was rapidly emerging as the most thriving and productive sugar plantation colony in the Caribbean. Soon after, in 1655, English forces wrested Jamaica from the Spanish crown and the Cromwellian regime began to develop the commercial and productive potential of that island. Furthermore, the new Commonwealth government in England, despite the hesitation and inconclusive result of the Whitehall Conference of that year, showed distinctly more willingness than had the early Stuarts to attract and make use of Jewish enterprise—at any rate in the Caribbean. To argue that the Sephardi network in the Americas came to be centred chiefly in the Dutch, and only secondarily in the English colonies, because the latter were less tolerant or less willing to accept Jewish settlement than the former, would, given the initially strong reluctance of the Dutch West India Company to extend the kind of advantages the Jews had benefited from in Netherlands Brazil to the Dutch colonies elsewhere in the New World, fly in the face of the facts.

The major reason, it may be argued, that the hub of the New World Sephardi maritime trade network came to be fixed for over a century in the Dutch rather than the English colonies was of a geo-political and strategic character. Circumstances, at any rate before the Peace of Utrecht (1713), and the assigning of the slaving *asiento* for Spanish America to Britain, were simply unconducive to an English commercial break-through in Spanish America. Recoiling under the impact of the English aggression of 1655, and at war with England from then until 1660, the Spanish crown and council of state during the second half of the seventeenth century—in sharp contrast to the first half—was altogether more suspicious, wary, and nervous about English designs and ambitions in the Indies than of the Dutch. England's rapidly growing military, naval and commercial might was clearly capable of achieving a degree of political and strategic ascendancy far beyond what the (no longer rapidly expanding) Dutch trading system was capable of. It is true that after the final peace between Spain and the Dutch, in 1648, the United Provinces continued to be viewed in Madrid as a major commercial and maritime threat to the vitality, trade and shipping of Spain's

American empire; but no longer was it seen as posing a political and strategic challenge, capable of physically dismembering the empire, in the way that the England of Cromwell and Charles II patently was.[1]

During the second half of the 1650s, Spain found herself at war with France, England and Portugal all at the same time, the English threat in particular causing a degree of disruption to her normal trans-Atlantic convoy system which created severe shortages of European imports (and black slaves) in the Spanish Indies. The predictable result was an huge upsurge in clandestine commerce carried on in violation of the Spanish Laws of the Indies and the crown's official convoy system, often via the Canaries which were frequently mentioned in this connection in the innumerable complaints about interloping submitted by the representative bodies of the Seville *cargadores*. Hundreds of illegal cargoes were smuggled in particular into the ports of Venezuela, Nueva Granada, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Buenos Aires and for the most part in Dutch vessels.[2] As an anonymous Jewish informant in Amsterdam expressed it, in September 1663, 'con la guerra que tubo su Magestad con Inglaterra no pudiendo yr continuadamente Galeones y Flotas procuraron los olandeses introducir en Indias muchas haziendas haziendo della [i.e. of Curaçao] almacen para toda la costa de Tierra Firme' [with the war which his Majesty had with England, as the Galeones and flotas were unable to cross, the Dutch managed to introduce many consignments of goods in the Indies making of Curaçao a shop for the entire coast of Tierra Firme].[3] While many or most of the merchants that opened up this major new Spanish American trading system in the late 1650s were doubtless Dutch Protestants—and there is no way of measuring the part played by Amsterdam Sephardi Jews—there is no doubt that the latter participated and were a major factor in the traffic being chiefly responsible for at least some of these clandestine voyages. Thus, for instance, a Dutch ship called *De Liefde* which traded with several Spanish colonies in the Caribbean, in 1660, but on the return voyage, was lost in a storm, off the Dutch coast, towards the end of year, was carrying cargo belonging to

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[1] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 237–44; Herrero Sánchez, *Acercamiento hispano-neerlandés*, 357–9, 368.

[2] Bernal, *Financiación*, 211, 228; García Fuentes, *Comercio español con América*, 67–70; Lynch, *Hispanic World*, 275–86.

[3] AGS Libros de la Haya vol. 47, fo. 109 anonymous 'aviso' on Curaçao, Amsterdam, 4 September 1663.

Aaron Moreno Henriques, Jacob Abeniacar Bondía, and other Amsterdam Jews.[4]

This contraband traffic was extensively connived at not only by Spanish colonists, and some officials, in the Canaries and the New World but also, to a degree by ministers in Madrid. Their feeling was that if Spain's American dependencies had to obtain linen, woollen cloth, spices, wine, and slaves from somewhere, and the suppliers had to be foreigners, then it was better to be supplied by the Dutch who were no longer a political and strategic menace to the empire than from the English or French who all too obviously were. At first, in the late 1650s and early 1660s, this clandestine trade remained distinctly furtive character. In March 1661, the Spanish ambassador at The Hague passed on reports circulating in Amsterdam that the Dutch on Curaçao had now 'grandes almacenes de todos generos de haciendas, y que las introducen de noche con barcos luengos en aquella costa, sacando sus retornos en barras y otros generos de aquellas partes' [established large stores with every kind of merchandise there which they deliver during the night, using long boats, taking back silver bars and other goods].[5] The following month he reported the voyage from Curaçao to Amsterdam of a ship called *the Prince* carrying 1,500 quintals of Campeche wood brought to the Dutch island aboard a Spanish vessel which also carried silver, emeralds and pearls and had come to purchase slaves and other goods.[6]

As from December 1662, moreover, this increasingly close interaction between Amsterdam and Spanish America was rendered semi-legal by the decision of the Spanish crown to assign the slaving *asiento* to a group of Genoese factors in Madrid, headed by Domingo Grillo, who were forbidden to obtain slaves from the Portuguese but authorised to do so from the Dutch West India Company's slaving depot at Curaçao.[7] This was a crucial step in making Curaçao the major link in the triangular trans-Atlantic traffic which now developed connecting Holland, West Africa and Spanish America, and in regularising and stabilising the vibrant Curaçao-based transit traffic which had recently become established over the last few years.

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[4] GAA NA 2890B, pp. 1469, 1487, deeds, Amsterdam, 10 and 13 Jan. 1661 (P. Padthuysen).

[5] AGS Libros de la Haya 42, fo. 94.

[6] AGS Libros de la Haya vol. 43, fo. 163, Gamarra to Philip IV, The Hague, 5 April 1661.

[7] Scelle, *Traite negrière*, I, 484–5; Van Brakel, 'Bescheiden', 61–6; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 241–2.

Once the new slaving *asiento* was in place, the Dutch transit trade to Spanish America became partly open and official while yet simultaneously comprising a large element of smuggling. Thus, for example, as was reported to Madrid from Amsterdam, in September 1663, the vessel *Concordia*, chartered by a group of Jews including Francisco Dias Jorge, a brother-in-law of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa,[8] with the Jew David Abeniacar aboard as commissary, sailed that month from Hellevoetsluis partly loaded with cargo to procure slaves in Angola whence the ship continued to Curaçao to sell both slaves and textiles to Grillo's agents;[9] while in December 1664 *The Golden Tiger*, sailed from Amsterdam carrying valuable merchandise to Angola where the commissary purchased 350 slaves; from there, it continued to Curaçao where it anchored for many months, 200 blacks being sold to the factors of the Genoese while the rest were sold to Spaniards who crossed from Venezuela, in boats filled with local products and silver; the vessel arrived back in Amsterdam in March 1666, carrying 45,000 *pesos* in silver and 120 canisters of Venezuelan Variñas tobacco.[10] Commenting, in March 1665, on the return from there of two other vessels carrying a large amount of silver, remitted from Cartagena—and pending departure from Amsterdam for Curaçao of two more vessels loaded with textiles—the Spanish agent in Amsterdam, Andrés de Belmonte, observed: 'siendo puente de todo esto los Grillos y sus factores' [the bridge for all this being the Grillos and their factors].[11] In April 1666, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa was one of the organizers of a voyage from Amsterdam to Curaçao via Angola to deliver slaves, for Grillo and the *asiento*, the ship, however, also carrying '15000 libras de canela y otras especerías por mas de 30,000 pesos y puntas de todas suertes para introduzirlo abuelta de los negros' [15,000lb of cinnamon and other spices and lace of every sort to be introduced under cover of the blacks].[12]

At the same time, a general contraband transit traffic without slaves continued albeit often using Curaçao as a base. In the spring of 1664, the *Sint Pieter* sailed from Amsterdam with 150,000 guilders worth of textiles and other valuable merchandise; a veritable moving shop, it anchored first off Santiago de Cuba, then at San Francisco de Campeche, after which it visited Maracaibo and Caracas; after sailing home 'northabout' around the top of Ireland and Scotland and down the east side of Britain—the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664–7) having commenced—it finally arrived home on 14 September 1665 carrying 30,000 *pesos* in silver, 200 boxes of tobacco, 2,500 quintals of Campeche wood, 4,000 hides, and a consignment of indigo.[13] It was more convenient though, in many cases to use Curaçao as a way-station as did *De Liefde*, which carried textiles from Amsterdam to Cuba, Caracas, Maracaibo, and Río de la Hacha, liberally plying local officials with 'presents', and then anchored at Curaçao for some time for cleaning and reprovisioning before sailing 'northabout' back to Holland, in September 1665, carrying 30,000 *pesos* in silver, 4,000 hides, and 300 canisters of Venezuela tobacco.[14]

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[8] On the close connection between the Dias Jorge (alias Abaz) family and the Curiels, see Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 35, 489; Swetschinski,, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 194.

[9] AGS Libros de la Haya vol. 47, fo. 196v.

[10] Ibid. vol. 53, fo. 266, *avisos*, de Belmonte, Amsterdam, 3 April 1666.

[11] Ibid. vol. 50, fo. 214v, *avisos*, Belmonte, Amsterdam, 31 March 1665.

[12] Ibid., vol. 53, fo. 268.

The upsurge of trade at Caribbean in the late 1650s, and then the assigning of the Grillo *asiento*, created a situation in which the West India Company had little choice but to allow Sephardi merchants a wide-ranging freedom to trade if it was to attract a large share of the traffic in contraband textiles and spices to Curaçao. However, there is little sign for the period between the planters' revolt in Brazil, in 1645 and the late 1650s, that the WIC directors had necessarily intended to extend the freedom conceded to the Jews in Netherlands Brazil to its other territories in the New World. Even in Brazil there had been a measure of opposition from the predominantly Protestant investors in the Company, and from the Zeeland and other regional chambers, to the large amount of private, and in particular the large amount of Jewish trade, the directors resolved—albeit with some hesitation—to permit.[15] By the late 1640s and early 1650s there was evidently a strong feeling among the investors, intensified by the costly disaster facing the WIC in Brazil, that the Company in which they had invested their money ought to reap all the profits accruing from its hard-won and expensively maintained conquests. Consequently for over a decade following the Portuguese planters' revolt in Brazil, the WIC directors pursued a policy of encouraging Sephardi settlement in its other

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[13] Ibid., 51/2, fo. 235, *avisos* de Belmonte, Amsterdam, 13 Oct. 1665.

[14] Ibid. vol. 51/2, fo. 204, *avisos* de Belmonte, Amsterdam, 29 Sept. 1665.

[15] Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 75–82; Van Winter, *Westindische Compagnie*, 154; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 163–5.

American territories for the purpose of agriculture, and especially to encourage sugar production, but not for purposes of trade.

This tendency is clearly perceptible in the case of New Netherland where the Calvinist town council of New Amsterdam (New York) responded to arrival of several groups of Sephardi refugees who left Brazil following the surrender of Recife, by firmly opposing the Jews' request to be allowed to participate in commerce and retailing. Most of the Sephardim who landed on Manhattan Island, in 1654, reportedly wished to stay and settle.[16] However the generality of Protestant burghers felt that this 'bedriegelijck geslachte soo hatelijcke vijanden ende blasfemateurs vande name Christi' [deceitful race, such hateful enemies and blasphemers of the name of Christ] should not be permitted to 'infect' the new colony with their 'gewoonlijcke woeckerije en bedriegelijcken handel' [usual usury and deceitful trading].[17] To counter this hostility and obstruction, the 'merchants of the Portuguese nation' in Amsterdam petitoned the directors of the Amsterdam Chamber of the WIC, in January 1655, reminding them of the major role their people had played in Dutch Brazil, that the French were now permitting them to settle in Martinique and the English on Barbados, and that more refugees from the Inquisition in Portugal and Spain would doubtless be coming to the overseas colonies of the Dutch and also those of their rivals.[18]

In addition, they reminded the directors that 'veele vande de Joodsche natie sijn Hooftparticipanten inde Compagnie, sulcx hebben altoos het beste van de Compagnie gesocht, ende veele van hunne natie hebben sware en groote capitalen inde actien en obligatien verlooren' [many of the Jewish nation are *Hooftparticipanten* in the Company and as such have always sought the Company's best interest, and many of their nation have lost large and extensive sums in the Company's shares and bonds]. The Jewish 'chief investors' at Amsterdam, as stated in a list of 1656 were Bento Osorio, Simon and Luis Rodrigues da Sousa, Fernando Diaz de Britto, Joseph d'Acosta, Andres Cristobal Nunes and Abraham and Isaac Pereyra.[19] After carefully pondering the matter, the WIC directors wrote to their governor of New

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[16] See Stuyvesant to directors of the Amsterdam Chamber of WIC, Manhattan, 22 Sept. 1654 printed in Oppenheim, 'Early History', 4–5.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., 11–13.

[19] Ibid., 14–15.

Netherland, Pieter Stuyvesant, in April 1655, remarking that they would indeed have wished to accede to the wish of the worthy Christian burghers that the Jews be completely excluded but had nevertheless decided that this would be both unjust, given the heavy losses the Jews had sustained in Brazil, and inadvisable 'because of the large amount of capital which they have invested in the shares of this company'.[20] Consequently, they had decided that the Jews should be allowed to settle in New Netherland but under greater religious and economic restrictions than had applied to the Jews in Netherlands Brazil.

Implementing this decision, Governor Stuyvesant who fully shared the antipathy toward the Jews of the Calvinist majority, stipulated various onerous restrictions, denying them the right to the public exercise of 'their abominable religion', as well as the right to own real estate, and expressly forbade them to trade up the Hudson River to Fort Orange (Albany) or on the Delaware River.[21] The Jews at once complained to the Company directors who, in June 1656, wrote instructing the governor that they were to be allowed to trade at Fort Orange and on the Delaware but that, in contrast to Brazil, they were to remain excluded from the crafts and shop-keeping, just as in Amsterdam itself.[22] In January 1657, Stuyvesant and the colonial council of New Netherland drew up revised regulations stressing the exclusion of the Jews from all forms of retailing except for religious articles and kosher meat for their own consumption. The antagonistic attitude of the governor and town council of New Amsterdam had had its effect, however, and by 1657 most of the Sephardim who had settled there in 1654–5 departed for the Caribbean, leaving only a small rump.[23]

Meanwhile, in the three so-called 'Curaçao islands'—Curaçao, Aruba and Bonaire—it would seem that no right of trade was conceded to Sephardi settlers at any point between the Company's conquest of the islands from the Spaniards in 1634 and the end of the 1650s. Indeed, for many years after 1634, down to the early 1650s, Curaçao, despite having one of the best and most ample harbours in the Caribbean, attracted so little commerce that the WIC directors on several occasions, even as late as 1651 contemplated abandoning the islands altogether so as to save the expense of garrisoning them.[24] Yet even in these unpromising circumstances, the company showed little inclination to permit Jews to trade there. The first contract for Jewish settlement on Curaçao, drawn up between the Company and João de Yllão, in March 1651, provided for the settlement of fifty Jewish colonists for the purpose of cultivating the land and establishing plantations but did not grant any right to engage in commerce, international or local.[25] The directors were indeed intensely suspicious—as they confided to Stuyvesant, at the time governor of Curaçao—that the offer of the Jews to establish plantations was really nothing but a blind to persuade the Company to admit them to the islands and that in reality De Yllão 'and his associates have quite another objective in view, namely to trade from there to the West Indies and the Spanish Main'.[26]

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[20] Ibid., 8; Smith, *Religion and Trade*, 214.
[21] Ibid., p. 215; Williams, 'Atlantic Perspective', 380–1.
[22] Ibid., 381; Smith, *Religion and Trade*, p. 216.
[23] Williams, 'Atlantic Perspective', 383.

When, the following year, the WIC directors signed a second contract, this time with David Nassy (alias Joseph Nunes da Fonseca), the latter undertook to bring a 'large number of people' doubtless including many refugees from Brazil, to cultivate the land; but again there was no conceding of any right to engage in commerce. 'Time will tell whether we shall succeed with this nation', wrote the directors to Stuyvesant, 'they are a crafty and generally treacherous people in whom therefore not too much confidence should be placed'.[27] The agreement expressly reserved the logwood and salt assets on the three islands—their only tangible resources—for the Company's own use and also failed to assign as much freedom of religion as the Jews had enjoyed in Brazil. By late 1652, the directors had concluded that João de Yllão and the twelve other Jews who settled on Curaçao with him—there is no evidence that Nassy ever went—were, in violation of their undertakings, utterly neglecting to 'plant tobacco, indigo, cotton and other staples' which is what they had been given permission to do, and were in fact busy cutting logwood and trying to use it to trade with other Caribbean islands, and were also exporting the islands' horses.[28] The directors wrote to the governor insisting that 'no more horses shall be exported from Buenairo, Curaçao and Aruba but they shall remain there to be used eventually in our province of New Netherland'.[29] In June 1653, there were again complaints that the Jews living on Curaçao were not cultivating the land but cutting dye-wood and 'exporting horses from the islands of Aruba and Bonaires to the Caribbean and other neighbouring isles'.[30]

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[24] Van Brakel, 'Bescheiden', 49–50; Menkman, *Nederlanders*, 44–5.

[25] Grol, *Grondpolitiek* ii, 123.

[26] Ibid., ii, 124; Cone, 'Jews of Curaçao', 143; Swetschinski, 'Conflict and Opportunity', 231.

[27] Emmanuel, *History* i, 43; Cone, 'Jews of Curaçao', 147–9.

[28] Ibid., 150; Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 145–6.

The rapid success of the Sephardi community on Curaçao from the late 1650s onwards thus has to be viewed in context and seen as the result not of a policy of seeking to attract Jewish commerce, on the part of the WIC, but rather as a result of the Anglo-Spanish War, and accompanying shift in the relationship between Spain and Spanish America, opening a gap for a flourishing contraband traffic handled principally by the Dutch. As Curaçao's trade links with the Spanish American mainland, Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico, and then eventually with the French and English Caribbean colonies, as well as with English North America, developed, the Sephardi community of Willemstad, Curaçao's capital, became both the largest and the most important—from a religious and cultural as well as economic perspective—of all the Jewish communities in the New World. It held this position from around 1660 at least until the beginning of the nineteenth century. The synagogue Mikveh Israel, built in the centre of the island's capital, Willemstad, in 1730–2, to replace an earlier and smaller structure, was one of the largest buildings in the Caribbean and by far the most imposing synagogue in the western hemisphere until well into the nineteenth century. In ritual matters and questions of Jewish law, Curaçao was without doubt the 'mother' community of the Caribbean, indeed all the Americas, and one that deferred to Amsterdam and to Amsterdam alone.[31]

At its height Curaçao's trading fleet consisted of some eighty barques, many of them owned by Jews living on the island, which plied back and forth especially to Coro, La Guaira, Maracaibo, Río de la Hacha, Tucacas, and Puerto Rico but also Santo Domingo and as far as Puertobelo. They also carried on an extensive trade, in violation of both British and French colonial legislation with Barbados, Martinique and other British and French islands as well as with Saint

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[29] Cone, 'Jews of Curaçao', 150.

[30] Ibid., pp. 150–1.

[31] Kaplan, 'Curaçao and Amsterdam', 197–202; Yerushalmi, 'Between Amsterdam and New Amsterdam', 191–2.


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BARBADOS
TOBAGO
Paraguana Peninsula
Tucacas
ARUBA
BONAIRE
CURAÇAO
Río de la Hacha
Santa Marta
Cartagena de Indias
Maracaibo
Coro
Caracas
Panama
NUEVA GRANADA
Bogotá
Quito
Essequibo
DUTCH WEST GUYANA
Paramaribo
Joden Savanna
SURINAM
Cayenne
Essequibo River
▲ Sephardi Communities
F.D. 2002

Map 9. The Sephardi Communities in the Caribbean and Surinam

Thomas, an island where a small Sephardi community took root and which, though technically Danish, came to form an integral part of the Dutch and Dutch Jewish Caribbean trading system. By 1702 there were 126 Jewish families, the great majority Sephardi, living on Curaçao, totalling together with a number of widows and other single people over 600 souls, a figure which, by 1789, had risen to over 1,500.[32] By comparison, there were only a handful of Jews living on the rest of the Dutch Antilles and Saint Thomas, though, the small Sephardi community on Saint Eustatius—in 1722, there were 21 Jews there out of a total population of 204—had by the third quarter of the eighteenth century also developed into an extremely vigorous trading community numbering several hundred.[33]

Meanwhile, the Sephardi communities on Barbados and Jamaica had also begun to flourish, albeit more modestly and hesitantly than those of Curaçao and Surinam. From 184 in 1680, and 275 by 1715, the Jewish population of Barbados is estimated to have grown to possibly as many as 400 by 1750.[34] That of Jamaica has been estimated to have increased to around 800 souls by 1730.[35] But the relatively large Jewish populations on these two islands is mainly due to their having been thriving plantation economies with a highly developed local and retailing trade, and with much larger populations than either Curaçao or Surinam. Certainly, these communities also played a significant role in maritime commerce, at any rate down to the mid-eighteenth century. But it was always one which was wholly or partly linked to, and in a measure also subordinate to, the Dutch trading system,[36] a point which British imperial historiography conspicuously tended to gloss over and underestimate.

A marked aversion to the Sephardi settlers was evident from the outset among the Christian merchants and clergy in both Barbados and Jamaica; but the crown, the islands' governors, and at least some of the planters (who wanted European goods as cheaply as possible) often took a more positive view of the Jews. The close ties of the Sephardim on Barbados with Holland were indeed never any secret.

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[32] Emmanuel, *History* i, 277 and ii, 763; Israel, 'Sephardi Contribution to Economic Life', 389–90.

[33] Emmanuel, *History* i, 519, 522, 524; Böhm, *Sefardíes en los dominios holandeses*, 219–22.

[34] Fortune, *Merchants and Jews*, 48; Cohen, 'Séfarades des Indes occidentales', 596.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Schnurmann, *Atlantische Welten*, 241–2, 368; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 237–40.

So evident were the Dutch and Brazilian connections of most of the Jewish settlers on Barbados that one governor described the original community as 'thirty Jew families of Dutch extraction from Brazil'.[37] But this unwelcome fact was to an extent counteracted in the minds of English ministers by contrary considerations. 'The islanders here', reported one observer to the London Council of State, in 1655, 'much desire commerce with strangers [i.e. Dutch and Jews] our English merchants traffiquing to those parts being generally great extortioners'.[38] During the 1650s, as is illustrated by the incident of *De Perel*, a Dutch ship carrying twenty-seven Jewish emigrants and a valuable cargo belonging to Amsterdam Jews to Barbados in 1657, which was captured by a privateer in Spanish service, and brought into San Sebastian, the Sephardim in Amsterdam, and not those in London, were the principal correspondents of Barbadian Sephardi Jewry.[39] When the 'Council for Foreign Plantations' in London discussed the question of Jewish settlement on Barbados, in April 1661, King Charles was clearly told that London merchants were insisting that the 'Jewes are a people soe subtile in matters of trade, and that they, and their stocks, are soe settled in other nations, that in a short time they will not only ingrosse trade among themselves, but will bee able to direct the benefit thereof to other places'; but he was also advised that the local planters 'as earnestly doe urge that the admission of the Jewes, or any other accession of a free trade with other nations, will tend exceedingly to the comfort and advantage of all your Majesty's colonies, and consequently to the benefit of Your Majesty and of trade'.[40] It was a dilemma for English colonial policy which was only very slowly resolved.

The Sephardim on Barbados consequently were not only resented as Jews but continually denounced as both an economic and strategic threat to English interests. The rapid growth of the Sephardi population of Barbados in the early 1660s led one disgruntled commentator to accuse the island governor of enabling Jews to engross 'the greatest part of the trade of the island, to the great discouragement of the English merchants, their dealings being principally with those of their own tribe in Holland'.[41] During the Second Anglo-Dutch

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[37] Ibid., 240; Samuel, 'Review', 13.
[38] Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers* iii, 142.
[39] Israel, *Empires and Entrepots*, 391.
[40] Friedenwald, 'Material', 63.
[41] Quoted in Fortune, *Merchants and Jews*, 109.

War (1664–67), during which the French supported the Dutch against the English in the Caribbean, the partiality of Barbados Jewry for the Dutch and their lack of deference for the English and the English crown, was repeatedly remarked on: 'the Jews not having like liberty as in the Dutch and French islands', noted one observer, in the autumn of 1667, 'have been very treacherous, discovering when the English were to embark against the French and Dutch and in the matter of the relief of Antigua'.[42] In December 1668, the Scotsman, William Davidson, having spent a week in Amsterdam investigating ships about to leave port, alerted the English ambassador at The Hague to the pending departure of the 300 ton *Matthew and Francis* of London, a vessel 'fully lodent for the accompt of the Iews of Amsterdam for the Barbados', insisting that the Jews of Amsterdam had 'a grate trade for the Barbados' and that the Jews there had 'grate freedome and liberty' and carry 'on a grater trade there nor very feu in England does'.[43] This warning was acted on, the king's ministers sending orders to Lord Willoughby for the immediate apprehending of the vessel at Barbados and 'any other that shall come to trade in any of his Majesty's plantations under his command from any foraigne parts contrary to the Act of Navigation'.[44]

Needless to say, there was a continual pressure to restrict Jewish activity. In October 1668, the Grand Jury of Barbados reiterated the ban on Jews engaging in retail trade.[45] After a time even the planters seem to have grown more hostile. In 1705, the Island Council roundly declared: 'it appears to this board that the Jews in this island are very prejudicial to trade, by not buying the produce of this island, but on the contrary ship off all the ready money they can get'.[46] Nor was the position much different on Jamaica. Thirty Protestant merchants of Port Royal petitioned Sir Thomas Lynch, governor of Jamaica, in March 1672, against the 'infinite number of Iewes which daylie resort to this island', trading there 'contrary to all law and policy'. They were accused of collaborating with each other to form a kind of informal 'company, and trade with a joynt stocke, whereby they alwaies command ready money, and by that meanes do not onely alwaies buy the choicest and best goods, but frequently whole cargoes' and of undercutting Christians with 'their penurious way of living': 'and although their trading amongst us makes a noyse and seemes to give some kind of creditt and reputacion to the island, yet the kingdome of England receives noe benefit, because all their merchandises are brought directly from Holland where they will againe (certainly) transport themselves, with all the gayne and advantage they shall have made of this place, and how much the island will bee drayned by that, and all his Majesty's subiects suffer in it, may easily be apprehended and foreseene'.[47]

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[42] *Cal. State papers. Colonial, 1661–1668* (no. 1657), p. 530; Friedenwald, 'Material', 92.
[43] Ibid., 93.
[44] Ibid., p. 95.
[45] Ibid., 58.
[46] Darnell Davis, 'Notes', 142–3.

The constant complaints and grievances against the Jews especially on the part of Christian merchants in the Caribbean led the island councils, and some officials, to try to prune back the legal, religious and commercial privileges and rights conceded to the Jews by the crown of England. The usual method of self-defence resorted to in these situations, in the British no less than in the Dutch and French colonies was to mobilise the Amsterdam *parnasim* to intercede with the relevant foreign monarch on their behalf. The Amsterdam elders would then usually delegate the task to one or both of the (in the late seventeenth century) two permanent deputies for dealing with governments, namely Jeronimo Nunes da Costa and the Baron Belmonte. This mechanism is indeed a typical feature of the Sephardi Caribbean commercial system with its strong orientation towards Amsterdam. Thus, the Jesuit-backed moves undertaken by officials in the French West Indies in 1681–2, against the wishes of Colbert, to persuade the king to expel the Jews, a project judged by some 'très utile au Christianisme', led among other things to the arrival of a letter in Paris from 'le sieur d'Acoste, Juif, et agent des affaires de la couronne de Portugal en Hollande', asking Louis XIV to 'confirmer les juifs qui sont aux Isles dans la liberté qu'ils ont eue jusques à présent de faire l'exercise de leur religion'.[48] His intervention had no useful result and not long afterwards the Jews were expelled from the French Antilles. When the governor and council of Surinam attempted, in the early 1690s, to prevent the Jews there from requiring their slaves (who rested on the Jewish sabbath, Saturdays) to work on Sundays, so that their slaves should respect the Christian sabbath and work only five days, the Baron Belmonte was asked to intercede with the directors in the Republic together with Samuel Nassy, on that occasion successfully.[49] When the Jamaican Island Assembly, beginning in December 1695, introduced 'special assessments' for additional taxation to be levied specifically on the Jews in addition to the general taxes, Belmonte was again brought into action, his petition to William III in London, requesting that the king remind the governor of Jamaica 'que il aye a maintenir et observer religieusement et sans delai les privileges que Votre Majesté et les rois predeceseurs ont fait la grace d'accorder à la nation juif portugaise par ses lettres patentes sans les singulariser par aucune taxe particulière et qu'on les laisse jouir du culte et du libre exercise de leur religion'.[50] This too seems to have succeeded.

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[47] Friedenwald, 'Material', 52, 89–91.

[48] Cahen, 'Juifs de la Martinique', 106.

Meanwhile, the Sephardi communities in the Guyanas played a notable part both in the sugar production of tropical America and in maritime trade. While it is true that the Sephardi community of Surinam, and the rest of the Guyanas was originally, and during the first half of the eighteenth century still predominantly, a plantation society, and that most of its members were planters or belonged to the families of planters, Surinam Jewry was also to a degree a mercantile community like those in Curaçao, New Amsterdam, Saint Thomas and Saint Eustatius. Maritime commerce, as in Netherlands Brazil earlier, always constituted a large part of the activity of the Sephardim in Surinam, just as in the Caribbean. Although Surinam was in English hands until the Dutch captured the colony in 1667 and the origins of Sephardi settlement lay well back in the 'English' period, very likely prior to 1654, it is striking that the commercial and financial ties of the early settlers in Surinam were not with London but once again principally with Amsterdam.

Many of the early settlers had come from Netherlands Brazil and many had close relatives in Holland. Thus, for example, Isaac de Silva (alias Ferão Martins da Silva) who resided in Amsterdam and drew up his will there, in August 1668 traded with Saleh and many other places in the Old World; but he also had a brother, Aron da Silva in Surinam where he was a leading member of the pre-1667 Sephardi community, a English subject naturalised by Act of Parliament,[51] and owner of a sugar crushing mill, or *engenho*, which he had built with capital belonging to the family in Amsterdam.[52] Admittedly, as has often been mentioned, some of the Surinam Sephardim, wishing to be English subjects, preferrred to leave the colony and settle in Jamaica, and became involved in a complicated argument between the English crown and the States General as to whether, under the terms of the 1667 Anglo-Dutch peace treaty, they were free to move to English territory, or not. But it seems that only around ten families expressed a desire to do so, and this can scarcely have amounted to much more than a fifth of the then community of 200 to 250 persons, a group which appeared to an English visitor in 1675 'to be as considerable both for number and fortune' as the Protestant Dutch.[53] Those who wished 'to transport themselves and estates to Jamaica' undeniably included a few of the more substantial settlers, among them Aaron de Silva who with seventy-four slaves was then the largest Jewish slave-owner in Surinam and assuredly the richest of those who wished to quit Surinam.[54] However the States General denied that these Jews were the King's subjects or denizens,[55] and refused to authorise their departure, so that in the end it would seem that most or all of them stayed. In any case, the Sephardi settlement steadily expanded after 1675, under the leadership of Samuel Nassy, by 1694 reaching the level of ninety families plus another fifty single persons, around 560 individuals altogether (including forty to fifty *Ashkenazim*), owning forty plantations and several thousand slaves.[56]

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[49] [Nassy], *Essai historique*, 53–4, 137–9.
[50] Andrade, *A Record*, 10.

Although Surinam Jewry remained divided between the plantations and Paramaribo, during the second half of the eighteenth century, the colony's plantation economy—and most of all the Jewish sector of it—rapidly declined. Whereas in 1730, Jews still owned 115 out of 440 sugar and coffee plantations in Surinam, by 1788 this figure had dropped to only forty-six.[57] Meanwhile, the commercial sector, the Jewish presence in Paramaribo, gradually expanded. Two substantial synagogues were to be seen in Surinam: one, built in 1685, was inland, among the plantations, situated in the Jewish village of Jodensavanne, on the Surinam River, the other, rebuilt in 1735, was located near the harbour, in Paramaribo. By 1791, the original pattern of Jewish settlement in Surinam had been completely reversed : there were 1,050 Jews (620 Sephardim and 430 Ashkenazim) in Paramaribo out of a total population of nearly 13,000, while inland there were only around 200 Jews scattered among the plantations with just a few dozen at Jodensavanne.[58]

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[51] Hollander, 'Documents' 27.

[52] GAA NA 2898, pp. 441–2, deed, Amsterdam 29 Aug. 1668 (P. Padthuysen).

[53] Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 155; Böhm, *Sefardíes en los dominios holandeses*, 140–1; Hollander' Documents', 13.

[54] Ibid., 17.

[55] Ibid., 20–1.

[56] [Nassy], *Essai historique*, 48, 83; Oudschants Dentz, *Colonisatie*, 17; Van Lier, 'Jewish Community', 19.

[57] Ibid., 23; Cohen, *Jews in another Environment*, 61–75; Goslinga, *Dutch in the Caribbean*, 353, 362; Klooster, 'Jews in Suriname and Curacao', 352.

By contrast, the Sephardi settlement in Cayenne, at Remire, briefly flourishing, came to an early and unhappy end. A charter for settlement there was negotiated by David Nassy with the WIC directors and drawn up in September 1659.[59] A substantial number of settlers, refugees from Brazil and immigrants from Livorno, duly arrived. At its height, in 1664, the thriving Jewish agricultural colony at Remire numbered from three to four hundred Jews mainly engaged, once again, in sugar cultivation. Some of these departed that year, however, when a French expedition arrived and seized the colony by force from the Dutch.[60] The rest were removed by the attacking English fleet which descended on Cayenne in 1667 with the aim of burning the town and the sugar plantations.[61] Both waves transferred to Surinam then still under English rule.

In the Guyanas, as in Curaçao and New Netherland, the Dutch authorities initially showed little willingness to encourage Jewish trade. Even in the case of the (in most respects) extremely liberal privileges conceded to the Jews by the Zeeland towns, in 1657, for settlement in the western Guyana colonies of Nova Zeelandia, the emphasis was on encouraging Jewish settlers to acquire land and establish plantations, as well as engage in 'hunting and fishing', rather than on commerce, though the document does grant that 'it shall be lawful to trade with the Indians'.[62] The western Guyana settlements, especially Pomeroon and Essequibo, at first enjoyed some success. Beginning in 1658, with several batches of settlers being shipped out from Zeeland, some of them refugees from Netherlands Brazil, a thriving plantation economy was established.[63] But again war disrupted what had been achieved. In 1669, after its destruction, an English officer noted of Pomeroon that 'a great colony of Dutch and Jews drawn off from Brazil by the Portuguese settled there, and being experienced planters, that soon grew a flourishing collonie'.[64] But the fort and harbour of 'Nieuw Middelburg' together with the Jewish settlement and sugar plantations were all pillaged and burned during the English attack of January 1666, which was so thorough that it led to the complete abandonment of the site. The Jewish community of some fifty to sixty families was permanently dissolved.[65]

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[58] Ibid., 363.

[59] Arbell, 'Jewish Settlements', 296.

[60] [Nassy], *Essai historique*, 22.

[61] Arbell., 300.

[62] Cohen, 'Edgerton Manuscript', 333–47.

Meanwhile, the island of Tobago was planned by the WIC to be developed together with the Guyana settlements, being regarded as an off-shore base and shipping terminal for the Wilde Coast as well as a useful additional plantation economy. Despite an initial lack of enthusiasm for Jewish settlement there, in 1658–9, the Zeeland committee responsible for Nova Zeelandia negotiated with Paulo Jacome Pinto, one of the chief Sephardi merchants of Middelburg, an arrangement whereby a sizeable group of Sephardi emigrants, many from Livorno among them recently arrived Portuguese New Christian refugees from Spain, were to be shipped from Zeeland to Nova Zeelandia. For whatever reason, the second ship-load of 120 emigrants which went out in 1659 was not taken to Guyana but left on Tobago where many were quickly reduced to 'poverty and misfortune'. A third shipload of 152 Livorno Sephardim who sailed on board the *Monte de Cisne*, in 1660, supposedly to settle in Cayenne, was similarly deposited and left to their own devices on Tobago. Among these was the poet, Daniel Levi de Barrios, and his wife Deborah Vaez, who died there.[66] Of those brought to Tobago, a few apparently stayed, more moved on to the Guyanas or elsewhere in the Caribbean while still others, including De Barrios, unable or unwilling to establish themselves there, or in the Guyanas, eventually returned to Amsterdam.[67]

Pomeroon, Cayenne and Tobago were a string of disastrous setbacks which befell the Sephardim in the Caribbean and the Guyanas, to which should be added the expulsions from Martinique, and Guadaloupe by Louis XIV in the early 1680s. It is noticeable that most of the Sephardim who left these failed and aborted settlements, especially the more substantial merchants, subsequently gravitated towards the Dutch rather than the English colonies and trading system. When Louis XIV expelled the small community (probably less than 100) which had taken route in Martinique, in 1683–4, most, including Spinoza's nephew, Benjamin de Casseres and the richest, most enterprising and most famous of the Martinique Jews—Benjamin da Costa da Andrade who had brought the community's *sepher torah* and its ornaments from Amsterdam, in 1676—migrated directly to Curaçao.[68] From Curaçao, moreover, they continued to maintain a tenuous contact with Martinique and other French islands, mainly through temporary Sephardi residents and visitors, one of whom, in 1694, was Manuel Levy Mendes, a nephew of the Amsterdam diamond and stock exchange dealer Manuel Levy Duarte.[69]

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[63] Arbell, 'Jewish Settlement in Pomeroon', 348–56; Böhm, *Sefardíes en los dominios holandeses*, 109–22.

[64] Oppenheim, 'Early Jewish Colony', 128; Arbell, 'Failure', 305.

[65] Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 150–1; Arbell, 'Jewish Settlement in Pomeroon', 357.

[66] Zwarts', 'Episode', 519.

[67] Arbell, 'Failure', 306–7.

During the early eighteenth century, a large part of the imports and exports of the English Caribbean and North American colonies was still being shipped in and out by various clandestine means, usually in English ships, to and from, Curaçao, Paramaribo, Saint Thomas, or Amsterdam. Curaçao, alone, according to one English observer, in 1704 'loads home for Holland in one year about 50 sail of ships, and most of them are richly laden, and a great part of their loading comes out of the English plantations, chiefly sugar, cotton, tobacco, indigo and ginger; of their own produce by trade with Spaniards, cocoa, hides, tobacco, logwood, stockfish, wood and money'.[70] The surviving list of ships entering and departing the harbour of Willemstad during the second half of 1714, though it reflects an unusually low level of contact with the Venezuela coast—listing only five vessels arriving from La Guaira (Caracas), and two from Maracaibo—as well as other Spanish colonies, fully reflects the usual intensity of traffic to and from the English colonies in defiance of the Navigation Acts not only to Barbados and Jamaica but also Newport, Boston, New York, and other North American ports.[71] In that six-month period no less than twenty-six vessels arrived from the English Caribbean and North America. Curaçao was dependent on flour, pickled meat and other basic provisions from English North America. It also exported considerable quantities of illegally transported English colonial produce; yet the core of its commerce was always the trade with Spanish America. Linen, from Silesia and other parts of northern Germany as well as the Netherlands, remained the most important item supplied from Amsterdam; the other main imports were fine cloth, spirits, wine, candles, cinnamon, pepper and paper.[72]

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[68] Emmanuel, 'Juifs de la Martinique', 515–6; Arbell, 'Jewish Settlements', 294; Klooster, 'Jews in Suriname and Curaçao', 353.

[69] Emmanuel, 'Juifs de la Martinique', 516.

[70] Quoted in Fortune, *Merchants and Jews*, 143–4.

[71] ARH WIC 206, fos. 8–16; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 396.

That the Sephardim of Curaçao formed not just a religious and legal entity but also the hub of a far-ranging maritime trade and family network is further demonstrated by the fact that the leading merchants of the community had regular commercial partners in Amsterdam, who were usually close relatives, and in the rest of their trade dealt normally only with other Sephardi Caribbean merchants. Characteristically, the Jewish merchants of Curaçao—except for Phelipe Henriquez (alias Jacob Senior) (c. 1660–1718) who spent long periods on the mainland and was frequently at the Dutch occupied promontory of Tucacas, near Coro—like nearly all those of the Caribbean and Guyanas, normally signed business transactions with their Jewish names whilst the business names of the partners and relatives in Amsterdam were still usually in their secular, Iberian forms: hence for example, Alexandre Nunes da Costa rather than 'Selomoh Curiel'.

Given the fundamental ties of Curaçao's Caribbean trade network, and that of the Caribbean Sephardi world as a whole, with Holland and Zeeland, it is scarcely surprising that the entire system began rapidly to decline from the middle of the eighteenth century as the Dutch trading system itself lost momentum.[73] Of course, the waning of Sephardi activity in Caribbean trade was obvious in the Dutch colonies. But it was also quite noticeable in the English territories. Gradually, the Navigation acts were applied more meticulously and effectively and as, from around 1740, the Dutch Republic ceased to be a major exporter of linen and other textiles to the Caribbean, Dutch textiles ceased to be smuggled into the English as well as the Spanish colonies. Whereas the very world 'Holland' denoted fine linen on Barbados in the second half of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, subsequently Holland linens, and German and French linens imported from Amsterdam, were entirely replaced by British-controlled Irish linen.[74] With the increasing effectiveness of British mercantilist policy and the Navigation acts, and the relentless eradication of foreign participation in English Caribbean trade that this implied, the Sephardi communities of Jamaica and Barbados steadily lost both vitality and numbers.

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[72] Klooster, 'Jews in Suriname and Curaçao', 356; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 323–5.
[73] Ibid., 377–415.

Table: *The Leading Curaçao Jewish Merchants trading with Europe (1700–1705)*

Firm in Curaçao	*Trading Partners in Amsterdam*
Abenatar, Jacob	'Jeronimo Nunes da Costa' Francisco Ximenes Belmonte
Alvares Correa, Manuel	Gabriel Alvares Correa Simon and Luis Rodrigues de Sousa
Chaves, Abraham de	Jacob de Chaves
Crasto, Jacob de	Francisco and Duarte Nunes da Costa
Crasto, Mordechai	Manuel de Crasto
Moseh Henriques and Joshua Naar	Alexandre Nunes da Costa
Henriques, Phelipe and David Senior	Abraham Fundão
Henriques Moron, Abraham	Aaron Henriques Moron
Lopez Dias, Isaac and David	Lopo Nunes Ramires
Lopez Henriques,	David Lopez Henriques Baron Manuel de Belmonte Jacob van Moseh Lopez Henriques
Medina, Selomoh de	Alexandre Nunes da Costa
Pereira, Elias	David Abenatar
Pina, Abraham and Joshua de	'Jeronimo Nunes da Costa'
Senior, David and Isaac	Abraham Fundão Lopo Nunes Ramires
Vas Nunes, Manuel and Jacob	Samuel Teixeira

Source: This list is extracted from ARH WIC vols. 566, 567, 568 and 569; although Jeronimo Nunes da Costa died in 1697 his sons, Francisco and Alexandre continued dutifully trading under his name.

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[74] Darnell Davis, 'Notes', 142.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

COMMERCE, RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS: SEPHARDI JEWRY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1700–1714)*

If what today is called globalisation began, as it assuredly did, with the world maritime empires of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the process speeded up dramatically during the pan-continental struggle of the Spanish Succession (1700–1714), a world drama which involved Sephardic Jewry in numerous and remarkable ways. For while the political context of Spanish-Dutch relations from 1648 to 1700, had greatly enhanced the commercial and financial role of the western Sephardim in world affairs, the alignment of Spain with France, from 1700, cancelled those advantages and effectively dismantled the Sephardic maritime trade network pivoting on Holland which had resulted. It is against this background that one has to interpret the fervent, almost obsessive, preoccupation of many Jews and *conversos* in Holland, London, Antwerp, Spain, Portugal, Gibraltar, the Caribbean, and the western Mediterranean generally at the close of the 1690s, and during the first fifteen years of the eighteenth century, with the great issue of the Spanish Succession. In general terms what was at stake was power and wealth—in fact the balance of power in Europe and trade hegemony across the globe. For the Sephardim in particular what was at stake was their status in the world and the viability of the trans-Atlantic trade network that had served them so well over the last half century.

Where during the first half of the seventeenth century, the commerce of the Dutch Sephardim was predominantly with Portugal and the Portuguese colonial empire, especially Brazil, a fundamental restructuring of the Dutch Jewish overseas trade network had begun during the middle years of the century.[1] The prolonged antagonism between Portugal and the United Provinces after 1645, the end of Netherlands Brazil and eradication of the Jewish community there in 1654, and the emerging English hegemony over the Portugal trade in the 1650s, all contributed to a growing shift away from the Portuguese sphere and towards Spain and Spanish America. At the same time, this reconfiguring of western Sephardi activity was driven by notable changes on the Spanish side, especially the favourable terms granted to the Dutch under the 1648 peace treaty—and supplementary maritime accord of 1650, and the Spanish king's acceptance (however reluctantly), after 1648, that Jews living under the States General's sovereignty were Dutch subjects and therefore entitled to share, on an equal basis, in commercial rights and privileges granted to Dutch Protestants. Also important was the substantial emigration of Portuguese New Christians from Spain to Holland, after the financial crash of 1647 and after coming under renewed pressure from the Spanish Inquisition, among them a number of wealthy merchants and financiers who had been living for several decades mostly in Madrid and Seville.[2] Last but not least, reorientation towards the Spanish monarchy, was driven also by the policy of the Genoese (and later other) holders of the Spanish slave *asiento*, or monopoly for importing slaves to the Spanish Indies who, being forbidden by the Spanish crown to buy slaves from the Portuguese between 1640 and the Spanish-Portuguese peace of 1668, became accustomed, from around 1660 onwards, to procure most of their slave consignments for Spanish America from the Dutch West India Company usually using the slaving depot at Curaçao and with Sephardic Jews acting as intermediaries in the traffic.

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* A shorter, less developed, version of this essay appeared under the title 'The Dutch Republic and its Jews during the Conflict over the Spanish Succession (1699–1715)' in *Dutch Jewish History* vol. 2 (ed.) J. Michman (Jerusalem, 1989), pp. 117–36.

[1] Israel, 'Economic Contribution of Dutch Sephardi Jewry', 507; Israel, 'Sephardi Contribution to Economic Life', pp. 384–92; Israel, *European Jewry*, 91–3, 145–6; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 119–22.

Dutch Sephardic Jews, then, directly and indirectly, played a notable part in the financial and commercial life of the Spanish monarchy after 1648 essentially because Amsterdam was, for over half a century, a major influence in the workings of the Spanish and Spanish American market. The unrivalled position of the Dutch in general in Spanish trade during the second half of the seventeenth century was indeed widely acknowledged by contemporaries. As Savary des Bruslons expresses it in his *Dictionnaire universel de commerce* (1723), the late seventeenth-century wars between Spain and France constricted French commerce with the hispanic world and gave 'occasion aux Hollandois de s'emparer de la meilleure partie du commerce d'Espagne, don't ils sont restez les maítres jusqu'à la guerre pour l'acceptation du testament de Charles II en faveur du duc d'Anjou', that is that Dutch hegemony over Spanish trade at the expense of the French, and others persisted until the outbreak of the War over the Spanish Succession in 1702.[3] The War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1714) effectively ended Amsterdam's preponderance and by so doing simultaneously curtailed the post-1648 prominence of the Sephardim in key sectors of the maritime, financial and commercial life of the Spanish empire.

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[2] Ebben, *Zilver, brood en kogels*, 215–17.

After 1648, Sephardic links with the Spanish empire had grown more diverse and complex with each passing decade. While the Amsterdam-Portugal-Brazil circuit had already been largely displaced as the chief element in the western Sephardi commercial system, by the more complex and politically charged circuit Amsterdam-Madrid-Cadiz-Curaçao, as early as the 1660s, significant new elements were added to the pattern of Sephardi involvement with the Spanish seaborne imperium in later decades. In particular, with Spain and the United Provinces linked from 1673 to 1700 in a formal military and political alliance, designed to defend the southern Netherlands, Luxemburg and Cologne from Louis XIV's expansionism, the two powers developed new procedures for strategic and logistic collaboration in the Low Countries which, in turn, led to Sephardi involvement in Dutch military finance and army contracting connected with Spain. During the wars of 1672–8, 1688–97, in which the United Provinces fought France in alliance with Spain and Austria (and in the latter also England), the Dutch army under the Stadholder—and after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 also king of England—William III (Stadholder: 1672–1702; king of England: 1689–1702) campaigned chiefly in the Spanish Netherlands. The troops had to be paid, fed and supplied, as did their Spanish and (from 1688) English allies and the chief provisioners, the suppliers of the army's bread, forage and wagons were Antonio Alvares Machado and Jacob Pereira and their associates. This firm won such plaudits for reliability and good service from 1672 onwards, that year after year, at the prompting of the Stadholder (who seems to have been a personal friend of Machado), the States General invariably turned to Machado and Pereira in preference to other victuallers (even when the latter were cheaper) to provision the Dutch army—as well, from 1689 onwards, as the English and other allied troops campaigning in the Spanish Netherlands.[4] As the scale of Machado and Pereira's operation grew, other Sephardi merchants were drawn in both as investors and as managers and assistants.

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[3] Savary des Bruslons, *Dictionaire universel* i, 930; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 224–44, 31–26, 359–76.

Other key figures in the post-1673 logistical collaboration of Spain and the Netherlands were the financier Baron Francisco Lopes Suasso and Spain's Jewish 'Resident' at Amsterdam, the Baron Manuel de Belmonte who, among other things, helped arrange the complicated financial package by which Spain undertook to reimburse the Republic for the cost of the De Ruyter naval expedition, of 1675, to defend Spanish Sicily from the French.[5] By the 1690s, Lopes Suasso, as Low Countries agent of the Madrid banker, the Baron de Tamari, was entrusted with forwarding a great part of the money for the monthly installments of Spain's own military expenditure in the southern Netherlands.[6] Lopes Suasso, Belmonte, and probably also Alvares Machado were at the same time involved in various ways in commerce with Spain and Spanish America so that their success in military finance and contracting can be said to have further increased the dependence of the Dutch Sephardic Atlantic system as a whole on the Republic's close political and maritime relations with Spain.

But if the special relationship between Spain and the United Provinces during the last three decades of the seventeenth century provided the basis for Sephardic prominence in the Spanish trans-Atlantic system what were the prospects for continuance of that relationship, and prominence, in the future? In diplomatic circles there had, for decades, been a great deal of speculation about the fate of the Spanish empire once the childless and sickly Carlos II (reigned: 1665–1700) finally expired. Efforts to influence the outcome had been in progress for forty years. But the Spanish Succession crisis as such began only in the last months of that feeble king's long reign when it became obvious, late in 1699, that he was finally near to death's door. The royal court in Madrid became a vipers' nest of factionalism and rivalry as courtiers and foreign diplomats openly jostled for advantage, aligning for or against the feuding 'French' and 'Austrian' parties. In this welter of intrigue, Francisco Schonenberg (alias Jacob Abraham Belmonte), special envoy of William III and a nephew of the Baron Belmonte, evidently played—despite the fact that no-one in Madrid seemed to know whether he had converted to Christianity or was still an unconverted Jew—a central role.[7] Having first gone to Madrid, in 1678, to help negotiate the reimbursement due from Spain following De Ruyter's Sicilian expedition, he had subsequently become a key member of the diplomatic corps at the Spanish court despite lacking the title and status of 'ambassador'.[8] He seems to have been tenacious and shrewd but tactless and too obviously interested in commerce. In 1695, Carlos II's ministers, outraged by his insistent style of defending two bankrupt Dutch wool exporters, Jacques and Charles Mols, declared him *persona non grata* and expelled him from Madrid; but neither William III nor the States General would accept this and retaliated by boycotting the Spanish ambassador at The Hague, until the Spanish court was forced to relent and re-admit him to court.

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[4] Nimwegen, *Subsistentie van het leger*, 26–9; Israel, *European Jewry*, 104–8.
[5] Ibid., 109, 112.
[6] Van Kalken, *Fin du régime espagnol aux Pays-Bas*, 104–5.

Even before Carlos II's demise, Schonenberg, in his double capacity as Dutch representative and 'Envoy Extraordinary of his Royal Majesty' of England, laboured, in accordance with William III's instructions, to promote and encourage the faction of the marqués de Leganés which was seeking to secure the throne—and with it the entire Spanish inheritance in Europe and America—for the Austrian Habsburg candidate, the Emperor's second son, the Archduke Karl.[9] Had these endeavours succeeded and the dyeing Carlos bequeathed the empire to his Austrian nephew, the Spanish world would have kept within the system of alliances linking Austria, the United Provinces and Britain and not only would the European balance of power have remained largely as before but there would, presumably, have been no War of the Spanish Succession. The Dutch Sephardic Atlantic trading and financial system, in that case would probably have continued to flourish largely unchanged. However, in the last weeks of Carlos' life, after a tense deadlock of many months, opinion among those around the king's death-bed shifted decisively in favour of the Bourbon claimant to the Spanish throne, Louis XIV's grandson, the duc d'Anjou, the future King Philip V of Castile and, therefore, in favour of *rapprochement* and alignment with France.

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[7] Francis, *Methuens and Portugal*, 162; Gotttheil, *The Belmont-Belmonte family*, 51, 54.

[8] Ibid., 51, 54, 94.

[9] Ibid., 68–70; *Documentos inéditos referentes a las postrimerias de la Casa de Austria* v, 118, 166, 247; Caro Baroja, *Judíos* ii, 169; Schreiber, 'Juden in Madrid', 484.

Among other factors which contributed to an outcome which meant abandoning the Habsburg connection and the special relationship with the Dutch, seems to have been a growing reaction against foreign and particularly foreign Protestant influence within Spain and its empire. Many Castilians saw that if the Archduke Charles secured the Spanish throne with English and Dutch help, this was bound to mean yet more commercial concessions to the Maritime Powers both in Spain and the Spanish New World, and therefore more Protestant (and Jewish) commercial penetration and, with it, a growing likelihood that notions of religious toleration, (and infiltration of Protestant and Jewish influences) would increase. The feeling in some quarters was that the unity and integrity of Spanish Catholicism as well as the supremacy of the Inquisition and ecclesiastical authority were being increasingly put a risk.[10] Doubtless, the spectacle of Schonenberg, a Jew reputed to be fiercely anti-French, closeted in secret meetings with Leganés and openly orchestrating moves in favour of the Austrian Succession, can only have encouraged such sentiment. Heartily resented and disliked, Schonenberg was seen, not without some justification, as being not just William III's personal representative, and the States General's trusted envoy, but also in some sense a representative of Jewish interests which in a way he was and by no means only by virtue of being a dogged defender of Dutch commercial interests as a whole. That he enjoyed the confidence of the Dutch Sephardic business elite is proven, among other indications, by their intercession on his behalf, in 1707, five years after his transfer to Lisbon at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession when he (once again) applied to the States General for the title of 'Ambassador': 'the Jews here sollicite hotly to obtain that honour for him', noted the English envoy at The Hague, in February of that year, 'but there is not yet great disposition to gratify them in that'.[11]

Doubtless many courtiers and financiers in Madrid were aware of Schonenberg's connection with Belmonte and other members of the

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[10] *Documentos inéditos referentes a las postrimerias de la Casa de Austria* v, 247.

[11] PRO SP 84/229, Dayrolle to Harley, The Hague, 4 Feb. 1707.

Dutch Sephardic merchant elite. Certainly, French diplomats knew of it as we see from a report of the marquis d'Harcourt, Louis XIV's minister there, of December 1700, a few weeks after Carlos' death, at a point where Schonenberg had just begun actively lobbying against a Bourbon Succession. 'Il est nécessaire', the marquis advised his superiors, 'de veiller à la conduite de Schonenberg, agent des États Généraux. Vous savez qu'il est très mal intentioné. Il ne faut pas cependant le faire sortir tant que l'ambassadeur d'Espagne demeurera en Hollande; mais il est bon que la Junte lui fasse parler fortement sur le retardement que les États-Généraux apportent à reconnaître le roi d'Espagne [i.e. Philip V] et à le féliciter son avènement à la couronne'.[12] A few weeks later, Harcourt warned Paris that the Baron Belmonte, Schonenberg's 'oncle sert le roi d'Espagne en qualité de son resident à Amsterdam. Comme on ne peut plus prendre aucune confiance en lui pour cet emploi, il serait nécessaire de le donner à quel autre plus fidèle et attaché aux seuls intérests du Roi Catholique'.[13] Presumably, the new king of Spain, Philip V, after arriving in Madrid intended to replace him; but the States General rapidly lost all inclination to gratify the Bourbons in any respect and pointedly retained Belmonte as 'agent-general of Spain' in Amsterdam.

By the time Carlos II died on 1 November 1700, it was obvious that the Maritime Powers had suffered a vast and disastrous diplomatic defeat at the hands of the French and their Castilian allies. Under the terms of his will, the Spanish empire was to remain intact and be transferred *in toto* to Philippe d'Anjou, the Bourbon claimant. This not only represented a grave blow to the allies politically and strategically but also to their trade, shipping and commercial interests and ambitions. For the time being, though, both Maritime Powers (much to the frustration of the Austrian court) preferred to wait and see how matters developed rather than rush headlong into a new war. Given the allied failure, despite immense expenditure of resources, decisively to get the upper hand over France (even with Spain on their side) during the Nine Years' War (1688–97), they not unnaturally hesitated somewhat before undertaking a vast new struggle this time against France and Spain combined. Deliberating in January 1701, the Amsterdam city government detailed the grave risks for the Dutch involved in accepting Philippe d'Anjou as the new Spanish king, but urged, nevertheless, that war be averted if at all possible owing to the devastating effect such a global struggle on land and sea would have on commerce and shipping.[14]

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[12] Quoted in Gottheil, *The Belmont-Belmonte Family*, 70–1.

[13] Ibid., p. 71.

Over the next months, however, the mood in Holland and England rapidly hardened both against France and against acquiescing in the Bourbon Succession. The unprovoked entry of the French army into the southern Netherlands, in February, in the name of Philip V, forcing the Dutch Barrier garrisons, stationed there under the peace terms of 1697, ignominiously to withdraw was perceived not just as an affront, and blatant violation of the peace of Rijswijk, but an intolerable setback to Dutch security interests, at a stroke eliminating the defensive cordon against France and removing the only guarantee the Dutch had that the Schelde—and therefore Antwerp—would remain closed to maritime trade. This latter aspect was viewed as all the more worrying by the States of Holland in that, recently, moves had been afoot in the Spanish Netherlands to try to free that country's languishing industries and commerce from economic subjection to the Dutch.[15] Still more threatening to Dutch and English interests were developments in the New World and in Spain itself. Already, in August 1700, the last Spanish Habsburg trans-Atlantic fleet arrived at Cartagena de Indias bringing numerous new office-holders and royal instructions which clearly reflected the change of mood in Madrid, that is the growing preference for *rapprochement* with the French and estrangement from the Dutch. A month later, the three factors of the Portuguese Guinea Company on Curaçao—Jan Goetvrint, a Dutchman, and the Sephardi brothers, Phelipe Henriquez and David Senior, were warned by the Company's agent at Caracas, that royal *cédulas* had arrived with the fleet proclaiming that no more Dutch or other foreign vessels bringing slaves could be admitted to Spanish American ports under the terms of the *asiento*.[16] This change in policy disrupted not just existing arrangements for supplying slaves to the Spanish Indies but also the existing mechanism for exporting Dutch and other European goods to the Spanish Indies direct from the Netherlands via Curaçao. Worse still, the change was promptly and energetically enforced as the Curaçao factors discovered, in

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[14] GAA Vroedschapsresoluties vol. xlv, p. 103. Res. 5 Jan. 1701.

[15] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 361–2.

[16] ARH WIC 566, fo. 3v. Beck to Bewindhebberen, Curaçao, 18 Sept. 1700.

October, on forwarding a batch of slaves to Caracas on a Curaçao barque flying the Dutch flag. No sooner had it anchored than the vessel was obliged to sail away again without delivering its human cargo.[17] Not long afterwards, two Dutch slaving vessels were expelled from Cartagena without receiving payment for slave deliveries while a third, dispatched from Curaçao to replenish the Puerto Rican market with Osnabrück, Flemish and Rouen linens, pepper and candles was confiscated by the Spanish authorities off the Puerto Rican coast. By November 1700, the Curaçao transit trade with the Spanish Indies had been brought to a complete standstill.

Amsterdam merchants were not long left in doubt as to whether this was a short-term interruption or heralded a wider and more fundamental shift in Spain's trans-Atlantic commercial system. In February 1701, it was confirmed, now in the name of Philip V, that no more ships flying the Dutch flag would be admitted into Spanish American ports under the *asiento*, or any other pretext.[18] By March, business confidence among the principal Amsterdam houses at Cadiz had disintegrated to the point that the factors there received orders to cease normal business and, as inconspicuously as possible, transfer stocks into the warehouses of Hanseatic, Genoese and other neutrals for safekeeping.[19] In May, as Schonenberg immediately advised the States, the new king dispatched orders to all the ports of Spain 'om generalijk alle de vreemde tabaquen geen gewasch wezende vande de Spaensche dominien in America strengelijk te prohiberen' [generally strictly to prohibit the import of all kinds of tobacco not produced in the Spanish dominions of the New World] an aggressively mercantilist measure chiefly directed against Dutch-spun and blended tobacco, thereby shutting out from the Spanish market one of Amsterdam's (and Amsterdam Jewry's) principal manufactured products.[20] Finally, in September 1701, Philip completed the commercial rupture with the Dutch by transferring the slave *asiento* from the Portuguese Guinea Company (which in recent years had serviced the contract in collaboration with the WIC and merchants of

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[17] ARH WIC 566, fo. 62v–63. Beck to Bewindhebberen, Curacao, 22 Nov. 1700.

[18] ARH WIC 200, fo. 65. Governor of Curaçao to WIC directors, Curaçao, 26 Feb. 1701.

[19] ARH SH 2548, fos. 138v, 155, 173. Dutch consul in Cadiz to States General, Cadiz, 14 and 29 March 1701.

[20] ARH SH 2548, fos. 115, 138v, 155, 161, 192v.

Curaçao) to the French Guinea Company based at Saint Malo.[21] The effects of these measures in Spain and the Caribbean were quickly noticed in the United Provinces. Flows of silver from both Spanish American viceroyalties, merino wool, cacao, Venezuela tobacco, cochineal, Campeche wood, and other tropical dyestuffs rapidly dwindled. Within weeks, the Amsterdam Exchange became so nervous about the drop in silver imports from the Spanish empire to the Dutch Republic, that the States General, in an unprecedented move, issued a decree suspending all export of silver from the United Provinces other than VOC shipments to the East Indies, specially minted silver crowns for Denmark, and consignments of *leeuwendaalders* for the Levant trade, all of which outflows were deemed indispensable.[22]

Baron Belmonte, meanwhile, like his relative Schonenberg, Antonio Alvares Machado, and others, set to work to frustrate the commercial plans of the new Spanish monarch. While it would be incorrect to say that Sephardi Jews played a primary role in the Dutch slave trade via Curaçao—for this was chiefly a West India Company business organized, supervised and justified by Protestants[23]—Belmonte and his Caribbean agents were undoubtedly heavily involved in an intermediary capacity, the baron, together with the brothers Luis and Simão Rodrigues de Sousa (who for decades had been among the largest Jewish investors in the WIC), having been the Amsterdam agents of the Portuguese Guinea Company and therefore responsible for negotiating its dealings with the WIC.[24] In addition, Belmonte and others invested directly in some slave shipments from the Guinea Coast to the factors of the Portuguese company at Cartagena, Porto Bello, Havana and elsewhere in the Spanish Caribbean.[25] On hearing of the transfer of the *asiento* to the French, Belmonte at once wrote to William III's political secretary in London, William Blathwaite, assuring him that the French Company's undertaking to provide Spanish America with sufficient slaves for its needs from French West Africa by-passing the WIC was bound to fail, owing to inadequate finance and access to supplies; for his part, he vowed to do everything he could to thwart the French Company's efforts to raise investment capital in Amsterdam and London.[26]

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[21] ARH SH 2548, fos. 318v, 353; Scelle, *La traite negrière* ii, 35, 48, 67, 134; Palacios Preciado, *Trata de negros*, 62, 70, 86, 136–8; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 362.

[22] Van Dillen, 'Amsterdam als wereldmarkt', 594–6; Jansen, *Koophandel van Amsterdam*, 97.

[23] Klooster, 'Jews in Suriname and Curaçao', 356; Drescher, 'Jews and New Christians in the Atlantic Slave Trade', 450–1.

[24] ARH WIC 356 fos. 287, 290, 310v. res. 8 Nov. and 6 Dec. 1701; in 1674, with 30,000 guilders invested, Simon and Luis Rodrigues de Sousa had together had the fourth largest Sephardi portfolio in the WIC after Antonio Lopes Suasso (107,667 guilders) and Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (46,200 guilders), and Jacob de Pinto (42,000), equal with Jacob Delmonte (30,000), see Schneeloch, *Aktionäre*, 33–4; Swetschinski, *Reluctant Cosmopolitans*, 117.

[25] ARH WIC 356, fos. 287, 290, 310v.

The United Provinces together with Britain and Austria declared war on both France and Spain in May 1702. What was probably the vastest, bloodiest, and most costly war in the history of mankind to date had finally begun. Initially, with the struggle focusing mainly on the Low Countries and the Lower Rhine, the Archduke Karl's claim to be rightful king of Spain, the Indies and the Spanish viceroyalties in Italy, sounded somewhat hollow and remote. In the early months all eyes were on the campaigning in north-west Germany where Machado supplied the Dutch and allied forces with his usual competence and forethought albeit continually complaining that he could not carry on furnishing the army's bread and other provisions while only receiving a fraction of the state funds earmarked for these supplies; 'le mal est' as the Dutch Pensionary, Heinsius, acknowledged, 'qu'il n'y a que la province d'Hollande dont [Machado] reçoit de l'argent', the lesser provinces continually delaying payment of their quotas towards purchasing the army's provisions.[27] When one of the Dutch columns had to pull back suddenly, Machado won praise from the generals for moving his stores out so fast that almost nothing fell into the hands of the advancing French.[28] In his capacity as *providiteur-generaal* Machado inevitably had to be entrusted with a certain amount of secret information. On one occasion, in August 1703, the field commanders in Brabant had to change their line of march because two members of Machado's staff, furnished with the marching plans so that they could organize the field stores, kitchens and bread provision, were inconveniently captured by the enemy.[29]

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[26] BL MS Add, 34340, fos. 115–16. Belmonte to Blathwaite, Amsterdam, 1 Nov 1701 (I am indebted to Daniel Swetschinski for drawing my attention to this letter).

[27] Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed.) Veenendaal i, pp. 325–326. Athlone to Heinsius, Bemmel, 6 July 1702 and Heinsius to Athlone, The Hague, 7 July 1702.

[28] Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed.) Veenendaal i, pp. 155–6.

[29] Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed.) Veenendaal, p. 377. Hop to Heinsius, army camp at Westwesel, 1 Aug. 1703.

After a while, though, the Archduke's claims to the Spanish throne began to sound distinctly less far-fetched, especially from May 1703 when Portugal entered the war on the allied side. The Maritime Powers now possessed a splendid strategic base in the Peninsula from which they could plan and prepare their intended conquest of the Spanish realms. Having been duly recognized by his allies as 'King Carlos III of Spain', the Archduke took up residence in Lisbon where he surrounded himself with a skeleton court and began building a network of representatives and advisers. Schonenberg, having transferred to Lisbon after being expelled from Spain, was one of those on whom he apparently most came to rely. Indeed, the Archduke often conferred with him about the various rival plans put forward for the pending combined Anglo-Dutch-Portuguese invasion of Spain.[30] At the same time, in Holland, Pensionary Heinsius and the secretary of the Amsterdam admiralty college, Job de Wildt formed a advisory panel of experts to help concert Dutch strategy in the Spanish New World. Besides Belmonte, this tiny secret cabal included Alvares Machado who evidently not only knew about finance and supplying armies but also how to organize fleets being described by De Wildt, an official uniquely experienced in naval organization, as 'een man van ondervindingh en oordeel' [a man of experience and judgment].[31] The main item on the agenda at this stage was the proposed sending of an allied expedition to suborn the Spanish Caribbean, possibly under the flag of 'Charles III' or, as Machado suggested, the Imperial flag.

With plans in the air for invading Spain, and conquering the Caribbean, many Sephardic factors, merchants and contractors, mostly—but by no means only—Dutch subjects, followed Schonenberg, Belmonte, and Alvares Machado in openly declaring their support for, and allegiance to, the Austrian claimant. The Archduke no doubt realized that in the Iberian context there were hefty disadvantages to his court being perceived to be closely associated with Protestant governments and with Jews;[32] and in the medium and longer term, the impression that 'Carlos III' was indeed, as his detractors claimed, the creature of English and Dutch heretics and an underground network of Portuguese New Christians and Jews, undoubtedly seriously damaged his standing and prospects. Yet, if he was to fight Philip for his kingdom, it was not easy to see how he could escape from this dilemma; for he urgently required supplies, and loans, as well as knowledgeable advisers, and had little choice but to find these where best he could.

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[30] Francis, *Methuens and Portugal*, 162, 170, 300.
[31] Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed.) Veendendaal ii, p. 24 De Wildt to Heinsius.
[32] Ibid., 300.

Needing their support, 'Carlos III of Spain' proved as assiduous in cultivating Jewish notables previously connected with the Spanish Habsburg court, as Philip V was in disowning them. In April 1704, the Archduke wrote to Belmonte, from Lisbon, nominating him 'mi ministro residente' in Amsterdam,[33] and also to the States General asking that Belmonte be recognized as his 'minister resident' and that the States show him 'tous les égards favorables que nous devons nous promettre de votre amitié'.[34] This they promptly did.[35] To assist Belmonte, the Archduke nominated Judah Senior Henriquez 'consul in deese Vereenighde Nederlanden met maght om in plaatsen daer hij in persoon selfs niet en kan resideren een ander in desselfs plaetse te substitueeren' [consul in these United Netherlands with the power to delegate someone else in places where he can not reside in person], implying a supervisory role over Daniel de la Penha (1649–1718) whom Carlos II had nominated consul of Spain in Rotterdam in 1693,[36] and Isaac Semach Ferro, Spain's Jewish consul in Middelburg. The States General approved this appointment likewise, Senior Henriquez being a brother-in-law of Captain Felipe Henriquez (alias Jacob Senior), the foremost figure among the Jewish ship-owners of Curaçao and David Senior, Belmonte's factors in Curaçao where they had helped service the slave *asiento* during the 1690s.[37] A still more relevant reason for Senior Henriquez's selection for this consulship was that he was The Hague correspondent of Joseph Cortissos, the Archduke's chief Jewish contractor in the Iberian Peninsula and, at the same time, an associate of Machado's, playing, especially in 1705–6, a substantial role in the running of the latter's army provisioning operation.[38] In this connection, in April

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[33] ARH SG 7099/i. Belmonte to SG, The Hague, 2 May 1704.

[34] ARH SG 7100/i. Archduke Charles to States General, Lisbon, 30 May 1704.

[35] ARH SG 7100/i. Extract res. States General, The Hague, 4 May 1704.

[36] Hausdorff, *Jizkor: Platenatlas*, 17–19.

[37] ARH SG 7100/i. 'Memorie van Jehudah Senior Henriquez', 16 July 1704; it also seems significant that the mother of the two brothers Senior, Sara Lopes was a sister of the Baron Lopes Suasso; see Emmanuel, *Precious Stones*, 302–4; Samuel, 'Manuel Levy Duarte', 24.

[38] Nimwegen, *Subsistentie van het leger*, 28, 49, 161, 355 n. 36.

1705, Senior Henriquez submitted a paper to the States General urgently requesting that the lesser Dutch provinces pay Machado the 400,000 guilders which they now owed in unpaid installments for military provisions.[39] After Machado's death in December 1706, Senior Henriquez took over part of his organization, or at least continued to be closely involved with the provisioning of the Dutch forces in the southern Netherlands.[40]

The Archduke's first foothold in Spain itself was the Rock of Gibraltar which the allies captured in July 1704. Once an allied garrison was installed and had survived the Franco-Spanish siege lasting from October 1704 to May 1705—a time when Gibraltar was supplied from Morocco and Portugal—the Rock played an important part in the war as a staging post, especially for grain and other supplies transported from Holland, Britain, Portugal and Morocco and then reshipped to Valencia and Barcelona; for without a forward base where provisions and munitions could be stockpiled and distributed as needed, the allies would have been unable to sustain, as they did, a major military effort in eastern Spain.[41] In this connection, it should be noted that until the Peace of Utrecht (1713), Gibraltar was not regarded as a British possession or dependency even though the British had been chiefly responsible for capturing it. Rather the Rock was seen as part of the Spanish kingdom of 'Carlos III' temporarily garrisoned by British and Dutch troops. Accordingly, it was at the Austrian Pretender's wish that, besides other foreigners, the Jews should enjoy generous rights and trading privileges on Gibraltar which they indeed obtained and were to retain undisturbed until the territory was annexed by Britain in 1713. 'Carlos III's representatives ensured that 'in a short time after the place was declared a free port people came from all [foreign] parts to reside in it' and while there were also Italians, Greeks and Moors, it was especially the Jews who came 'daily in great numbers from Barbary, Leghorne and Portugal', those from Barbary acquiring 'some of the best houses in the town'. By 1712, the Jews enjoyed such prominence in Gibraltar there were no less than twenty-eight 'Jews' shops in the great street'.[42] By contrast, only around seventy of the 1,200 Spanish Catholic families living in the town when the allies arrived availed themselves of the Archduke's offer of protection, the rest, despite every reassurance, refused to acknowledge him as king, fleeing as soon as they could into the interior.

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[39] Ibid., 161.

[40] Ibid., 29, 190, 235, 241.

[41] BL MS Add. 38329, fo. 157. Jos. Bennett, 'Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar' (Nov. 1712).

If 'Carlos III' was well disposed toward the Jews in general, his most significant Jewish appointment was undoubtedly that of Joseph Cortissos (1656–1742) as *proveedor general* of the allied armies in Spain. An experienced financier and victualler born in Antwerp, Cortissos was a son of Abraham Semach Cortissos, an Amsterdam Jew of Spanish background with extensive experience of Morocco where he had frequently stayed as a factor for his brother, Joseph's uncle, Jacob Semach Cortissos (alias Antonio Hidalgo) of Amsterdam.[43] Joseph Cortissos apparently gained his experience as a military contractor in Flanders during the campaigns of the 1690s, learning his trade under the direction of Machado and Pereira.[44] On securing his services 'Carlos III', signed several 'royal' patents defining his functions as *proveedor general*, one addressed to the sultan of Morrocco (28 June 1704), empowering him to purchase grain and other supplies there on his behalf, another appointing him to provision his troops in Castile (25 July 1705), and a third issued by the Archduke a little later, at Barcelona, on 11 September 1705, designating him *proveedor general* 'of our armies and those of our allies' for furnishing bread and fodder to both the infantry and cavalry in the eastern viceroyalties of Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon.

Besides being a financier and contractor, Cortissos was evidently considered an all-purpose expert on Iberia and useful adviser to have available during high-level negotiations about strategy in the Peninsula. In July 1704, whilst in Schonenberg's company, at the Archduke's court in Lisbon, Cortissos sent two secret papers on the situation in Spain to Heinsius. Not knowing Dutch well, apparently, he penned the reports in Spanish, appending a note suggesting, should Holland's

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[42] Ibid., fo. 161v.

[43] Thus, in October 1661, for example, Cortissos' father had sailed as commissary in charge on a Dutch vessel, the *Prophet Moses*, chartered by his brother to convey cargo to Cadiz first, and then the Morrocan ports of Saleh and La Mámora where it was to anchor for many weeks, his task being to negotiate the sale of the goods and buy up suitable return cargo, see GAA NA 2890A, p. 275. Amsterdam, 24 Oct. 1661 (P. Padthuysen).

[44] Rubens, 'Joseph Cortissos', 122.

Pensionary require a translator whose discretion could be relied on, to send for Manuel Levy 'who lives next door to the Treasurer-General [Jacob] Hop' in The Hague.[45] Cortissos spent much of the spring of 1705 in Morocco, negotiating agreements for the supply of horses and grain for the allied armies in the Peninsula. He was recalled to Lisbon, in April, to advise not just on logistical matters but also more broadly on issues of allied strategy in Spain.[46] There were numerous difficulties, however, including the question of whether, and in what capacity, 'Carlos III' should accompany the expeditionary forces in Spain, something the Portuguese king, preferring not to entrust Portugal's security, or forces, to him, stubbornly opposed and which also worried his own entourage.[47] Schonenberg was asked to intercede. 'Monsieur de Schonenberg et moy', reported the Habsburg claimant's minister, Lichtenstein to Heinsius, in July 1705, 'avons tâché de lui représenter combien sa personne royale étoit prétieuse à toute la chrétienté et quels dangers il alloit courir au préjudice de sa santé par une résolution de cette nature et dont l'heureux succès étoit sujet à mille funestes acidens'.[48]

Schonenberg, then, was undoubtedly a rather important participant in the Lisbon strategic deliberations between England, the Dutch, Portugal and 'Carlos III' as to how to achieve the conquest of Spain.[49] A key issue was whether the principal allied effort should be directed through Catalonia and Valencia as some of the commanders urged, or whether as Schonenberg and the Dutch general, François Nicolaas Fagel in particular proposed, the allies should first invade Andalusia from Portugal, thrusting towards Cadiz. The English generals, Galway and Peterborough, carrying 'Charles III of Spain'—after some hesitation on his part—with them, eventually determined on an eastern strategy,[50] though Peterborough had initially also favoured the attack on Cadiz. In changing his mind, it may be that the earl was partly swayed by his growing irritation with Schonenberg who he despised as a presumptious, nagging and self-seeking Jew.[51] Schonenberg in any case never ceased to complain about what he saw as a fundamental and disastrous error in allied war strategy.[52] Again and again, he reminded the archduke and the generals, as he reminded Heinsius, writing from Lisbon, in May 1707, in a letter (in which he also bitterly lamented that the Portugal trade had now been wholly usurped by England and that Dutch trade with Portugal had utterly decayed) of the superiority as he saw it, of an Andalusian strategy over that chosen by the English generals. Andalusia should have been the objective, he contended, insisting that he had always been among those who believed the main offensive should be directed towards Andalusia, rather than Catalonia, with the gaining of Cadiz as an overriding priority, 'als kunnende den oorlogh aldaar door de opulentie van die provintie, de quantiteyt van goede paarden voor de cavallerie, de nabuyrschap van Portugael, de bequaemheyt der havenen en zeeplaatsen om de nodige descentes en secoursen te effectueeren ende door meer andere commoditeyten met veel meer convenientie voortgeset worden' [since the war there could be fought with far more convenience given the richness of that province, the quantity of good horses for the cavalry, the proximity of Portugal, the suitability of harbours and inlets at which to effect the necessary landings and bringing of reinforcements] to which should be added, he urged, the great importance of the 'geheele West-Indische navigatie en commertie meester te worden' [the gaining control of the whole of New World navigation and trade] by taking Cadiz and blocking French trade with Castile.[53]

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[45] Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed.) Veenendaal iii, 215.

[46] Ibid., iv, p. 135. Liechtenstein to Heinsius, Bellem, 20 April 1705.

[47] Ibid., iv, 160, 244, Schonenberg to Heinsius, Lisbon, 16 May, and 14 July 1705.

[48] Ibid., iv, 229. Liechtenstein to Heinsius, Bellem, 7 July 1705.

[49] See, for instance, ibid., v, pp. 198, 200. Saunière de l'Hermitage to Heinsius, London, 16 April and Van Vrijbergen to Heinsius, London, 16 April 1706.

[50] Ibid., iv, p. 228. Fagel to Heinsius, Lisbon, 7 July 1705.

[51] Ibid., iv, 245–6, 294–5. Peterborough to Heinsius, Lisbon, 15 July and Van Almonde to Heinsius, Bay of Althea, 14 Aug. 1705.

Even so, there was also weighty arguments for launching the main allied thrust into Spain from the east. 'Carlos III' quickly won the allegiance of the Catalans who had long resented rule from Castile, the Valencians were well-disposed, and, in October 1705, after a few months fighting, Peterborough, commanding the combined allied forces in Spain, succeeded in taking Barcelona. Within a few more months virtually all of Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia was either conquered or spontaneously came over to Carlos whose pretensions to be rightful king of Spain now began to look more formidable.

Meanwhile, a severe slump gripped Dutch commerce and merchant shipping. Although Amsterdam's merchants, the Jews among them, had been expecting the outbreak of war many months before it occurred and stockpiled large stores of French and Spanish merchandise accordingly, the initial joint British-Dutch prohibition on trade with Spain and France caused such a disastrous recession that the Holland towns simply refused to continue with the ban after the summer of 1704.[54] The French too, wilting under the strain, were willing to consent to a system of restricted war-time commerce, issuing passes to Dutch vessels to bring badly needed timber and Baltic stores as well as herring, cheese, butter, and other fish, and take off French wines and brandy, the lack of an outlet for which had seriously depressed rents and land values in south-western France. But they did so deliberately keeping in place their ban on Dutch manufactures and colonial goods where precisely the best profits were to be found. Inevitably, some tried to circumvent the restrictions. Among applications for passes submitted to Louis' *controleur-général* of commerce, in April 1705, was a letter from the Brothers Mendes da Costa, described by a French official as 'fameux juifs établis à Amsterdam' previously of Bayonne, declaring themselves ready 'à envoyer des vaisseaux d'Hollande à Bayonne si sa Majesté veut leur accorder des passeports', loaded with cacao, candles, muscovedo, pepper, cinnamon, and other spices, precisely the sort of goods which were still prohibited and to ship back wine, brandy and Spanish wool, prices for which in Holland had soared.[55] The proposition was referred to the *Conseil de commerce* in Paris which, however, rejected it.

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[52] Francis, *Methuens and Portugal*, 299.

[53] Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed.) Veendendaal vi, pp. 277–8. Schonenberg to Heinsius, Lisbon, 19 May 1707.

By 1705, Dutch commerce in the Caribbean too had begun to revive.[56] But throughout the Spanish territories there was disappointingly little sign of any trend of opinion in favour of 'Carlos III'. If there are Spaniards 'in these regions' inclined to declare for the House of Austria, reported the governor of Curaçao to the WIC directors, in April 1705, they do not dare say so openly 'because the contrary party has the upper hand and it would cause their ruin to do so'; from which one could assume, he added, that there was unlikely to be any change for the better in the Spanish Caribbean until and unless matters are settled in favour of 'King Carlos III' in Spain and a considerable force is sent here 'om de welmeenende te ondersteunen ende andere to onderdrucken' [to support the well-meaning and suppress the others].[57] For a time, though, that is precisely what seemed likely to be about to occur. In northern Europe, in the wake of Blenheim, the allies achieved their most brilliant successes, the most decisive being Marlborough's crushing victory over the French at Ramillies, in May 1706, when virtually all Flanders and Brabant was overrun by the British, Dutch and Prussians and what was effectively an Anglo-Dutch political and economic condominium imposed on the occupied 'Spanish' Netherlands. Hence, by 1706, the war for the Spanish Netherlands seemed to be all but won and the main strategic focus had shifted to Spain which was now at the forefront of discussion in Holland, England and at Vienna, and to an extent also Spanish America.

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[54] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 364.

[55] Blumenkranz, *Documents modernes*, 287.

[56] ARH WIC 202, fo. 13. Beck to Bewindhebberen, Curaçao, 1 Aug. 1705.

Then, with the capture of Madrid, in the autumn of 1706, intense excitement spread among the Sephardic congregations in Holland and the Caribbean as also among the Portuguese New Christians throughout the Peninsula. If only a few Castilians were willing to support the Austrian candidate, there were persistent rumours in Madrid, Seville Cadiz and other main centres that many descendants of the Portuguese *conversos* were his ardent supporters.[58] Indeed, it began to appear as if their world was about to be transformed from one of persecution and repression into one of virtual toleration, freedom of movement, extensive influence and flourishing commerce. For with the outbreak of war, and Philip V's initial unwillingness to be associated with such an institution, the Inquisition had for the time being all but lapsed and there was every appearance should 'Carlos III' triumph, that the Inquisition would permanently cease to be a significant force in Spain. Already, Joseph Cortissos who lived openly as a practicing Jew, had established his home in Valencia. At this juncture, the offices and honours conferred by the Austrian Habsburg claimant who now transferred his own head-quarters to Valencia, appeared to be potentially immensely valuable and attractive assets. When Baron Belmonte died, in 1706, Carlos at once nominated to succeed him 'als sijn rezident' in the United Provinces, the latter's nephew, Baron Francisco (Isaac) Ximenes Belmonte (d. 1713), who happened also to be a nephew of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, his mother, Gracia, being a sister of the latter.[59] Ximenes

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[57] ARH WIC 201, fo. 389. Beck to bewindhebberen, Curaçao, 11 April 1705.
[58] Caro Baroja, *Judíos* iii, 23–4; Fernández Durán, *Gerónimo de Uztáriz*, 231.
[59] Heinsius *Briefwiseling* (ed.) Veenendaal iii, p. 171n.

Belmonte presented his credentials to the States General in January 1706, signing himself as 'Don Francisco Ximenes Belmonte'.

Besides victualling, financial support, seeking to influence allied strategy in Spain and Spanish America, and providing the best news service from the interior of Spain to the Netherlands and England then available, Sephardic Jewry also backed the struggle against the Bourbons, by helping organize and finance the privateering campaign against French and Spanish commercial shipping both in Europe and the Caribbean. Dutch Sephardi Jews, having been involved in privateering since the attack on Portuguese trans-Atlantic navigation in the late 1640s,[60] invested extensively in privateering during the Spanish Succession war in Rotterdam, Middelburg and also Curaçao.[61] With a peacetime fleet of as many as eighty barques, manned by crews ranging from fifteen to eighty men, a considerable proportion owned and operated by the island's Jews, Curaçao, had the largest carrying fleet in the Caribbean. But especially in the first and last years of the war many of these were redundant due to lack of trade. In 1703–4, indeed, the commercial slump was so severe that some of the island's Jewish merchants spoke of leaving for Saint Thomas, a Danish possession, or other islands.[62] It was logical that some at least of the island's seamen and shipping resources should be put to profitable use in the war at sea. Equipped with guns, powder and munitions supplied from Amsterdam, several barques were armed by David and Jacob Lopes Henriques, and others, as early as the autumn of 1702.[63] A large sloop fitted out for war by Mordechai de Crasto, Abraham Henriques Moron, Moseh Lopes Henriques (alias Francisco Lopez) and Mordechai Henriques captured two Spanish vessels loaded with cacao, off the Venezuela coast, early in 1703.[64] Four of the larger Curaçao fighting barques joining two Dutch warships, in all carrying 500 men, unsuccessfully attacked the Spanish fortress of La Guaira, near Caracas, in March 1703.[65]

Besides Philip V's prohibition of 1701, and the general risk and uncertainty of war, there was another reason for the slump of 1702–

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[60] See chapter above.

[61] Emmanuel, *History of the Jews of the Netherlands Antilles* i, 83.

[62] ARH WIC 567, fo. 215. Beck to Bewindhebberen, Curacao, 6 March 1703.

[63] ARH WIC 357, fo. 169.

[64] ARH WIC 358, fo. 148. Res. WIC directors, 15 June 1703.

[65] Ibid., ARH WIC 200, fos. 389–95. Beck to Bewindhebberen, Curaçao, 6 March 1703.

4—the implacable hostility of the English to Dutch attempts to renew their transit traffic to the South American mainland. During these years, the Jamaican privateers scoured the sea-lanes of the Caribbean searching not just for French or Spanish vessels to capture but also allied Dutch vessels suspected of trading with the enemy. So damaging was this campaign that by February 1704, estimated the governor of Curaçao, no less than twenty-one Curaçao barques plus two more flying Danish flags, and ostensibly based at St Thomas but actually Dutch, but had been captured by British warships and privateers, causing massive loss to the Curaçao Sephardic merchants, including Phelipe Henriquez.[66] There were a hail of complaints via the States General to London. But it took until the end of 1704 to persuade the English to change their stance and agree that the Spanish America trade should henceforth be open to the Dutch and British alike and only the French and pro-Bourbon Spanish vessels at sea physically attacked in the Caribbean. Once this was accomplished, lucrative ties with the Spanish American mainland were quickly restored and Curaçao's trade and shipping began to thrive once again. During the next four years there was a notable revival of Curaçao's transit traffic, Dutch Sephardic merchants furnishing spices, brandy, linen, paper and slaves to Coro, Maracaibo, Río de la Hacha and the enclave at Tucacas, on the remote promontory of Paraguana, in the extreme north-west of Venezuela which the Dutch had been using as a mainland staging post since around 1693.[67]

The push to prize open the markets of Spanish America never quite constituted a New World parallel to the allied invasion of Spain. But the atmosphere of suspicion and bitter rivalry throughout the Caribbean during the war fully reflected the fraught mixture of political, commercial, and religious tensions, domestic and international, which characterized the struggle in Spain itself. Efforts to open up the Venezuela coast to Dutch Jewish enterprise were at their height precisely during the middle years of the war when the Habsburg Pretender's prospects in Spain itself were brightest. The foremost figure on the other side of the Atlantic was undoubtedly Phelipe Henriquez, a veteran Curaçao ship-owner, brought up in Amsterdam with an ambitious temperament and a solid grounding in Hebrew.[68] Well acquainted with successive governors of Curaçao, he had also been imprisoned briefly by the Inquisition, in Cartagena, for judaizing at Río de la Hacha, but then released owing to the intervention of influential friends. Subsequently, he continued to cultivate contacts all around the Spanish Caribbean as well as with the Portuguese and French Guinea companies. He, moreover, was no less emphatic a supporter of 'Carlos III' than were Alvares Machado, Schonenberg, Belmonte or Cortissos and he too seemingly aspired to assume the trappings of rank and high diplomacy. Fertile in schemes for subverting Philip V's system of commercial, administrative and religious controls in the Spanish Caribbean, and in touch with officials and merchants along the coast, it was no accident that he was appointed by 'Carlos III's' representative in the Caribbean, the Italian count de Antería, as his chief adviser in the delicate task of trying to coax Venezuela over to the Austrian side.[69] When discussing an eventual possible partitioning of the Spanish Caribbean territories between 'Carlos III', the English and the Dutch, it was envisaged that Henriquez would hold high office in Venezuela.

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[66] ARH WIC 201, fos. 246–7. Governor to WIC Directors, Curaçao, 1 March 1704; Emmanuel, *Precious Stones*, 305; Goslinga, *Dutch in the Caribbean*, 174.

[67] Israel, 'Jews of Dutch America', 338; Klooster, 'Jews of Suriname and Curaçao', 358–9.

Henriquez remained prominent among Curaçao Sephardim investing in the Dutch Caribbean privateering and war-time trading fleet. His main supplier and consignee in Amsterdam was Abraham Fundão. Another leading figure was Manuel Alvares Correa, born in Livorno but whose family had migrated to Amsterdam, in 1652, when he was two. Serving as presiding *parnas* of the Curaçao synagogue, *Mikveh Israel*, in 1705 and 1715, he was chief correspondent on the island of Simão and Luis Rodrigues de Sousa as well as of his son Gabriel Alvares Correa who, from Amsterdam, supplied his father with the sails, ropes, and gunpowder for his several barques.[70] A third key investor was Abraham Henriques Morão second *parnas* of the *Mikveh Israel* synagogue in 1705 who in his business with Amsterdam corresponded principally with his brother, Aaron Henriques Morão. A fourth substantial importer of naval stores and munitions from Holland, and fitter out of barques on Curaçao, as well as trader with the Spanish and other Caribbean colonies, was Mordechai de Crasto, second *parnas* of the synagogue in 1702, and consignee of the Amsterdam firm of Manuel and Elias de Crasto.

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[68] Emmanuel, *Precious Stones*, 303–4.

[69] Klooster, 'Jews of Suriname and Curaçao', 360; Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed.) Veenendaal iii, 532.

[70] ARH WIC 357, fo. 178v. res. WIC directors, Amsterdam, 10 Oct. 1702.

As the governor of Curaçao observed, in March 1703, it was impossible for the island ever to compete with Jamaica as a privateering base.[71] But Curaçao continued to surpass Jamaica as a commercial conduit to the Spanish *Tierra Firme* owing above all to geography, Curaçao having a superb harbour relatively close to Coro, Maracaibo, and Río de la Hacha, and lying near to the promontory of Tucacas, an ideal transit depot, being remote from centres of Spanish authority yet quite near the vital Andean passes running southwestwards to the heartland of Spanish South America.[72] Curaçao, therefore, was far better located than Jamaica or Barbados for access to the main Andean passes dominating the routes to Popayán, Quito and Peru. Merchandise was transported along these high corridors through the sierra by mule-train as were the returns of silver which flowed back to the coast by the same route. Hence, the Dutch furnished the bulk of the linens, spices, silks, paper, brandies and candles—the items most in demand among the Spanish settlers—absorbed by the Spanish American market. From Coro, Maracaibo and nearby ports along the coast, the silver was shipped back together with consignments of cacao, indigo, and Variñas tobacco to Curaçao where this merchandise were loaded on WIC vessels bound for Amsterdam. Inevitably, in wartime conditions, the trading barques had to be heavily armed so that both privateering, and stockpiling weapons and munitions on Curaçao, became integral to the commerce.

Bourbon authority in Spanish America, as in Spain, reached its lowest point, in the years 1706–7. With Spanish naval power largely neutralized, and the French relatively weak in American waters, Curaçao's commercial penetration of the Spanish Caribbean reached its peak. Besides the nearby ports of western Venezuela, the Dutch traded intensively once again with Santa Marta in Nueva Granada, Puerto Rico and were attempting to resume trade also with Puerto Velo, in Panama.[73] The only real obstacle at this stage was sporadic harassment by French privateers, two of which captured a Dutch vessel, *The Rachel*, belonging to Amsterdam Sephardi Jews, trading off the coast at Santa Marta in the autumn of 1707.[74] Impressive quantities of cacao, Campeche wood, Española hides, Variñas tobacco and hundreds of thousands of *pesos* in silver and gold were shipped back from Curaçao to Amsterdam during this period. Among well-known Amsterdam Sephardim who received consignments of minted and unminted bullion imported on the convoys of 1707 were Alexandre Nunes da Costa, Manuel Ximenes Belmonte, Lopo Nunes Ramires and the younger Jeronimo Nunes da Costa.[75] A report which arrived in Paris, in 1707, claimed that 150 Dutch vessels yearly were now unloading merchandise in the Maracaibo-Río de la Hacha area, enough to load two thousand mules with spices, linen and candles 'et inonder les provinces de Popayán, de Sancta Fé et de Quito'.[76] Nor was this necessarily exaggerated. For given that each Curaçao barque was accustomed to visit the nearby mainland coast three times in a year, if even half the normal peacetime compliment of eighty were operative—and in the middle years of the war the proportion is likely to have been higher—such a total could easily have been attained.

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[71] ARH WIC 200, fo. 392. Governor Beck to WIC Directors, Curaçao, 6 March 1703.

[72] Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 324–5.

[73] ARH WIC 202, fo. 203v. Beck to Bewindhebberen, Curaçao, 9 Dec. 1707.

But Curaçao's flourishing wartime commerce of the years 1705–7 was achieved in a precarious context requiring meticulous cultivation of mainland contacts, a great deal of information-gathering, unrelenting vigilance, and close collaboration between Curaçao and Amsterdam. But even then it remained risky and unpredictable. Meanwhile, the situation deteriorated noticeably due to increasing French privateering activity along the Spanish Caribbean coasts early in 1708. When, in February, a Dutch vessel, *De Europa* was chased away from the Caracas coast by three French privateers just after starting to trade, the governor of Curaçao requested the WIC directors to send warships 'om ten minste de Cust van Caraques wederom schoon ende veyligh te maken voor onse navigatie ende commertie' [so as at least to make the coast of Caracas clear and safe again for our navigation and commerce].[77] More Curaçao barques were attacked off the Venezuela coast by the French during the spring and several were taken.

Meanwhile, in the Republic itself, the main center of Jewish investment in privateering appears to have been Rotterdam. There, at least nine, or virtually one third of the thirty privateers sailing under the aegis of the Rotterdam admiralty college during the War of the Spanish Succession were financed, equipped, and managed by the ship-owning Brothers Daniel and Joseph de la Penha (1658–1731),[78] heads of what in recent decades had been the leading Jewish family in the town. The de la Penha family, originally from Malaga, continued to take a keen interest in everything happening in Spain and for the duration of the war counted among the most prominent and active Sephardi supporters of 'Carlos III'. During the summer of the allies great break-through in the Spanish Netherlands, one of Daniel de la Penha's privateers, the *Grote Eendracht* boarded and captured a French merchant vessel off Le Havre.[79] Daniel de la Penha also financed and managed two vessels of the much larger Zeeland privateering fleet.[80]

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[74] Ibid., fo. 201, 218v.

[75] ARH WIC 569, fos. 361, 36v, 373v, 381–91v.

[76] Scelle, *Traite negrière* ii, 160, 309–10.

[77] ARH WIC 202, fo. 218v.

The years 1705–8 marked the high tide of Sephardic hopes and aspirations linked to the projected Habsburg recovery of Spain and Spanish America, renewal of the Dutch-Spanish special commercial relationship, and curbing of the Inquisition. Victory in this war could be expected to bring not just a harvest of economic rewards, and increased influence, but the end of serious pressure against the *conversos* as well as a cementing of Dutch economic dominance in the southern Netherlands where at least two of the Jewish army contractors supplying the allied forces, Don Manuel Cardoso in Brussels and Joshua Castanho (another of Machado's former deputies) in Antwerp were already building fine residences.[81] But the euphoria which followed the heady news of the capture of Madrid by British, Dutch and Portuguese forces proved short-lived. The inspiring successes of 1705–6 were followed only by year after year of dispiriting deadlock, failure, and disillusionment. Gradually hopes of securing the allies' goals in Spain and Spanish America began to fade. Although the conflict in Spain was in some respects a bitter civil war, the Church and most of the common people in Castile increasingly associated 'Carlos III''s cause with foreigners—Catalans, Valencians, Portuguese,

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[78] Verhees-Van Meer, *Zeeuwse kaapvaart*, 197–8.

[79] ARH SG 5644. David de la Penha to States General, Rotterdam, 11 Sept. 1706.

[80] Verhees-Van Meer, *Zeeuwse kaapvaar*, 186.

[81] Lamberti Arconati, *Mémoires* vii, 366; Schmidt, *L'histoire des juifs à Anvers*, 55.

British, and Dutchmen—a tendency which rendered xenophobic claims that he was really just the king of intruders, heretics and Jews increasingly plausible, leading the populace to swing more and more firmly behind the Bourbons.

Meanwhile, hard terrain, sickness and indifferent generalship sapped the effectiveness of the allied armies. After a few months Madrid was retaken by troops loyal to Philip. Then, in the crucial battle in the Castilian interior, at Almanza, in April 1707, the Bourbon forces under the duke of Berwick, decisively defeated the allied army under Peterborough's successor, the earl of Galway, and followed up their victory by recapturing Zaragoza followed by most of Aragon. During 1708, the Borbonists overran Valencia despite stubborn resistance at Alicante, Denia and elsewhere. Indeed, as the allied position in Spain collapsed in the wake of Almanza, the only gain made by the allies anywhere in the area was the capture of Minorca by the British in the name of 'Carlos III', in September 1708. Once again, in Habsburg Minorca, as in Gibraltar, it was not long before Sephardic settlers began to arrive under the special protection of 'Carlos III'. In March 1712, a French official in Valencia on learning of the arrival of more Jews in Minorca, reminded ministers in Paris, that 'plusieurs juifs s'y sont déjà establis'.[82]

For Cortissos, the withdrawal from Valencia, in the fall of 1706, was followed by bitter personal disillusionment and heavy financial loss. In fact, he had had exasperating difficulties with the Portuguese court from the outset and, unfortunately for him, got on less well with Galway than with Peterborough. In April 1707, he appeared before a public notary in Valencia to record his formal protest at the injustice done to him by the inspector-general of the Portuguese troops, Das Minas, and by Lord Galway, who simply refused to pay him amounts which were due, leaving him to sustain heavy losses.[83] Further ruinous setbacks followed. Indeed, from 1707 onwards, he was locked in a interminable tussle with the Portuguese court for reimbursement for provisions and horses supplied to the Portuguese troops in Spain while finding himself simultaneously at loggerheads with Galway and the British government. Nevertheless, he continued to support 'Carlos III', as *proveedor general* of the allied forces and doggedly persisted with supplying the troops with bread and forage in the hope eventually of recouping his losses. Meanwhile, he continued to reside in Spain as an observant Jew. His only son, Abraham, born in Barcelona in 1710, was circumcised by a *mohel* who was brought over specially from Morocco.[84] No doubt there was much to criticize in Cortissos' handling of the allied supplies. But Peterborough at least took the view 'he dealt better with other people than they dealt with him'.[85] Relatively little of the total still owed to him by the Portuguese and British governments at the end of the war, in 1713, an amount estimated to exceed £100,000, was ever paid. At the time of his death in London, in 1742, he appears to have been living in complete destitution.

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[82] Blumenkranz, *Documents modernes*, 390.
[83] Rubens, *Joseph Cortissos*, 124.

No doubt, Schonenberg's tireless efforts on behalf of Cortissos (in whose business he is thought to have invested), further contributed to the deep aversion in which he was already held in Lisbon. The British came to dislike him almost as much as the Portuguese especially for his opposition to the special privileges acquired by English merchants under the Anglo-Portuguese Methuen Treaty of 1703, and his incorrigible attempts to procure equal treatment for Dutch cloth imports to Portugal.[86] Refusing to acquiesce in what the English haughtily considered their natural right to dominate Portuguese trade, he was also decidedly unmannerly in his suspicions regarding British intentions at Gibraltar. As early as December 1704, he had sent a detailed warning to the unsuspecting Heinsius who seemed to have almost infinite trust in the British that the English queen and her ministers planned eventually to annex Gibraltar to their own empire, an outcome which, in his opinion, would be quite disastrous for Dutch interests in Spain and the Mediterranean.[87]

In December 1708, the British government protested officially about Schonenberg in The Hague, claiming that the friction between him and Portuguese ministers was having an adverse effect on the common interest of the allies. But 'the Pensionary pretended to be ignorant of any misunderstanding between the court of Portugal and that minister', reported the British envoy in Holland with some annoyance, Heinsius merely remarking laconically that 'it was true Mons. Schonenberg was a little hot, but very zealous and knows perfectly well that court and the affairs there which, by their ill situation may have given him too much reason some times to be dissatisfied and out of humour'.[88] A few weeks later the Portuguese court renewed its campaign to get rid of the detested Jewish diplomat. It was reported to London from The Hague, in February 1709, that the 'Portuguese envoy made great complaints of Mons. De Schonenberg and presses to have him recall'd. The subject of his complaints are that Mons. de Schonenberg has play'd the merchant at Lisbon and defrauded the king of his custome in a considerable quantity of ingots of silver brought on shore and to his house by his servants and coaches. What success the envoy will have, one can not very well judge; for Schonenberg has here a great many protectors, among them some perhaps who are concerned in the ingots'.[89]

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[84] Ibid., 126.

[85] Ibid., p. 127; Israel, *European Jewry*, 108.

[86] ARH SG 7018/i. Schonenberg to States General, Lisbon, 22 March 1706; Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed. Veenendaal) vi, 278; Gottheil, *Belmont-Belmonte Family*, 80–1; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 372.

[87] Ibid., iv 455. Schonenberg to Heinsius, Lisbon, 3 Dec. 1704.

As the tide turned in Spain and the forces of 'Carlos III' and his allies were driven back, so the authority of the Spanish Bourbons revived also in Hispanic America. During 1708, Curaçao still plied a significant trade with Venezuela and other parts of the Spanish Main and grandiloquent plans for redrawing the map of the Caribbean were still in the air. Whilst the British searched for means to acquire the Spanish *asiento* for themselves and generally thwart Dutch interests in the Caribbean,[90] Heinsius conferred with 'Carlos III's resident minister at Brussels, Don Francisco Bernardo de Quiros, about renewed proposals for sending a powerful allied or Dutch expedition to the Caribbean, something for which several Holland towns had been pressing for years. But before discussing its precise objectives with Quiros, Heinsius thought best first to confer with an expert who had detailed knowledge of the Spanish defences in the Indies who was either—it is certain that it was one of the brothers but not clear which—Daniel de la Penha (d. 1718) or, Joseph de la Penha.[91] He then informed Quiros who was with the allied army in Flanders, that he had 'une conference avec Mons. de la Penha qui regardait les interests du roy vostre maistre dans les Indes Occidentales' and that De la Penha would write shortly to him, directly, with the details.[92] 'J'espère', replied Quiros, duly briefed by de la Penha, a few days later, 'à la bonne issue de l'entreprise projettée aux Indes Occidentales'.[93]

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[88] PRO SP 84/231, fo. 569. Dayrolle to Boyle, The Hague, 4 Dec. 1708.

[89] PRO SP 34/232, fo. 47. Dayrolle to Boyle, The Hague, 27 Feb. 1709.

[90] Goslinga, *Dutch in the Caribbean*, 94.

[91] Heinsius, *Briefwisseling* (ed.) Veendendaal vii, pp. 359–61, 427, 499, 514, 522.

But the plans were shelved and each year from 1708 onwards prospects for overturning the Bourbons in Spanish America looked increasingly implausible. Before long, a Spanish royal counter-offensive against Dutch trade penetration in northern South America began, though Phelipe Henriquez remained in a privileged position and continued for some time to act as chief intermediary between Curaçao and the agents of the French slaving *asiento*, organizing protected shipments of slaves and much else.[94] Other Curaçao barques belonging to Curaçao shipowners however, found themselves being increasingly intercepted and chased off. In 1709, several leading Curaçao ship-owners trading with the Caracas coast, Maracaibo, and Río de la Hacha, addressed a petition to the governor, complaining about the growing Spanish harassment of their vessels and commissaries. The petition was signed by eighteen Protestant and seven Jewish ship-owners, the latter being Daniel Moreno Henriques, David and Isaac Senior, Isaac and David Lopes Dias and Abraham and Joshua de Pina.[95] The next month, in September 1709, no less than four Curaçao barques were captured by Spanish warships and privateers.[96] Interestingly, a proposal from the governor of Curaçao urging the shipowners to invest in more heavily armed, sloops, in August 1709, apparently received a less positive response from the Protestant shipowners than from their Sephardic counterparts. Those who signed supporting the governor's proposal to arm more barques were named as Phelipe Henriques, David Senior, Manoel Alvares Correa, Mordechai de Crasto, Elias Pareira, Gabriel Levy, Abraham Henriques Moron, Mordechai Henriques, Daniel Moreno Henriques, Abraham and Joshua de Pina and Elias de Crasto plus only one or two Protestants whereas, most of the Protestants, including Pieter Moyart, Hendrik de Wilde and Gerrit Vriesenburg refused to support the proposal.[97]

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[92] Ibid., vii, p. 499. Heinsius to Quiros, The Hague, 4 Sept. 1708.
[93] Ibid., pp. 361, 499, 514.
[94] ARH WIC 203 (Curaçao papers) fos. 30–1, 74.
[95] Ibid., 203 fos. 186–7, undated petition (August 1709).
[96] Ibid., 203, fo. 310, 446.
[97] Ibid., 203, fos. 310–13, memorandum, Curaçao, 4 Sept. 1709.

In January 1710, the governor of Curaçao informed the WIC directors that trade from there with the Spanish American mainland and islands had now fallen off disastrously, partly due to Spanish counter-measures and French privateers but also owing to efforts to develop rival interloping routes, notably on the part of Zeelanders operating via the Danish island of Saint Thomas: from a fleet of eighty barques operative a few years before there were now only about seventeen plying back and forth to Venezuela, Santa Marta and the islands, though presumably these were the larger ones with sizeable crews of up to eighty men.[98] Also in 1710, the depot at Tucacas where the Dutch, and Dutch Jews, had established shore facilities and warehouses on the mainland, as well as an offshore island, stockpiling silver, gold and emeralds brought from Santa Fe (Bogotá), Popayán and Quito, as well as large quantities of Venezuelan cacao, and where, reportedly, even a makeshift synagogue had been erected, was attacked by the chief ensign of Coro, commanding a force of Spanish soldiers and 150 Indian archers.[99] During their assault the Spaniards liquidated the buildings, and killed the cattle, on the mainland promontory jutting north, towards Dutch Aruba, but failed to destroy the houses and stores on the offshore island which they were unable to reach by boat as it was defended by fire from four Curaçao armed barques.[100]

The Dutch transit traffic between Curaçao and the Spanish Caribbean, driven by slaves and silver, nevertheless persisted and Sephardic Jews continued to play a major role in organizing the traffic. Meanwhile, there were signs that elsewhere in the Caribbean, Sephardic merchants and their trade were being increasingly and severely disrupted by the war. Thus, several Sephardi Jews living on Barbados, including Isaac de Fonseca Valle and Isaac and Jacob Suarez, complaining of the chronically depressed state of trade there, and the impossibility of carrying on their business, applied to settle in Curaçao where, indeed, even the French enemy was sporadically forced to turn for slaves.[101] When the WIC publicly auctioned 162 slaves on Curaçao, in June 1709, Protestants and Jews bid against each other as buyers, three of the leading Sephardic suppliers to the mainland—Phelipe Henriques, Daniel Moreno Henriques and Mordechai de Crasto—alone accounting for almost a third of the sale, purchasing thirteen, twenty and nineteen slaves respectively; of these a proportion were then sold to agents of the French Guinea company and subsequently imported into the Spanish American colonies legally, by the French. The rest were shipped clandestinely and more cheaply but illegally and with more risk, evading the *asiento*, direct to the Spanish buyers. The Company's factors, not surprisingly complained to the French Guinea Company directors that the inhabitants of Coro and neighbouring places always preferred to purchase their slaves direct from Curaçao, if they could, rather than through the French and the *asiento*.[102] Nevertheless, those same factors remained dependent themselves on the Curaçao slave market for much of the time since they lacked the means to ship over enough other slaves direct from French West Africa. In March 1711, a single brigantine belonging to Phelipe Henriquez, sailing from Coro and manned by a Dutch crew, brought 40,000 *pesos* of Guinea Company bullion into Curaçao.[103]

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[98] Ibid., fo. 291v. Beck to directors, Curaçao, 4 Jan. 1710.

[99] Klooster, 'Jews in Suriname and Curaçao', 359.

[100] Arbell, 'Tucacas', *Amercian Jewish Archives* (1997).

[101] ARH WIC 203, fos. 515–16, 520, 533–4.

After the murderous battle of Malplaquet, in September 1709, the situation in the southern Netherlands was one of unbreakable stalemate; the French holding their lines tenaciously. In Spain, the fortunes of war swung wildly. The allied cause revived in 1710 with the recapture of Zaragoza, in August, and Madrid, in September. But the arrival of French reinforcements again turned the tide and, on 10 December 1710, the main allied army, under the Dutch general Stahremberg, was beaten at Villaviciosa. The allies again fell back in disarray on the eastern viceroyalties. After 'Carlos III' himself abandoned Barcelona, at the end of 1711, in order to return to Vienna where his older brother, the Emperor Joseph had died prematurely, and he himself now succeeded as Emperor, a deepening despondency spread through the entire pro-Habsburg camp in the Iberian Peninsula, everywhere from Lisbon to Barcelona and from Gibraltar to Minorca.

In the autumn of 1711 the Tory administration in London began to negotiate with the French behind the back of Britain's allies, backed by such pamphlets as *The Conduct of the Allies* (November

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[102] Scelle, *La traite negrière* ii, 311.

[103] ARH WIC 204, fo. 11v. Van Colen to WIC directors, Curaçao, 21 April 1711.

1711) from the brilliantly savage and anti-Dutch pen of Jonathan Swift. The realization that 'the Duke of Anjou' as the Dutch referred to Philip V was not going to be dislodged either from Spain or Spanish America and that Britain now wanted to abandon the struggle in Spain, leaving Philip on his throne and the Catalans to their fate, turned the thoughts of the Amsterdam merchant community, and West India Company directors, to the possibility of seeking some form of colonial compensation for vast effort and treasure now seen to have been uselessly expended on the Spanish and Spanish American dimensions of the war. After some intense debate, the West India Company directors agreed in January 1712, that if Philip kept the Spanish Indies, the most suitable compensation for the Dutch in the New World would be the island of Puerto Rico. When the Dutch afterwards heard that the British were seeking the *asiento* for themselves, every pressure was brought to bear to secure a shared arrangement with half of the *asiento* for the Dutch. Heinsius was urged to press for this and for full sovereignty over Puerto Rico which should be ceded to the Company, their choice being dictated by the fact that it was linked to Curaçao by an easy trans-Caribbean passage, was potentially more productive and fruitful than Surinam though it had been little exploited by the Spaniards, while its forts and location made it relatively easy to defend, and because 'zeer veel familien uyt deser landen tot cultiveering van het vorn. Eyland zouden gaan' [very many families would go from these lands to cultivate the said island].[104] Presumably, the expectation was that the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish community would once again participate prominently in cultivating plantations in tropical America under Dutch rule just as in Dutch Brazil, Surinam and Curaçao.

By the spring of 1712, it was clear, moreover, not just that Philip would remain king of Spain and the Indies and that Britain wanted the *asiento* for herself alone but that she was determined also to annex Gibraltar and Minorca and make sure her Dutch ally did not get Puerto Rico. Britain secured all her own desiderata by striking a separate deal with Louis, undertaking to accept Philip V as rightful king of Spain in exchange for French support for Britain's obtaining her particular aims at the expense of the rest. The States General and the Austrian Emperor, though furious and bitterly resentful, found themselves powerless to prevent it. Meanwhile, French diplomacy firmly identified Dutch Sephardi Jewry as an especially obdurate element in the constituency of opinion which continued to oppose the projected Anglo-French settlement and the consolidation of the Bourbon Powers. In December 1711, a French diplomat, the Sieur de Saint Maurice, reported from Holland, that those in the Republic most stubbornly opposed to Britain's projected deal with France, 'le parti de la guerre, est composé des Juifs, des religionnaires et des marchands', a remarkable piece of wording.[105] 'Les juifs sont en fort grand nombre', he explained to his superiors in Paris, 'et très accredités; leur avarice insatiable est allarmé en voyant rester le Roy d'Espagne [i.e. Philip V] maître des Indes et conséquement de l'or et de l'argent qu'on en retire, ce qui leur fait craindre que ces pretieux mêtaux prennent une autre route que celle de la Hollande'.[106]

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[104] ARH WIC 447 secr. res. directors, 12 Jan. 1712 and secr. res. Bewindhebberen, 12 April 1712; Goslinga, *Dutch in the Caribbean*, 33–4.

The betrayal of the Republic and Austria by Britain, and their diplomatic humiliation at Utrecht, was not without its consequences for the Sephardim. Indeed, the Peace constituted a serious reverse for the western Sephardic diaspora and its interests in several important respects. A fairly short-term setback was the reduced status of the Jews in Gibraltar and Minorca. On acquiring Gibraltar in disregard of the claims of 'Carlos III', the British crown accepted Philip V's proviso, that no Jews or Muslims should be allowed to live there; and while it has been asserted that the 'English made no attempt to observe these discriminatory demands',[107] this is in fact quite untrue. By the end of the war, there were between 150 to 300 Jews in Gibraltar and the terms of the Peace for a time totally undermined the basis of their community and trade.[108] Her Majesty, Queen Anne, detested not only dissenters, Latitudinarians, Socinians and Dutchmen but also Jews and Muslims and, in February 1714, the authorities in Gibraltar were instructed in the clearest terms that 'it is the Queens' pleasure that you do not allow, under any pretence whatsoever, any Jews or Moors to inhabit at Gibraltar—those that are there must leave within a month.'[109]

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[105] Blumenkranz, *Documents modernes*, 390.
[106] Ibid., 389.
[107] Kamen, *Inquisition and Society*, 233.
[108] Benady, 'Gibraltar', 327–8; Benady, 'Settlement of Jews', 90.
[109] PRO CO 91/6. Instructions of Bolingbroke, London, 25 Feb. 1714.

Furthermore, these orders were obeyed; for on 18 November, the commander of the colony reported to London: 'all Jews have been removed from Gibraltar [. . .] except six principal Jews of Barbary and such European Jews as have debts to English merchants'.[110] But the Queen died soon after and subsequent developments prevented her declared policy of intolerance being adhered to. For it turned out that whenever relations with Spain deteriorated, as they soon did, Gibraltar at once became dependent on northern Morocco, and on Barbary Jews, for its provisions. Consequently, there was no alternative but to let the Jews return; but still they lacked any kind of charter or rights. As soon as there was another improvement in Anglo-Spanish relations, in 1717, the Jews were again expelled from Gibraltar by the British, although only two years later they had to be re-admitted yet again when relations with Spain worsened once more, in the years 1719–21.[111]

More generally, the War of the Spanish Succession can be said to have led to a noticeable and perhaps decisive weakening of the western Sephardic diaspora viewed as a trans-Atlantic trade and religious network. Dutch Sephardic trade with Spain and Spanish America was undoubtedly diminished, the assigning of the *asiento* to Britain was a considerable blow to Dutch Caribbean commerce, the Methuen treaties guaranteed Britain's near exclusive grip over trade with Portugal and Brazil, while Cortissos, Solomon de Medina and other war-time Sephardic contractors were left financially broken. Furthermore, during these years the role of Portuguese New Christians in Castile's tax-farming system and financial administration if not eliminated was certainly drastically diminished while the lapsing of the Inquisition which had been such a welcome feature of the Spanish Succession War among its potential victims was reversed almost as soon as it ended, with the defeat of the Bourbon reformers, in Madrid, in 1714. By 1718–19 the Spanish Inquisition had triumphantly recovered its authority and seen exactly how to recover its standing and prestige among the credulous and superstitious. In 1718–19, it embarked on the last, and perhaps most vehement of all the great waves of repression of the 'judaizers' in Spain.

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[110] Ibid., Congreve to?, Gibraltar, 18 Nov. 1714; Benady, 'Settlement of Jews' 90.

[111] By 1725 there were again 137 Jews forming 12% of the civilian population, Benady, 'Settlement of Jews', 96.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE FINAL SUPPRESSION OF CRYPTO-JUDAISM IN SPAIN AND THE END OF THE SEPHARDI WORLD MARITIME NETWORKS (1714–40)

Viewed as a global network, the system of interlocking Sephardic and Portuguese *converso* diasporas based initially on Venice, Salonika and the Ottoman lands—and then, from around 1609 for just over a century, down to 1713, on Amsterdam—began to wane and fragment from around the start of the eighteenth century. The chief factor behind this decline, given the complexity of the generating circumstances which had created it in the first place, rendering so remarkable a set of connections a working system, was simply the sheer difficulty of sustaining such complex and intricate ties across the immense distances involved and so many formidable political and religious frontiers. The Sephardic world maritime networks, in other words, were a self-eroding system which was bound to lose its efficacy after a few generations. At the same time, the strengthening of state power in the late Baroque age, and the emergence of more developed and powerful colonial bureaucracies in the eighteenth century, progressively rendered redundant the intermediary and surrogate fiscal, administrative and diplomatic functions by which the Jews had made themselves useful, and sometimes indispensable, to sixteenth and seventeenth-century European mercantilist states.

The long-distance intelligence-gathering, military contracting, tax-farming, interpreterships, and diplomatic auxiliary services in which Portuguese Jews, and some Spanish Jews and *conversos*, had so successfully specialised for nearly two centuries were needed to a far smaller extent after the Peace of Utrecht (1713) than they had previously been.[1] As England increasingly replaced Holland as world economic leader, the role of Sephardi Jews in the inner workings of the world emporium steeply declined. At the same time, and causally entwined with this receding at the centre, a process of rapid deterioration or ossification set in in many of the Sephardi diaspora's essential branches. The Portuguese Jewish elite of Hamburg was largely eliminated in the late 1690s, through the introduction of new discriminatory measures which scattered them to Amsterdam and London. The Venetian trading system, and with it that of Venetian Jewry, never recovered from the collapse of the late seventeenth-century Venetian empire in Greece (1682–1716). In Spain and Portugal, in the wake of the War of the Spanish Succession, *converso* financiers rapidly ceased to play a major role in the state finances and in tax-farming as well as in overseas trade.[2] Within the Ottoman empire, as the eighteenth century wore on the Sephardi communities increasingly tended to lose their social and cultural as well as commercial ties with western Europe and were gradually replaced at least in considerable part by the rising new Greek Christian trade diaspora.[3]

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[1] Israel, *European Jewry*, 195–215.

Another key factor was that the later waves of New Christian emigration from the Iberian peninsula, following the resurgence of persecution in Portugal during the 1660s and 1670s, and continuing down to the final wave leaving Portugal, in the 1740s, failed to renew and revitalize the internationally interactive character of the networks based increasingly in north-west Europe and the Caribbean. This was not because prominent Portuguese New Christian merchants and financiers felt more secure in the Peninsula than had been the case previously, certainly they did not, but rather owing to the steady displacement of the Portuguese New Christian merchant class from its former central position in the government finances, and overseas trade and their replacement in the latter case by foreigners (and increasingly, especially the English) and in the former by new bureaucratic mechanisms and office-holders. Consequently, despite the large scale of the *converso* emigration in the 1720s and 1730s, and the fact there were still some important financiers and merchants among them, hardly any retained viable commercial contacts in the Iberian Peninsula on which they could subsequently build. By the time the important Spanish economic writer Gerónimo de Uztáriz (1670–1732) systematically attacked what he regarded as the pernicious effects of the institution of the Portuguese New Christian *arrendador* (contractor) in Spanish economic life, in his treatise on the theory and practice of commerce, published at Madrid, in 1724, that institution was already in an advanced state of decay.[4]

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[2] Caro Baroja, *Judíos*, iii, 23–7; Fernández Durán, *Gerónimo de Uztáriz*, 230–33.
[3] Lewis, *Jews of Islam*, 142–7.
[4] Caro Baroja, *Judíos*, iii, 23; Fernández Durán, *Gerónimo de Uztariz*, 224–30.

Finally, there was the last major push on the part of the Inquisitions of Spain and Portugal to liquidate crypto-Judaism as a living force in the Peninsula, a persecution of unparalleled vehemence which resumed in both lands around 1720 and which exhausted itself after a few years in Spain but dragged on much longer in Portugal down to 1740. For this last great Inquisition drive against the *Marranos* effectively destroyed what was left of crypto-Jewish society in the Iberian Peninsula at any rate in all but a few particularly isolated rural centres. By the time this final outburst of intolerance and repression wore itself out, the old crypto-Jewish networks social, commercial, and religious in most of Spain and Portugal had for all practical intents and purposes been liquidated so there was no longer any meaningful or viable *converso* entity in either Spain or Portugal, or their respective dominions, that the Sephardic diasporas of northwest Europe, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean could continue to interact with.

In Spain, the context and timing of the Inquisition's final sweep against crypto-Judaism, and the way it was completed in the relatively short span of seven years (1720–7), has frequently seemed rather puzzling.[5] After a prolonged lull in Inquisition activity since the 1690s, with almost no arrests of judaizers in Spain, or at least very few, before and during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–14),[6] the sudden resumption of Inquisition persecution of alleged crypto-Jews, and on a massive scale that dwarfed anything seen since the beginning of the sixteenth century, has always appeared to historians to go totally against the basic thrust of the Bourbon reformism—the growth of state power, and the impulse towards secularisation so typical of Spain (as of all of Europe) in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, this renewed Inquisition onslaught on judaizers (and to a very much lesser extent crypto-Muslims) took place precisely when the chronic political instability and tension characteristic of the period from the late 1690s to 1714 had at last been terminated and the new Spanish Bourbon dynasty could finally feel secure. It occurred, moreover, at a time of falling prices, plentiful food and an unmistakable easing of earlier social and regional tensions. The material conditions of life in Spain had improved since the end of the war and were then comparatively benign. As the English consul at Cadiz remarked, in July 1722, 'the harvest is abundant' and there was every 'prospect of a good vintage'.[7]

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[5] Kamen, *Inquisition and Society*, 233; Lynch, 'Spain after the Expulsion', 152–3; Alpert, 'Secret Jews', 137; Schreiber, *Marranen in Madrid*, 53, 56.

[6] Ibid., 53–5; Kamen, *War of the Spanish Succession*, 233.

Yet on closer inspection it is not really surprising that the remnants of the Portuguese crypto-Jewish network in Castile and Aragon should have been ferociously attacked and eliminated in a last bout of institutionalised, sacred repression and violence in the immediate wake of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–14). For in the first place, *converso* contractors and tax-farmers, though still a much resented group, had become essentially superfluous. Secondly, and perhaps most important, the Inquisition had by 1718, when it suddenly sprang into action, been inactive for over two decades and, ever since the death of Carlos II, in 1700, had seemed to many to be on the verge of losing a great deal of its former sway in Spanish life. Not only had it had to suspend its campaign against heretics but, since the onset of the Cartesian philosophical disputes in Spain in the 1690s, had conspicuously failed to stem the tide of foreign books entering Spain, to influence intellectual debate or set down clear guide-lines for a society increasingly caught up in a *Kulturkampf* between old and new ideas.[8] At the same time the Holy Office and its allies deeply resented its growing impotence and threatened obsolescence.

Moreover, since Bourbon reformism clearly entailed some loss of ecclesiastical authority more generally, it was certain, should the reformist tide ever be checked and there be a chance of restoring ecclesiastical authority itself to an unqualified ascendancy over Spanish cultural and spiritual life that the Inquisition would do everything possible to restore its own previous status and power. Finally, there was also a widespread perception of the bitter war which had just ended as a time when Castile had been overrun by seditious forces emanating from Spain's fringes—Portugal, Catalonia, Valencia and Gibraltar—sponsored, financed and supported by foreign Protestants and Jews in alliance with domestic dissidents, traitors and crypto-Jews. In such a context, renewing the onslaught on crypto-Judaism was readily combined in men's minds with the new driving political impulse towards centralisation, Castilianisation and heightened loyalty to the Bourbon monarchy and the Church. Indeed, it is by no means impossible that at court a semi-conscious desire for revenge on those who had aided and abetted the Austrian Habsburg Pretender contributed also.

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[7] PRO SP 94/214, Charles Black to Lord Carteret, Cadiz, 7 July 1722.
[8] Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 528–35.

A further factor of no small significance was the increasingly morbid personality and psychological difficulties of Philip V himself, instability which became acute from around 1717.[9] In his first years as king of Spain, Philip had relied for advice on French and Spanish ministers who were in the main reform-minded and intent on sorting out Castile's archaic financial and fiscal system and restoring the country's military capabilities as well as whittling down ecclesiastical power. Indeed, the new men at the helm had even tried, during 1713–14, to reform the Inquisition.[10] The Aragonese Rafael de Macanaz (1670–1760), one of the most energetic of the court reformers, was not only opposed to full ecclesiastical control of education, and hostile to Jesuits, but intent on secularising censorship which meant taking it out of the hands of the Inquisition. Backed by the leaders of the French faction, Jean Orry and Anne-Marie de la Trémouille, Princesse des Ursins (1641–1722), the Queen's *camerera mayor*, Macanaz proposed some far-reaching reforms of Church power and wealth. Of course, his memorandum on the excessive size and worldly influence of the clergy was strenuously opposed at court in particular by the *Suprema* of the Inquisition. Indeed, it was resolutely blocked in the royal councils as contrary to piety and the Catholic religion. Posters denouncing the reformers appeared in the churches of Madrid. Spurred on by its success in worsting Macanaz and stirring up popular hostility towards the reformers, the *Suprema* quietly gained in confidence. The attempt to reform the Inquisition proved a turning-point which enabled the enemies of reform, at the end of 1714, to engineer the downfall of the French and reforming faction, a turn assisted by the death of Marie Louise, Philip V's French queen, and his marriage, in December 1714, to the domineering Italian, Elisabetta Farnese which brought in its wake a vigorous revival of ecclesiastical power and prestige.

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[9] Hidalgo, 'Abdicación de Felipe V', 560, 563–4.

[10] BL MS Egerton 396 [Macanaz], 'Auxilio para bien governar una Monarchia Catholica', fos. 51–5, 57v; Gonzalez Carvajal, *España de los Borbones*, 241; Lea, *History of the Inquisition* i, 315, 317; Alpert, 'Secret Jews', 136–7; Schreiber, *Marranen in Madrid*, 55.

By special decree of 10 February 1715, the Inquisition was confirmed in all its power and privileges. Meanwhile, the trend at court towards reaction, and restoration of ecclesiastical prestige, was accompanied by a growing tendency towards melancholy and depression in a monarch who sought to cope with his personal difficulties by shutting himself away from courtiers, neglecting public business, and ever more morbid professions of Catholic piety and deference to the Church. Furthermore, in appointing Juan de Camargo (d. 1733), bishop of Pamplona, Inquisitor-General, in 1720, he for the first time elevated to that rank a man of formidable energy and political ambition who was determined to restore the efficacy and sway of the Holy Office. Described by one diplomat as a 'great canonist having always applied himself to that study and never assisted in any public affairs',[11] he was the first Inquisitor-General of the Bourbon era, and the last in Spain's history to play a major role in the life and evolution of the country. Though initially, on arriving in Spain, Philip V and his advisers had indicated that they did not wish to associate themselves with the Inquisition and had refused to patronise it, by 1720, the year in which the main persecution began, the king's attitude had been completely reversed and he willingly appeared in public at the Madrid *auto-de-fé* of that year to lend his weight to the revival of Inquisition authority. In 1724, he formally admonished the heir to the throne, his son, Luis, in all circumstances to back the Inquisition to the hilt.[12]

Meanwhile, so much influence accrued to an ally of the Inquisition, the king's French confessor, Père Daubenton, that when he died at the age of eighty-two, in 1723, foreign ambassadors in Madrid took it for granted, the king having in recent years become accustomed to place an 'extraordinary reliance on him' that the new confessor, the Jesuit Padre Gabriel Bermúdez, would count for much 'in the administration of affairs here, in the direction of which the confessor of so religious a prince will always have the most considerable influence'.[13] By late 1723, the king's condition was such, according to the British envoy, Stanhope, that 'this unaccountable retreat of his Catholic Majesty for so many months has put so entire a stop to the despatch of all sort of business, that even those of the greatest consequence seem to be entirely forgot'.[14] The king was interested only in demonstrations of Catholic piety.

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[11] PRO 94/92. Keene to Carteret, Madrid, 28 Feb. 1724.

[12] Lea, *History of the Inquisition* iii, 229 and iv, 501.

[13] Ibid., SP 94/92. Stanhope to Carteret, Madrid, 9 Aug. 1723.

Meanwhile, there was a tendency to encourage rumours that a widespread crypto-Jewish underground was pervasive in Spanish society. There was earnest talk about how such a fifth column should be countered and dealt with. Not a few held that the judaizers should on no account be tolerated, ignored, or allowed to assimilate inconspicuously into the rest of society, insisting on the links between crypto-Judaism viewed as a religious underground and the allegedly massive and pernicious financial power it was reputed to wield. Thus, the Jesuit rector of the college of San Jorge, in Madrid, Father Juan de Cabrera, writing in 1719, in his survey of the Spanish body politic, *Crisis Politica* (Madrid, 1719) emphasized the importance of excluding persons suspected of professing the Law of Moses from prominent offices and positions of responsibility. Deeming *conversos* 'perfidos y pertinaces', he held that they think it justified on the basis of their false and insidious religion to deceive and betray those who uphold the true faith. Their spiritual outlook being fundamentally duplicitous—'doble y engañoso'—they enrich and better themselves, he claimed, through systematic deception, trickery and fraud. Passionately defending the Inquisition's authority and power, he piously recommended that crypto-Jews 'deben ser desterados de la republica come peste della' [should be expelled from the republic as a pest].[15]

By 1718, crypto-Jews were widely rumoured to be committing acts of sacrilege against crucifixes and other images sacred to Catholics.[16] But it was the notion that the crypto-Jews form a treacherous fifth column, and one thriving in contemporary Spain, addicts of treason whose religion enjoins them to hate Catholics and to seek to convert them to Judaism, or kill them, and, in the meantime, to strip them of their money, that did most to prepare the ground for the new repression. This message was propagated among other publications, by a new edition, published at Pamplona in 1720, of the Franciscan Fray Francisco de Torrejoncillo's, *Centinela contra Judíos*, of 1673, and by a Capuchin friar, Fray Felix de Alamin, writing in

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[14] Ibid. Stanhope to Carteret, Madrid, 20 Sept. 1723.

[15] Cabrera, *Crisis Política*, 162, 493–4.

[16] Alpert, 'Did Spanish crypto-Jews', 86.

1723.[17] Torrejoncillo's book, for example, is not just a declaration of theological war but clearly identifies the Portuguese New Christians living in Spain as an ethnic group with innately pernicious characteristics, a poisonous element of disturbance and sedition within Spanish society in a secular as well as a religious sense.[18]

The wave of arrests and trials which preceded the *Autos-de-fé* of the 1720s began specifically in 1718.[19] The second and more public stage of the persecution commenced with the *Auto-de-fé*, a great public occasion, in Madrid, of April 1720. This and the comparatively few other *Autos-da-fé* which were staged in the capital subsequently during this final great persecution tended to be more widely publicised, and to cause more surprise and shock, than the rest, presumably owing to the large number of diplomats and other foreigners residing there and the presence of supporters of reformist ideas; and this may, indeed, be the reason why, despite the fact that most of the Inquisition's victims had not yet been paraded before the public, after the third *Auto* in Madrid, that of February 1722, there was only one other held in the capital—that of February 1724. After February 1722, the major demonstrations of Inquisition power in central Spain were reserved for Toledo, Valladolid and Cuenca.

That Spanish Bourbon prestige internationally suffered from the events in Madrid is scarcely open to doubt. Reporting to London about the Madrid 'Act of Faith' of April 1720, the Swiss-born secretary of the British embassy, Lucas Schaub (1690–1758), affirmed that the 'Holy Inquisition have condemned eleven persons and two statues, all Jews. Four men and four women (one of them very handsome) abjured, and were only sentenced to perpetual imprisonment; but the three statues and the three remaining women were condemned to the flames. Two of them, one of them a good eighty, the other sixty, having abjured, were first strangled and then thrown into the fire, but the third, a young girl of about twenty years of age, and as beautiful as the Graces, was absolutely burned alive. No terrors could induce her to renounce her religion. She was for some time held before the fire, in the hope that, like the two old women, she might be frightened and relent; but, pushing aside a cross which was presented to her, she loosened herself from those by whom she was held, said she was going to the true God, without being polluted by idolatry, and rushed into the midst of the flames. The triumphant shouts of the populace, whilst this poor creature was consuming would scarcely be credited by you'.[20]

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[17] Alamín, *Impugnación contra el Talmud*, 52–6.

[18] Torrejoncillo, *Centinela contra judíos*, 141, 126–7, 190; Bodian, 'Men of the Nation', 57; Alpert, 'Secret Jews', 144–5.

[19] Vignau, *Catálogo de las causas*, pp. 163, 182, 197, 202, 204, 216–19, 234; Alpert, 'Secret Jews', 149–50.

But the real horror began, and in all parts of the country, during 1721. Since the Inquisition's main objective was to reassert its prestige and influence in Spanish society, it not only rooted out real or alleged crypto-Jews but was eager to punish all forms of heresy, blasphemy and infidelity. Yet it is undeniable that the vast majority of the condemnations were for judaizing, demonstrating how deeply the obsession with the crypto-Judaism had impressed itself on the popular imagination. Indeed it has been estimated that for the whole first half of the eighteenth century almost 80% of all those who were punished in *Autos-de-fé* by the Spanish Inquisition were condemned for 'crimes' of Judaism.[21] All considered, the statistics that we have for the persecution of these years, though incomplete, are quite sufficiently appalling.[22] Between 1720 and 1731, reaching a peak in the years 1722–3, some eighty-six *Autos-da-fé* took place in all parts of Spain, with over a thousand *converso* victims in total of whom nearly one hundred were burnt at the stake, though most of the latter, intimidated enough by the sight of the flames to go down on their knees and kiss the crucifix, were garrotted before being burnt.

Several features of this last great repression of judaizers, chiefly in Castile and Andalusia, throw an interesting light on the final stages of the evolving pattern of Portuguese New Christian diaspora networks. For the surviving crypto-Jewish remnants—real and alleged—harassed, broken up and eliminated during these years were clearly descended for the most part either from the pre-1640 immigration of Portuguese or from the wave of immigration from Portugal that followed the making of the Spanish-Portuguese peace of 1668, an event which occurred at a time of resurgent persecution in Portugal.[23] Those who themselves had been born in Portugal, like Leonor López

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[20] BL MS Add. 35837, fos. 405v–406. Schaub to Tilson, Madrid, 8 April 1720.

[21] Pérez Villanueva and Escandell Bonet, *Historia de la Inquisición* I, 1386, 1396; Lynch, 'Spain after the Expulsion', 152.

[22] Ibid. 152.

[23] Lúcio de Azevedo, *História dos Cristãos Novos*, 283–4, 289–301.

Table 1: Chronology and Distribution of 86 *Autos-da-fé* in Spain, 1720–1731

a) *Chronology*:

Year	*Autos-da-fé*	Year	*Autos-da-fé*
1720	1	1726	6
1721	4	1727	3
1722	16	1728	4
1723	17	1729	0
1724	12	1730	4
1725	15	1731	2

b) *Distribution*:

Region	Inquisition Tribunal	Number of *Autos*
a) *Andalusia*	Granada	15
	Seville	10
	Córdoba	9
	Total Andalusia	34
b) *Castile*		
	Valladolid	9
	Cuenca	7
	Toledo	5
	Madrid	4
	Total Castile	25
c) *Murcia, Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia, Balearics*		
	Murcia	6
	Valencia	4
	Barcelona	3
	Mallorca	3
	Zaragoza	2
	Total Eastern Spain	18
d) *Extremadura*		
	Llerena	5
e) *Galicia, Asturias, Navarre, Basque provinces*		
	Santiago de Compostela	3
	Total north coast	3
	Total Spanish *Autos-da-fé*	83

Sources: BL 4071 i 3 and 4: 'Autos de fee celebrados desde el año de 1720 en adelante en varias Ynquisiciones de España' (1720–31); Lea, *History of the Inquisition* iii, 309 and iv, 38; Caro Baroja, *Judíos* iii, 501–10 ; Kamen, *Inquisition and Society*, 234.

Table 2: Judaizers reconciled and excecuted 1720–1730

	1720	1721	1722	1723	1724	1725	1726	1727	1728	1729	1730	total
Barcelona	0	0	0	5	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	
Córdoba	0	27	12	23	32	0	9	0	5	0	0	
Cuenca	0	29	32	1	8	10	0	0	0	0	0	
Granada	0	56	48	108	38	41	7	10	5	0	0	
Llerena	0	0	17	10	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	
Madrid	11	19	11	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Murcia	0	0	62	18	8	5	6	0	0	0	0	
Seville	0	38	82	36	41	10	0	0	1	0	0	
Toledo	0	0	44	11	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	
Valencia	0	0	0	9	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Valladolid	0	0	14	2	5	5	2	42	0	0	0	
Zaragoza	0	0	10	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total	11	162	330	224	157	91	25	52	11	0	0	1,063

Sources: BL 4071 i 3 and 4; Lea, *History of the Inquisition* iii, 309; Caro Baroja, *Judios*; Kamen, *Inquisition and Society*, 234.

Marquesa, 'reconciled' in the *auto* at Murcia in October 1722, at the age of ninety, were often very elderly.[24] Blanca Gutiérrez, born in Portugal at Trancoso, around 1654, had been 'reconciled' in Cuenca, in 1702, before appearing, at the age of seventy in the Cuenca *auto* of July 1724. Among this category there were some who had been 'reconciled' in *Autos-da-fé* in Portugal and, this being known, were now executed as 'relapsos'. Thus, Juan López, an eighty year old former silk worker, later a tobacco *estanquero*, who was one of the three 'relaxados in persona' in the fourth and last Madrid *auto*, that of February 1724, had been born in Braganza and 'reconciled' in Coimbra in 1667.[25] As a penitent he was garrotted first, though one of the other three, a nineteen year-old bachelor, born in Granada, remaining obdurate, was burned alive.

At the Granada *Auto-da-fé* of 30 November 1721, twelve persons were burnt at the stake, including a ninety year-old woman who was garrotted first and Leonor Maria Rodríguez, of Granada, who was burnt alive. Of these one had been born at Chule in Peru and all the rest, though often into immigrant families from Portugal, in Andalusia. Another eight persons, several of whom had recently died, and whose remains had been exhumed, were solemnly burned in effigy. Among these was the seventy-one year-old Nuño Alvárez Pereyra and a sixty-nine year old, presumably a relative, Enrique Alvárez Núñez, both of whom had long resided in Malaga but been born at Mogodouro, in Portugal. The wife of the former, Beatriz de Fonseca, also burned in effigy, was likewise a native of Portugal while their son forty-two year old son, Pedro Alvárez Pereyra, similarly burned in effigy and latterly economic head of the group, being *administrador* of the tobacco tax in Malaga, had been born in Andalusia, at Puerto de Santa Maria, which implies that the family had migrated from Portugal before 1680.[26] Another of those burned in effigy, Antonio Fernández de Solis, born in Madrid, had been *administrador de la renta del tabaco* at Ronda. It is interesting that a further member of the family, born at Malaga, Ines Alvárez Pereyra, 'reconciled' in the *auto* in Murcia, on 17 May 1722, at the age of thirty-four, was the widow of Manuel de Silveira formerly *arrendador general del tabaco* of Murcia; she was a widow, however, because her husband had been burnt at the stake in Madrid in the *auto* of May 1721.[27]

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[24] BLIR, *Relacion de los Avtos particvlares* (Toledo, 25 Oct. and Murcia 18 Oct. 1722), no. 1.

[25] BLIR, *Relacion de el auto particular de Fè* (Madrid, 1724) p. 4.

In the *Auto* at Seville, of 5 July 1722, one of those burned at the stake as a *judaizante relapso* was Manuel de Andrade, a royal tax collector in Seville who had previously been 'reconciled' in Madrid and been born in Lisbon around 1682.[28] A brother and sister both burned in person in the Seville *auto* of 30 November 1722 were Joseph Maldonado y Alvarado, a thirty-eight year old merchant born at Lisbon who had been 'reconciled' in Seville, in 1718, and Blanca Maria Alvarado y Maldonado, born in Lisbon around 1692 who had been 'reconciled' in the Portuguese capital at the age of eleven, in 1703.[29] Juan de Castro el Mayor, who owned a spice shop in Granada and was burned in person there, in the *auto* of 31 January 1723, was born in Lisbon around 1647 and had been previously 'reconciled', by the Lisbon Inquisition, in 1703.[30] His son, the cashier in his spice shop, had been born in Lisbon around 1700; having apparently escaped the Inquisitors's clutches, he could only be burned in effigy. A Portuguese burnt in person at the stake, this time at Cordoba, in the *auto* of 13 June 1723, Antonio Vara Vergara, had been previously 'reconciled' in the same city, in 1698. In the Cordoba *auto* of April 1724, one of those burnt in person was the Portuguese Diego Joseph Ramos, born at Mogodouro around 1674 and previously 'reconciled', in 1705, at Évora. Though penitent, Felix Duarte de Andrade, born in Lisbon around 1684, a surgeon working in Barcelona at the time of his arrest, having been 'reconciled' by the Inquisition in Navarre, in 1700, was duly garrotted and burnt in person at the Barcelona *auto* of 1 September 1726.[31]

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[26] BLIR, *Relacion del Avto Particvlar* (Granada, 30 Nov. 1721), 'relaxados en estatuas'; Caro Baroja, *Judíos* iii, 92.

[27] Ibid., iii, 97; BLIR, *Relacion del Avto de Fe* (Murcia, 17 May 1722), *relaxados* no. 1.

[28] BLIR, *Relacion de causas de los reos* (Seville, 5 July 1722).

[29] BLIR, *Relacion de lo reos* (Seville, 30 Nov. 1722), *relaxados*; Caro Baroja, *Judíos* iii, 100–1.

[30] BLIR, *Relacion del Auto Particular* (Granada, 31 January 1723).

Though it may safely be presumed that nearly all the 'judaizers' that appeared in the Spanish *Autos da fé* of the 1720s were ultimately of Portuguese origin, only a handful had immigrated since the beginning of the new century, and some of these, especially among those 'reconciled' in the mid and late 1720s, had not lived in Spain at all but had only recently arrived from Portugal, in an attempt to escape across Spain to the French border. At the same time, though, there were also a number of Portuguese New Christians born in Castile who had moved to Portugal during the early eighteenth century only to fall victim in the 1720s and 1730s to the renewed Inquisitorial onslaught there. A remarkable instance of this was the *Auto-da-fé* at Évora, on 26 March 1724, when no less than five of the twelve judaizers 'reconciled' had been born in Spain mostly in or around Malaga, Cadiz, Granada or Seville.[32]

A remarkable aspect of the Portuguese crypto-Jewish network in Spain as it survived down to the 1720s was the persistence, particularly in Andalusia and Murcia, of what appear to have been entrenched family networks preserving crypto-Jewish traditions over many decades, reaching back in some instances, to at least the middle of the seventeenth century if not earlier. Unlike the judaizers from other major cities, those from Madrid, moreover, had usually been born elsewhere in Spain and not infrequently in precisely these small rural centres.[33] Among notable examples of places where such 'cells' had persisted were Antequera, midway between Seville and

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[31] BLIR, *Relacion de los Avtos Particvlares* (Granada, 18 Aug., Barcelona, 1 Sept. 1716 and Valencia, 17 Sept, 1726), part 2, 'Barcelona' no. 1.

[32] BLIR, *Lista de las personas* (Evora, 26 March 1724).

[33] Alpert, 'Secret Jews', 152.

Granada, Guadix, Marbella, Vélez-Malaga, Lorca, Atienza, Almagro, Arcos, Mula and Baza, the last near Granada but under the jurisdiction of the Inquisition tribunal of Murcia. More than twenty people, including confectioners, a carpenter and spice vendors who had been born, or still lived in Baza, were 'reconciled' in the Murcia *Auto-da-fé* of May 1722, including a sixty-three year old confectioner, Juan Rodríguez, born there around 1660.[34] Another nine natives and inhabitants of Baza appeared in the next Murcia *auto*, of October 1722, including two born there a full half-century before. While a few were wealthy, most had humble occupations, or were indigent, the latter being supported in many cases by the better off.

In Castile, Berlanga, near Soria, a small place with only 400 households in the mid seventeenth century, provides a further interesting instance. Jacob Rodrigues Péreire (1715–80), one of the most distinguished French Sephardic mathematicians and scholars of the Enlightenment era was born into a crypto-Jewish family at Berlanga and taken to France, by his mother, after his father's death where they converted to normative Judaism. Catalina Pinedo, inhabitant of Berlanga, having been previously 'reconciled' at Valladolid, in 1692, was garrotted and burnt at the stake in Cuenca, in November 1721; among those 'reconciled' in the Cuenca *auto* of 29 June 1722 was a Manuel Fernández born in Berlanga around 1702 and a Maria Rodríguez, a candle-vendor, still living there.

Possibly the single most significant feature of the Portuguese New Christian network in Castile and Aragon in its final discernible stage of development, in the 1720s, is the presence of a number of judaizers who had evidently been born and raised as observant Jews, in most cases in south-west France. Among these were Catalina de Reyna y Medina, a widow, who had been born in Bordeaux around 1664, 'reconciled' in Toledo in 1691 and garrotted and burnt in the Córdoba *auto* of 12 April 1722,[35] and Juan Bautista (alias Samuel) Rodríguez, *escrivano* or secretary of the once *Morisco* town of Hornachos, in Extremadura, a man born in Bordeaux around 1674, who was 'reconciled' in the *auto* held at Llerena, in August 1725.[36] Appearing in the same auto, and also inhabitants of Hornachos, were his wife, Isabel Maria Mendez, born in Seville, who was 'reconciled' together with three or four daughters and another relative.

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[34] BLIR, *Relacion del Avto de Fe* (Murcia, 17 May 1722).

[35] BLIR, *Relacion del Avto Particvlar* (Córdoba, 12 April 1722), *relaxados en persona*, no. 1.

[36] BLIR, *Relacion de los avtos particvlares* (Granda, 24 August and Llerena, 26 August 1725, p. 6.

In the *Auto* held at Zaragoza, on 11 October 1722, Santiago Moreles, born in Lisbon, was burnt in effigy and his brother, Joseph, also born in Lisbon was 'reconciled, both having been taken by their parents in around 1707 to Bidache (Vidax de Francia), eight leagues from Bayonne where Santiago certainly, and presumably also Joseph, 'fue circuncido' [was circumcized].[37] As adults, both brothers had migrated to Zaragoza to earn their living. Miguel del Soto, a merchant in Écija, in Andalusia, burnt in person in the *Auto* at Córdoba, in June 1723, had been born in Bordeaux around 1660 and 'reconciled' in Madrid in 1693.[38] In the *auto* at Granada, of 18 August 1726, was 'reconciled' a fifty-four year old employed by the administrators of the *millones* tax at Antequera, who had been born, around 1672 in the *barrio* de saint-Esprit, at Bayonne.[39] But if the Jewish world of south-west France was strongly represented, there was apparently only one case of a baptized North African Sephardic Jew who had lapsed back into Judaism falling into the Inquisition's merciful grasp, a certain Joseph de la Santíssima Trinidad, born in Tetuán around 1686, 'reconciled' in Granada in 1717 and burnt at the stake in the Granada *auto* of January 1723; his wife, Beatriz Meléndez y León, was 'reconciled' in the same *auto*.[40]

The double resurgence of intense Inquisition persecution in Spain and Portugal simultaneously in the 1720s generated a final large-scale movement of *Marrano* emigration from the Peninsula by land and sea. The influx—and the various social and communal problems it created—remained for some two decades through the 1720s and 1730s the foremost concern of the Sephardic congregations in France, Holland and England alike. It has been estimated that the Sephardi population of London nearly doubled between 1710 and 1733 from around 880 to 1,700, most of the newcomers there arriving by sea direct from Portugal.[41] At the Bevis Marks Sepharic synagogue, in London, as likewise in Amsterdam, circumcisions of adults and boys above the normal age reached an unparalleled peak in the years 1724–7.[42] Requiring the new *Marrano* immigrants from Spain and Portugal to renew their marriages in synagogue, Bevis Marks conducted no less than 101 re-marriages between 1720 and 1735.[43] Inundated with destitute refugees, disbursements for poor relief among the Sephardi community of Amsterdam reached the highest levels ever attained during the 1720s and early 1730s.[44]

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[37] BLIR, *Relacion de los Autos Particvlares* (Valladolid, 24 August 1722 and Zaragoza, 11 October 1722), pp. 4–7.

[38] BLIR, *Relacion del Avto Particvlar* (Córdoba, 13 June 1723).

[39] BLIR, *Relacion de los Autos particvlares* (Granada, 18 Aug., and Valencia 17 Sept. 1726, no. 1.

[40] BLIR, *Relacion del Avto Particvlar* (Granada, 31 Jan. 1723), 'relaxados en persona' no. 4; Caro Baroja, *Judíos* iii, 104.

An appreciable proportion of the refugees from Portugal fled overland towards France, across Spain. One group, of fourteen or fifteen Portuguese New Christian *fugitivos*, headed by a forty-year, Miguel Nunes Cavalho, *administrador del tabaco* at Pinhel, and including his wife, a teenage son, two teenage sisters, Ana and Leonor Maria Carvalho, and a fifty year old cousin, Ines Nunez, all seeking safety in France, were intercepted by the Inquisition at Valladolid and all appeared in the Valladolid *auto* of 26 January 1727.[45] Those previously 'reconciled' in Portugal were literally fleeing for their lives and not the least poignant suffering at the hands of the Holy Office in Castile was that of a fifty-six year old widow, Ana Henriques Nunes, born in Portugal around 1669 caught in 'Salamanca, yendo fugitiva a Francia', who, having been 'reconciled' in Lisbon, in 1703, was garrotted and burnt at the Valladolid *auto* of 1727.[46] She had been one of a group which also included Manoel Freyre Lisboa, *administrador* of the tobacco tax in Pinhel, and six others, including a seventy-one year old widow, Guiomar Gomes Henriques, from La Guardia, likewise caught in Salamanca seeking to flee to France. The Inquisitors were just in time to 'reconcile' her in the Valladolid Auto of 1727 *in articulo mortis*.

The clear objective of the Inquisitors during the 1720s was to exploit popular fears and prejudices, and by means of staging such a powerfully impressive spectacle, to restore their authority, and unquestioning deference for ecclesiastical authority. There was thus consummate poetic appropriateness (conscious or not) in the arrest of the man who was perhaps intellectually the most distinguished of all the immediate victims of the repression—the physician and prolific medical and philosophical writer, Diego Matheo Zapata (c. 1665–1745). Zapata was a medical reformer and advocate of the New Philosophy whose avowed purpose was to strengthen foreign—that is French, Dutch and English—intellectual influence in Spain.[47] Accused, before his arrest, by his philosophical opponents of irreverence towards the Church Fathers, he had answered that 'I will depart from the opinion of any holy Father of the Church whenever I have a compelling reason to do so'.[48] Urging a total separation of theology and science (with philosophy), he boldly maintained that there was no danger in liberty to philosophise. Perhaps not, but there was undoubedly danger in advocating it. Of Portuguese New Christian descent, and of suspected crypto-Jewish leanings, Zapata was arrested, in 1721, investigated and tried. Under torture, he confessed to having been taught Judaism by his mother at the age of twelve, to participating in crypto-Jewish prayer gatherings and practices, and to denying Christ in his heart and following the Law of Moses not only in his native Murcia, and later Valencia, but during the many years during which he had laboured with the sick and wounded in the Hospital General of Madrid.[49]

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[41] Diamond, 'Problems', 40, 60.

[42] Barnett, 'Correspondence', 4–5; Lipman, 'Sephardi and other Jewish Immigrants', 42.

[43] Ibid.; Diamond, 'Problems', 40.

[44] Levie Bernfeld, 'Financiering', 431; Levie Bernfeld, 'Financing Relief', 99.

[45] BLIR, *Relacion del Avto Particuvlar* (Valladolid, 26 Jan. 1727).

[46] BLIR, *Relacion de los Avtos Particvlares* (Granada, 18 May 1727 and Valladolid, dia de S. Fernando, 1727).

By publicly humiliating, and labelling as a 'judaizer', the man who had been instrumental in founding the royal medical academy of Seville, as he put it 'for the general utility and credit of our nation',[50] in May 1700, the Holy Office powerfully demonstrated the supremacy of ecclesiastical authority. Zapata was publicly 'reconciled' at the *Auto-da-fé* at Cuenca, of 14 January 1725. 'Some days ago', recounted the *London Gazette*, shortly afterwards, accurately reporting the details of his sentence, 'an Auto de fé was held at Cuenca when (among others) Dr Zapata, a famous physician of this town, who was seized about three years ago by the Inquisition and kept in close prison, received his sentence, by which he was condemned to a year's penance [in prison], to be during that time instructed by some learned divine, half his money and effects confiscated, and to be banished for ten years from residing in this or any other of the chief cities in Spain.'[51]

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[47] Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 531–4.
[48] Quoted in, ibid., 533.
[49] Caro Baroja, *Judíos*, iii, 83–7, 415–18; Kamen, *Inquisition and Society*, 234.
[50] Quoted in Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 530.

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[51] *The London Gazette* no. 6344, 6 Feb. 1724; Caro Baroja, *Judíos* iii, 118.

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Abbreviations

ACG	Archives of Corfu, Greece
AGR	Archives Génerales du Royaume, Brussels
AGN Inquisición	Archivo General de la Nación, Inquisition Archives, Mexico City
AGS	Archivo General de Simancas, Spain
AHNM	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid
ANTT	Archivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon
ARH SG	Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, archives of the States General
ARH WIC	Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, archives of the West India Company
ASV CSM	Archivio di Stato, Venice. Papers of the Board of trade (Cinque Savii alla Mercanzia)
BL MS	British Library, Department of Manuscripts, London
BLIR	British Library: Printed Inquisition 'relaciones de autos de fe', catalogue nos. 4071 i 3 and 4
CODOIN	*Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España* 112 vols. (Madrid, 1842–95)
GAA NA	Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Notarial Archives
GAA PJG	Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Archives of the Portuguese Jewish Community
HAHR	*Hispanic American Historical Review*
JGSWGL	*Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*
PRO SP	Public Record Office, State Papers, London
PAJHS	*Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*
REJ	*Revue des Études Juives* (Paris)
TJHSE	*Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* (London)
TvG	*Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*
UCL	University College London

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